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Approach and Conceptual Framework
Overview of the Research Topic
The starting point of this research is the following: crimes under interna-
tional law are, partly with the exception of war crimes, defined broadly
and construed in a vague manner in the respective statutes of international
criminal courts and tribunals.1 As a practical consequence, it is up to the
judges to fill the gaps left in the statutes by taking recourse to extra-statu-
tory law. The nature and the hierarchy of these sources are stated in Arti-
cle 21 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (‘Rome Statute’)
for the Interantional Criminal Court (‘ICC’), wheras for the ad hoc and hy-
brid tribunals, the sources are enshrined in the more general provision of
Art. 38 Statute of the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ Statute’).2 The
application of extra-statutory sources and the interpretation that this appli-
cation inevitable requires can lead to legal uncertainty and to the unequal
application of the law within the same court or tribunal. While this is a
problem with which all courts and tribunals applying international law are
faced, international criminal courts and tribunals encounter this dilemma
in an aggravated form because, as criminal courts, they have to adhere to
procedural guarantees and fair trial standards. Applying extra- statutory
sources, they run the risk of violating one of the cornerstones of the right
to a fair trial, the principle of legality.
Hence, this book looks at one of the major external sources consulted
by judges, namely international human rights law, in the context of this
conflict. The book consists of three major parts: first, the dogmatic analy-
I.
1.
1 See Arts 6-8 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court ([adopted 17 July
1998, entered into force 1 July 2002] 2187 UNTS 90); Arts 2-4 Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (UNSC Res 955 [1994] [8 November 1994]
SCOR 49th Year 13) [Rome Statute]; Arts 2-5 Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (UNSC Res 827 [1993] [25 Mai 1993] SCOR
48th Jahr 29).
2 Statute of the International Court of Justice (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into
force 24 October 1945) 145 BSP 832.
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sis of the differing doctrinal architecture of international criminal law and
international human rights law and resulting problems in the application of
international human rights law in substantive international criminal law;
second, the analysis of case law to establish how various bodies of interna-
tional criminal law have dealt with these problems and in which areas
judges are most forthcoming in their reference to international human
rights law; and third, the attitudes of judges concerning the relationship of
international criminal law and international human rights law, the resulting
interpretative practices in their decision and judgments and the factors
which influence to what extent a practitioner is open to any form of refer-
ence to human rights law.
The thesis employs two major methodologies. A larger part of the re-
search consists of doctrinal legal analysis of statutes, treaties, decisions of
judiciary bodies both in the fields of human rights law and international
criminal law, as well as various international soft law instruments. This is
supplemented by a qualitative study of the interpretative practices of sit-
ting judges of international criminal law courts of human rights laws,
based on interviews.
The issue of broadly constructed and vague legislative texts is not
unique to international criminal law. Many domestic criminal codes also
include crimes the definition and elements of which are not apparent when
solely consulting the letter of the law and require clarification. However,
the problem is particularly pressing in modern international criminal law
as an area of law still in its buildup-phase, an area which is frequently crit-
icized as susceptible to the influence of international politics. The perime-
ters of many crimes often remain vague and unclear, due to fragmentary
codification as well as the temporarily and substantively limited number
of practical cases of application.
This vagueness in content is highly problematic regarding the principle
nullum crimen/nulla poena sine lege, one of the most fundamental princi-
ples to be adhered to by a State or institution based on the rule of law. Ac-
cording to this principle, an act can be punishable only on the basis of a
legal act and a person may not be punished arbitrarily and without suffi-
cient legal basis.3 For criminal law, including international criminal law,
this implicates that at the time an act occurred, a written or unwritten norm
3 Erkin Gadirov und Roger S Clark in Otto Triffterer (hrsg) Commentary of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court (2nd edition CH Beck 2008) 506.
Introduction
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has to establish its categorization as a crime for a person to be punished
accordingly.4
In order to define crimes ‘with the clarity, precision and specificity re-
quired for criminal law in accordance with the principle of legality (nul-
lum crimen sine lege)’5 the ICC, pursuant to Art 9, introduced the Ele-
ments of Crime.6 These help the Court in the interpretation and application
of the crimes enlisted in Arts 6-8 Rome Statute. Judges at the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) cannot take recourse to such ele-
ments according to their statutes.
Even though the introduction of Elements of Crimes at the ICC sig-
naled awareness and a positive development, the Elements of Crime can
only partially provide legal certainty to the practitioners and the subjects
of international criminal law, because they are, again, phrased in a rather
broad manner. For this reason, the judges at the ICC will continue to have
to consult external sources of law for the interpretation of crimes.
Hence, judges at international criminal law are often faced with a
dilemma as, by adhering to the principle of nullum crimen sine lege and
clearly defining the punishable acts in question, they might overextend the
letter of the law, when they take recourse to conventions or legal concepts
outside their own statures. In principle, judges at the ICC and other inter-
national criminal courts and tribunals are entitled to consult sources out-
side their statutes. When doing that, they have to respect the sources of in-
ternational law pursuant to Art. 38 Statute of the ICJ (for the ICC Art. 21
Rome Statute, which also establishes a hierarchy of the sources).7
Apart from looking at the application of existing conventions and
treaties in the specific case, judges will also consider customary interna-
tional law. Due to the fragmentary codification of international law, cus-
tomary international law, is of particular importance to judges at interna-
4 See eg Gerhard Werle Völkerstrafrecht (2. Auflage Mohr Siebeck 2007) 44; funda-
mental regarding nullum crimen sine lege in international law: Otto Triffterer Dog-
matische Untersuchungen zur Entwicklung des materiellen Völkerstrafrechts seit
Nürnberg (E. Albert 1966) 124.
5 Summary of the Proceedings of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of
an International Criminal Court 25 March – 12 April 1996 UN Doc A/AC.249/1 (7
May 1996) para 13.
6 Elements of Crimes (9 September 2002) Doc ICC-ASP/1/3 (Pt. II-B).
7 Statute of the International Court of Justice (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into
force 24 October 1945) 145 BSP 832.
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tional courts and tribunals. A norm of customary international law is gen-
erated through State practice in the in the belief that the act in question is
legally binding (opinio juris).8
In order to determine these two elements, it is common practice to ex-
amine, inter alia, the acceptance of specific standards of international law
within the international community. These standards cannot only be ex-
tracted through legally binding conventions or treaties, but can also be de-
ducted from jurisprudence, decisions of treaty bodies or the UN General
Assembly.9
With respect to international standards relevant to the work of interna-
tional courts and tribunals, the reference to human rights law, especially,
seems obvious and even self-evident as international criminal law and hu-
man rights law hold common roots and complement each other.10 Practi-
cally all relevant crimes under international law also contain violations of
international human rights law and can be systematized accordingly.11
8 See eg Malcom N. Shaw International Law (6. Auflage Cambridge University
Press 2008) 72 ff.
9 See eg Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Judgment) IT-96-21 (16 November 1998) paras
453 ff; Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment) IT-95-17 (10 Dezember 1998) paras
160 ff; Prosecutor v Kvočka (Judgment) IT-98-30 (2 November 2001) paras 137 ff;
Prosecutor v Krnojelac (Judgment) IT-97-25 (15 März 2002) para. 186; Prosecu-
tor v Kunarac (Judgment) IT-96-23 (Juni 2002) paras 469 ff.
10 The tribunals also were faced with the problem that a treaty provision to which the
parties wree bound or which was part of customary international law provided for
the prohibtion of a certain act, but not necessarily for its criminalization. For this
reason, the tribunals then had to look at customary law to define the circumstances
under which a prohibited act triggered penal consequences: see Prosecutor v Galić
(Appeal Judgment) IT-98-29-A (30 November 2006) para. 83.
11 It was this knowledge that led the States negotiating the Rome Statute to include
several so-called ‘treaty crimes‘ in the Statute (as modalities of crimes against hu-
manity or war crimes), crimes which were listed as violations of international hu-
man rights law in the respective human rights instruments but were, up until then
not to be found in the statutes of international criminal tribunals; see See Andreas
Zimmermann ‘Article 5: Crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court’ in Otto
Triffterer (ed) Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court (2nd ed Beck Munich 2008) 129-142, 130-131; see also Anja Seibert-Fohr
Prosecuting Serious Human Rights Violations (OUP Oxford 2009) 1ff; Alette
Smeulers and Fred Grünfeld International Crimes and Other Gross Human Rights
Violations (Nijhoff Leiden 2011); Gerhard Werle ‚Menschenrechtsschutz durch
Völkerstrafrecht’ (1997) 109(4) Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswis-
senschaft 808-829; Carsten Stahn ‚Internationaler Menschenrechtsschutz und
Völkerstrafrecht’ 82 (3) Kritische Justiz (1999) 345-355.
Introduction
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The area of conflict between the need to consult international human
rights law as an external source and the need to adhere to the principle of
nullum crimen sine lege are the subject of this book. The common roots,
but also the substantive differences between the areas of human rights law
and international criminal law, which allow for recourse to human rights
law only under specific, dogmatically well-justified and defined condi-
tions, will be explored. The work scrutinizes the advantages as well as the
dangers that such recourse entails. It highlights the preconditions under
which human rights law is most likely to be referred to in a coherent and
methodologically sound manner. As such, the project seeks to contribute
to the dogmatic understanding of international criminal law and its dy-
namic development.
Approach and Demand for Research
As examined in the following, the current practice in jurisprudence is
characterized by a condition of legal uncertainty in which dogmatic ambi-
guity led to a situation where similar acts are at times evaluated differently
by different Chambers of the same court or tribunal, leading to an unequal
legal categorization of the acts in question. This problem has presented it-
self, for example, in the categorization of torture as a crime against hu-
manity before the ICTY. Whereas one Chamber required the perpetrator to
be a State official or at least having acted with the consent or acquiescence
of a State official, another Chamber of the same tribunal deemed this re-
quirement not necessary for the definition of torture under international
law.12 Pointing out these ambiguities, their causes and consequences, con-
tributes to the unification of international criminal law and therefore its le-
gal security. Furthermore, the project explicitly focuses on substantive in-
ternational criminal law and its interconnection with human rights law.
The connection between these two fields is currently underresearched, as
priority, in legal research as well as in practice, is often given to the impor-
tance of ‘procedural’ human rights law, in particular, to safeguarding the
rights of the accused. While this is no doubt a vital part of applying inter-
national criminal law and its violations endanger the the credibility of the
2.
12 See Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Judgment) IT-96-21 (16 November 1998) para 473
and Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgment) IT-96-23 (22 February 2001) paras 488-96;
see in detail at Part Two Chapter One I. 1. b. and f. below.
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field as a whole, the Rome Statute brings about numerous legal innova-
tions with regards to substance. Hence, recourse to extra-statutory sources
will be inevitable for judges in the future. Thereby, the ICC, as the single
permanent court in the field of international criminal law, has the unique
opportunity to counteract fragmentation of the practical application of the
law and focus on the development of coherent jurisprudence. This re-
search project points out the preconditions for such development.
Scope and Methodology
This book aims at answering the following central research questions:
– How do substantive international criminal law and human rights law
relate to each other and how does this relationship allow for or pre-
clude recourse to international human rights law in substantive interna-
tional criminal law?
– Under which circumstances (status of a specific concept under human
rights law, status of a specific crime under international and/or national
criminal law, composition of chambers etc.) and within which dogmat-
ic framework do judges of international criminal courts and tribunals
refer to international human rights law?
– What are the factors (professional background, legal system in which
the judge was educated/was acting professionally) that determine if
and how judges refer to international human rights law?
– What are the conditions under which it is appropriate for judges of in-
ternational courts and tribunals to refer to human rights law and what
are the benefits of such reference?
According to the hypotheses underlying this research project, recourse to
international human rights law is necessary and helpful for judges in inter-
national criminal tribunals due to a variety of reasons:
– International criminal law and international human rights law have
common roots; international criminal law developed, in a large part,
out of the human rights discourse. However, the differences in scope,
the scenarios covered, the actors, addressees and the general frame-
work of a penal system versus a rights- based system do often allow
only for limited recourse.
– Reference to international human rights law is often indispensable for




customary international law, highlighting opinio iuris and State prac-
tice in a certain area of human rights law. This is due to the area of
conflict between the broadly sketched definitions of crimes under inter-
national law on the one hand and the judges’ obligation to adhere to
the principle of nullum crimen sine lege on the other hand. Recourse to
human rights law is more likely in areas of human rights which are
well-established and governed by ‘robust’ conventions rather than soft
law. For crimes which have a counterpart in national criminal legisla-
tion, human rights law is more often consulted.
– Experts in public international law are more open to the application of
extra-statutory law in general and human rights law in particular.
– Reference to international human rights law strengthens legal argu-
ments and the persuasive power and therefore raises the legal weight of
judgments in an area of law which continues to be under construction
by drawing from a field of law which offers a sophisticated and well-
established convolute of legal dogmatic theory and jurisprudence.
– Reference to international human rights law is a suitable tool for
judges to determine the content of a crime under customary interna-
tional law. However, currently, recourse to human rights law often ap-
pears as a necessary box to be ticked in judgments without a deeper
understanding of the legal concept in question. In the absence of
streamlined international criminal law education, a balanced composi-
tion of the Chambers, taking into account various backgrounds, as well
as continuous training for judges is advisable.
Generally, reference to human rights law offers international courts and
tribunals the opportunity to benefit from decades of work and experience
of international human rights courts and committees and their jurispru-
dence.
This book focuses on the influence of international human rights law on
the development and practical application of substantive international
criminal law. While the majority of scholarly research in the area concen-
trates on the application of human rights law in procedural international
criminal law, in particular the right to a fair trial,13 this work examines
why and how human rights law can be and is used in substantive law in
13 See recently eg Jessica Almqvist ‘Complementarity and Human Rights: A Litmus
Test for the International Criminal Court’ (2008) 30 Loyola of Los Angeles Inter-
national and Comparative Law Review 20 (2008) 336-366; Segun Jegede ‘The
II. Scope and Methodology
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order to define crimes under international law. However, procedural inter-
national criminal law and how it is influenced by international human
rights law will be also touched upon for two reasons: the first reason is
that the two concepts are frequently blurred in the approaches of the per-
sons applying the law as well as in academia. When one asks the question
of recourse to human rights law in international criminal law, most of the
practitioners interviewed were zooming in on one of the two aspects, pro-
cedural or substantive, dismissing or disregarding the other. The second
reason why it is impossible to delve into substantive law without having
first considered the rules regarding the application of human rights law in
procedural matters is that both set of rules are intertwined and frequently
misunderstood even by the practitioners. It is important to disentangle the
provisions and rules of international law allowing recourse to human
rights law in international law and scrutinize which type of recourse, pro-
cedural or substantive, they allow for.
The work will not deal with the issue of deterrence of crimes and the
potential use of human rights law to further any deterrent effect of interna-
tional criminal law. This limitation is set despite the repeated (self-) asser-
tion of international criminal ad hoc tribunals of their work contributing to
the prevention of conflict and crime under international law.14 Apart from
exceeding a feasible scope of a research project, the issue of deterrence is
Right to A Fair Trial in International Criminal Law’ in Chile Eboe-Osuji Protect-
ing Humanity: Essays in International Law and Policy in Honour of Navanethem
Pillay (Nijhoff Leiden 2010) 519-548; Manoj Sinha International Criminal Law
and Human Rights (Manak Delhi 2010); Thomas Kruessmann (ed) ICTY: Towards
a Fair Trial? (Vienna Neuer Wissenschaftlicher Verlag 2008); Damien Scalia
‘Long-term sentences in international criminal law: Do they meet the standards set
out by the European Court of Human Rights?’ (2011) 9(3) Journal of International
Criminal Justice 669-687; Rebecca Young ‘”Internationally Recognized Human
Rights” Before the International Criminal Court’ (2011) 60 International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 189-208.
14 Eg Prosecutor v Aleksovski (Appeal Judgment) IT-95-14/1 (24 March 2000) para.
185; Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Celebići Case Appeal Judgement) IT-96-21-A (20
February 2001) para. 806; Prosecutor v Todorović (Judgment) IT-95-9/1-S (31 Ju-
ly 2001) paras 28-30; Prosecutor v Krnojelac (Judgment) IT-97-25 (15 March
2002) para. 508; Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment) IT-95-17 (10 December
1998) para. 288; Prosecutor v Erdemović (Sentencing Judgement) IT-96-22-T (29
November 1996) para. 64; Prosecutor v Hadžihasanović et al (Judgment)
IT-96-22-T (29 November 1996) para 64; Prosecutor v Perišić (Judgment)
IT-04-81-T (6 September 2011) para 2204; Prosecutor v Ntakirutimana (Judg-
ment) ICTR-96-10 and ICTR-96-17-T (21 February 2003) para 882; Prosecutor v
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a controversial subject, it is hard to measure and many doubt the existence
of any deterrent effect of international criminal law altogether.15 As the
author of this study is a public international lawyer by training, the subject
will generally be approached from the entry point of public international
law in general and international human rights law in particular. Ultimately,
the study aims at pointing out synergies between the two areas and seeks
to narrow the gap that often prevents further synthesis.
Niyitegeka (Judgment) ICTR-96-14-T (16 May 2003) para 484; Prosecutor v
Rugambarara (Judgment) ICTR-00-59-T (16 November 2007) para 11; Prosecu-
tor v Ntawukulilyayo (Judgment) ICTR-05-82-T (3 August 2010) para. 463; Pros-
ecutor v Kalimanzira (Judgment) ICTR-05-88-T (22 June 2009) para. 741; the
ICC lists deterrence as one of its goals in the Preamble to the Rome Statute but has
been remarkably quiet about the presumed deterrent effect of its work and has not
referred to deterrence in its so far only two judgments Prosecutor v Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo (Judgment) ICC-01/04-01/06 (14 March 2012) and Prosecutor v
Mathieu Ngudjolo (Judgment) ICC-01/04-02/12 (18 December 2012).
15 See further Payam Akhavan ‘Beyond Immunity: Can International Criminal Jus-
tice Prevent Future Atrocities?’ (2001) 95(1) American Journal of International
Law, 7-31; Payam Akhavan ‘Justice in the Hague, Peace in the Former Yu-
goslavia? A Commentary on the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal’ (1998)
20(4) Human Rights Quarterly, 737-816; Mirjan Damaška ‘What is the Point of
International Criminal Justice?’ (2008) 83 Chicago-Kent Law Review 329-369;
Hunjoon Kim and Kathryn Sikkink ‘Explaining the Deterrence Effect for Human
Rights Prosecutions for Transitional Countries’ (2010) 54(4) International Studies
Quarterly 939-963; Julian Ku and Jide Nzelibe ‘Do International Criminal Tri-
bunals Deter or Exacerbate Humanitarian Atrocities?’ (2006) 84(4) Washingto-
nUniversity Law Review 777-833; Christopher W Mullins and Dawn L Rothe
‘The Ability of the International Criminal Court to Deter Violations of Internation-
al Criminal Law: A Theoretical Assessment’ (2010) 10(5) International Criminal
Law Review 771-785; Robert D Sloane ‘The Expressive Capacity of International
Punishment: the Limits of the National Law Analogy and the Potential of Interna-
tional Criminal Law’ (2007) 43(1) Stanford Journal of International Law 39-94;
Immi Tallgren ‘The Sensibility and Sence of International Criminal Law’ (2002)
13(3) European Journal of Public International Law 561-595; David Wippman
‘Atrocities, Deterrence and the Limits of International Justice’ (1999-2000) 23
Fordham International Law Journal 473-488; Danilo Zolo ‘Peace through Crimi-
nal Law?’ (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 727-734.
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in international criminal law have of the relationship between human rights 
law and international criminal law. Furthermore, it shows how their respective 
perception shapes the willingness of the judges to refer to human rights law in 
their jurisprudence and points out which dogmatic considerations are 
undertaken. Thereby, the study points out to what degree a recourse to human 
rights law is likely in the future of international criminal courts and tribunals. 
It further illustrates under which conditions such recourse is appropriate and 
helpful for the practical application of international criminal law.  
 







Practical Application: Case Law Analysis
(Part II)
Minority Rights Law
Genocide/Persecution Torture under IHL





Perception of Judges 
Contrasting Perception with Findings of Parts I & 
II (Conclusion) 
 
The study is divided into three broad parts which broadly correlate to three
different methodological approaches. Traditional analysis and interpreta-
tion of positive norms as well as literature exegesis lay the theoretical
framework of the research project in Part One. Starting from case law ana-
lysis, an inventory of the use of human rights law in substantive interna-
tional criminal law is created in Part Two regarding the areas of the prohi-
bition of torture, minority rights and sexual violence. Together with the
empirical part (Part Three) consisting of interviews with judges at the ICC
and the ICTY, this deductive deficit analysis illustrates the perception
practitioners in international criminal law have of the relationship between
human rights law and international criminal law. Furthermore, it shows
how their respective perception shapes the willingness of the judges to re-
fer to human rights law in their jurisprudence and points out which dog-
matic considerations are undertaken. Thereby, the study points out to what
degree a recourse to human rights law is likely in the future of internation-
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al criminal courts and tribunals. It further illustrates under which condi-
tions such recourse is appropriate and helpful for the practical application
of international criminal law. 
II. Scope and Methodology
27

The Relationship between International Criminal Law
and Human Rights
Introduction
The relationship between substantive international criminal law and hu-
man rights is, despite the continuously academic and non-academic inter-
est in both disciplines, not conclusively established. There are two main
reasons for this: the first one is that none of the two areas is clearly and
exclusively defined and delimitated in the first place. The term ‘human
rights’ can cover a plethora of rights and claims like the right to physical
integrity and the right to liberty, to fair trail guarantees, minority rights,
economic, social and cultural rights and the generally non-enforceable so-
called third generation rights.16 They are mostly rights that protect the in-
dividual from an excess of authority from the State, but additional to re-
specting the individual’s human rights, the States’ role is also to protect
and fulfil the right, meaning to facilitate and provide them vis-à-vis the in-
dividual.17 International human rights law encompasses rights, for exam-
ple rights protecting life, physical integrity, freedom of movement, minori-
ty rights, the mass violation of which are under certain circumstances con-
sidered to be crimes under international law and can trigger international
criminal proceedings. Hence, there is a clear connection, but no conclud-
ing answer, as to the relationship between the two disciplines.
Part One:
Chapter One:
16 The umbrella term “third generation rights” is in itself ill-defined and covers many
different concepts. What unites them is their general non-enforceability as well as
their complex nature (which is why they are also referred to as ‘composite rights’),
see Theo van Boven ‘Categories of Rights’ in Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah and
Sandesh Sivakumaran (eds) International Human Rights Law (OUP Oxford 2010)
173-188 at 178; for the multi-faceted concept of ‘human rights’ see also Laurence
R Helfer ‘Forum Shopping for Human Rights’ 148 University of Pennsylvania
Law Review (1999) at 285-400 at 298: ‘The corpus of international human rights
law does not exist in a single, comprehensive treaty, code or statute. Rather, the
rights and freedoms it enshrines are found in a complex web of overlapping glob-
al, regional, and specialized agreements, many of which contain identical, related,
or even conflicting substantive standards’.
17 See eg Manfred Nowak U. N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR
Commentary (N. P Engel Kehl 2005) at XX-XXI.
29
Equally, the notion of international criminal law encompasses not only
conduct which is deemed criminal, but also establishes the principles ac-
cording to which a person can be held accountable for such conduct, the
procedure regulating who can investigate and judge such crimes, as well
as procedural frameworks for international criminal proceedings that take
into account the proper handling of evidence and the rights of all the par-
ticipants of the proceeding, including the accused person.18 International
criminal law is therefore, broadly speaking, made up of two large set of
rules, substantive and procedural ones. The same is true for human rights
law as an umbrella term for very different sets of rights, including mini-
mum standards that an individual is entitled to in court proceedings.
This leads to the second reason for the non-conclusive establishment of
the relationship between international criminal law and human rights law:
due to the broad concepts used, the discourses regarding the commonali-
ties and differences of the two disciplines get increasingly inaccurate and
confusing. Scholars and practitioners talk at cross-purposes because they
do not have a common understanding and definition of the areas in
question and are essentially discussing different subjects:
– One group, and that includes most scholars debating the relationship
between international criminal law and human rights law, examines the
relationship between international criminal law and human rights law
in terms of the substantive interconnectedness of the two: how interna-
tional criminal law emerged from, was a by-product or the logical last
step of, the evolution of human rights.19
– The other group, including most of the practitioners interviewed in the
course of this research project, have, at first glance, little regard for this
question they see as a rather academic problem.20 In theirday-to-day
work, what seems more pressing or immediately relevant is how hu-
man rights relate to the procedural aspect of the trial, inter alia, how
can the rights of the accused be consolidated with the needs of victim
protection. This is a logical consequence of international criminal pro-
18 Antonio Cassese International Criminal Law (2nd edition OUP Oxford 2008) 3.
19 See below Part One Chapter Three I. eg M. Cherif Bassiouni ‘The Proscribing
Function of International Criminal Law in the Process of International Protection
of Human Rights’ (1982-3) 9 Yale Journal of World Public Order 193-216;
Carsten Stahn ‘Internationaler Menschenrechtsschutz und Völkerstrafrecht’ (1999)
3 Kritische Justiz 343-355.
20 See Part Three Chapter One III. below.
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ceedings that take, compared to many national criminal trial, a very
long time during which most of the human rights related issues that
need to be addressed concern procedural aspects including the length
of detention, the degree of victim participation, disclosure of evidence,
witness proofing etc.
When discussing the ‘use’ of human rights law in international criminal
law, one must thus first identify which of the two scenarios in question
one is faced with, as they both entail very different practical consequences
triggered by different legal provisions and questions. Hence, there are two
basic conceptual differences that are not sufficiently distinguished with re-
gard to their influence on the development and practical application of in-
ternational criminal law:
– The first is the influence of human rights law on procedural interna-
tional criminal law. Those are the rules that safeguard the accused’s
right to receive a fair, an independent, transparent and expeditious trial
which provides for an equality of arms between the parties. Fair trial
guarantees containing minimum standards for criminal trials are con-
tained in all major human rights conventions21 and are a part of cus-
tomary international law.22 In the area of international criminal law, the
role and influence of international human rights law is much more
prominent than in domestic jurisdictions, in which national constitu-
tions often provide for much more efficient mechanisms of individual
protection. As these mechanisms are absent in international law, hu-
man rights law comes to the forefront to fill the gaps. One of the most
crucial, elementary fair trial standards is the principle of legality, made
21 Art. 10 and 11 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNGA Res 217 A [III]
[10 December 1948] GAOR 3rd Session Part I Resolutions 71); Art. 14 Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 19 December 1966, entered
into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171; Art. 6 Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Council of Europe signed 4 November
1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) 213 UNTS 221; Art. 8 American Con-
vention on Human Rights (signed 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July
1978) 1144 UNTS 123 (Pact of San José); Art. 7 African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights (adopted 27 June1981, entered into force 21 October 1986) 1520
UNTS 217 (Banjul Charter).
22 Patrick Robinson ‘The Right to a Fair Trail in International Law, with Specific
Reference to the Work of the ICTY’ (2009) 3 Berkeley Journal of International
Law Publicist 1-11 at 5.
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up of the two basic rules nullum crimen sine lege (no crime without
law) and nuella poena sine lege (no punishment without law).23 This
standard plays a vital role in the assessment of the second and more
complex concept:
– The relationship between human rights law and substantive interna-
tional criminal law. Examining this relationship means nothing less
than examining the roots of the evolution of international criminal law.
What is substantive international criminal law made of? What is the
common denominator of the actions we label crimes under internation-
al law? What is the essence of genocide, crimes against humanity and
war crimes? These questions are so fundamental because international
criminal provisions are vague, their written definition, if any, leaves
the need for judicial interpretation. If international criminal law is in-
deed, as argued by some, the logical result of an evolution of human
rights, human rights law is an obvious place for judges in international
criminal cases to turn to when they seek to fill the gaps left open by the
statutes to the international courts and tribunals they operate in.
However, the judicial interpretation of a crime by way of consultation of
substantive norms outside the ones written in the statute in which the
crime is contained can undermine the defendant’s basic rights to a fair tri-
al. To put it differently and perhaps more strikingly, the application or in-
terpretation of substantive human rights law in criminal matters might vio-
late the defendant’s human rights. In this case, the whole essence of what
courts in general and international criminal courts and tribunals in particu-
lar are, what they stand for, is endangered, for if a court who is to uphold
law and justice violates human rights itself, it has essentially failed.24
This book will concentrate on the role of human rights in substantive
international criminal law. However, as demonstrated above, substantive
and procedural international criminal law are interlinked and an incorrect
application of one will have obvious consequences on the other. In order
to grasp the parameters, guarantees and limitations of the application of
human rights law in substantive international criminal law, the understand-
23 Claus Kreß ‘Nulla poena nullum crimen sine lege‘ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed) Max
Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law 2nd ed (OUP 2012) vol VII
889-899 at 889.
24 See also Daniel Sheppard ‘The International Criminal Court and “Internationally
Recognized Human Rights”: Understanding Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute’
(2010) 10 International Criminal Law Review 43-71, 59.
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ing of human rights in procedural international criminal law is a necessity.
The following chapters will hence first outline the relationship between
human rights law and procedural international criminal law, followed by
the connection between human rights law and substantive international
criminal law. This part elaborates on the similarities and the differences of
the two fields of law. Once the extent to which human rights law can be
useful in international criminal law is established, the thesis will discuss
what authorizes the courts and tribunals to use human rights law. This in-
cludes a discussion of nullum crimen sine lege in international criminal
law and the potential clashes of this basic principle of human rights law
with the application of human rights law in substantive international crim-
inal law.
Human Rights Law and Procedural International Criminal
Law
‘Procedural’ human rights law to be applied by international courts and
tribunals are, first and foremost, the rights of the accused person. All mod-
ern international criminal courts and tribunals explicitly refer to the rights
of the accused, albeit to a differing degree of sophistication. The ad hoc
and hybrid tribunals, as well as the ICC, all dedicate an article to the rights
of the accused during preparation and trial phase.25 All these provisions
are explicitly modelled after Art. 14 ICCPR26 and only slightly adapted to
fit the needs of an international criminal legal context. Other ‘procedural’
Chapter Two:
25 See Art. 21 ICTY Statute; Art. 20 ICTR Statute; Art. Art. 17 SCSL Statute; Art. 16
STL Statute; Art. 35 Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes committed during the Period of
Democratic Kampuchea (27 October 2004) S/RKM/1004/006 http://www.eccc.go
v.kh/sites/default/files/legal-documents/KR_Law_as_amended_27_Oct_2004_Eng
.pdf (31 October 2017); see also Art. 67 Rome Statute.
26 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted 19 December 1966,
entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171; for the ICTY see Theodor
Meron ‘Human Rights Marches into New Territory: The Enforcement of Interna-
tional Human Rights in International Criminal Tribunals’ Fourth Marek Nowicki
Memorial Lecture (28 November 2008) <http://web.ceu.hu/legal/pdf%20documen
ts/Nowicki/Meron_Enforcement%20of%20HRwarsawnowicki13nov 08.pdf> (as
last accessed on 10 June 2013; speech no longer accessible online); ‘Report of the
Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808
(1993)’ UN Doc S/25704 para. 106.
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human rights guarantees, taking the example of the Rome Statute as the
most detailed and elaborate of the Statute are Art. 20 (ne bis in idem);
Art. 22 (nullum crimen sine lege); Art. 23 (nulla poena sine lege); Art. 24
(non-retroactivity); Art. 26 (exclusion of jurisdiction over persons under
eighteen); Art. 64 (2) (Trial Chamber as the organ that must ensure a fair
and expeditious trial); Art. 66 (presumption of innocence); Arts 81-84
(right to appeal); Art. 85 (right to compensation in cases of unlawful arrest
of detention).
These provisions give guidance to the chamber on how it shall conduct
proceedings in a way which guarantees a fair trial for the accused. The
ICC has taken ample opportunities to examine the human rights of the ac-
cused in international criminal proceedings in the course of its first, now-
completed, trial against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. When issuing the first of
its two stays of proceedings the Court’s Trial Chamber referred extensive-
ly to international human rights law regarding the right to a fair trial, more
specifically the scope of the prosecution’s obligation to disclose exculpa-
tory evidence to the defence.27
Human rights law has also been used by the ICC to outline the scope,
rules and limitations of victim protection and has already been used to
27 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Decision on the consequences of non-dis-
closure of exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the
application to stay the prosecution of the accused, together with certain other is-
sues raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008) ICC-01/04-01/06-1401 (13
June 2008); para. 58 refers to fair trial provisions in Art. 14(1) ICCPR, the
Art. 11(1) UDHR and Art. 6 ECHR; paras 77-81 analyses ICTY and ECtHR ju-
risprudence regarding the prosecution’s disclosure obligations; paras 82-87 deals
with the role of the judges in determining whether or not the disclosure obligations
have been met. The second stay of proceedings following the refusal of the prose-
cution to reveal the identity of one of its intermediaries did not include such direct
references to human rights instruments outside the Rome Statute, see Prosecutor v
Thomas Lubanga Dylio (Decision on the Prosecution's Urgent Request for Varia-
tion of the Time-
Limit to Disclose the Identity of Intermediary 143 or Alternatively to Stay Pro-
ceedings Pending Further Consultations with the VWU) ICC-01/04-01/06-2517 (8
July 2010); for a comprehensive analysis of the use of regional human rights ju-
risprudene by the Court in Lubanga see Annika Jones ‘Insights into an Emerging
Relationship: Use of Human Rights Jurisprudence at the International Criminal
Court’ (2016) 16 Human Rights Law Review, 701-29.
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clarify the unique victim participation procedure before the ICC.28 The IC-
TR and the ICTY have both referenced international human rights law in
interpreting what rights a person accused before any of their tribunals is
entitled to.29
On what legal basis could the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC invoke these
extra-statutory instruments?
Ad Hoc Tribunals
When referencing human rights law in a procedural context, the ICTY and
the ICTR, unlike the ICC, could not take recourse to a provision outlining
their applicable law (for a detailed analysis of the ICC’s rules on the law
applicable see Part One Chapter Three II. 2 below). Due to their sui gener-
is nature, due to its establishment through UN Security Council Resolu-
tions, it is at times cumbersome to determine which standards they are
I.
28 Further William A Schabas The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on
the Rome Statute (OUP Oxford 2010) 399-400; eg Situation on the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Pro-
ceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6) ICC-01/04
UN (17 January 2006); Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Decision on Victims’
Participation) ICC-01/04-01/06-1119 (18 January 2008) para. 35; Prosecutor v
Jean-Pierre Bemba (Fourth Decision on Victims’ Participation) ICC-01/05-01/08
6/39 (2 December 2008) para. 16; instruments referred to varied from the Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child ([adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2
September 1990] 1577 UNTS 3) to soft law documents such as Commission on
Human Rights ‘Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law
and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law’ ([19 April 2005] ES-
COR 61st Session Supp 3, 136); UNGA Res 40/34 ‘Declaration of Basic Principles
of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power’ ([29 November 1985] GAOR
40th Session Supp 53, 213).
29 Prosecutor v Akayesu (Appeal Judgment) ICTR-96-4-A (1 June 2001) para 117;
Prosecutor v Kajelijeli (Appeal Judgment) ICTR-98-44-A-A (23 May 2005) paras
209-212, 224-230, 251-255; Prosecutor v Kambanda (Appeal Judgment) IC-
TR-97-23-A (19 October 2000) para 33; Mugenzi and Mugiraneza v Prosecutor
(Appeal Judgment) ICTR-99-50-A (4 February 2013) paraas 7 an 10; Prosecutor v
Furundžija (Appeal Judgment) IT-95-17/1-A (21 July 2000) para 69; Prosecutor v
Milutinović et al (Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic’s Motion Challenging Jurisdic-
tion–Joint Criminal Enterprise) IT-99-37-AR72 (21 May 2003) para. 9, Prosecu-
tor v Tadić (Appeal Judgment) IT-94-1-A (15 July 1999) paras 43-51
Prosecutor v Vasiljević (Judgment) IT-98-32-T (29 November 2002) para 197.
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bound to.30 This has led to a particular dogmatic vagueness in the applica-
tion of law outside the Statute, both in the procedural and substantive
sense. As international criminal law is a part of public international law,
the ad hoc tribunals are generally bound by the same sources of law as any
other area of public international law, the ones enlisted in Art. 38 ICJ
Statute.31 The rights of the accused are outlined in Art. 21 ICTY Statute
and also in Art. 20 dealing with fair and expeditious trial. The ICTR cov-
ers substantially the same rules in Art. 20 and Art. 19 of its Statute respec-
tively. As the tribunals are not given the guidance of a specific list of
sources applicable, the tribunals seem to be overly cautious not to overstep
their legal boundaries. This, paradoxically, leads to a watering down of the
standards of applicable law in many instances before the ad hoc tribunals:
as the tribunals tread carefully as to not exceed their mandates, they seem
to circumvent, in many cases, a discussion whether they apply a certain
external provision as (customary) law per se and retreat to the safer notion
of using the provision as a ‘interpretational guidance’ or ‘inspiration’ for
the court without properly discussing the basis of such an application as
‘guidance’ (see Part One Chapter Three II. 2. C. below). In the end,
whether a provision is applied as part of customary international law or as
‘inspiration’ does usually not change the outcome of the Chamber’s rea-
soning. ‘Inspriration’ and ‘guidance’ allow the court to use concepts the
legal basis of which is not entirely established in circumvention of dog-
matically sound discussions about what authorizes the respective tribunal
to apply the standard in question. A thorough examination of the status of
the applied law or concept as well as convincing proof of why the specific
30 The ICTY was established pursuant to UNSC Res 808 (1993) (22 February 1993)
SCOR 48th Year 28; the ICTR UNSC Res 955 (1994) (8 November 1994) SCOR
49th Year 15; see also eg Christiane Kamardi Die Ausformung einer Prozessord-
nung sui generis durch das ICTY unter Berücksichtigung des Fair-Trial Prinzips
(Springer Berlin 2009); Jacob Katz Cogan ‘International Courts and Fair Trials:
Difficulties and Perspectives’ (2002) 27 Yale Journal of International Law 111-140
at 116-8.
31 Alexander Zahar and Göran Sluiter International Criminal Law: A Critical Intro-
duction (OUP Oxford 2008) 277; see also Interpretation of the Agreement of 25
March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt (Advisory Opinion) [1980] ICJ Rep 73,
89-90: ‘international organizations are subjects of international law and, as such,
are bound by any obligations incumbent upon them under the general rules of in-
ternational law’.
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standard is (or is not) considered to be applicaple to the court and tribunal
in question is thereby avoided.
This is a regrettable and at times dangerous neglect. The ICTY has jus-
tified its reference to the ICCPR by stating that the fair trial rights in the
ICTY Statute are based on the ICCPR, which, in turn, based the provi-
sions on fair trials in the ECHR.32 The Secretary-General’s Report which
proposed the ICTY Statute stated that it was ‘axiomatic’ that the ICTY
fully respected international standards regarding the rights of the accused
and shared its view that ‘such internationally recognized standards are, in
particular, contained in article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights’.33 The ICTY jurisprudence seems to not feel the need
to delve into a discussion about the content of customary international law
in this are and regards Art. 21 ICTY Statute as awarding a greater scope of
protection than Art. 14 ICCP as Art. 21 also covers the pre-trial phase.34
The court is, however, concerned with the interpretation of fair trial
provisions in international legal treaties by international judicial bodies
(such as treaty bodies and regional human rights courts), which it sees not
as binding,35 but holds that the provisions and their interpretation have to
be adapted to the ‘object and purpose’ of the statute and its unique con-
text.36 This might make sense as far as the interpretation of the legal pro-
vision is concerned. The treaty bodies’ jurisprudence is not binding in it-
self but provides authoritative interpretations of the binding texts. The rel-
evance of judgments of regional human rights courts beyond their direct
binding force on the parties to a specific case is subject to much discussion
32 Christiane Kamardi Die Ausformung einer Prozessordnung sui generis durch das
ICTY unter Berücksichtigung des Fair-Trial Prinzips (Springer Berlin 2009) 148.
33 UNSC ‘Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security
Council Resolution 808 (1993)’ (3 May 1993) UN Doc S/25704 para 106; see also
Theodor Meron ‘Human Rights Marches into New Territory: The Enforcement of
International Human Rights in International Criminal Tribunals’ Fourth Marek
Nowicki Memorial Lecture (28 November 2008) <http://web.ceu.hu/legal/pdf%20
documents/Nowicki/Meron_Enforcement%20of%20HRwarsawnowicki13nov 08.
pdf > as last accessed on 10 June 2013; speech no longer accessible online.
34 Prosecutor v Tadić (Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion Requesting Protective
Measures for Victims and Witnesses) IC-94-I-10 (10 August 1995) para. 25.
35 Christiane Kamardi Die Ausformung einer Prozessordnung sui generis durch das
ICTY unter Berücksichtigung des Fair-Trial Prinzips (Springer Berlin 2009) 148.
36 Prosecutor v Tadić (Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion Requesting Protective
Measures for Victims and Witnesses) IC-94-I-10 (10 August 1995) para. 26.
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in international law.37 They might in any case be an indication of existing
customary law. The question at hand is whether existing customary law, in
the area of human rights or otherwise, is binding as such to the ad hoc tri-
bunals.
One argument that the ICTY, in particular, invokes to counter such an
obligation to apply customary international law in the area of fair trial
rights, is that the ICTY Statute, pursuant to Art. 22, obliges judges to pro-
vide for the protection of its witnesses and victims. Article 21 ICTY
Statute also states that the right to a fair and public hearing is subject to
Art. 22.38 This follows a tendency at the ad hoc tribunals to pay lip service
to the importance of international human rights standards before interna-
tional criminal tribunals but actually wanting ‘full authority to determine
when it wants to comply with the ICCPR’39 or other international instru-
ments applicable to it. Instead of a dogmatically sound examination of
whether, in fact, the respective instrument is applicable to the ad hoc tri-
bunal and accordingly applying or disregarding it, the tribunals’ approach
is often characterized by an element of ‘yes, but’. One argument, which
factually always limits the scope of protection of international human
rights instruments,40 is that the tribunals operate in unique situations of
mass violence and thus in a different legal context.41 The strength of this
argument is, however, at least questionable. It is the events that triggered
37 Art. 46 ECHR, for example, states explicitly that the judgments are binding on the
parties of the case in question, but do not state that the judgments have an effect
erga omnes; see, e.g. the speech of Boštjan Zupančič, judge of the ECtHR entitled
‚The Binding Nature of the Judgments of the ECHR and the Universality of Hu-
man Rights’ (14 April 2014) available at http://www.cd-n.org/index.php?the-bindi
ng-nature-of-the-judgments-of-the-echr-and-the-universality-of-human-rights (31
October 2017).
38 Prosecutor v Tadić (Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion Requesting Protective
Measures for Victims and Witnesses) IC-94-I-10 (10 August 1995) para. 26.
39 James Sloan ‘The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and
Fair Trial Rights: A Closer Look’ (1996) 9(2) Leiden Journal of International Law
479-501 at 488.
40 Göran Sluiter ‚Human rights protection in the ICC pre-trial phase’ in Carsten
Stahn and Göran Sluiter (eds) The Emerging Practice of the International Crimi-
nal Court (Nijhoff Leiden 2009) 459-476, 461.
41 Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgment) IT-96-23 (22 February 2001) para 470; Prose-
cutor v Kunarac (Appeal Judgment) IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A (12 June 2002 paras
142-148; see also eg Prosecutor v Haradinaj (Judgment) IT-04-84-T (3 April
2008) para. 127; Prosecutor v Mićo Stanišić (Judgment) IT-08-91-T (27 March
2013) para 47.
Part One: The Relationship between International Criminal Law and Human Rights
38
the tribunals’ jurisdiction, not the tribunals themselves that manoeuvre in
environments of mass violations. It is the situations themselves, which
might constitute a national emergency in which derogations from some
rights might exceptionally be allowed. The Rwandan armed conflict ended
in July 1994, the ICTR was established in November the same year.42 It is
true that the ICTY was established in May 1993, when the armed conflict
in the former Yugoslavia was still on-going. Nevertheless, the court did
not start its investigations until July 1994 and the large majority of sus-
pects was investigated, indicted and tried long after the Dayton Agree-
ment. Naturally, this did not necessarily mean that threats to witnesses and
victims were eliminated alongside the cessation of the conflict. However,
it put the tribunals, which were geographically removed from the crime
scenes, in a position not unlike the one many post-conflict States face in
the aftermath of mass crimes or a situation like it occurs in large, high-
profile criminal investigation involving gangs or other organized crime
able to jeopardize the safety of victims and witnesses. These are precisely
the kind of situations in which fair trial rights are especially important, to
fend off accusations or tendencies of victor’s justice and revenge. They are
no situations that require any adaptation to a perceived uniqueness of in-
ternational criminal law and the environment in which it operates.
ICC
Art. 21 (3) ICC
In order to provide a clearer guidance of the applicable sources and to
avoid some of the ad hoc tribunals’ dogmatic mishaps, the Rome Statute,
as the first international criminal law forum ever, contains a list of the ap-
plicable law in Art. 21 Rome Statute. It also can take recourse to a provi-
sion that explicitly enables the court to apply some procedural human
rights law. Art. 21 (3) Rome Statute reads
‘ [t]he application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be
consistent with internationally recognized human rights, and be without any
adverse distinction founded on grounds such as gender as defined in article 7,
II.
1.
Kunarac, para. 488; see also Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment) IT-95-17 (10 De-
cember 1998) para. 162.
42 See ICTR UNSC Res 955 (1994) (8 November 1994) SCOR 49th Year 15;.
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paragraph 3, age, race, colour, language, religion or belief, political or other
opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth or other status’.43
Art. 21 (3) Rome Statute ‘provides a standard against which all the law ap-
plied should be tested’.44 This has been affirmed by the ICC Appeals
Chamber when it stated that ‘[h]uman rights underpin the Statute; every
aspect of it […]. Its provisions must be interpreted and more importantly
applied, in accordance with internationally recognized human rights; first
and foremost, in the context of the Statute, the right to a fair trial’.45
Art. 21 Rome Statute imposes a hierarchy of sources unknown to Art. 38
ICJ Statute. Art. 21 (3) Rome Statute is on the top of this hierarchy, plac-
ing it above the Statute itself.46 It acts, in a way, as a constitution for the
43 A detailed discussion on the general sources of law applicable for the ICC and oth-
er international criminal tribunals can be found under Part One Chaper Three II.
44 Mahnoush H Arsanjani ‘The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’
(1999) 93 American Journal of International Law 22-43 at 29.
45 The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on the Defense Challenge to the Jurisdiction
of the Court pursuant to Article 19(2)(a) of the Statute of 3 October 2006)
ICC-01/04-01/06-772 (14 December 2006) at para. 37.
46 Daniel Sheppard ‘The International Criminal Court and “Internationally Recog-
nized Human Rights”: Understanding Article 21 (3) of the Rome Statute’ (2010)
10 International Criminal Law Review 43-71 at 46; Gilbert Bitti ‘Article 21 of the
Statute of the ICC and the treatment of sources of law in the jurisprudence of the
ICC’ in Carsten Stahn and Göran Sluiter (eds) The Emerging Practice of the Inter-
national Criminal Court (Brill The Hague 2008) 286-304, 293-4; of a different
opinion are Gerhard Hafner and Christina Binder ‘The Interpretation of Article 21
(3) ICC Statute, Opinion Reviewed’ (2004) 9 Austrian Review of International
and European Law 163-190, 173-177, who argue, inter alia, that Art 69(7) which
states: ‘Evidence obtained by means of a violation of this Statute or internationally
recognized human rights shall not be admissible if [...]’ indicates that internation-
ally recognized human rights and the Statute are on equal footing. As the Statute
does not provide an exhaustive list of applicable human rights nor does it exhaus-
tively define the ones that are mentioned in the Statute, this argument is not plausi-
ble. The ICC itself seems to suggest a supremacy of internationally recognized hu-
man rights in the above-cited section of The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo
(Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on
the Defense Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to Article 19(2)(a)
of the Statute of 3 October 2006) ICC-01/04-01/06-772 (14 December 2006) at
para. 37.
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court a norm on which all application of the sources of law have to be
measured against.47
The phrasing of Art. 21 (3) is likely to stem from paraphrasing a similar
one used before the ICTY which states that the ICTY Statute and its Rules
of Procedure and Evidence were drafted with regard to and compliance of
‘internationally recognized standards of fundamental human rights’48 and
itself referred to a section in the Secretary-General’s Report on the Estab-
lishment of the ICTY in which the Secretary-General mentioned ‘interna-
tionally recognized standards regarding the rights of the accused’ which
are ‘in particular, contained in article 14 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights’.49 The origin of the terminology clarifies that
the drafters of the statute thought of Art. 21 (3) Rome Statute as sort of a
constitutional provision guaranteeing that trials before the ICC are con-
ducted with regard to the rights of the accused and characterized by the
leading principles of fairness, transparency and foreseeability. This was
also explicitly mentioned in the last Draft Version of the Rome Statute
where the drafters stated that:
‘It was generally agreed that consistency with international human rights law
would require that interpretation by the Court be consistent with the principle
of nullum crimen sine lege. A view was also expressed that this should be ex-
plicitly stated in this article or be made clearer in article 21.’50
47 See also Daniel Sheppard ‘The International Criminal Court and “Internationally
Recognized Human Rights”: Understanding Article 21 (3) of the Rome Statute’ 10
(2010) International Criminal Law Review 43-71 at 46; Mahnoush H Arsanjani
‘The Rome Statute of the Internatonal Criminal Court’ 93 (1999) American Jour-
nal if International Law 22-42 at 29; Gilbert Bitti ‘Article 21 of the Statute of the
ICC and the treatment of sources of law in the jurisprudence of the ICC’ in
Carsten Stahn and Göran Sluiter (eds) The Emerging Practice of the International
Criminal Court (Brill The Hague 2008) 286-304,300-2.
48 Prosecutor v Tadić (Decision on the Prosecutors Motion Requesting Protective
Measures for Victims and Witnesses) IT-94-1 (10 August 1995) para. 25.
49 UNSC ‘Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security
Council Resolution 808 (1993)’ (3 May 1993) UN Doc S/25704 para 106.
50 Draft Art. 20 United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court ‘Report of the Preparatory Com-
mittee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court: Addendum’
(15-17 July 1998) A/Conf.183/2/Add.1 para. 63; in the draft article, what is now
regulated under Article 21 was proposed to be Art. 20, while nullum crimen sine
lege (now Article 22) was discussed as Article 21.
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Hence, Art. 21 (3) Rome Statute requires the court to safeguard a fair trial
in line with internationally recognized human rights.51 It expands the list
of fair trial rights already explicitly mentioned in the Statute and guaran-
tees its adherence at every stage of the proceedings.52 The ICC Appeals
Chamber has discussed Art. 21 (3) Rome Statute in the context of a poten-
tial breach of the rights of the accused when it said [t]he Statute safe-
guards the rights of the accused […] Such rights are entrenched in articles
55 and 67 of the Statute. More importantly, article 21 (3) of the Statute
makes the interpretation as well as the application of the law applicable
under the Statute subject to internationally recognised human rights. It re-
quires the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with in-
ternationally recognized human rights norms.’53
What are ‘internationally recognized human rights’?
It is less than clear what ‘internationally recognized human rights’ actually
are. Comparing the phrasing with Art 7 (1) (h) of the Rome Statute, which
speaks of ‘grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under
international law’ leaves room for the assumption that Art. 21 (3) requires
something short of universal recognition.54
According to Art. 31 Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties,55
Art. 21 (3) Rome Statute must be ‘interpreted in good faith in accordance
2.
51 See eg William A. Schabas The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on
the Rome Statute (OUP Oxford 2010) 398-9; Joe Verhoeven ‘Article 21 of the
Rome Statute and the Ambiguities of Applicable Law’ (2002) 33 Netherlands
Yearbook of International Law 3-22, 14-15.
52 William A Schabas The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the
Rome Statute (OUP Oxford 2010) 398.
53 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on the Defense Challenge to the Jurisdiction
of the Court pursuant to Article 19(2)(a) of the Statute of 3 October 2006)
ICC-01/04-01/06-772 (14 December 2006) para. 36.
54 George E Edwards ‘International Human Rights Challenges to the New Interna-
tional Criminal Court: the Search and Seizure Right to Privacy’ (2001) 26 Yale
Journal of International Law 323-412 at 376-77.
55 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (concluded 23 May 1969, entered into
force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331; see also Situation in the Democratic Re-
public of the Congo (Judgment on the Prosecutor's Application for Extraordinary
Review of Pre-Trial Chamber I's 31 March 2006 Decision Denying Leave to Ap-
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with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in the light of its object and purpose’. In any case, interpreta-
tion of the term ‘internationally recognized human rights’ should be car-
ried out carefully and rather conservatively in line with the object and pur-
pose of the Rome Statute which is ensuring common action in order to
punish the ‘most serious crimes of concern to the international communi-
ty’.56 The Rome Statute is not a human rights treaty in itself and the court
it establishes is not a human rights court per se. The Preamble to the Rome
Statute furthermore contains references to State sovereignty, territorial in-
tegrity and non-interference in internal affairs to emphasize the limits of
the convention. Far-reaching inclusion of human rights concepts in differ-
ent stages of becoming actual law and exceeding a conservative reading is
not what the parties to the Rome Statue would have been ready to accept.
A far-reaching human rights inclusion should therefore be rejected.
Furthermore, Art. 21 Rome Statute (just as Art. 38 ICJ Statute) is a sec-
ondary rule of international law, ‘which provide for the formation of pri-
mary rules, those rules that state what has to be done and what cannot be
done’57. The provision of Art. 21 (3) Rome Statute only guides the court in
how its interpretation and application has to be conducted but it does not
in itself define the applicable law for the court.58
What, then, does a more conservative approach on this question con-
tain? The 1998 so-called Zutphen Draft of the Rome Statute referred, al-
beit in a different context, to the term ‘internationally protected human
rights’. In a footnote, it was made clear that this term was chosen to in-
peal) ICC-01/04-168 (13 July 2006) para. 33; Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Germain Katanga against
the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled "Decision on the Defence Request
Concerning Languages) ICC-01/04-01/07-522 (27 May 2008) paras 38 and 39;
Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo against the decision of Trial Chamber III of 28 July 2010
entitled ‘Decision on the review of the detention of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo
pursuant to Rule 118(2) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence’)
ICC-01/05-01/08-1019 (19 November 2010) para. 49.
56 See Preamble to the Rome Statute.
57 Noora Arajarvi ’Between Lex Lata and Lex Ferenda – Customary International
(Criminal) law and the Principle of Legality ‘ (2010-11) 15 Tilburg Law Review
163-182 at 170.
58 Noora Arajarvi ’Between Lex Lata and Lex Ferenda – Customary International
(Criminal) law and the Principle of Legality ‘ 15 Tilburg Law Review (2010-2011)
163-182 at 170.
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clude non-treaty human rights guarantees, namely customary human rights
law and that the term was meant to be broader than the term ‘international
law’.59 The first part of this footnote is clear and has also been explicitly
supported by jurisprudence of the court who stated that ‘[i]nternationally
recognized may be regarded those human rights acknowledged by custom-
ary international law and international treaties and conventions’.60
The second part of the footnote is less susceptible to a clear interpreta-
tion, particularly because it is not further explained and has not been de-
bated in any of the travaux préparatoire. It seems to suggest that ‘interna-
tionally recognized human rights’ seems to be a term more expansive than
59 Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court
‘Report of the Inter-Sessional Meeting from 19 to 30 January 1998 in Zutphen,
The Netherlands’ (4 February 1998) UN Doc A/AC.249/1998/L.13at 47-50.
60 The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Decision on the Prosecutor’s “Applica-
tion for Leave to Reply to ‘Conclusions de la defense en reponse au memoire
d’appeal du Procureur’” Separate Opinion of Judge Georghios M. Pikis)
ICC-01/04-01/06-424 (12 September 2006) at para. 3; in 2004, Hafner/Binder ex-
amined in detail the various manifestations of opinio iuris for ‘internationally rec-
ognized human rights’. For the case of international human rights treaties, they
look at the number of ratification and the geographical distribution. After
analysing the core human rights treaties (ICCPR, ICESCR, ICERD, CEDAW,
CRC, CMW, CAT and their Optional Protocols) Hafner and Binder conclude that
for all of these instruments apart from the CMW which only had 26 ratifications in
2004 (47 ratifications as of September 2013) and the second optional protocol to
the ICCPR, which deals with the abolition of the death penalty (Second Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the
Abolition of the Death Penalty [adopted 15 December 1989, entered into force 11
July 1991] GAOR 44th Session Supp 49 vol 1, 207; 77 ratifications as of 2013), a
presumptio iuris should exist as to their international recognition. Based on the
numbers of ratifications they deemed sufficient for being ‘widely ratified’ and
therefore recognized, this list now also includes the two optional Protocols to the
Convention of the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed
Conflict and on the sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography
([25 May 2000] GAOR 54th Session Supp 49 vol 3, 6. As another one of the core
human rights conventions triggering the presumtio iuris, the Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities ([adopted 13 December 2006, entered into
force 3 May 2008] 2515 UNTS 12) which, as of 2013, has been ratified by 134
States, could be mentioned; see Gerhard Hafner and Christina Binder ‘The Inter-
pretation of Article 21 (3) ICC Statute, Opinion Reviewed’ (2004) 9 Austrian Re-
view of International and European Law 163-190, 186-190.
152 and 164 ratifications respectively in 2013.).
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merely customary international law.61 The most likely interpretation in
light of the object and purpose of the convention is that it referred to soft
law relevant to the court, which the latter has to take into account and has
to give due regard to, but by which it is not bound. 62 This would be first
and foremost the jurisprudence of the treaty bodies interpreting interna-
tionally recognized human rights law, namely the major UN human rights
conventions, as for example the ICCPR, interpreted by the Human Rights
Committee (‘HRC’).63 On the other hand, judgments of regional human
rights courts have to be taken into account by the court to a greater extent
than the treaty body decisions.64 Even though the court itself is not party
to any regional human rights treaty, the Member States to the Rome
Statute are and, unlike the recommendations of the treaty bodies, the judg-
ments of the regional human rights bodies are binding. For this reason,
judgements of regional courts come under Art. 21 (1) (c) of the Rome
Statute as part of the ‘national laws that would normally exercise jurisdic-
tion’ the court takes recourse to when it seeks to distil general principles
of law to apply and therefore also find their way into the canon of interna-
tionally recognized human rights to be consulted by the court in questions
of fair trial.65
61 See also George E Edwards ‘International Human Rights Challenges to the New
International Criminal Court: the Search and Seizure Right to Privacy’ (2001) 26
Yale Journal of International Law 323-412 at 381.
62 See also Daniel Sheppard ‘The International Criminal Court and “Internationally
Recognized Human Rights”: Understanding Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute’
(2010) 10 International Criminal Law Review 43-71, 69.
63 See also Daniel Sheppard ‘The International Criminal Court and “Internationally
Recognized Human Rights”: Understanding Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute’
(2010) 10 International Criminal Law Review 43-71, 69.
64 See also Daniel Sheppard ‘The International Criminal Court and “Internationally
Recognized Human Rights”: Understanding Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute’
(2010) 10 International Criminal Law Review 43-71, 69-70.
65 Daniel Sheppard ‘The International Criminal Court and “Internationally Recog-
nized Human Rights”: Understanding Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute’ (2010)
10 International Criminal Law Review 43-71, 69-70; Amal Alamuddin ‘Collection
of Evidence’ in Karim A A Khan, Caroline Buisma and Christopher Gosnell (eds)
Principles of International Criminal Justice (OUP Oxford 2010) 231-305 at 236.
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Human Rights Law and Substantive International
Criminal Law
This chapter will explore the relationship between and the use of ‘substan-
tive’ human rights law in the work of the material consideration of inter-
national criminal courts and tribunals. It will first scrutinize the similari-
ties, the common development, but also the differences between the two
fields of law. This is necessary to understand to what degree it is actually
warranted for the courts and tribunals to refer to international human
rights law before delving into the question to what degree the ad hoc tri-
bunals and the ICC are entitled to refer to international criminal law in this
context by their own secondary law.
Relationship ICL – Substantive HR:
‘Crimes against humanity might usefully be viewed as an implementation of
human rights norms within international criminal law. Just as human rights
law addresses atrocities and other violations perpetrated by the State against
its own population, crimes against humanity are focused on prosecuting the
individuals who commit such violations’.66
International criminal law has been called a ‘hybrid branch of law’67. It is
a part of public international law that encompasses ‘notions, principles and
legal constructs’68 from national criminal law as well as from both interna-
tional humanitarian law and international human rights law.69 International
human rights law and international criminal law are obviously related as a
violation of the one (e.g. the prohibition of slavery) often finds a mirror
provision in the other (e.g. enslavement as a crime against humanity).
Many crimes under international law do consist of mass violations of hu-
man rights. According to its Preamble and Art. 1 Rome Statute, the ICC is
responsible for the prosecution of the most serious crimes of concern to
the international community as a whole. This is an expression of a system
of values and morals the international community as a whole seeks to pro-
Chapter Three:
I.
66 William Schabas, Commentary on the Rome Statute, Article 7, p. 139.
67 Antonio Cassese International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 2008) 7.
68 Antonio Cassese International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 2008) 7.
69 Antonio Cassese International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 2008)
4-10.
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tect.70 The codification of those values of the international community is,
to a great extent, to be found in international human rights law.71 Further-
more, the human rights movement and the focus of human rights institu-
tions like the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) and the
HRC on accountability of mass violations fertilized and spurred the devel-
opment of legal concepts of international criminal law and are responsible
for much of the political momentum that led to the ad hoc tribunals and
later to the establishment of the ICC.72
At the same time, the two concepts are framed very differently in dog-
matic legal terms. Human rights law formulates rights the individual has
against the State.73 International criminal law is a catalogue of prohibi-
tions, obligations and criminal offences based on the principle of individu-
al criminal responsibility74
70 Carsten Stahn and Sven-R. Eiffler ‘Über das Verhältnis von Internationalem Men-
schenrechtsschutz und Völkerstrafrecht anhand des Statuts von Rom’ (1999) 82(1)
Kritische Vierteljahresschrift für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft 253-277,
267.
71 Carsten Stahn and Sven-R. Eiffler ‘Über das Verhältnis von Internationalem Men-
schenrechtsschutz und Völkerstrafrecht anhand des Statuts von Rom’ (1999) 82(1)
Kritische Vierteljahresschrift für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft 253-277,
267.
72 William A Schabas The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the
Rome Statute (OUP Oxford 2010) 397.
73 However, the non-binding nature of many bodies which are accessible to individu-
als in order to individually claim their rights vis-à-vis States raises the question to
what degree human rights can indeed be classified as rights of the individual; for
this discussion see Jost Delbrück and Rüdiger Wolfrum Völkerrecht Volume I/2:
Der Staat und andere Völkerrechtssubjekte; Räume unter internationaler Verwal-
tung (2nd edition De Gruyter Berlin 2002) with further references, in particular, to
two of the most influencial scholars of modern public international law whose
views differed substantively on the subject: whereas Hans Kelsen was of the opin-
ion that human rights cannot be seen as rights of the individual if said individual
cannot enforce the rights in national or international courts whose judgments are
binding upon States (Hans Kelsen Principles of International Law [Rinehart and
Company New York 1952] 143-4), Hersch Lauterpacht argued for the existence of
human rights as individual rights even if the individual cannot enforce the rights
directly (Hersch Lauterpacht International Law and Human Rights [FA Praeger
London 1950] 27, 48, 61, 159-160).
(2nd edition De Gruyter Berlin 2002) 260-4.
74 See Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgment) IT-96-23 (22 February 2001) para. 470;
however, the extent to which State involvement is a prerequisite element of crimes
against humanity has in recent years been controversially discussed, with many ar-
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So how are the two disciplines related; what unites them what sets them
apart?
There are obvious intersections: in the 1991 ILC Draft Code of Crimes
against the Peace and Security of Mankind, the crimes now known as
crimes against humanity were enlisted under the heading ‘systematic or
mass violations of human rights’.75
During the negotiation of the Rome Statute, there were repeated at-
tempts to expand the jurisdiction of the court to so-called ‘treaty crimes’:
crimes which were enshrined in international human rights treaties but the
customary nature of which was not beyond doubt.76 Examples of such
‘treaty crimes’ are, for instance, terrorism or drug trafficking. Ultimately,
these crimes were not included as crimes punishable by the ICC. How-
ever, there are examples of such ‘treaty crimes’ to be found in the Rome
Statute, albeit not listed as separate crimes, but under the heading of
crimes against humanity or war crimes. The crimes of apartheid, forced
disappearance (crimes against humanity) and intentional attacks on per-
sonnel in peacekeeping missions (war crimes) are punishable under the
Rome Statute and had before only been explicitly punishable under human
rights law conventions. This indicates flexibility and provides for a margin
within which international criminal courts and tribunals can take recourse
to international human rights law, may it be treaty law, custom or jurispru-
dence of international courts. Furthermore, it also indicates the interrela-
tion between human rights law and international criminal law.
The extra-statutory conventions which the courts and tribunals use are
made up first and foremost of the conventions directly related to the ‘core
guing for a necessary involvement of State or at least State-like actors, see Claus
Kress ‘On the Outer Limits of Crimes against Humanity: The Concept of Organi-
zation within the Policy Requirement: Some Reflections on the March 2010 ICC
Kenya Decision’ (2010) 23 Leiden Journal of International Law 855–73; William
A Schabas ‘Prosecuting Dr Strangelove, Goldfinger, and the Joker at the Interna-
tional Criminal Court: Closing the Loopholes’ (2010) 23 Leiden Journal of Inter-
national Law 847–53; see also International Criminal Court ‘Decision Pursuant to
Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the
Situation in the Republic of Kenya’ ICC-01/09-19 (31 March 2010), Dissenting
Opinion of Judge Hans-Peter 83–163.
75 UN ILC ‘Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind’ in
‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Third Ses-
sion’ (29 April – 19 July 1991) (1991) vol II part II UNYBILC 79.
76 See also Zimmermann in Trifferer 130f.
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crimes’ over which the ICC has jurisdiction, namely the Genocide Con-
vention and the four Geneva Conventions and two Additional Protocols
and their violation is often characterized by violations of human rights law
at the same time as violations of international criminal law/international
humanitarian law.77 The case law of the ICTY and ICTR is replete with
reference to jurisprudence of international judicial bodies applying inter-
national human rights law. However, there is no clear blueprint or struc-
ture in the reference to international human rights law in international
criminal courts and tribunals. This is partly owed to the fact that there is
no ‘one-size-fits-all’-solution for the use of human rights law in interna-
tional criminal law, as ‘human rights’ are in themselves a complex and
fragmented concept in which the different rights are elaborated, enforce-
able and protected to varying degrees. These degrees could be classified
according to the stages identified by Bassiouni, which are outlined in the
following section. Furthermore, international criminal justice is developed
in a decentralised manner by a variety of different practitioners (interna-
tional courts and tribunals) and scholars whose conception of what ‘inter-
national criminal law’ is and what sources it derives from, vary according
to the legal system they were educated in and their field of expertise. In-
77 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (adopted
9 December 1948, entered into force 12 January 1951) 78 UNTS 277; Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October
1950) 75 UNTS 31 (Geneva Convention I); Geneva Convention for the Ameliora-
tion of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75
UNTS 85 (Geneva Convention II); Geneva Convention relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21
October 1950) 75 UNTS 287 (Geneva Convention IV); Geneva Convention rela-
tive to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into
force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 135 (Geneva Convention III); Protocol Addi-
tional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (adopted 8 June 1977, en-
tered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 3; Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims
of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (adopted 8 June 1977, entered
into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 609. There are other conventions laying
down the laws of war which are of relevance, for instance the 1907 Hague Con-
vention, Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its An-
nex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (signed 18
October 1907, entered into force 26 January 1910) (1907) 205 CTS 277.
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ternational (human) rights lawyers and scholars often arrive at different
conclusions than their colleagues who are specialised in criminal law.
Hierarchy vs Horizontal Completion
One of the major theories on the interrelation between human rights and
international criminal law has been developed by Cherif M. Bassiouni
when he identified five stages of emergence and development of human
rights.78 First, he identifies the enunciative stage, ‘[t]he emergence and
shaping of internationally perceived shared values through intellectual and
social processes’79; second, the declarative stage, in which the shared val-
ues get pronounced as such at an international level. In the prescriptive
stage, the values are proscribed in a normative binding form, for example
in an international treaty. This stage is followed by the enforcement stage
which is categorized by a quest for means of encoring the proscribed val-
ues. In the final and most elaborated stage, the criminalization stage, vio-
lations of these shared values are internationally punishable.80 According
to Bassiouni, there is a logical development of human rights from the
shaping of shared values, the emergence of non-binding commitments to-
wards them and the elaboration of specific normative prescriptions to-
wards enforcement and finally a penalization of violations of these shared
values.81 For Bassiouni, ‘international criminal proscriptions are the ulti-
1.
78 MC Bassiouni ‘The Proscribing Function of International Criminal Law in the
Process of International Protection of Human Rights’ (1982-83) 9 Yale J World
Pub. Ord 193-216; see also, for preceding discussions on the interrelation oh hu-
man rights and international criminal law Robert K Woetzel ‘International Crimi-
nal Law and Human Rights: The Sharp Edge of the Sword’ (1968) 62 Proceedings
of the American Society of International Law at Its Annual Meeting (1921-1969)
117-123.
79 MC Bassiouni ‘The Proscribing Function of International Criminal Law in the
Process of International Protection of Human Rights’ (1982-83) 9 Yale J World
Pub. Ord 193-216 at 195.
80 MC Bassiouni ‘The Proscribing Function of International Criminal Law in the
Process of International Protection of Human Rights’ (1982-83) 9 Yale J World
Pub. Ord 193-216.
81 MC Bassiouni ‘The Proscribing Function of International Criminal Law in the
Process of International Protection of Human Rights’ (1982-83) 9 Yale J World
Pub. Ord 193-216, 195.
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ma ratio modality of enforcing internationally protected human rights’82.
Similarly, Meron holds that criminalizing human rights norms through
means of international criminal law enhances ‘the bite of human rights
law’83 as it provides for additional enforcement mechanisms, adding to
human rights law by providing measures against individual actors instead
of States.84
This approach partly overlaps with the approach taken by the Interna-
tional Law Commission (ILC) when adapting its first Draft Articles of
Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind in 1991.85 The ILC’s
article entitled ‘Systematic or mass violations of human rights’ ‘in sub-
stance covers the same field as article 5 of the Statute of the International
Tribunal [for the Former Yugoslavia]’ as the ILC states itself in 1994,
meaning the substantive content of the draft article is the prohibition of
crimes against humanity.86 As a consequence, international criminal law
and human rights law overlap on a lot of occasions and depend on each
other in order to establish the given parameters in which the two disci-
plines shift, where they stand and in what direction they intend to develop
further. Bassiouni’s theory explains the relation between the two disci-
plines as to their emergence and common roots. But this model offers only
limited value when it comes to the practical application of human rights
law in international criminal law.
82 MC Bassiouni ‘The Proscribing Function of International Criminal Law in the
Process of International Protection of Human Rights’ (1982-83) 9 Yale J World
Pub. Ord 193-216, 196.
83 Theodor Meron ‘Human Rights Marches into New Territory: The Enforcement of
International Human Rights in International Criminal Tribunals’ Fourth Marek
Nowicki Memorial Lecture (28 November 2008) <http://web.ceu.hu/legal/pdf%20
documents/Nowicki/Meron_Enforcement%20of%20HRwarsawnowicki13nov 08.
pdf > (as last accessed on 10 June 2013; speech no longer accessible online 36).
84 Theodor Meron ‘Human Rights Marches into New Territory: The Enforcement of
International Human Rights in International Criminal Tribunals’ Fourth Marek
Nowicki Memorial Lecture (28 November 2008) <http://web.ceu.hu/legal/pdf%20
documents/Nowicki/Meron_Enforcement%20of%20HRwarsawnowicki13nov 08.
pdf > (as last accessed on 10 June 2013; speech no longer accessible online) 36.
85 UN ILC ‘Draft Articles against the Peace and Security of Mankind’ Yearbook of
the International Law Commission [1991] vol II part II UNYBILC 79-107;.
86 UN ILC ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-
Sixth Session’ (2 May–22 July 1994) GAOR 49th Session Supp 10, 40 at 39; see
also William Schabas, Commentary on the Rome Statute, Article 7, p. 141.
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Carsten Stahn criticizes Bassiouni’s analysis at a normative-legal level
when it comes to the different application requirements for international
criminal law and human rights law. He states that crimes under interna-
tional law require an attack not of an individual, but of the international
community as a whole and that they must therefore be seen in the context
of a threat to international peace and security.87
Whereas it is undoubtedly true that international criminal law, from the
outset, has been a means to counteract and punish crimes that ‘endangered
the international community or shocked the conscience of mankind’88 and
a reference to the peace and security of mankind is to be found in the
preamble of the Rome Statute, it has never necessarily been the case that
just because a crime under international law is shocking to the internation-
al community as a whole, it does also aleways constitute a threat to inter-
national peace and security. Specific instances of genocide or crimes
against humanity, shocking as they might be, might not automatically
threaten international peace and security.89 Also, during recent years, ob-
servers witnessed a change of focus in international criminal law, which
more and more deals with internal conflicts and situations and in which
the threshold for crimes against humanity is dramatically lowered to the
point where no state or state-like organization needs to be involved, which
in turn tends to lower any threat to international peace and security.90
Still, it is undeniably true that international criminal law deals with
crimes that are collective in nature, committed against a specific group of
persons or population, rather than ‘a limited and randomly selected num-
87 Carsten Stahn ‘Internationaler Menschenrechtsschutz und Völkerstrafrecht’ (1999)
3 Kritische Justiz 343-355, 351; Carsten Stahn and Sven-R. Eiffler ‘Über das
Verhältnis von Internationalem Menschenrechtsschutz und Völkerstrafrecht an-
hand des Statuts von Rom’ (1999) 82(1) Kritische Vierteljahresschrift für Geset-
zgebung und Rechtswissenschaft 253-277, 263.
88 United Nations War Crimes Commission History of the United Nations War
crimes Commission and the Development of the Laws of War (HMSO London
1948) 179.
89 For example, the post-election violence in Kenya, is being dealt with before the
ICC and during which the prosecution claims crimes against humanity have been
committed, has never been subject to a Security Council Resolution, under Chap-
ter VII or otherwise.
90 See International Criminal Court ‘Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome
Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic
of Kenya’ ICC-01/09-19 (31 March 2010).
Part One: The Relationship between International Criminal Law and Human Rights
52
ber of individuals’.91 Nevertheless, the reason for their punishment, and
what sets them apart from other crimes, is the mass violation of human
rights, a violation that targets individuals systematically for a specific in-
fringement of their human rights not because of their individual and per-
sonal characteristics but because they belong to a specific group as such.
This does by no means contradict that the underlying offences, though not
the scope of protection of these crimes, are human rights violations.
In addition, Bassiouni has been criticized, in particular, for his narrow
view on international criminal proscriptions as the ‘highest form’ of hu-
man rights protection. Stahn claims that the relationship between the two
disciplines is not a vertical but rather an horizontal one as the question
whether or not the violation of a human right is punishable by means of
criminal law does not create a hierarchy within international human rights
law and does not make one set of human rights more meaningful and im-
portant than others.92 According to Stahn, the reason why some human
rights are protected by means of an international criminal threat of punish-
ment is not that those rights are more important than others whose viola-
tion does not trigger criminal charges, but the reason is simply that these
rights are more prone to infringement in the context of conflict.93 He sees
this further substantiated by the fact that the rights Bassiouni talks about
are not protected in absolute terms but only in the context of armed con-
flict or when they are committed as part of a widespread or systematic at-
tack.94 Stahn’s criticism here is only partly convincing. As the ICJ has
held, human rights are applicable in times of peace as well as in times of
armed conflict95 and military occupation.96 However, for all its talk about
the indivisibility of human rights, the international system of human rights
protection in itself introduces a hierarchy of human rights by identifying
91 Prosecutor v Kunarac (Appeal Judgment) IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A (12 June
2002) para. 90.
92 Carsten Stahn ‚Internationaler Menschenrechtsschutz und Völkerstrafrecht‘ 3 Kri-
tische Justiz (1999) 343-355, 354.
93 Carsten Stahn, Internationaler Menschenrechtsschutz und Völkerstrafrecht, at 354.
94 C. Stahn, Internationaler Menschenrechtsschutz und Völkerstrafrecht, at 351.
95 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ
Rep 226 para. 25.
96 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory (Advisory Opinion) [2004] ICJ Rep 136, paras 106-113; Armed Activi-
ties on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda)
[2005] ICJ Rep 168 para 216.
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some from which derogation is not possible even in times of ‘public emer-
gency’ or ‘war’.97 Prime examples of emergencies that ‘threaten the life of
the nation’98 are, amongst others, international as well as internal armed
conflict and unrest.99 Core minimum rights that are not eligible for dero-
gation even in those times are, in all the instruments, the prohibition of
torture, slavery and servitude, as well as nullum crimen/nulla poene sine
lege and certain aspects of the right to life.100 The ACHR and the ICCPR
expand the prohibition of derogations to other rights such as the freedom
of religion (ACHR and ICCPR), the rights of the child (ACHR) or the
right to participate in government (ACHR). In addition, the HRC declared
several elements of rights that are not listed in Art. 4 (2) factually non-
derogable as well, given their status in general international law.101 These
include the right of persons deprived of their liberty to be treated with dig-
nity,102 the prohibition of genocide with explicit reference to Art. 27 IC-
CPR regulating the rights of minorities,103 propaganda of war and hate
speech104 as well as deportation and forcible transfer of population. The
latter is deemed non-derogable by the HRC with explicit reference to its
status as a crime against humanity under the Rome Statute.105 The core
minimum rights, covered by all the conventions that include non-dero-
gable provisions, as well as the majority of provisions deemed non- dero-
97 See Art. 4 (2) ICCPR, Art. 15 ECHR, Art. 27 ACHR (2); while the first speaks
only of public emergency, the three latter instruments refers to both public emer-
gency and war.
98 See Art. 4 (1) ICCPR, Art. 15 (1) ICCPR.
99 Jaime Oraá Human Rights in States of Emergency in International Law (Claren-
don Press Oxford 1992) 30-31; see also UN Commission on Human Rights
‘Study of the Right of Everyone to be Free from Arbitrary Arrest, Detention and
Exile’ (1962) UN Doc E/CN.4/826, 153.
100 See See eg Manfred Nowak U. N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR
Commentary (N. P Engel Kehl 2005) 85.
101 UN HRC ‘General Comment No 29: Derogations from Provisions of the
Covenant during a State of Emergency (Art. 4)’ (24 July 2001) GAOR 56th Ses-
sion Supp 40 vol 1, 202; The HRC, in its General Comment, mostly followed the
evaluations of the International Commission of Jurists in International Commis-
sion of Jurists States of Emergency—Their Impact on Human Rights: A Compar-
ative Study by the International Commission of Jurists (International Commission
of Jurists Geneva 1983).
102 Para. 13 (a).
103 Para. 13 (c).
104 Para. 13 (e).
105 Para. 13 (d).
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gable by the HRC, mirror crimes under international law. It is in a situa-
tion of international or internal war, ‘the greatest public emergency’,106
that crimes under international law are mostly committed. In these circum-
stances, international criminal law complements the provisions of interna-
tional human rights law by providing penal sanctions in the case the most
core rights are violated. Many of those are again mirrored in Common Ar-
ticle 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, albeit modified to fit the subject-
matter of the Geneva Conventions and its beneficiaries.107 Other human
rights, even if they are violated on a mass scale, will never trigger interna-
tional legal responses. This is to say that whereas for some rights, interna-
tional criminal law can indeed be seen as a complimentary set of instru-
ments to be applied alongside human rights law on a horizontal level, for
other rights, the relation is more of a vertical one. This is due to the hierar-
chy inherent in the international system of human rights protection to be-
gin with.
The problem with Bassiouni’s model in light of the subject of this book
is rather that its simplicity, which makes it so appealing at first sight,
presents a basic structural problem that renders the model to be of limited
use in terms of practical application. This is exemplarily shown by the fact
that the principle of nullum crimen sine lege, which is at length discussed
under Part One Chapter Three III, is not mentioned.
Structural Differences vs Universality
The obvious overlap and the common roots of the two concepts has made
human rights law a self-evident place to seek recourse when international
criminal tribunals had to fill the gaps their respective statutes left when
defining crimes under the tribunals’ jurisdiction. The most ground-break-
ing jurisprudence in this respect, which is extremely telling when it comes
to the relationship of human rights and international criminal law and its
conception by practitioners is the ICTY judgement in the case against
2.
106 UN Enable ’Human Rights in Time of Emergency’ http://www.un.org/esa/socdev
/enable/comp210.htm (31 October 2017).
107 Theo van Boven ‘Distinguishing Criteria of Human Rights’ in Karel Vasak and
Philip Alston (eds) The International Dimensions of Human Rights (Greenwood
Press Wetport 1982) 43.
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Dragoljub Kunarac, in which the chamber delved into an in-depth analy-
sis of the two concepts, their similarities and differences.108
The Chamber stated that because of the resemblance, in terms of goals,
values and terminology between human rights and international criminal
law, recourse to practices and instruments of human rights law is often
taken by international criminal law in order to determine the content of
customary international law with regards to a specific question of interna-
tional criminal law.109 The Trial Chamber also agreed with the chamber in
Furundžija on its approach taken, the determination of the definition of
torture under customary law, supplemented with specific elements which
stem from the international criminal/international humanitarian law con-
text in which the crimes under scrutiny of the ICTY were committed.110
The court referred solely to ‘international humanitarian law’ in its argu-
mentation, but it factually examined the definition of torture as a crime
against humanity valid also outside of armed conflict. The court took ac-
count of the peculiarities of the conduct punishable under the ICTY
Statute, which is limited to crimes committed in relation to an armed con-
flict, circumscribed as ‘serious violations of international humanitarian
law’ by the UNGA resolution establishing the ICTY, but its conclusions
are valid for the whole body of international criminal law.111
The ICTY, in Kunarac, bestowed great care in portraying the similari-
ties and differences of the two regimes as well as the intersection in which
the two meet. The court identified two crucial doctrinal points in which
the human rights regime and the international criminal law regime differed
fundamentally:
i. Firstly, the ICTY found the role of the State as an actor in internation-
al human rights law to fundamentally differ from the role of the State
in international criminal law. In the human rights context, the ICTY
found the State to be the ‘ultimate guarantor’ of the rights in ques-
tions, the entity which is bound to observe them and the one which
will be accountable for violations and responsible for the halt of in-
fringements.112 Even though human rights can also have a horizontal
108 Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgment) IT-96-23 (22 February 2001).
109 Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgment) IT-96-23 (22 February 2001) para. 467.
110 Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgment) IT-96-23 (22 February 2001) para. 468–69.
111 UNSC Res 808 (1993) (22 February 1993) SCOR 48th Year 28 para. 1; UNSC
Res 827 (1993) (25 May 1993) SCOR 48th Year 29 para. 2.
112 Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgment) IT-96-23 (22 February 2001) para. 470 (i).
Part One: The Relationship between International Criminal Law and Human Rights
56
effect on the relations between private actors, ultimately, it is that
State that is under an obligation to protect its citizens or inhabitants
against a violation of their rights by State as well as non-State agents.
International criminal law, in contrast, is based on the principle of in-
dividual criminal responsibility and the role of the State as peripheral
when it comes to accountability.113 In order to illustrate that point, the
ICTY cited two US-American decisions applying the Alien Tort
Claims Act.114 In Filártiga v Peña-Irala, the United States Court of
Appeals held that torture perpetrated by a State official violated uni-
versally accepted customary human rights law.115 15 years later, the
same court held in Kadić v Karadžić, that when it comes to acts (in-
cluding torture) which could be qualified as genocide or war crimes,
no State involvement was necessary in order to hold an individual ac-
countable for said actions. 116
With respect to the last argument brought forward by the Chamber, is
has, however, to be observed that what leads to the actual account-
ability of a single individual under international criminal law, is, in the
vast majority of cases and especially when it comes to genocide and
crimes against humanity, his or her involvement in illegal conduct as
part of a State organ or an organization affiliated with the State (or at
least as part of a State-like entity exercising effective control over a
specific territory). Even though non-State actors have in recent years
become the centre of the international criminal law spotlight and have
often been the focus of prosecutorial investigations and indictments
before the ICC, this development has been criticized harshly by those
who think that international criminal law has first and foremost been
established to prosecute criminal behaviour of States, involving large
segments of a State apparatus and resources, and not to help govern-
113 See further for the obligations of individuals in the context of international crimi-
nal law: Jost Delbrück and Rüdiger Wolfrum Völkerrecht Volume I/2: Der Staat
und andere Völkerrechtssubjekte; Räume unter internationaler Verwaltung (2nd
edition De Gruyter Berlin 2002) 265-6.
114 Alien Tort Claims Act (1789) 28 USC § 1350.
115 Filártiga v Peña-Irala United States Court of Appeals (2nd Cir 1980) 630 F 2d
876, 878–79.
116 Kadić v Karadžić United States Court of Appeals (2nd Cir 1995) 70 F 3d 232.
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ments to dispose of insurgencies and rebel forces within their own
country.117
In addition, some significant human rights provisions oblige States to
make the violation of a certain human right a criminal offence based
on individual criminal responsibility. This is, for example, the ap-
proach of Article 4 UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) according to
which acts of torture, their attempt, complicity and participation shall
be a criminal offence in any Member State. 118
ii. The second structural differences lies, according to the view taken by
the ICTY in Kunarac, in the functions of international criminal law as
a penal regime in which the prosecutor on one side faces the individu-
al defendant at the other side and of international human rights law in
which the respondent is the State.119
For these reasons, the Trial Chamber concludes that international hu-
man rights law can only be referred to in international criminal law
when taking into account the peculiarities which are inherent in this
specific area of law.120
This can be countered with the HRC’s observation that human rights
standards contain an obligation to bring perpetrators of human rights
violations to justice, thereby acknowledging that one area might trig-
ger the other.121
117 Claus Kress ‘On the Outer Limits of Crimes against Humanity: The Concept of
Organization within the Policy Requirement: Some Reflections on the March
2010 ICC Kenya Decision’ (2010) 23 Leiden Journal of International Law 855–
73; William A Schabas ‘Prosecuting Dr Strangelove, Goldfinger, and the Joker at
the International Criminal Court: Closing the Loopholes’ (2010) 23 Leiden Jour-
nal of International Law 847–53; see also International Criminal Court ‘Decision
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investiga-
tion into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya’ ICC-01/09-19 (31 March 2010),
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Hans-Peter Kaul 83–163.
118 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (adopted 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987) 1465
UNTS 112.
119 Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgment) IT-96-23 (22 February 2001).para. 470 (ii).
120 Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgment) IT-96-23 (22 February 2001) para. 471.
121 UN HRC ‘General Comment No 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation
Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant’ (29 March 2004) GAOR 59th Session
Supp 40 vol 1, 175.
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A similar-sounding argument, which nonetheless follows a different logic,
is brought forward by McIntyre. He states that the courts and tribunals are
setting their own human rights standards in the context of courts dealing
with crimes committed in times of armed conflict.122 For him, the relevant
question is not whether the court and tribunals adhere to international hu-
man rights standards but whether the standards they are setting themselves
are deemed proper so that the court or tribunal can be said to comply with
the rule of law.123
This point of view has, in turn, been described as dangerous by Sluiter.
His arguments are twofold: firstly, he points to the universality of human
rights as minimum standards, like the majority of the fair trial rights.124 He
does, however, admit that there are indeed rules that need to be adapted
and re-interpreted in the context of international criminal courts and tri-
bunals. Second, he claims that ‘one notices the harmful tendency that this
so-called re-interpretation of the human rights corpus in light of the unique
character and circumstances of international criminal tribunals practically
by definition results in reduced protection, and always favours the inter-
ests of prosecution and/or victims over those of the accused’.125
Though international criminal law and human rights law, as demonstrat-
ed above, have many things in common, they are, in some ways, exact op-
posites. Not only in the way elaborated on before the ICTY in Kunarac,
but also in a dogmatic sense of emergence and applications of the two
regimes a substantial structural difference exists. Human rights, as part of
public international law, are subject to the gradual development and inter-
122 G McIntryre ‘Defending Human Rights in the Area of International Humanitari-
an Law: Human Rights in the Jurisprudence of the ICTY‘ in Gideon Boas and
William A Schabas (eds) International Criminal Law Developments in the Case
Law of the ICTY (Brill Leiden 2003) at 194.
123 G McIntryre ‘Defending Human Rights in the Area of International Humanitari-
an Law: Human Rights in the Jurisprudence of the ICTY‘ in Gideon Boas and
William A Schabas (eds) International Criminal Law Developments in the Case
Law of the ICTY (Brill Leiden 2003) at 194.
124 Göran Sluiter ‘Human rights protection in the ICC pre-trial phase’ in Carsten
Stahn and Göran Sluiter (eds) The Emerging Practice of the International Crimi-
nal Court (Nijhoff Leiden 2009) 459-476, 461.
125 Göran Sluiter ‘Human rights protection in the ICC pre-trial phase’ in Carsten
Stahn and Göran Sluiter (eds) The Emerging Practice of the International Crimi-
nal Court (Nijhoff Leiden 2009) 459-476, 461.
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pretation of this area of law by way of custom and gradual codification.126
They are also often formulated in a general way, which makes their inter-
pretation by treaty bodies and courts a vital component of their implemen-
tation.127 On the other hand, criminal law, albeit also often leaving lacunae
in its subject-matter provisions that require interpretation by judges is by
definition more static, because it operates in an environment in which the
need to reach a verdict is limited by basic principles of criminal law of
which nullum crimen sine lege is one of the most important.
Legal Basis for the Application of Extra-Statutory Substantive Law
Having established the close relationship between human rights law and
international criminal law, their similarities and differences, and having
concluded that, indeed, it can be, from a practical point of view, advisable
or even necessary for an international criminal court or tribunal to seek
guidance from the vast area of human rights law in specific cases, the
question is: what is the basis on which the institutions are authorized to do
so? The statutes of the respective international criminal courts and tri-
bunals establish the crimes which are covered by their jurisdiction. How-
ever, these statutes are only applicable to the respective tribunals and do
not represent universally valid codifications of international criminal law,
which makes them not so much of a criminal code but rather a ‘specifica-
tion of the jurisdictional authority’128 of the respective court of tribunal.129
Neither is it correct to assume that these statutes do in all cases merely
represent a written record of an already existing customary rule even
though, it is well possible that some of the provisions laid down in the
Rome Statute will be an orientation for other courts and tribunals and as
such slowly turn to be customary international law.
II.
126 See eg Hersch Lauterpacht ‘Codification and Development of International Law’
(1955) 49(1) American Journal of International Law 16-43.
127 See also Louise Doswald-Beck and Sylvain Vité ‘International Humanitarian
Law and Human Rights Law’ (1993) 293 International Review of the Red Cross,
available at <https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jmrt.htm>
(31 October 2017).
128 Antonio Cassese International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 2008) 5.
129 Antonio Cassese International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 2008) 14.
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Ad Hoc Tribunals
Rather, international criminal law is based on a variety of sources, both
written and unwritten ones. This is hard to consolidate with the traditional
Romano-Germanic conception of criminal law as an entity that interprets
and applies written legal provisions.130 However, international criminal
law, as a branch of public international law, is subject to the very same
sources that apply to the rest of this field. As long as there is no exhaustive
lists of crimes available for the respective tribunal (as it is the case at the
Rome Stature for the ICC), the courts and tribunals therefore have to ori-
entate themselves on the general sources of public international law.
A guideline for applicable sources and their hierarchy is enshrined in
the famous Article 38 ICJ Statute, which reflects the sources of interna-
tional law proper.131 Article 38 designates that the ICJ shall apply
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teach-
ings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
Hence, the courts and tribunals can mostly draw upon primary sources
(treaties and custom) as well as secondary sources (law-making processes
envisaged by customary rules or treaty provisions) and finally general
principles of law and international criminal law.132
The ICTR and the ICTY are, therefore, under a current pressure to justi-
fy their use of human rights law by reference to the state of customary in-
ternational law in the area. As we will see in Chapter Two, they undertake
this exercise applying varying degrees of effort and dogmatically sound
methodology.
1.
130 Antonio Cassese International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 2008) 14.
131 Ian Brownlie Principles of Public International Law (6th ed OUP Oxford 2012)
5.
132 Antonio Cassese International Criminal Law (2nd edition OUP Oxford 2008) 14.
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ICC
The law applicable for the ICC is, different from what is stipulated for the
ad hoc tribunals, expressly stated in a provision which for large parts, mir-
rors Article 38 ICJ Statute but adapts it to the specific requirements of a
criminal law regime. Article 21 Rome Statute is lex specialis to Article 38
ICJ Statute and the first codification of the sources of international crimi-
nal law133. Article 21(1) of the Rome Statute determines that the ICC shall
apply
a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of
Procedure and Evidence;
(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the
principles and rules of international law, including the established
principles of the international law of armed conflict;
(c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from na-
tional laws of legal systems of the world including, as appropriate, the
national laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over
the crime, provided that those principles are not inconsistent with this
Statute and with international law and internationally recognized
norms and standards.
Article 21(2) and (3) clarify further:
2. The Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its
previous decisions.
3. The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must
be consistent with internationally recognized human rights, and be
without any adverse distinction founded on grounds such as gender as
defined in article 7, paragraph 3, age, race, colour, language, religion
or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin,
wealth, birth or other status.
Article 21 Rome Statute, unlike Article 38 ICJ Statute, provides a clear hi-
erarchy between the sources of law. First and foremost, the ICC is to use
2.
133 Margaret Mcauliffe deGuzman in: Otto Triffterer, Rome Statute, 2nd ed p 703; G
Bitti ‘Article 21 of the Statute of the ICC and the treatment of sources of law in
the jurisprudence of the ICC’ in Carsten Stahn and Göran Sluiter (eds) The
Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (Koninkllijke Brill 2008)
285-304 at 286-7.
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its statute and its Elements of Crime and Rules of Procedure and Evi-
dence, all secondary sources may only be used if a gap exists in the
Statute. Such was affirmed by the Appeals Chamber of the Court.134
The ’Elements of Crime’ which, pursuant to Article 9 Rome Statute, as-
sist the Court in the interpretation and application of the statutory rules on
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes are a valuable, non-
binding guideline for the court in defining the crimes under its jurisdic-
tion. However, in order to capture the core definition of the crimes and
what they contain, the courts and tribunals may often have to resort to
documents other than the actual statutes related documents.
Art. 21 (3) Rome Statute
Article 21(3) Rome Statute explicitly mention that the application of the
law according to Art. 21 must happen in accordance with internationally
recognized human rights. Does this mean that the article gives the Court
the authorization to look at human rights law for the definition of crimes
under the statute? Rather, what the drafters of the Statute had in mind
when drafting this provision were indeed procedural rights, namely the
procedural rights of the accused.135 This spirit of the provision becomes
clear when one looks at a footnote that the article included in its Final
Draft Version. It stated:
‘It was generally agreed that consistency with international human
rights law would require that interpretation by the Court be consistent with
the principle of nullum crimen sine lege. A view was also expressed that
this should be explicitly stated in this article or be made clearer in article
21.’136
a.
134 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Judgment on the Appeal of Mr.
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on the Defense Challenge to the Ju-
risdiction of the Court pursuant to Article 19(2)(a) of the Statute of 3 October
2006) ICC-01/04-01/06-772 (14 December 2006) para. 34.
135 Margaret McAuliffe deGuzman ‘Art. 21: Applicable law’ in Otto Triffterer Com-
mentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2nd edition
Beck Munich 2008) 701-712, 711.
136 Draft Art. 20 United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court ‘Report of the Preparatory
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court: Addendum’
(15-17 July 1998) A/Conf.183/2/Add.1 para. 63; In the draft article, what is now
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Hence, this provision entails the explicit right of the ICC to apply pro-
cedural customary international human rights law.137 As such, it frees the
ICC from engaging in discussions the ad hoc tribunals had to engage in
regarding the legal authorization to apply procedural human rights stan-
dards.
However, the mere fact that the Rome Statute mentions human rights as
an underlying constitutional principle against which the application and
interpretation of the Rome Statute has to be measured does not mean that
existing human rights norms can be turned into penal provisions under in-
ternational law.
Art. 21 (1) (b) Rome Statute
According to Article 21 (1) (b) Rome Statute, the ICC can apply, ‘where
appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international
law, including the established principles of the international law of armed
conflict’. The question arises what are ‘applicable treaties’ in the context
of this provision. The ICTY took this to apply international conventions
which bind the parties having jurisdiction in the case.138 For the ICC, the
same argument which has been used to dismiss the direct application of
national laws is equally valid: in case of this approach, the ICC would ap-
ply different standards to different accused but for the same conduct.139
According to another, very restricted view, the ‘applicable treaties’ are
merely the Geneva Conventions (and possibly the Genocide Convention)
as they are incorporated in the definition of war crimes. 140
b.
regulated under Article 21 was proposed to be Art. 20, while nullum crimen sine
lege (now Article 22) was discussed as Article 21.
137 See Part One Chapter Two above.
138 Margaret McAuliffe deGuzman ‘Art. 21: Applicable law’ in Otto Triffterer Com-
mentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2nd edition
Beck Munich 2008) 701-712, 706.
139 See also Margaret McAuliffe deGuzman ‘Art. 21: Applicable law’ in Otto
Triffterer Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
(2nd edition Beck Munich 2008) 701-712, 704 in relation to the application of
domestic law.
140 Margaret McAuliffe deGuzman ‘Art. 21: Applicable law’ in Otto Triffterer Com-
mentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2nd edition
Beck Munich 2008) 701-712, 704.
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Art. 21 (1) (b) Rome Statute unproblematically applies to conventions
which a) are part of customary international law and b) are punitive in na-
ture (e.g. Genocide Convention or Geneva Convention and Protocols.)
The problem of application of human rights treaties in the substantive con-
text is less one in the case of treaties which provide for penal conse-
quences in case of violation as for example the CAT. It is more problemat-
ic in the case of recently emerged concepts like gender-based rights and
gender-based violence, concepts which are controversial amongst States
and which, in their current state of evolution, consist of a multitude of
binding as well as non-binding instruments with no punitive character.
Central to the understanding of the reference of international courts and
tribunals to other areas of human rights is the concept of customary inter-
national law. A careful examination of whether or not a particular action is
prohibited under customary international law is particularly important in
the context of criminal law and the significance of the principle of legality.
The UN Secretary-General’s report calling for the establishment of the
ICTY explicitly states
[i]n the view of the Secretary-General, the application of the principle
nullum crimen sine lege requires that the international tribunal should ap-
ply rules of international humanitarian law which are beyond any doubt
part of customary law so that the problem of adherence of some but not all
States to specific conventions does not arise. This would appear to be par-
ticularly important in the context of an international tribunal prosecuting
persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian
law.141
This report was later approved by the Security Council Resolution
which established the ICTY.142 ‘According to the Secretary-General’s Re-
port as a whole (approved by the Security Council), international human
rights law of crime and criminal procedure should generally apply in an
international criminal tribunal’.143
But, whereas in a national legal criminal system, customary law is
scarcely used in criminal trials, the international arena still depends to a
141 UNSC ‘Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security
Council Resolution 808 (1993)’ (3 May 1993) UN Doc S/25704 para. 34.
142 UNSC Res 827 (1993) (25 May 1993) SCOR 48th Year 29 para. 1.
143 Kenneth S Gallant ‘International Criminal Courts and the Making of Public Inter-
national Law: New Roles for International Organizations and Individuals’ (2010)
43 The John Marshall Law Review 603–34, 609.
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large degree on customary law to reflect the rapid developments within the
international community, with which the development of new treaty law
can only marginally keep up. In the words of Malcolm Shaw ‘[c]ustom
within contemporary legal systems, particularly in the developed world, is
relatively cumbersome and unimportant and often only of nostalgic value.
In international law on the other hand it is a dynamic source of law in the
light of the nature of the international system and its lack of centralised
government organs’144
‘Principles and rules of international law’ in Art. 21 (1) (b) Rome
Statute authorizes the court formally to apply the necessary customary
law. This approach is shared amongst some of the most senior commenta-
tors and scholars in international criminal law.145
Schabas argues that the reference in Art. 21 (1) (b) Rome Statute to
‘principles and rules of international law’ suggests a resort to Art. 38 (1)
(a)-(c) ICJ Statute and that Art. 21 (1) (b) encompasses all three sources of
law enlisted in Art. 38(1) (a) – (c). He justifies this with reference to
Art. 21 (1) (c) Rome Statute which, albeit including a reference to ‘general
principles of law’ just as Art. 38 (1) (c) ICJ Statute follows a comparative
criminal law approach which is not so much focussed on delineating the
content of public international law as such but rather calls at the Court to
look at national laws representing legal systems of the world (including
the laws of States that would normally have jurisdiction over the case) to
derive principles the court may apply.146
Art. 21 (1) (b) provides that the ‘applicable treaties, and the principles
and rules of international law’ the court shall apply must only be applied
as secondary rules and only ‘where appropriate’. The court therefore has
to find a reason for the application of Art. 21 (1) (b) or (c), an objective in
144 Malcolm N Shaw International Law (6 ed Cambridge University Press Cam-
bridge 2008) 73.
145 Eg Alain Pellet who argues that ‘In reality, there is little doubt that this provision
[Art. 21(1)(b)] refers, exclusively, to customary international law, of which the
“established principles of international armed conflict” clearly form an integral
part’ Alain Pellet ‘Applicable Law’ in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta John RWD
Jones (eds) The Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary
vol 2 (OUP Oxford 2002) 1051-1084 at 1071 or William A. Schabas The Interna-
tional Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute (OUP Oxford 2010)
391.
146 William A. Schabas The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the
Rome Statute (OUP Oxford 2010) 391.
Part One: The Relationship between International Criminal Law and Human Rights
66
the Statute or the Rules of Procedure and Evidence as the primary sources
of law that those primary sources do not meet by themselves. Regarding
the substantive parts of the Rome Statute, this follows logically from hav-
ing jurisdiction over the crimes enlisted in Arts 6-9 pursuant to Art. 5
Rome Statute. Therefore the court also must have the incidental jurisdic-
tionto decide how the crimes are defined and what they contain (Kompe-
tenz-Kompetenz).147 ‘Incidental jurisdiction […] covers the rules that the
court can apply to settle a preliminary question whose resolution is neces-
sary to decide on the principal question brought to the court. Of course,
the final decision of the court is always based on the legal rules falling un-
der its primary jurisdiction […] the ‘’outside’ rules […] come into play as
legal rules proper’.148
The ICC Chambers and the Office of the Prosecutor seem to agree in
their understanding that the court is only allowed to apply substantive ex-
tra-statutory rules as long as they are customary international law.149 In its
first ever judgment, however, the court refers to customary international
law only indirectly, citing the ICRC Study on Customary International
Law in footnotes on the definition of a non-international armed conflict as
one of several sources.150 In her separate and dissenting opinion, Judge
Odio-Benito referred to customary international law as one of several
sources of law along with the Rome Statute and human rights treaties in
general.151
147 Giulia Pinzauti ‘The European Court of Human Rights’ Incidental Application of
International Criminal Law and Humanitarian Law- A Critical Discussion of
Kononov v. Latvia’ (2008) 6 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1043-1060,
1048-49 and explanations in fn 6.
148 Giulia Pinzauti ‘The European Court of Human Rights’ Incidental Application of
International Criminal Law and Humanitarian Law- a Critical Discussion of
Kononov v. Latvia’ 6 (2008) Journal of International Criminal Justice 1048-49
1049.
149 See eg Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Decision on the confirmation of
charges) ICC-01/04-01/803-tEN (29 January 2007) para 274; Prosecutor v
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Prosecution’s Closing Brief) ICC-01/04-01/06-2748-
Red fn 78, paras 52, 53, 138, 150 (1 June 2011).
150 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Judgment) ICC-01/04-01/06 (14 March
2012) fn 1646.
151 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Judgment. Separate and Dissenting Opin-
ion of Judge Odio-Benito) ICC-01/04-01/06 (14 March 2012) para 6.
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Guidance and Interpretational Aid
‘Interpretational aid’152 or ‘guidance’153 are often-employed buzzwords in
terms of a broad reference to human rights or humanitarian law. These
vague terms tend to be invoked by court in tribunals when trying to avoid
creating precedent by declaring a certain issue of human rights law bind-
ing law to be applied before their court. Referring to a legal source outside
the respective Statute as ‘guidance’ or ‘inspiration’ seems to be an easy
way out which contains the benefit of referring to a source of law to
strengthen the legal weight and the persuasion of the argument while, at
the same time, avoiding to set precedent for a future application of extra-
statutory sources with all its complications. It is exactly for these reasons,
however, that a use of these legally vague terms is problematic. The
Statutes of the courts and tribunals are to be applied subject to the sources
of public international law as listed in Art. 38 ICJ Statute or subject to the
lex specialis of Art. 21 Rome Statute in case of the ICC. The judges would
be entitled to use human rights law as guidance in order to determine
whether or not a provision inside or outside the Statute, a legal concept or
principle, is binding law according to one of the sources enlisted in either
Art. 38 ICJ or Art. 21. Rome Statute. However, in order to do that the
courts have to clearly label their exercise as interpretational aid towards
clarifying the binding concept of a specific character under a specific pro-
vision of their sources. In the absence of that, invoking vague terms such
‘inspiration’ or ‘guidance’ means having the cake while eating it which, in
terms of criminal law, is a dangerous exercise which can easily violate the
rights of the defendant and should therefore be avoided.
c.
152 Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgment) IT-96-23 (22 February 2001) 482.
153 Prosecutor v Blaškić (Judgment) IT-95-14-T (3 March 2000) 329; Prosecutor v
Delić (Judgment) IT-04-83-T (15 September 2008) footnote 153; Prosecutor v
Deronjić (Judgment) IT-02-61-S (30 March 2004) para 159; Prosecutor v Galić
(Judgment) IT-98-29-T (5 December 2003) footnote 87; Prosecutor v Halilović
(Judgment) IT-01-48-T (16 November 2005) para 99; Prosecutor v Haradinaj
(Judgment) IT-04-84-T (3 April 2008) para 107; Prosecutor v Kordić (Appela
Judgment) IT-95-14/2-A (17 December 2004) para 69; Prosecutor v Krajišnik
(Judgment) IT-00-39-T (27 September 2006) para. 705; Prosecutor v Kupreškić
(Judgment) IT-95-16 (14 January 2000) paras 588, 590; Prosecutor v Limaj
(Judgment) IT-03-66-T (30 November 2005) para 86; Prosecutor v Tadić (Appeal
Judgment) IT-94-1-A (15 July 1999) para. 321; Prosecutor v Delalić et al
(Celebići Case Judgment) IT-96-21-T (16 November 1998) para 432.
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Application of Substantive Extra-Statutory Human Rights Law and
the Principle of Nullum Crimen Sine Lege
The concept of nullum crimen sine lege?
The principles of nullum crimen sine lege (no crime without law) and nul-
la poena sine lege (no punishment without law) have been called the ‘bul-
wark of the citizen against the state’s omnipotence (…) the Criminal Code
is the criminal’s magna charta. It guarantees his or her right to be punished
only in accordance with the requirements set out by the law and only with-
in the limits laid down in the law’154 for conduct that was ‘unambiguously
criminal at the time of its commission’.155 There are four elements which
together make up the nullum crimen principle in the national setting: the
law must be written law; the crime must be defined with sufficient certain-
ty; the law must not be applied retroactively; the crime must not be con-
strued by way of analogy.156 Nullum crimen and nullla poena sine lege are
connected to the requirements of specificity, certainty, foreseeability and
accessibility of criminal law.157 The principles are the cornerstone of any
punitive system which invokes legitimacy and basis on the rule of law.
Nullum crimen and nulla poena sine lege touch upon one of the most fun-
III.
1.
154 Franz von Liszt ‚Die deterministischen Gegner der Zweckstrafe‘ (1893) 3
Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft 325-70 at 357 (translation by
Antonio Cassese in International Criminal Law 2 ed Oxford University Press
(2008) at 37).
155 Susan Lamb ‘Nullum Crimen, Nulla Poena Sine Lege in International Criminal
Law’ in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, John R. W. D. Jones (eds) The Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary Volume I Oxford
University Press Oxford (2002) at 733.
156 See eg Susan Lamb ‘Nullum Crimen, Nulla Poena Sine Lege in International
Criminal Law’ in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, John R. W. D. Jones (eds) The
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary Volume I Ox-
ford University Press Oxford (2002) at 734; Prosecutor v. Vasiljević (Judgment)
IT-98-32-T (29 November 2002) para 193; see also Mohamed Shahabuddeen,
‘Does the Principle of Legality Stand in the Way of Progressive Development of
Law?’ (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1007-1017, at 1008.
157 Prosecutor v. Vasiljević (Judgment) IT-98-32-T (29 November 2002 para 193; see
also Mohamed Shahabuddeen, ‘Does the Principle of Legality Stand in the Way
of Progressive Development of Law?’ (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal
Justice 1007-1017, at 1008.
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damental functions of criminal law, namely deterrence of crimes.158 Any
deterrent effect whatsoever as a prerequisite requires maximum foresee-
ability and legal certainty and regular enforcement of criminal law.159
Nullum Crimen Sine Lege in International Criminal Law
The application of the principle nullum crimen sine lege in international
criminal law faces problems which are rooted in the peculiarities of inter-
national criminal law as a public international law regime applying crimi-
nal law.
In international criminal law in its current form, crimes are not defined
in a specificity that would be required in national law. Many crimes are
construed in a general manner and contain common place terms like ‘inhu-
mane acts’160 or ‘great suffering’161 that lack the precision needed for the
law to be applied without in-depth interpretation by the courts.162 The in-
ternational legal order, as opposed to national legal orders is merely loose-
ly structured one with sovereign legislature163 and the criteria of foresee-
ability and accessibility are therefore particularly difficult to measure
and/or to fulfil.164
It has been claimed that the international legal order rests ‘uncomfort-
ably’ besides nullum crimen sine lege.165 Thedor Meron, in 1987, took the
2.
158 See eg Andrew Ashworth Principles of Criminal Law (6th ed OUP Oxford 2009)
16-7.
159 See also Andrew Ashworth Principles of Criminal Law (6th ed OUP Oxford
2009) 16, 63-66.
160 See Art. 7 (1) (k) Rome Statute.
161 See Art. 8 (2)(a)(iii) Rome Statute.
162 See also A. Cassese International Criminal Law 2nd ed Oxford University Press
(2008) at 41-2.
163 Margaret Mcauliffe deGuzman in: Triffterer, Rome Statute, 2nd ed p 703.
164 See also Prosecutor v Vasiljevic (Judgment) IT-98-32-T (29 November 2002)
para. 193, Jonas Nilsson ‘The Principle of Nullum Crimen Sine Lege’ in
Olaoluwa Olusanya Rethinking International Criminal Law: The Substantive
Part (Europa Law Publishing Groningen 2007) 35-64, 62-63.
165 Susan Lamb ‘Nullum Crimen, Nulla Poena Sine Lege in International Criminal
Law’ in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, John R. W. D. Jones (eds) The Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary Volume I Oxford
University Press Oxford (2002) at 746; see also Jonas Nilsson ‘The Principle of
Nullum Crimen Sine Lege’ in Olaoluwa Olusanya Rethinking International
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pragmatic stance that international criminal tribunals will ‘continue to be
guided by the degree of offensiveness of certain acts to human dignity’.166
Yet, the offensive, debasing and criminal character of an act and, follow-
ing from this, the foreseeability of the act as prohibited and enforced by
criminal penalties is not always clear cut in the context of international
criminal law. Whereas it is clear that the killing of a person in peacetime
and in the absence of any grounds for justification such as self-defence, is
a crime, the same conduct, in the context of an armed conflict, is not nec-
essarily a punishable act and may in fact not be penalized. Apart from the
fact that it therefore cannot be assumed that the penal nature of an act and
its seriousness is always obvious in the context of mass crimes, there is
another factor which makes nullum crimen sine lege in international law
differ from its application in national law. International criminal law fea-
tures crimes that do not necessarily have a counterpart of a similar mani-
festation in national law.167 Others are based on acts which might have an
equivalent in national criminal codes but these acts are extended by an ad-
ditional element, which mirrors the context of the crime and the aggrevat-
ed circumstances, which turns these actions into crimes affecting the inter-
national community as a whole.168
Hence, courts are needed to define the exact contents of these provi-
sions gradually, applying the broad definitions to a multitude of different
scenarios that might not even have been foreseen by their drafters on a
case-by-case basis. Therefore, judicial analysis of statutory rules, treaties
and customary law are a vital component of international criminal law,
more so than in most national criminal courts.
Criminal Law: The Substantive Part (Europa Law Publishing Groningen 2007)
35-64 at 39.
166 Theodor Meron ‘The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law’ 1987 81(2) Amer-
ican Journal of International Law 348-370, 361.
167 A different opinion is voiced by Jonas Nilsson who argues that nullum crimen
sine lege will hardly be a successful challenge in contemporary international
criminal law precisely because of the seriousness of the crime and, as Nilsson
claims, because ‘these crimes, or crimes very similar to them, most likely existed
in the domestic criminal law of the defendant’ Jonas Nilsson ‘The Principle of
Nullum Crimen Sine Lege’ in Olaoluwa Olusanya Rethinking International
Criminal Law: The Substantive Part (Europa Law Publishing Groningen 2007)
35-64, 64.
168 Georg Dahm, Jost Delbrück and Rüdiger Wolfrum Völkerrecht Volume I/3: Die
Formen des völkerrechtlichen Handelns; Die inhaltliche Ordnung der interna-
tionalen Gemeinschaft (2nd edition De Gruyter Berlin 2002), 1088.
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Furthermore, the lack of a central authority or a court of higher instance
complicates a stringent jurisprudence further and leads to the fact that any
specification and interpretation of the general rules must remain decentral-
ized and fragmentary.169
One of the consequences of this state of affairs is that judges, unlike in
national legal systems, often have to take recourse to extra-statutory law,
in particular to customary international law, in order to solve contempo-
rary legal questions.170 Because international criminal law is also a rela-
tively recent discipline and as such cannot resort to lex lata as comprehen-
sive and sophisticated as it might be the case in domestic systems,171 it
also cannot take recourse to a catalogue of well-defined and sufficiently
large customary international law,172 often, judgements in international
criminal law ‘appear instead to be largely declaratory of nascent and pre-
viously unexpressed customary principles’.173
This is the background before which the area of conflict between nul-
lum crimen sine lege and the use of extra-statutory law arises. Public inter-
national law has always been vulnerable to criticism of being too vague,
too open to interpretation, hardly law at all. The old criticism that ‘the bor-
derlines between interpretation of existing law and the making of new law
are inevitably fluid’174 are equally true for international criminal law in its
contemporary work-in-progress-form.
169 Antonio Cassese International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 2008)
42-3.
170 Regarding the importance of customary international law in a public legal order
lacking a common legislative see Jost Delbrück and Rüdiger Wolfrum (eds) Völk-
errecht Volume I/1: Die Grundlagen; die Völkerrechtssubjekte (2nd edition De
Gruyter Berlin 1989), 55.
171 Noora Arajarvi ’Between Lex Lata and Lex Ferenda – Customary International
(Criminal) Law and the Principle of Legality ‘ 15 Tilburg Law Review
(2010-2011) 163-182 at 168.
172 Susan Lamb ‘Nullum Crimen, Nulla Poena Sine Lege in International Criminal
Law’ in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, John R. W. D. Jones (eds) The Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary Volume I Oxford
University Press Oxford (2002) at 745.
173 Susan Lamb ‘Nullum Crimen, Nulla Poena Sine Lege in International Criminal
Law’ in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, John R. W. D. Jones (eds) The Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary Volume I Oxford
University Press Oxford (2002) at 745.
174 Wolfgang Friedmann ‘The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases – A Critique’
(1970) 64 American Journal of International Law 229-240 at 235.
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Acting under such preconditions, it seems particularly important to
safeguard the rights of any accused by a strict interpretation of nullum
crimen sine lege.
There is a dispute amongst scholars as to just how strictly nullum
crimen sine lege should be applied in international criminal law.
The most extreme position is that the principle of nullum crimen sine
lege is only applicable in domestic law.175 This opinion is to be disregard-
ed. Even though international criminal law is a branch of public interna-
tional law and the sources relevant for public international law are there-
fore in principal applicable to international criminal law also, a mere refer-
ence to this does not relieve from a discussion of the principle problem
that international law is a system of criminal law and ultimately will rule
over the criminal punishment in form of deprivation of liberty of individu-
als. Hence, it requires principles guaranteeing a fair way of establishing
guilt or innocence of this individual.
According to another straits of arguments, nullum crimen sine lege in
international law is broader a. because of the nature of international law
and b. because the protected interest is peace and security and the ‘preser-
vation of the world order’,176 tilting the balance to be struck between the
competing interests in favour of the protection of peace and security. 177 In
general, this is a variation of the discussion of substantive justice vs prin-
ciple of legality, which in international criminal law prominently has been
led at the time of the Nuremburg trial.178 Supporters of the doctrine of
substantive justice recognized supremacy of substantive justice to be met-
175 Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg ‘Criminal International Law and Customary Inter-
national Law’ in Andreas Zimmermann (ed) International Criminal Law and the
Current Development of Public International Law (Duncker and Humblot Berlin
2003) 27-46 at 28.
176 M Cherif Bassiouni Crimes against Humanity in International Criminal Law
(2nd ed Kluwer Law International The Hague 1992) 144.
177 M Cherif Bassiouni Crimes against Humanity in International Criminal Law (2nd
ed Kluwer Law International The Hague 1999) 144; see Bruce Broomhall ‘Art
22: Nullum crimen sine lege’ Otto Triffterer Commentary on the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court (2nd edition Beck Munich 2008) 713-729, 718
fn 30 for Art. 22.
178 Most prominently Hans Kelsen ’Will the Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunals
Constitute a Precedent in International Law?’ (1947) 1 International Law Quar-
terly 153-71, 165; Antonio Cassese ’Crimes against Humanity’ in Antonio Cass-
ese, Paola Gaeta John RWD Jones (eds) The Rome Statue of the International
Criminal Court: A Commentary vol 1 (OUP Oxford 2002) 353-78, 354-5.
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ed out over procedural questions regarding the formal prohibition of the
conduct by law at the time the action was taken. 179 The doctrine of sub-
stantive justice, in contrast, concentrates on the prohibition of socially
harmful conduct or conduct which is dangerous to society or, in the case
of international criminal law, the international community and the preser-
vation of its peace and security.180 However, the major arguments behind
the principle of nullum crimen sine lege namely, legitimacy, deterrence
rule of law, are not touched by these arguments, and they do require a nar-
row construction of nullum crimen. These principles and aims of criminal
law are absolute and cannot be lightly given up, even in the context of
mass crimes. Whereas ‘threat to international peace and security’ is in it-
self a wide term whose definition is contested and evolves over time, the
right to a fair trial is absolute and not open to derogation.181 A trial is ei-
ther fair, or it is not. In any criminal trial, one of its most important com-
ponents, nullum crimen sine lege, which is part of customary international
law,182 must be vigorously adhered to. This is even more crucial when
keeping in mind that the undertaking of international criminal law was a
controversial one from the beginning and has from the very start, been
struggling with claims of violations of the principle of legality.183 Whereas
these claims might have had some truth to it in the era of Nuremberg184,
there is less need, in modern international courts and tribunals, with its in-
179 Claus Kreß ‘Nulla poena nullum crimen sine lege’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed) Max
Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law 2nd ed (OUP 2012) vol VII
889-899 para 16.
180 Antonio Cassese International Criminal Law (2nd edition OUP Oxford 2008) 36.
181 See for example Art. 4 (2) ICCPR; Art. 15 (2) ECHR.
182 Susan Lamb ‘Nullum Crimen, Nulla Poena Sine Lege in International Criminal
Law’ in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, John R. W. D. Jones (eds) The Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary Volume I Oxford
University Press Oxford (2002) at 734; Göran Sluiter ‘Human Rights Protection
in the ICC pre-trial phase’ in Carsten Stahn and Göran Sluiter (eds) The Emerg-
ing Practice of the International Criminal Court (Nijhoff Leiden 2009) at 461.
183 See further Hans-Heinrich Jeschenk ‘The General Principles of International
Criminal Law Set out in Nuremberg, as Mirrored in the ICC Statute’ (2004) Jour-
nal of International Criminal Justice 38-55, 40-42.
184 This is true, at the very least, when it comes to the prosecution for crimes against
peace and crimes against humanity; See inter alia Claus Kreß ‚Nulla poena nul-
lum crimen crimen sine lege‘ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed) Max Planck Encyclopedia
of Public International Law Oxford University Press (2012) para 16; see also An-
tonio Cassese International Criminal Law (2nd edition OUP Oxford 2008) 38-39.
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creasingly vast amount of case law, to open themselves to criticism be-
cause of a broad construction of the international crimes it has jurisdiction
over.185 This is particularly important when keeping in mind that since the
Nuremberg Trials, basically all relevant universal and regional human
rights treaties have included the principle nullum crimen sine lege as one
of the basic components of the rule of law and a most fundamental human
right.186 This naturally had to have an effect on the conduct of internation-
al courts and tribunals set up by the international community and, again,
shows the interconnectedness between international criminal law and hu-
man right law.187 Criminal courts, due to their nature, and due to their
power to infringe upon one of the individual’s most basic human rights,
the right to liberty of person,188 are not the right forum to expedite the pro-
gressive development of international law. They can further such develop-
ment by way of progressive interpretation of existing laws only to the ex-
tent a strict construction of the principle of nullum crimen sine lege allows
it. In this sense, there approach has to be a ‘conservative’ one,189 ‘pre-
dictable and precise’.190 A less stringent approach is also not necessary.
International criminal law can evolve and new crimes can develop as the
recently-included definition of aggression into the Rome Statute shows.191
The successful definition of the crime of aggression, which had been
deemed to be very unlikely before, shows that compromise and coopera-
tion in the advancement of criminal law making is by all means possible in
the international arena even given a strict application of nullum crimen
sine lege.
185 See also Antonio Cassese International Criminal Law 2nd edition Oxford Univer-
sity Press (2008) at 40-1,see also Susan Lamb ‘Nullum Crimen, Nulla Poena Sine
Lege in International Criminal Law’ in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, John R W
D Jones (eds) The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commen-
tary Volume I Oxford University Press Oxford (2002) at 740-1.
186 Antonio Cassese International Criminal Law 2nd edition Oxford University Press
(2008) at 41.
187 Antonio Cassese International Criminal Law (2ed Oxford University Press 2008)
at 40.
188 See Art. 8 ICCPR; Art. 3 UDHR, Srt. 5(1) ECHR, Art. 7(1) ACHR,
Art. 6ACHRP.
189 Theodor Meron ‘Revival of Customary Humanitarian Law’ (2004) 99(4) Ameri-
can Journal of International Law 817-834, at 817.
190 Theodor Meron ‘Revival of Customary Humanitarian Law’ (2004) 99(4) Ameri-
can Journal of International Law 817-834, at 822.
191 Generally, the Rome Statute can be amended pursuant to its Articles 121 and 122.
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This strict application does, however, have to be adapted to the realities
of law making in international law, in particular, to the codification and
progressive development of public international law through custom on
one hand and to the young age of international criminal law as such. The
scarceness of State practise in the classical sense in this area is an obstacle
for the deduction of customary international law in the area. Susan Lam
therefore claims that because of this scarceness, the jurisprudence of the
ad hoc tribunals often seems to convey a de lege ferenda character.192 Re-
lying on the theory of modern positivism as suggested by Bruno Simma
and Andreas Paulus that pays regard to the shifting position of States in
international law and gives increased attention to alternative manifesta-
tions of State practise and opinion juris, a strict interpretation of nullum
crimen sine lege is feasible without compromising the greater rationale be-
hind international criminal justice.193 This approach allows for a deduction
of State practise and opinio iuris from an expanded range of actions by
States and by international institutions. State’s domestic legislations, but
also their voting records, the acceptance of work of institutions like the In-
ternational Law Commission or the ad hoc tribunals play a big part of the
deduction of customary international law.194
How is this area of conflict solved in international criminal
jurisprudence?
The ad hoc tribunals have elaborated on nullum crimen sine lege in a way
that will be beneficial for the ICC in future proceedings. The ICTY was
created with the explicit mission to only apply those legal norms which
3.
192 Susan Lamb ‘Nullum Crimen, Nulla Poena Sine Lege in International Criminal
Law’ in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, John R. W. D. Jones (eds) The Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary Volume I Oxford
University Press Oxford (2002) at 746.
193 Bruno Simma and Andreas L Paulus ‘The Responsibility of Individuals for Hu-
man Rights Abuses in Internal Conflict: Toward a World Public Order of Human
Dignity’ (1999) 93 American Journal of International Law 302-315, 306-313.
194 Bruno Simma and Andreas L Paulus ‘The Responsibility of Individuals for Hu-
man Rights Abuses in Internal Conflict: Toward a World Public Order of Human
Dignity’ (1999) 93 American Journal of International Law 302-315, 307.
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were beyond doubt part of customary international law.195 Nullum crimen
sine lege therefore demanded of the chamber to prove, when prosecuting
persons ‘responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian
law’, that the crimes in question existed in customary international law.196
Already in the early-on Tadić case, the tribunal set out four prerequisites
for a crime to be an international crime under the court’s jurisdiction: the
infringement of a rule of international humanitarian law, the customary or
treaty law character of the crime, the ‘seriousness’ of the violation of hu-
manitarian law (the crimes must constitute a breach of important values),
and the consequence of individual criminal responsibility set up by the
rule in question.197 In Milutinović et al the ICTY stated that certain be-
haviour had to be recognized as a crime ‘qua custom at the time this crime
was allegedly committed’.198
As the Trial Chamber in Furudzija has held, a conventional, non-statu-
tory provision can have an extra-conventional effect ‘to the extent that the
definition at issue codifies, or contributes to developing or crystallizing
customary international law’.199 This is uncontroversial in the case of the
ICTY which is only to apply customary international humanitarian law.
The same is, however, equally true for any other criminal court or tribunal.
Extra-statutory law can only be applied if it derived in accordance to the
195 UNSC ‘Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security
Council Resolution 808 (1993)’ (3 May 1993) UN Doc S/25704 para. 34.
196 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council
Resolution 808 (1993)’ UN Doc S/25704 at para. 29.
197 Tadić Interlocutory Appeal, para. 94; Bruno Simma and Andreas L Paulus ‘The
Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflict: To-
ward a World Public Order of Human Dignity’ (1999) 93 American Journal of
International Law 302-315 at 311; for an analysis of the realities of judicial law-
making in the early stages of the ICTY but arguing that the controversial Tadić
Appeal Decision was an the result of unique, exceptional circumstances see
Tamás Hoffmann ‘The Gentle Humanizer of Humanitarian Law – Antonio Cass-
ese and the Creation of the Customary Law of Non-International Armed Conflict’
in Carsten Stahn and Larissa van den Herik (eds) Future Perspectives on Interna-
tional Criminal Justice (Asser Press Leiden 2010). 58-80.
198 Prosecutor v Milutinović et al (Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic’s Motion Chal-
lenging Jurisdiction–Joint Criminal Enterprise) IT-99-37-AR72 (21 May 2003)
para. 9.
199 Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment) IT-95-17 (10 December 1998) para. 160;
more on the ad hoc tribunal’s interpretation of the principle of nullum crimen sine
lege see Gerhard Werle and Florian Jeßberger Principles of International Crimi-
nal Law (3rd ed OUP Oxford 2014) 40.
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rules of law-making found in the respective statutes (if any) or under
Art. 38 ICJ Statute and is customary in nature (see above under Part One
Chapter Two and Part One Chapter Three II.). As Art. 38 ICJ Statute is ap-
plicable as the indicator of sources for the ad hoc tribunals and Art. 38 ICJ
Statute mirrors Art. 21 Rome Statute in the listed sources, nothing indi-
cates that the sources of substantive law at the ICC should differ from
those of the ad hoc tribunals, in particular, because the ICTY has also en-
gaged in identifying general principles of law through comparative analy-
sis in its jurisprudence.200 It is absolutely necessary in order to safeguard a
fair trial and the observance of the principle of legality. In order to apply
an extra-statutory legal provision or use an interpretation by a court or
treaty body affiliated with a legal instrument other than the statute of the
respective court or tribunal, the responsible trial chamber needs to prove
whether the provision it seeks to apply is indeed part of customary interna-
tional law. This can at times be a difficult and controversial undertaking.
The court and tribunals need to carefully examine provisions with regard
to their status in customary international law. They then need to examine
whether the provision in question can be applied within the regime of in-
ternational criminal law, which is different, in nature and purpose, from
human rights law.
On the other hand, the ad hoc tribunals as well as the ICC repeatedly
clarified that nullum crimen sine lege does not prevent them from ‘inter-
preting and clarifying elements of a particular crime’.201 The ICTY also
relied heavily on the jurisprudence of the ECtHR in order to conclude that
nullum crimen sine lege does also not preclude ‘the progressive develop-
ment of the law by the court’.202
200 Prosecutor v Erdemović (Appeal Judgment, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge Mc
Donald and Judge Vohrah) IT-96-22-A (7 October 1997) para 40.
201 Prosecutor v. Vasiljević (Judgment) IT-98-32-T (29 November 2002) para. 196;
see also Prosecutor v Aleksovski (Appeal Judgment) IT-95-14/1 (24 March 2000)
paras126-17; Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Celebići Case Appeal Judgement)
IT-96-21-A (20 February 2001) para 173; see also Prosecutor v Imanishimwe et
al (Appeal Judgment) ICTR-99-46-A (7 July 2006) para 127.
202 Prosecutor v Milutinović et al (Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic’s Motion Chal-
lenging Jurisdiction–Joint Criminal Enterprise) IT-99-37-AR72 (21 May 2003)
para 38, referring to Kokkinakis v Greece (Judgment) (ECtHR) Series A No 260
A paras 36 and 40; EK v Turkey (Judgment) appl 28496/95 <http://hudoc.echr.co
e.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-64586> (31 October 2017) para 52; SW v
Part One: The Relationship between International Criminal Law and Human Rights
78
The jurisprudence of the ECtHR is non-binding to any international
criminal court or tribunal as such. But when interpreting the principle of
nullum crimen sine lege as a part of customary international law, the EC-
tHR offers the most sophisticated canon of jurisprudential analysis of this
principle and, as such, can be consulted by international courts and tri-
bunals. This has been recognized by the ICTR when it stated ‘[r]egional
human rights treaties, such as the European Convention of Human Rights
(ECHR)203 and the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR)204
and the jurisprudence developed thereunder, are persuasive authority
which may be of assistance in applying and interpreting the Tribunal’s ap-
plicable law. Thus, they are not binding of their own accord on the tri-
bunal. They are however, authoritative, as evidence of international cus-
tom.’205
According to the ICTY Appeals Chamber, nullum crimen sine lege only
prohibits the court ‘from creating new law or from or from interpreting ex-
isting law beyond the reasonable limits of acceptable clarification.’206
Being able to rely on customary law (which is applicable given the
structural differences of international criminal law discussed in Part One
Chapter Three I. 2. above) in accordance to Art. 38 ICJ Statute or Art. 21
Rome Statute already provides the courts and tribunal with a substantial
degree of flexibility that mirror the realities of international law but do not
provide persons with a degree of legal certainties they might be able to re-
ly on in national jurisdictions. The relatively young age of international
criminal law and the fragmentation of its jurisprudence increase the given
vagueness. This reality has to be accepted. Any further lowering of the
standard of nullum crimen sine lege on account of the peculiarities of in-
ternational criminal law is not compatible with international human rights
United Kingdom (Judgment) (ECtHR) Series A No 335 B paras 35-36; CR v
United Kingdom (Judgment) (ECtHR) Series A No 335 C para 34.
203 COE ‘Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms’ (signed 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) 213
UNTS 221.
204 American Convention on Human Rights (signed 22 November 1969, entered into
force 18 July 1978) 1144 UNTS 123 (Pact of San José).
205 Barayagwiza v Prosecutor (Decision) ICTR-97-19-A (3 November 1999) at para.
40.
206 Prosecutor v Milutinović et al (Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanic’s Motion Chal-
lenging Jurisdiction–Joint Criminal Enterprise) IT-99-37-AR72 (21 May 2003)
para. 38.
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law and jeopardises one of the most fundamental achievements the inter-
national community subscribed to: fair proceedings leading to transparent
and comprehensible outcomes based on the rule of law. Furthermore, the
vaguer the applicable law is, the more restrictive should the interpretation
and of the provision be conducted.207 For this reason, the attempt of the
ICTY Chamber in Vasiljević to water down the e principle of nullum
crimen sine lege in international criminal law are to be rejected.208 The
Trial Chamber in this case argued that the standards of accessibility and
foreseeability have to be adapted to the ‘specificity of customary interna-
tional law’.209
As Nilsson rightly argues, the specificity of customary international law
primarily lies in its character as non-written law as well as in the lack of a
centralized authority involved in its creation.210 Yet, for non-written law,
the ECtHR has affirmed the application of nullum crimen sine lege in
principal without restrictions. 211
As guaranteeing fair proceedings is an essential safeguard shielding in-
dividuals from the excess of authorities, this standard cannot be lightly
given up.212 The compromises that have to be made regarding some de-
gree of adjustment in international criminal law in this respect are due to
the nature of public international law as such and the sources from which
it derives. Compromises can, however, not be made with reference to the
nature of the crime in questions or any potential threat to peace and securi-
ty they might constitute.
207 Kokkinakis v Greece (Judgment) (ECtHR) Series A No 260 A paras 7-9.
208 Prosecutor v Vasiljević (Judgment) IT-98-32-T (29 November 2002) para 193;
see also Prosecutor v Hadžihasanović et al (Decision on Joint Challenge to Ju-
risdiction) IT-01-47-PT (12 November 2002) para. 62.
209 Prosecutor v Vasiljević (Judgment) IT-98-32-T (29 November 2002) para 193.
210 Jonas Nilsson ‘The Principle of Nullum Crimen Sine Lege’ in Olaoluwa Olu-
sanya Rethinking International Criminal Law: The Substantive Part (Europa Law
Publishing Groningen 2007) 62.
211 Eg Sunday Times v United Kingdom (ECtHR) Series A No 30 para 47.
212 See further Jonas Nilsson ‘The Principle of Nullum Crimen Sine Lege’ in
Olaoluwa Olusanya Rethinking International Criminal Law: The Substantive
Part (Europa Law Publishing Groningen 2007) 62-63.
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Concluding Remarks
What is at stake when it comes to the extra-statutory application of legal
provisions in substantive criminal law is nothing less than the principle of
nuella poena sine lege. International criminal law offers a unique area of
conflict in this respect because it combines criminal law, the formulation
of which, in national systems, is mainly in the hand of the legislative
branch, with public international law, which evolves through the way
States act and the gradual acceptance of these acts and the underlying mo-
tivations for these acts as customs and principals of law.213
This book argues in favour of a narrowly constructed application of ex-
tra-statutory human rights law. As we have seen, international criminal
law and international human rights law share many similarities. Structural
and dogmatic differences, which could call for precaution when invoking
human rights law in substantive international criminal law do in fact exist,
but they are fewer in number than sometimes argued and are often subject
to discussion and resolution.
It is argued here that the true danger in applying human rights law in
substantive international criminal law lies not in the conceptional differ-
ences of the two, but in the potential violation of the principle of nullum
crimen sine lege by way of recourse to extra-statutory law. Because of this
danger, the organs of the ICC, foreseen as the main institution for the prac-
tical application of international criminal law in the future, need to be in
agreement about the legal basis of their application of extra-statutory sub-
stantive law and to what degree of application the court is authorized by it.
Here, it is argued that Art. 21(3) Rome Statute is a provision which guar-
antees the rights of the accused person, but cannot be invoked for applying
extra-statutory substantive law. In this case, Art. 21 (1) (b) Rome Statute is
the more appropriate source of law. Therefore, a narrow construction of
the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC is advised and concludes
that extra-statutory substantive international criminal law can only be ap-
plied as part of customary international law (general principles of law play
less of a role in the substantive part of international criminal justice). Re-
course to vague terms like ‘interpretational guidance’ should be avoided
for the sake of legal clarity and fairness of criminal proceedings. For the
same reasons, voices which see the role of nullum crimen sine lege in in-
Chapter Four:
213 Margaret McAuliffe deGuzman in: Triffterer, Rome Statute, 2nd ed p 704.
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ternational criminal law less prominent than in national legal systems are
rejected.
As these parameters of the recourse to international human rights law
are defined, the next part of the book will deal with the actual application
of human rights law by the ad hoc tribunals as well as the ICC. It will be
examined to what degree the doctrinal framework set out by general inter-
national law as well as the respective statutes is adhered to, to what degree
the courts and tribunals actually use international human rights law in their
substantive considerations and how this use is categorized and justified.
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How are Different Areas of Human Rights Law
Referred to in International Criminal Jurisprudence?
Part Two of this book deals with three different areas of human rights and
their use in international criminal law by way of example: the prohibition
of torture, the protection of minorities and women’s rights/gender issues.
These three areas were chosen because they are, in themselves, elaborated
to differing degrees in human rights law and they are understood and used
to different degrees in international criminal law. This helps to highlight
the spectrum of the use of human rights law in international criminal law.
This approach makes it possible to explore, by way of comparison, under
which circumstances judges are willing to refer to human rights law and to
draw conclusions regarding the prerequisites necessary in order to facili-
tate such use. It also serves to examine whether human rights law is more
likely to be referenced in areas where human rights law and the protected
rights it contains overlap with what is likely to be prohibited under nation-
al criminal legal systems.
The limitations to these three areas of human rights law does by no
means suggest that those are the only areas in which international criminal
law benefits from human rights law. Other areas of international human
rights law which have a relevance to international criminal law and in
which international criminal law might to some degree depend on the find-
ings and developments of human rights law included, but are, inter alia,
the rights of children (see the prohibition of the enlistment and use of chil-
dren under the age of 15 under Art. 38 Convention on the Rights of the
Child214 as well as the classification of such action as a war crime under
Art. 8 (2) (b) (xxvi) Rome Statute), the issue of hate speech (see first and
foremost the case against Ferdinand Nahimana and others before the IC-
TR215), the prohibition of slavery which can be a crime against humanity
under Art. 7 (1) (c) and (g) Rome Statute, and the prohibition of arbitrary
Part Two:
214 Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into
force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3.
215 Prosecutor v Nahimana (Judgment) ICTR-99-52-T (3 December 2003).
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deprivation of liberty, prohibited in various human rights instruments as
well as in Art. 7 (1) (e) Rome Statute.216
Prohibition of Torture and ‘Other Inhumane Acts’
Where was the Prohibition of Torture Referred to at Ad Hoc Tribunals?
One of the areas of human rights law, which have had a clear impact on
international criminal law is the prohibition of torture under human rights
law. The ICTY and the ICTR have repeatedly resorted to the provisions
established under human rights law to protect the individual from torture
and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The focus
of the courts’ and tribunals’ attention is usually put on the CAT.
The Specific Elements in the Definition of Torture as a Crime against
Humanity
The tribunals referred to the definition of torture in the CAT in order to
identify how torture is defined under customary international law. The
crime of torture as a war crime or a crime against humanity is not defined
in their respective statutes (Art. 5 (f) ICTY Statute217 and Art. 3 (f) ICTR
Statute218), and as the ad hoc tribunals, unlike the ICC, have not adopted
‘elements of crimes’ in order to assist the interpretation and application of
the law, the judges often had and still have to consult sources outside their




216 See also Theodor Meron ‘Human Rights Marches into New Territory: The En-
forcement of International Human Rights in International Criminal Tribunals’
Fourth Marek Nowicki Memorial Lecture (28 November 2008) <http://web.ceu.h
u/legal/pdf%20documents/Nowicki/Meron_Enforcement%20of%20HRwarsawn
owicki13nov 08.pdf > (as last accessed on 10 June 2013; speech no longer acces-
sible online); Prosecutor v Krnojelac (Judgment) IT-97-25 (15 March 2002)
paras 110–114.
217 UNSC ‘Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’
UNSC Res 827 (1993) (25 May 1993) SCOR 48th Year 29.
218 UNSC ‘Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda’ UNSC Res 955 (1994)
(8 November 1994) SCOR 49th Year 13.
.
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In the following, the strategies of the ICTY and the ICTR in regard to
the definition of torture will be outlined.
The references of the ad hoc tribunals to human rights conventions with
regards to the definition of torture as a crime under international law are,
however, partly contradictory and do not establish a clear picture of the
definition of torture in international customary law. Common to the tri-
bunals’ analysis is the starting point of their argumentation, which is Art. 1
(1) CAT. Art. 1 (1) CAT reads follows
‘[f]or the purposes of this Convention, torture means any act by which severe
pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a
person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information
or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed
or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a
third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when
such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the con-
sent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or
incidental to lawful sanctions’.
a. Akayesu
The first judgement of the ICTR, the Akayesu judgement, used the CAT’s
definition without any modification and therefore held that the definition
of torture pursuant to Art. 1 CAT was congruent to the definition of torture
as a crime against humanity, without giving any reasons for its findings.219
This approach has been repeated by other chambers of the ICTR in later
cases.220
219 Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment) ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998) para. 681.
220 Eg Prosecutor v Musema (Judgment) ICTR-96-13-T (27 January 2000) para.
285; the Musema Judgment even adopted the second sentence of Art. 1 (1) CAT
(‘It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental
to lawful sanctions’.) as being part of the definition of torture under international
criminal law, without undergirding its assumption with any reasoning.
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b. Delalić and others (Čelebići)
The ICTY, on the other hand, established different approaches regarding
the evaluation of torture under customary international law. The need for
using human rights for guidance in interpretation is especially obvious
when it comes to the ICTY. As the first international criminal tribunal
since the end of World War II, the ICTY was primarily faced with defining
the crimes under its jurisdiction within the boundaries of nullum crimen
sine lege. In Delalić and others, the Court held, in a first step, that the pro-
hibition of torture is recognized as being part of customary international
law and ius cogens.221 Then, in a second step, the court turned to the defi-
nition of the prohibited phenomenon and how torture can be defined under
customary international law. The court held that the definition of torture
contained in the CAT ‘includes’ the definitions contained in both the Unit-
ed Nations Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Sub-
jected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (‘Torture Declaration’)222, which was used as a basis for the
CAT and the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture 223
and ‘thus reflects a consensus which the Trial Chamber considered to be
representative of customary international law’.224 The court also pointed
to the number of ratification of the CAT (109 as of 1998) as an indication
for its status as customary international law.225
After the court concluded that the CAT definition is representative of
customary international law, the Trial Chamber considered, in a third step
‘in more depth the requisite level of severity of pain or suffering, the exis-
221 Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Judgment) IT-96-21 (16 November 1998) para. 454;
regarding the prohibition of torture being part of ius cogens, see also UN Com-
mission on Human Rights ‘Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment: Report by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. P. Kooijmans, ap-
pointed Pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 1985/33’ (19
February 1986) UN Doc E/CN.4/1986/15 para. 3.
222 UNGA Res 3452 (XXX) ‘Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Be-
ing Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment’ (9 December 1975) 30th Session Supp 34, 91.
223 Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture (done 9 December
1985, entered into force 28 February 1987) (1986) 25 ILM 519.
224 Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Judgment) IT-96-21 (16 November 1998) para. 459.
225 Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Judgment) IT-96-21 (16 November 1998) para. 453.
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tence of a prohibited purpose, and the extent of the official involvement
that are required in order for the offence of torture to be proven’.226
For this undertaking, the court turned to the jurisprudence of the HRC,
the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) and the European Com-
mission of Human Rights (‘ECommHR’), all of which do not apply the
CAT, but other, at times conflicting definitions. In particular, the judg-
ments in the Greek Case227 and the Ireland v United Kingdom Case228 to
which the Trial Chamber refers, were rendered before the CAT was even
adopted.
Even though the Trial Chamber mentioned the ECtHR’s reference to
Art. 1 (2) Torture Declaration in the Ireland v United Kingdom Case229
which reads ‘[t]orture constitutes an aggravated and deliberate form of
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ the Trial Chamber
omitted to mention that this was an opinion which the ECommHR did not
share. The definition of torture applied by the ECommHR differs signifi-
cantly from the one applied by the ECtHR. In the Greek Case, the
ECommHR held that what distinguishes inhuman treatment from torture
was that the latter required the infliction of severe pain or suffering for a
prohibited purpose.230 The Commission held that
‘[t]he word “torture” is often used to describe inhuman treatment, which has a
purpose, such as the obtaining of information or confessions, or the infliction
of punishment, and is generally an aggravated form of inhuman treatment’.231
The Commission argued that what distinguished torture from inhuman
treatment or punishment is not the intensity of the pain and suffering, but
rather that the severe pain and suffering is inflicted for a prohibited pur-
226 Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Judgment) IT-96-21 (16 November 1998) para. 460.
227 Greek Case (ECommHR App Nos 3321/67 [Denmark v Greece]; 3322/67 [Nor-
way v Greece]; 3323 [Sweden v Greece]; 3344/67 [Netherlands v Greece]) (1969)
12 YECommHR.
228 Ireland v United Kingdom (ECtHR) Series A No 25; Ireland v United Kingdom
(ECommHR App 5310/71) (1976) Series B No 23-I.
229 Ireland v United Kingdom (ECtHR) Series A No 25 para. 167.
230 Greek Case (ECommHR App Nos 3321/67 [Denmark v Greece]; 3322/67 [Nor-
way v Greece]; 3323 [Sweden v Greece]; 3344/67 [Netherlands v Greece]) (1969)
12 YECommHR 168.
231 Greek Case (ECommHR App Nos 3321/67 [Denmark v Greece]; 3322/67 [Nor-
way v Greece]; 3323 [Sweden v Greece]; 3344/67 [Netherlands v Greece]) (1969)
12 YECommHR 168, 186.
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pose.232 This approach also prevailed amongst the drafters of the CAT, in
which no mention of torture being an aggravated form of cruel inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment was made.
The ECtHR, on the other hand, has taken a different approach, which
does not focus on the purpose of the conduct, but rather on the intensity of
the pain and suffering inflicted. In its famous Northern Ireland Case, it
held that
‘the five techniques [interrogation techniques used by British security forces
against suspect terrorists […] as applied in combination, undoubtedly
amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment, although their object was the
extraction of confessions, the naming of others and/or information and al-
though they were used systematically, they did not occasion suffering of the
particular intensity and cruelty implied by the word torture as so under-
stood’233.
The Trial Chamber seems to elide contradictions and chooses the dogmati-
cally flawed path of declaring the CAT definition of torture to be custom-
ary international law and subsequently using inherently contradictory defi-
nitions taken from other instruments and regional courts and treaty bodies
cumulatively in order to fill in the gaps left open by the CAT definition.
Furthermore, the court fails to explain how jurisprudence interpreting a re-
gional convention which was not applicable on the territory on which the
events before the court took place should be indicative of a pre-defined
norm to be followed by the actors at the time.234 Regional jurisprudence
232 See more in detail under Part Two Chapter One I. 1. F. below.
233 Ireland v United Kingdom (ECtHR) Series A No 25 para. 167.
234 This paradox is becoming even more obvious in the case of the ICC. As of 2017,
all but of of the situations under investigation y the ICC is concerned with are
within African States. However, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and the IACtHR
is developed to a much greater extent than that of the African Court on Human
and Peoples’ Rights. Therefore, if the ICC refers to human rights jurisprudence, it
basically always refers to regional jurisprudence developed on another continent.
Sheppard writes: ‘[T]he court [the ICC] tends to simply adopt reasons from the
human rights courts that they find compelling. The Court may be entitled to do
so, but in the context of locating quasi-constitutional norms, the Court should
take care to explain on what basis it adopts the reasons of the European court in-
terpreting a European convention as supportive of a paramount principle applica-
ble to a set of cases that have arisen exclusively from Africa’; see Daniel Shep-
pard ‘The International Criminal Court and “Internationally Recognized Human
Rights”: Understanding Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute’ (2010) 10 Internation-
al Criminal Law Review 43-71, 54.
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could, of course, be an indication of customary international law in a spe-
cific area, but the court makes no such assumption, but simply quotes re-
gional case law to support the argumentation the ICTY choose to follow.
The acts before the ICTY did without doubt lead to severe mental or
physical pain or suffering on part of the victims. They included beatings
with various objects including baseball bats, shovels, metal chains, wood-
en implements;235 burnings with various objects including hot pincers and
heated knifes236; suffocation237 as well as forcible sexual vaginal and anal
intercourse.238
However, by demanding cumulatively that the pain or suffering in
question needed to be ‘aggravated’ in comparison to inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment, and additionally for the aggravated pain or
suffering to be inflicted for a prohibited purpose, the Trial Chamber unrea-
sonably raised the requirements for torture both under human rights and
international criminal law.
Additionally, the Trial Chamber does not scrutinize whether interna-
tional criminal law actually requires torture to be inflicted by a State offi-
cial. The court merely affirms that this is the case, adding, without any fur-
ther examination that
‘[i]n the context of international humanitarian law, this requirement
must be interpreted to include officials of non-State parties to a conflict, in
order for the prohibition to retain significance in situations of internal
armed conflicts or international conflicts involving some non-State enti-
ties’.239
Thereby, it adds another requirement that has not been held to be a con-
stituent element of torture under international criminal and humanitarian
law by other chambers.240
235 Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Celebići Indictment) IT-96-21 (19 March 1996) paras
23 and 26–28.
236 Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Celebići Indictment) IT-96-21 (19 March 1996) paras
23 and 26–28.
237 Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Celebići Indictment) IT-96-21 (19 March 1996) paras
23 and 26.
238 Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Celebići Indictment) IT-96-21 (19 March 1996) paras
24–25.
239 Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Judgment) IT-96-21 (16 November 1998) para. 473.
240 See eg Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgment) IT-96-23 (22 February 2001) paras
488–96.
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Moreover, the court took recourse to human rights when deciding the
question whether rape can be considered torture, a question which the
court answers in the affirmative241. Additionally, the ICTY looked into the
jurisprudence of the ECtHR, the ECommHR and the HRC again, mainly
relying on the same points of arguments as in the torture discussion, when
it defined inhuman treatment punishable as a grave breach of the Geneva
Conventions under Art. 2 (c) ICTY Statute.242
c. Furundžija
A different Trial Chamber more openly criticized the lack of doctrinal pre-
cision and reasoning taken in Akayesu. In Furundžija the Trial Chamber
pointed out that the definition given in Art. 1 CAT was explicitly limited
to the ‘purposes of this Convention’. The ICTY stated, however, that an
extra-conventional effect may ‘be produced to the extent that the defini-
tion at issue codifies, or contributes to developing or crystallising custom-
ary international law’.243 The Court continued by scrutinizing whether the
definition in the CAT can be said to reflect customary international law.
The Court first stated that the definition given in the CAT, while being ex-
plicitly limited to the CAT, could be understood in a broader manner be-
cause it outlined ‘all the necessary elements implicit in international rules
on the matter’.244 Here, the court did not consider whether the ‘interna-
tional rules on the matter’ were the same ones, with the same reference
points, pursuing the same goals, in both human rights and international
criminal law. Given the differences in terms of goals and purposes in the
different fields of law, it is questionable whether ‘the matter’ of torture
can even be seen as congruent in both human rights and international
criminal law. Surely, it would have been helpful to the dogmatic credibili-
241 Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Celebići Indictment) IT-96-21 (19 March 1996) paras
475-497; See Part Two Chapter Three I. 2. below.
242 See paras. 534–42.
243 Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment) IT-95-17 (10 December 1998) para. 160; see
also Fausto Pocar ‘International Criminal Tribunals and Serious Violations of In-
ternational Humanitarian Law against Civilians and Prisoners of War’ in Manoj
Kumar Sinha (ed) International Criminal Law and Human Rights (Manak Delhi
2010) 1-26, 8-9.
244 Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment) IT-95-17 (10 December 1998) para 160.
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ty of the court to discuss at least whether the rules governing torture are
understood to be the same in both fields of law.
Then the Trial Chamber examined other relevant documents on the sub-
ject, namely the Torture Declaration. The fact that the Torture Declaration
was adopted within the UNGA by consensus and therefore no country did
object to it was referred to by the ICTY as an indication of the support of
the definition by all UN Member States.245 However, even though the def-
initions in the Torture Declaration and the CAT are similar, they are not
identical. Art. 1 (1) CAT contains much broader requirements of the in-
volvement of an official than the Torture Declaration.246 Furthermore, the
CAT lists additional prohibited purposes for the infliction of severe pain of
suffering which cannot be found in the Torture Declaration, namely coer-
cion and discrimination of any kind’. Art. 1 (2) Torture Declaration does,
moreover, explicitly state that ‘[t]orture constitutes an aggravated and de-
liberate form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’, a
sentence which was omitted under the CAT. Hence it cannot be said that
the global consensus that was achieved with the adoption of the Torture
Declaration does necessarily also consist with regard to the CAT.247 A few
countries have in fact issued reservations or ‘declarations of understand-
ing’ regarding the definition of torture in the CAT,248 to which a couple of
other countries objected.249
245 Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment) IT-95-17 (10 December 1998) para. 160.
246 Art. 1 CAT: ‘inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquies-
cence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity’; Art. 1 (1)
Torture Declaration: ‘intentionally inflicted by or at the instigation of a public of-
ficial’.
247 See also UN Commission on Human Rights ‘Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment: Report by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. P.
Kooijmans, appointed Pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution
1985/33’ (19 February 1986) UN Doc E/CN.4/1986/15 para. 31.
248 Botswana and Qatar made reservations regarding the definition of torture; the
USA has issued broad ‘understandings’ which in fact amount to reservations; see
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg_no=iv-9&cha
pter=4&lang=en> (31 October 2017); see also Manfred Nowak and Elisabeth
McArthur The United Nations Convention against Torture: A Commentary (OUP
Oxford 2008) 50–51.
249 See the objections of Denmark, Norway and Sweden to the reservation of
Botswana; of Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands Norway,
Spain and Sweden to the reservation of Qatar; and of the Netherlands and Swe-
den to the understandings of the USA; <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails
.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg_no=iv-9&chapter=4&lang=en> (31 October 2017).
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The Court further pointed to a substantially similar definition of torture
used in the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture and
emphasizes that the CAT’s definition is used by the Special Rapporteur on
torture other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment250, the
ECtHR251, the ECommHR252 and the HRC253.
This is, again a flawed analysis, because not two of these institutions or
instruments use exactly the same definition and characterize the exact
same actions as torture.
The ICTY in Furundžija concludes that the main elements of the defini-
tion of Art. 1 CAT are part of customary law, but notes that there are some
specific elements which pertain to torture in the context of international
criminal law, more specifically in the context of armed conflicts which are
not necessarily spelled out in the CAT.254 The court emphasized that the
‘general spirit of international humanitarian law’,255 whose primary pur-
pose is the safeguarding of human dignity, requires one of the possible
reasons of torture to be the humiliation of the victim. The court does, how-
ever, also mention that the purpose of humiliation is close to one that is
explicitly enshrined in the CAT, namely the purpose of intimidation of the
victim.256 In fact, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights men-
tions humiliation as the one of the impermissible purposes for the inflic-
tion for severe pain and suffering in connection to charges of torture be-
250 See UN Commission for Human Rights ‘Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment: Report by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. P.
Kooijmans, appointed Pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution
1985/33’ (19 February 1986) UN Doc E/CN.4/1986/15. The Special Rapporteur,
in this first report, does however, not solely depend on the definition of the CAT
and the Torture Declaration. He uses the definition of both instruments, but sub-
stantiates this definition by use of jurisprudence of human rights bodies like the
HRC, the ECtHR and the European Commission of Human Rights; see paras 30–
39.
251 Ireland v United Kingdom (ECtHR) Series A No 25 para. 167.
252 Greek Case (ECommHR App Nos 3321/67 [Denmark v Greece]; 3322/67 [Nor-
way v Greece]; 3323 [Sweden v Greece]; 3344/67 [Netherlands v Greece]) (1969)
12 YECommHR 168.
253 UN HRC ‘General Comment No 20: Replaces General Comment 7 concerning
Prohibition of Torture and Cruel Treatment or Punishment (Art. 7)’ (3 April
1992) GAOR 47th Session Supp 40, 193.
254 Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment) IT-95-17 (10 December 1998) paras 161–62.
255 Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment) IT-95-17 (10 December 1998) para 162.
256 Further see Chad G Marzen ‘The Furundzija Judgment and its Continued Vitality
in International Law’ (2010) 43 Creighton Law Review 505–27, particularly 517.
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fore the commission.257 It stated that ‘rape is considered to be a method of
psychological torture because its objective, in many cases, is not just to
humiliate the victim but also her family or community’.258 This is, how-
ever, not mentioned by the ICTY.
Furthermore, it is not evident how the ‘general spirit of humanitarian
law’ requires humiliation to be recognized as a prohibited purpose in the
context of torture whereas human rights law would not require such recog-
nition. Torture constitutes ‘the most brutal attack on human dignity and
personality’259 and bears great resemblance to slavery as both crimes are
characterized by an imbalance of power and complete powerlessness on
part of the victim. This core aspect of the phenomenon of torture does not
differ in situations of armed conflict, unrest or official peace. It is this im-
balance of power that makes the vulnerable party prone to human rights
abuses such as torture. It is hard to see therefore how the ‘spirit of humani-
tarian law’ should, in the context of torture, demand for an additional pur-
pose to be included in the list of prohibited purposes different from the
ones established in human rights law.
The court further emphasizes that ‘at least one of the persons involved
in the torture process must be a public official or must at any rate act in a
non-private capacity, e.g. as a de facto organ of a State or any other au-
thority-wielding entity’.260 The chamber fails to further specify the term
‘authority-wielding entity’, which cannot be found in any international
convention dealing with torture. It does not specify whether it let go of the
official’ requirement as a whole or whether it includes into the term ‘au-
thority-wielding entities’ only State-like authorities. In case of the latter,
the court could have backed up its reasoning with the help of the CAT.
Even though this is not as clearly pronounced in the CAT, the CAT does,
257 Fernando and Raquel Mejia v Peru Case 10.970 IACommHR Report No 5/96 (1
March 1996); a couple of years later, the Committee against Torture also explicit-
ly listed humiliation as belonging to the prohibited purposes under Arrest. 1 CAT,
see UN Committee against Torture ‘Communication No 262/2005, VL v Switzer-
land (20 November 2006) UN Committee against Torture ‘Report of the Com-
mittee against Torture 37th session (6-24 November 2006) 38th session (30
April-18 May 2007)’ GAOR 62nd session Supp 44, 207 para 8.10.
258 Fernando and Raquel Mejia v Peru Case 10.970 IACommHR Report No 5/96 (1
March 1996) para. 3; see further under See Part Two Chapter Three I. 2. below.
259 Manfred Nowak and Elisabeth McArthur The United Nations Convention against
Torture: A Commentary (OUP Oxford 2008) 76.
260 Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment) IT-95-17 (10 December 1998) para. 162.
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however, include the term ‘other person acting in official capacity’, which
leaves room for the inclusion of ‘de facto authorities’, private actors
whose authority is comparable with that of State actors.261
As for the forms of torture, the ICTY refers to human rights law in or-
der to conclude that rape can constitute a form of torture. In particular, the
ICTY referred to jurisprudence of the ECtHR262 and the IACtHR263.
d. Kvočka
In Kvočka, the Trial Chamber started its legal findings on torture by stat-
ing that ‘[t]orture has been defined by the Tribunal jurisprudence as severe
mental or physical suffering deliberately inflicted upon a person for a pro-
hibited purpose, such as to obtain information or to discriminate against
the victim’.264
In the Kvočka Judgment, the ICTY determined the required severity for
torture as an offence under Art. 3 ICTY Statute (Violations of the Laws
and Customs of War) and Art. 5 ICTY Statute (Crimes against Humanity),
261 Manfred Nowak and Elisabeth McArthur The United Nations Convention against
Torture: A Commentary (OUP Oxford 2008) 77–79.
262 Aydin v Turkey (ECtHR) Reports 1997-VI <http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-5
8371> (31 October 2017); Aksoy v Turkey (ECtHR) Reports 1996-VI 2260.
263 Fernando and Raquel Mejia v Peru Case 10.970 IACommHR Report No 5/96 (1
March 1996; The treaty body of the CAT itself, the Committee against Torture,
has later held that rape, when inflicted for one of the purposes mentioned in the
convention, can constitute a form of torture (see UN Committee against Torture
‘Communication No 262/2005, VL v Switzerland’ [20 November 2006] UN Doc
CAT/C/37/D/262/2005).
264 Prosecutor v Kvočka (Judgment) IT-98-30 (2 November 2001) para. 137.
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with reference to the HRC265, the ECommHR266 the ECtHR267, interna-
tional legal scholars as well as a Report by the UN Special Rapporteur on
265 Ibid. para. 146, referring to UN HRC ‘Consideration of Reports Submitted by
States Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant: Israel’ (28 July 1998) GAOR
53rd Session Supp 40 vol 1, 45: ‘The Committee notes also the admission by the
State party delegation that the methods of handcuffing, hooding, shaking and
sleep deprivation have been and continue to be used as interrogation techniques,
either alone or in combination. The Committee is of the view that the guidelines
can give rise to abuse and that the use of these methods constitutes a violation of
article 7 of the Covenant in any circumstances’ (at para. 19), see also UN HRC
‘Communications No 623/1995, 624/1995, 626/1995 and 627/1995, Domukovsky
et al. v. Georgia’ (6 April 1998), UN Docs CCPR/C/62/D/623, 624, 626 &
627/1995, para. 18.6; UN HRC ‘Communication No. 124/82, Muteba v Zaire’
(25 March 1983) UN Doc CCPR/C/OP/2 at 158; UN HRC Communication
194/85, Miango Muiyo v Zaire’ (27 October 1987) UN Doc CCPR/C/OP/2 at
219; UN HRC ‘Communication 366/89, Kanana v. Zaire’ (2 November 1993)
UN Doc CCPR/C/49/D/366/1989; UN HRC ‘Communication No. 11/1977,
Grille Motta v Uruguay’ (29 July 1980) UN Doc Supp. No. 40 (A/35/40) at 132;
UN HRC ‘Communication No. 52/1979, Lopez Burgos v Uruguay’ (29 July
1981) UN Doc CCPR/C/OP/1 at 88; UN HRC ‘Communication No 63/1979,
Sendic v Uruguay’ (28 October 1981) UN Doc No Supp. No. 40 (A/37/40) at 114
(1982); UN HRC ‘Communication No. 74/1980, Angel Estrella v Uruguay’ (29
March 1983) UN Doc Supp. No. 40 (A/37/40) at 114 (1982); UN HRC ‘Commu-
nication No. 147/83, Arzuaga Gilboa v Uruguay’ (1 November 1985) UN Doc
CCPR/C/OP/2 at 176; UN HRC Communication No 159/1983, Cariboni v
Uruguay’ (27 October 1987) UN Doc Supp. No. 40 (A/43/40) at 184; UN HRC
‘Communication 162/1983, Berterretche Acosta v Uruguay’ (25 October 1988)
UN Doc Supp. No. 40 (A/44/40) at 183; UN HRC ‘Communication No
161/1983, Herrera Rubio v Colombia’ (2 November 1987) UN Doc
CCPR/C/OP/2 at 192; UN HRC ‘Communication No 176/1984, Lafuente Peñar-
rieta et al v Bolivia’ (2 November 1987) UN Doc CCPR/C/OP/2 at 201.
266 Prosecutor v Kvočka (Judgment) IT-98-30 (2 November 2001) paras 142-4, refer-
ring to Ireland v United Kingdom (ECtHR) Series A No 25; the acts in question
in the case at hand where the so-called ‘five techniques’ applied by members of
the Royal Ulster Constabulary against alleged terrorist by the Irish Republican
Army. The ‘techniques’ were wall-standing, hooding, subjection to noise, depri-
vation of sleep and deprivation of food and drink (see para. 96). The ECommHR
concluded, however, that the cumulative use of this technique did not amount to
torture but to inhuman treatment (see para. 167).
267 Prosecutor v Kvočka (Judgment) IT-98-30 (2 November 2001) para. 150, refer-
ring to Aksoy v Turkey (ECtHR) Reports 1996-VI, 2260.
Chapter One: Prohibition of Torture and ‘Other Inhumane Acts’
95
Torture268, and accordingly compiled a list of several acts which are per se
severe enough to per se constitute torture and of those which can consti-
tute torture depending on the circumstances.269 The Chamber stated that it
is not possible to lay out a precise threshold for the severity of suffering
but that it depends on objective as well as subjective criteria. Regarding
objective factors, the Chamber concluded that ‘[b]eating, sexual violence,
prolonged denial of sleep, food, hygiene, and medical assistance, as well
as threats to torture, rape, or kill relatives were among the acts most com-
monly mentioned as those likely to constitute torture. Mutilation of body
parts would be an example of acts per se constituting torture’.270 It also
outlined a catalogue of helpful subjective factors which can be drawn,
namely, ‘physical or mental effect of the treatment upon the particular vic-
tim and, in some cases, factors such as the victim’s age, sex, or state of
health’.271 In its definition of inhuman treatment, the court refers to a deci-
sion of the ECtHR which found that a long-lasting effect was not required
for a mistreatment to fall within the ambit of Art. 3 ECHR.272 Further-
more, the ICTY refers to the HRC’s and the ECtHR’s evaluation of inap-
propriate conditions of detention as inhuman and/or degrading treat-
ment.273
268 Prosecutor v Kvočka (Judgment) IT-98-30 (2 November 2001) para. 144, refer-
ring to UN Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur Sir Nigel Rodley
‘Question of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment’ (3 July 2001) UN Doc A/56/156.
269 Prosecutor v Kvočka (Judgment) IT-98-30 (2 November 2001), para. 142–51.
270 Prosecutor v Kvočka (Judgment) IT-98-30 (2 November 2001), para. 144.
271 Prosecutor v Kvočka (Judgment) IT-98-30 (2 November 2001), para. 143.
272 Prosecutor v Kvočka (Judgment) IT-98-30 (2 November 2001), para. 159; Costel-
lo-Roberts v United Kingdom (ECtHR) Series A No 247 C.
273 Prosecutor v Kvočka (Judgment) IT-98-30 (2 November 2001), para. 169; UN
HRC ‘Communication No 188/84, Portorreal v Dominican Republic’ (5 Novem-
ber 1987) UN Doc Supp No 40 (A/43/40) at 207; UN HRC ‘Communication No
775/97, Brown v Jamaica’ (23 March 1999) UN Doc CCPR/C/65/D/775/1997;
UN HRC ‘Communication No. 74/1980, Angel Estrella v Uruguay’ UN Doc
Supp. No. 40 (A/37/40) at 114 (1982); Denmark, Norway and Sweden v Greece
(ECommHR App 4448/70) (1970) 13 YECommHR 108; Denmark, Norway,
Sweden and the Netherlands v Greece (ECommHR App 3321-3323/67 and
3344/67) (1968) 11 YECommHR 690; Cyprus v Turkey (ECommHR App
8007/77) (1979) 13 DR 85.
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e. Krnojelac
In Krnojelac, the Court had, for yet another time, to deal with the question
of the purposes for which the infliction of pain or suffering has to be in-
flicted to amount to torture. Here, the respective Trial Chamber does not
follow the chambers in Furundžija and Kvocka. In contrast, it explicitly
dismisses the argumentation followed in those two cases regarding humili-
ation as a potential purpose for torture. The Chamber invoked the princi-
ple of legality in order to argue that the purpose to humiliate the victim
‘is not expressly mentioned in any of the principal international instru-
ments prohibiting torture. Nor is there a clear jurisprudential disposition
towards its recognition as an illegitimate purpose. There may be a tenden-
cy, particularly in the field of human rights, towards the enlargement of
the list of prohibited purposes, but the Trial Chamber must apply custom-
ary international humanitarian law as it finds it to have been at the time
when the crimes charged were alleged to have been committed. In light of
the principle of legality, the proposition that “the primary purpose of hu-
manitarian law is to safeguard human dignity” is not sufficient to permit
the court to introduce, as part of the mens rea, a new and additional pro-
hibited purpose, which would in effect enlarge the scope of the criminal
prohibition against torture beyond what it was at the time relevant to the
indictment under consideration’.274
The Trial Chamber does not, however, discuss or mention that the list in
Art. 1 CAT and in other instruments is merely meant to be indicative and
is not an exclusive catalogue.
f. Kunarac and others
The most sophisticated approach of an international criminal tribunal re-
garding the interrelation of the prohibition of torture under the internation-
al human rights regime and under international criminal law can be found
in yet another case before the ICTY, the Kunarac judgement.275 The argu-
ments put forward by the court in order to carve out the similarities and
274 Prosecutor v Krnojelac (Judgment) IT-97-25 (15 March 2002) para. 186.
275 Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgment) IT-96-23 (22 February 2001) paras 465–97; for
the Trial Chamber’s findings on torture see also Fausto Pocar ‘International
Criminal Tribunals and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
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systemic differences between human rights and international criminal law
have been examined (and partially refuted) in Part One Chapter Three I. 2.
The Trial Chamber, after reaffirming the similarities of international
criminal law and international human rights law in terms of goals, values
and terminology, the Trial Chamber goes on to disentangle the two sub-
jects and to look at their dogmatic differences. Even though the arguments
brought forward can partially be refuted, the caution called for by the
court because of the different dogmatic roots and considerations underly-
ing the two areas of law is important. To what degree these dogmatic dif-
ferences play out in practice has to be determined on a case-to-case-basis.
This is necessary because, as examined above, human rights in themselves
are such a heterogeneous conglomerate and the violations of specific
rights is punishable by means of criminal law to very differing degrees.
This is why the Court in Kunarac, after outlining the differences of the
two subject, and concluding that international human rights law can only
be transposed to international criminal law when taking into account the
peculiarities which are inherent in this specific area of law276 carefully ex-
amines each element of a potential definition of torture in light of the ju-
risdiction of the court as a violation of the laws and customs of war as well
as a crime against humanity.
The Trial Chamber in Kunarac then turned to examine the specific ex-
tra-conventional effect of the definition in Article 1 CAT. It noted that the
specific limitation in Art. 1 and the statement in Art. 2 (1) according to
which this article is ‘without prejudice to any international instrument or
national legislation which does or may contain provisions of wider appli-
cation’—thereby entitling individuals to a broader protection then en-
shrined in the CAT in the case broader definitions in other international
conventions or national laws are applicable to the benefit of an individual
—have to be kept in mind when applying the CAT definition in the con-
text of international criminal law.
Subsequently, the Court consulted the relevant instruments in the con-
text which, apart from the ones already mentioned above, also include pro-
visions which prohibit torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, but
do themselves not provide a definition. These instruments are Art. 5 Uni-
against Civilians and Prisoners of War’ in Manoj Kumar Sinha (ed) International
Criminal Law and Human Rights (Manak Delhi 2010) 1-26, 9-11.
276 Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgment) IT-96-23 (22 February 2001) para. 471.
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versal Declaration of Human Rights277, Art. 3 ECHR, as well as Art. 7 IC-
CPR. The ICTY looks at the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and the
ECommHR and the HRC to find out how torture is defined in the Euro-
pean human rights context. As explained above, however278, the defini-
tions used by the ECtHR and the Commission differ significantly.
What the court does is that it looks at both the ECtHR and the Commis-
sion’s understandings of the concept of torture cumulatively and extracts
the basic preconditions for torture that they both use.279 This can, how-
ever, not be correct as the understanding of torture by the ECommHR and
the ECtHR do not complement each other. Both institutions used defini-
tions of torture which can lead them to draw different conclusions as to
whether or not a specific action amounts to torture, like in the Northern
Ireland Case, in which the techniques in question were qualified as torture
by the ECommHR,280 but as inhuman and degrading treatment by the EC-
tHR.281.
The intention of the CAT drafters is more coherent with the approach
taken by the Commission than with the one taken by the ECtHR. The de-
cisive criteria for torture (distinguishing it from cruel, inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment) ‘is not the intensity of the pain or suffering inflicted but the
purpose of the conduct, the intention of the perpetrator and the powerless-
ness of the victim.’282
277 UNGA Res 217 A (III) ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ (10 December
1948) GAOR 3rd Session Part I Resolutions 71.
278 See under Part Two Chapter One I 1. b above.
279 Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgment) IT-96-23 (22 February 2001) para. 478.
280 Ireland v United Kingdom (ECommHR App 5310/71) (1976) Series B No 23-I,
410; However, even if the Commission in its reasoning points to the ‘systematic
application of the techniques for the purpose of inducing a person to give infor-
mation’ its main point of argumentation lays in the combined application of the
five techniques ‘which prevent the use of the senses ’ and which ‘directly affects
the personality physically and mentally. The will to resist or to give in cannot,
under such conditions, be formed with any degree of independence’ (Ireland v
United Kingdom (ECommHR App 5310/71) (1976) Series B No 23-I, 410). The
Commission concludes that [a]lthough the five techniques —also called ‘disori-
entation’ or ‘sensory deprivation techniques’—might not necessarily cause any
severe after-effects the Commission sees in them a modern system of torture
falling into the same category as those systems which have been applied in previ-
ous times as a means of obtaining information and confessions’(ibid).
281 Ireland v United Kingdom (ECtHR) Series A No 25 para. 168.
282 Manfred Nowak and Elisabeth McArthur The United Nations Convention against
Torture: A Commentary (OUP Oxford 2008) 558; see also UN Committee against
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The Kunarac Chamber compares the different definitions and their in-
terpretation by the various courts and treaty bodies and concludes that the
definition of the CAT does not reflect customary international law. It aims
at an inter-State level, means to be applied to the responsibilities of States
and does, furthermore, not prevent other, broader definitions in regional or
national human rights instruments, which provide individuals with a more
thorough protection.283 This is a valid conclusion. Apart from the arguable
differences in the role of the State that the trial chamber identified, there
seems to be not sufficient quantity of State practice and opinio iuris to
conclude that the CAT definition of torture has prevailed to a degree that it
is to be considered part of customary international law. The trial chamber
would have nevertheless benefitted from a more thorough examination of
the contradictions within regional human rights regimes as the analysis of
the differing approaches taken by the ECommHR and the ECtHR show.
The trial chamber concludes that even though its definition does not
constitute customary international law, the CAT can nonetheless be used
by international criminal courts and tribunals as guidance and ‘interpreta-
tional aid’. It goes on to examine which parts of the CAT definition of tor-
ture can indeed be seen as customary international law ‘from the specific
viewpoint of international criminal law relating to armed conflicts’.284 In
this, it delves into analysis deeper than many other Chambers that rather
use references to ‘inspiration’ or ‘interpretational aid’ as an excuse to pick
and choose. The Trial Chamber identifies in that way three elements
which are non-contentious and have become part of customary interna-
tional law, namely the intentional (a) infliction of severe mental or physi-
Torture Special Rapporteur M Nowak ‘Civil and Political Rights, Including the
Questions of Torture and Detention: Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrad-
ing Treatment: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Question of Torture (23
December 2005) UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/6.
283 Kunarac para. 482; the findings of the Kunarac Chamber in this respect were up-
held on appeal and have been used as elements of crimes of some sorts by many
other ICTY Chambers which cited them as the requirements of torture as a crime
against humanity before the ICTY; see Prosecutor v Kunarac (Appeal Judgment)
IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A (12 June 2002 paras 142-148; see also eg Prosecutor v
Haradinaj (Judgment) IT-04-84-T (3 April 2008) para. 127; Prosecutor v Mićo
Stanišić (Judgment) IT-08-91-T (27 March 2013) para 47.
284 Kunarac, para. 488; see also Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment) IT-95-17 (10
December 1998) para. 162.
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cal suffering (b) for a specific purpose (c).285 Three other elements were,
according to the Trial Chamber, still controversial. Those were the list of
purposes with which the pain and suffering must be inflicted in order to
come under the realm of torture; the question whether or not the act in
question has to be committed in relation to an armed conflict; and finally
whether the act has to be inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an
official capacity.286 The Trial Chamber affirmed that the purposes listed in
the CAT have become part of customary law, but left open whether any
other purposes have been recognized as such, thereby not following the ju-
risprudence of the Chamber in Furundžija, which had assumed humilia-
tion of the victim to be one of the possible purposes for the conduction of
torture.287 Though all crimes over which the ICTY has jurisdiction have to
have a nexus to an armed conflict, the court held that crimes against hu-
manity under the ICTY Statute require a lesser degree of connection to the
armed conflict than war crimes whose commission have to be ‘closely re-
lated’ to the hostilities.288
Regarding the third, the ‘public official element’, the trial chamber sees
this as a result of the nature of the CAT as a human rights convention and
the resulting direction of States as obligated parties or respondents.289 For
the purposes of the ICTY, however, ‘the involvement of the State does not
modify or limit the guilt of the responsibility of the individual who carried
out the crimes in question’.290 The Chamber outlines the difference be-
tween provisions which trigger State responsibility and provisions which
provide for individual criminal responsibility, claiming that ‘human rights
norms are almost exclusively of the first sort.’ On that basis, the Trial
Chamber holds the presence of a State official or other authority is not
necessary for the act to be regarded as torture under international humani-
tarian law, or for the personal culpability of the perpetrator.
285 Kunarac para. 483.
286 Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgment) IT-96-23 (22 February 2001) para 484.
287 Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment) IT-95-17 (10 December 1998) para. 162.
288 Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgment) IT-96-23 (22 February 2001) para. 487.
289 Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgment) IT-96-23 (22 February 2001) paras 488-96.
290 Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgment) IT-96-23 (22 February 2001) para 493.
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However, human rights provisions dealing with torture do also oblige
the State to sanction of acts of torture.291 This puts them in contrast to
many other human rights which are mostly formulated as rights the indi-
vidual has against the State rather than prohibitions whose violation re-
sults in criminal liability. Pursuant to Art. 4 (1) CAT, for example,
‘[e]ach State Party shall ensure that all acts of torture are offences under its
criminal law’. Furthermore, State Parties are obliged to make torture, as well
as the attempt to commit torture and the complicity in torture, punishable by
‘appropriate penalties’.292
The Committee against Torture even goes as far as, in its contemporary ju-
risprudence, granting victims of torture a subjective right to have perpetra-
tors of torture punished by appropriate penalties.293 These considerations
make the Trial Chambers’ conclusion regarding the difference in nature of
international human rights and international criminal law less convincing.
Instead of concentrating on the perceived difference of the provisions pro-
hibiting torture in human rights and international criminal law, the Trial
Chamber could have easily found support for its position that torture does
not necessarily require the involvement of a State official. The ICCPR, for
291 See explicitly on the CAT Questions on the Obligation to Prosecutoe or Extradite
(Belgium v Senegal) [2012] ICJ Rep 422 CAT para 95: ‘prosecution is an interna-
tional obligation under the Convention, the violation of which is a wrongful act
engaging the responsibility of the State’.
292 Art. 4 (2) CAT.
293 UN Committee against Torture ‘Decision 212/2002, Guridi v Spain’ (24 May
2005) UN Doc CAT/C/34/D/212/2002 para 6.7: ‘With regard to the alleged viola-
tion of article 4, the Committee recalls its previous jurisprudence to the effect that
one of the purposes of the Convention is to avoid allowing persons who have
committed acts of torture to escape unpunished. The Committee also recalls that
article 4 sets out a duty for States parties to impose appropriate penalties against
those held responsible for committing acts of torture, taking into account the
grave nature of those acts. The Committee considers that, in the circumstances of
the present case, the imposition of lighter penalties and the granting of pardons to
the civil guards are incompatible with the duty to impose appropriate punish-
ment. The Committee further notes that the civil guards were not subject to disci-
plinary proceedings while criminal proceedings were in progress, though the seri-
ousness of the charges against them merited a disciplinary investigation. Conse-
quently, the Committee considers that there has been a violation of article 4, para-
graph 2, of the Convention.’ With the same reasoning, a violation of Art. 4 (1)
CAT would trigger a subjective right to a victim of torture under the CAT; see
Manfred Nowak and Elisabeth McArthur The United Nations Convention against
Torture: A Commentary (OUP Oxford 2008) 250–52.
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example, does not contain any State official requirement. The HRC stated
in its General Comment No. 20:
‘It is the duty of the State party to afford everyone protection through
legislative and other measures as may be necessary against the acts pro-
hibited by article 7, whether inflicted by people acting in their official ca-
pacity, outside their official capacity or in a private capacity.294’
The CAT, by including the term ‘other person acting in an official ca-
pacity’ does also not restrict torture per definition to State officials. The
phrasing opens the definition up to de facto authorities like rebel, guerrilla
and insurgent groups.295
Hence the court in Kunarac contradicted the chamber in Delalić leading
to the paradoxical result that within one and the same tribunal, torture as a
crime under international law is punishable pursuant to different require-
ments: according to one Chamber, the perpetrator has to be a State official
or acting with the consent or acquiescence of one, for another chamber,
this requirement is not part of the definition of torture under international
criminal law.
Nevertheless, the Kunarac approach is more convincing than the trial
chamber’s approach in Delalic. Delalic uses the ECtHR/ECommHR ju-
risprudence not for the definition of torture itself, but in order to fill the
gap which the definition that the court deems to constitute customary in-
ternational law, leaves open. Kunarac, on the other hand, uses other ju-
risprudence already on the level of the definition itself, in order to find out
whether the CAT definition constitutes customary international law.
The Kunarac approach is methodologically more convincing as it ex-
amines the definitions used in other jurisdictions already in order to deter-
mine if the CAT definition is customary law. This makes sense, as the def-
initions of other instruments and the jurisprudence based on these can
point to the existence (or the absence) of State practice and opinio iuris. In
contrast it is not convincing to first claim that a certain definition is part of
customary international law and to then subsequently use the jurispru-
dence of completely different bodies governed by a distinct treaty, in order
to fill the holes that this definition leaves.
294 UN HRC ‘General Comment No 20: Replaces General Comment 7 concerning
Prohibition of Torture and Cruel Treatment or Punishment (Art. 7)’ (3 April
1992) GAOR 47th Session Supp 40, 193 para. 2.
295 Manfred Nowak and Elisabeth McArthur The United Nations Convention against
Torture: A Commentary (OUP Oxford 2008) 78–79.
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Nevertheless, it is evidentially worrisome that the lack of a common
dogmatic approach and a streamlined interpretation of the specific ele-
ments of the crimes over which the ICTY has jurisdiction lead to such an
unequal application of the law.
g. Brđanin
In the aftermath of the Kunarac judgment, Brđanin employed the progres-
sive nature of customary international law as an argument.296 Having been
convicted of the aiding and abetting of torture, Brđanin’s defense council
argued on appeal that the definition of torture under customary interna-
tional law had changed since the Kurnarac and Furundžija judgments and
the threshold of pain to qualify as torture now had to be significantly high-
er. In defense of his arguments, he cited the so-called Bybee Memorandum
of the Bush Administration according to which ‘[p]hysical pain amounting
to torture must be equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious
physical injury such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or
even death’.297 This is an interesting invoking of instant custom by way of
reference to legal memoranda of a single State. In its own argumentation,
the Appeals Chamber emphasized the consistent reliance of the ICTY on
the definition of the torture convention and rejected the notion that a
change in custom can be the automatic consequence of the State practice
of only one State ‘no matter how powerful or influential’.298 It also dis-
missed the argument by reference to the drafting history of the CAT that
showed that the drafters of the CAT sought to distinguish ‘severe pain and
suffering’ from ‘extreme pain and suffering’ which requires a higher
threshold and argues that ECtHR and other institutions, have endorsed the
definition of the CAT. Whereas these are convincing arguments from a hu-
man rights point of view, the Appeal Chamber does not explain why the
same arguments should be valid in the context of international criminal
296 Prosecutor v Brđanin (Appeal Judgment) ICTY-99-36-A (3 April 2007) paras
244-252.
297 US Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel ‘Memorandum for Alberto R.
Gonzales, Counsel to the President Re: Standard of Conduct for Interrogation un-
der 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A’ (1 August 2002) https://www.aclu.org (31 October
2017) 1.
298 Prosecutor v Brđanin (Appeal Judgment) ICTY-99-36-A (3 April 2007) para.
247.
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law and the fact that a definition has been repeatedly employed by authori-
ties in international human rights law should have automatic effect on the
development of a crime under international criminal law. Here, it would
have been more convincing if the court left it at referring to the limited
number of parties which endorsed that definition and not mixed human
rights law and international criminal law at random and in a dogmatically
unsound manner.
The Definition of ‘Other Inhumane Acts’
Pursuant to Art 5 (i) ICTY Statute and Art 3 (i) ICTR Statute, ‘other inhu-
man acts’ are punishable as crimes against humanity. Art. 7 (1) (k) Rome
Statute contains a qualifying clause describing as punishable ‘[o]ther inhu-
mane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or
serious injury to body or to mental or physical health’. The blueprint for
this kind of vague catchall provision can be traced back to the Nuremberg
Charter, which listed ‘murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation,
and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before
and during the war’ under crimes against humanity.299
Determining the exact content of ‘inhumane acts’ can be more labori-
ous than the definition of many other crimes under international law as the
term is particularly vague and the definition of the adjective ‘inhumane’
involves a value judgment to a greater degree than it may be the case in
many other crimes.
2.
299 The Nuremburg Charter further mentioned persecution of on racial, political or
religious grounds as a crime against humanity, albeit only in execution of or con-
nection to any other crime under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal; Charter of the
[Nuremberg] International Military Tribunal (8 August 1945) 82 UNTS 284; In-
humane acts were also listed in Art. 2 (1) (c) Control Council Law No10 (‘Pun-
ishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes against Peace and against Hu-
manity’ [done 20 December 1945] [1946] 3 Official Gazette of the Control Coun-
cil for Germany 50), Art. 5 (c) Charter of the International Military Tribunal for
the Far East [19 January 1946] 4 Bevans 20) and Prinicple VI (c) Principles of
International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the
Judgment of the Tribunal UNILC ‘Report on Principles of the Nuremberg Tri-
bunal’ (29 July 1950) GAOR 5th session Supp 12, 11 (Nuremberg Principles); see
further Machtheld Boot, Rodney Dixon and Christopher K Hall ‘Article 7:
Crimes against Humanity’ in Otto Triffterer Commentary on the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court (2nd edition Beck Munich 2008) 159-273, 230.
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The qualification contained in Art. 7 (1) (k) Rome Statute as well as the
Elements of Crime of ‘other inhumane acts’ clarify that the inhumane acts
have to be of a similar character to the other crimes against humanity list-
ed, meaning they must reach a similar degree of seriousness. This is the
result of a line of jurisprudence that already started with Tadić which stat-
ed that ‘other inhumane acts”, must consist of acts inflicted upon a human
being and must be of a serious nature.’300 The Tadić Chamber also cited
the ILC Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind,
which contains a similar reference to the required gravity of the acts, as
well as a second requirement, namely the that acts ‘the act must in fact
cause injury to a human being in terms of physical or mental integrity,
health or human dignity.’301
In the Kupreskic judgment, the Court delved deeper into defining what
sort of acts were to be considered inhuman. In doing so, it takes recourse
to human rights law. The Court examines the UDHR as well as the two
covenants and concludes that there is a set of acts which are prohibited in
these instruments which can be characterised as inhumane acts and prose-
cuted as crimes against humanity in the case the chapeau requirements are
fulfilled.302 Examples that the Court mentions are ‘serious forms of cruel
or degrading treatment of persons belonging to a particular ethnic, reli-
gious, political or racial group, or serious widespread or systematic mani-
festations of cruel or humiliating or degrading treatment with a discrimi-
natory or persecutory intent’ or forcible transfer of civilians.303 There are
several problems with this approach: first, the Court does not clarify what
the category of inhume treatments adds in the case, for example, of de-
grading of persons belonging to a specific ethnic group with persecutorial
intent. Why are those acts not simply prosecuted as persecution? Second,
300 Prosecutor v Tadić (Opinion and Judgment) IT-94-1 (7 May 1997) para 728; see
also Stakic,in which counts of inhumane acts as crimes against humanity were
dismissed as the chamber was not convinced that the acts in question had reached
the necessary gravity: Prosecutor v Stakić (Judgment) IT-97-24-T (31 July 2003)
para 723.
301 UN ILC ‘Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind’
(1996) GAOR 51st Session Supp 10, 9, 103; Prosecutor v Tadić (Opinion and
Judgment) IT-94-1 (7 May 1997) para 729.
302 Prosecutor v Kupreškić (Trial Chamber Judgment) IT-95-16 (14 January 2000)
para 566.
303 Prosecutor v Kupreškić (Trial Chamber Judgment) IT-95-16 (14 January 2000)
para 566.
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when seeking to define what inhumane acts in fact are, the court applies
formulas, like ‘cruel and degrading treatment’ which are just as vague and
in need of interpretation as ‘inhumane acts’ is. The Court ignores there
that there is an elaborate discourse, at the ICTY and beyond, on how to
fill, for example ‘cruel and degrading treatment’ with meaning and narrow
it down to specific acts. Third, the court mentions the UDHR, the ICCPR
and the ICESCR, but then, when enlisting the acts which, in its opinion,
constitute other inhumane acts, takes as examples the ICCPR, the CAT,
the ECHR and the IACHR or from rules of humanitarian law. It also
makes no mention why the prohibitions enshrined in these instruments
should be applicable at all to the ICTY. As such, it gives the impression
that the Court merely uses these instruments as buzzwords rather than en-
gaging with them on a dogmatic level in order to deduce the meaning of
the term ‘inhumane treatment’. Lastly and intertwined with the earlier re-
mark, the court uses no dogmatically coherent methodology to fill the
term ‘inhumane acts’ with meaning. The Court states that cruel and de-
grading treatment is prohibited by certain instruments and that a certain
act constitutes cruel and degrading treatment, albeit without referencing
back to any of the instruments mentioned. As such, the Court pays lip ser-
vice to human rights law and basically uses it as a backup for its precon-
ceived notion that a certain action, which ought to be punishable fits under
vague formula by substituting it with a different vague formula. As with
torture, in the case of inhumane acts, human rights law is referenced in an
incoherent way which fails to take into account the need for justification
as to why it is applicable in the first place.
Where Could the Prohibition of Torture Have Been Referred to?
When it comes to torture, the problem lies in how it was referenced and
the incoherence in the determination of customary international law. This
lack of a coherent, common dogmatic approach can lead to practical in-
equality in the application of the law as seen in the cases of Delalić and
Kunarac, where the respective chambers came to different conclusions re-
garding the State official requirement in the definition of torture.304 Un-
II.
304 Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Judgment) IT-96-21 (16 November 1998) para. 473
and Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgment) IT-96-23 (22 February 2001) paras 488–
96; see Part Two Chapter One 1 b. and f. above.
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derlying the prohibition of torture is the CAT, a high-profile, ‘robust’and
widely ratified convention.305 The prohibition torture is a part of ius co-
gens, and as such, emanates authority like not many other concepts in in-
ternational human rights, which are, at times, dominated by vague terms,
soft law or reluctant ratification practice. Furthermore, the system of the
prohibition of torture in itself is coherent, particularly compared to other
areas of human rights law. Where is the Link?
State Obligations Regarding the Prohibition of Torture under Human
Rights Law
CAT
The CAT is the primary international instrument prohibiting torture and
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. It was adopt-
ed in 1984 and contains the most often quoted and referred to definition of
torture. According to Art. 1 (1) CAT
‘[f]or the purposes of this Convention, torture means any act by which severe
pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a
person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information
or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed
or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a
third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when
such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the con-
sent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or
incidental to lawful sanctions’.
Apart from providing for a comprehensive definition, from an internation-
al criminal law perspective, the CAT provides a number of relevant provi-
sions. Arts 5–7 provides for universal jurisdiction in cases of torture.306
1.
a)
305 The CAT has 162 parties as of November 2017.
306 This means that the value protected by the CAT was seen by its drafters as so im-
portant that no connection in terms of territory, offer or victim is needed in order
to prosecute the violation of said value. This places a double obligation on the
States bound by the CAT: they have to make the violation of the prohibition of
torture a crime enforceable in their national courts and effectively prosecute of-
fenders when they have the possibility to do so; see further eg Rüdiger Wolfrum
‘The Decentralized Prosecution of International Offences Through National
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Art. 5 (2) incorporates the principle of aut dedere aut iudicare into the
CAT framework. Additionally, Art. 17 CAT establishes, its treaty body, the
Committee against Torture, which receives and reviews individual com-
munications as well as State reports. Its definition of torture in Article 1 is
a standard-setting tool for interpreting other instruments that do not con-
tain a definition and, as demonstrated above,307 it us frequently consulted
to determine the customary definition of torture.308
The General Comments of Committee against Torture are not particu-
larly helpful for international courts and Tribunals. Apart from the fact
that it has only issued three general comments between 1998 and 2017,
these deal with issues that do not concern international criminal law, like
non-refoulment and the right to redress and rehabilitation for victims. Only
General Comment No 1 on the implementation of Article 2 CAT, which
sets out the absolute and non-derogable prohibition of torture could have
been useful, albeit it was only published in 2008, when much of the prob-
lems surrounding the definition and the character of the prohibition of tor-
ture were already solved by the tribunals, at least to a degree that they sim-
ply relied on each other’s previous decisions.309
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
The Universal Declaration prohibits torture under Art. 5, albeit without
defining what torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or pun-
ishment is. Interestingly, the Universal Declaration does not assume that
torture, at the same time, always constitutes cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment, as it mentions the two in the alternative.
b)
Courts’ in Yoram Dinstein and Mala Tabory War Crimes in International Law
(Martinus Nijhoff The Hague 1996) 233-249, 235-36.
307 See Part Two Chapter One I above.
308 Sandesh Sivakumaran ‘Torture in International Human Rights and International
Humanitarian Law: The Actor and the Ad hoc Tribunals’ (2005) 18 Leiden Jour-
nal of International Law 541-556, 543.
309 UN Committee against Torture ‘General Comment No 2: Implementation of Arti-
cle 2 by States Parties’ (24 January 2008) UN Doc CAT/C/GC/2.
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The prohibition of torture is enshrined in Art. 7 ICCPR. It reads as fol-
lows:
[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free
consent to medical or scientific experimentation.
As such, Article 7 ICCPR does not contain its own definition of what tor-
ture is. It has, however, been clarified by the ICCPR’s treaty body, the
HRC, that torture requires an act that intentionally inflicts severe physical
or mental pain or suffering to fulfill a certain purpose, such as extortion of
information or confessions, as punishment, intimidation or discrimination
of a person.310 If any of the elements are missing, the action can still be
characterized as cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.311 Unlike under
the CAT, torture under the ICCPR can also be inflicted on a horizontal lev-
el.312 According to Art. 4 (2) ICCPR, no derogation from this provision is
possible during a state of emergency. In its General Comment No 20, the
HRC stated that prolonged solitary confinement can amount to a violation
of Art. 7 ICCPR.313 It has also held that longer periods of incommunicado
detention amount to cruel and inhuman treatment; more than three years of
incommunicado detention can be classified as torture.314 As a universal
c)
310 Manfred Nowak U. N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commen-
tary (N P Engel Kehl 2005); see also Manfred Nowak and Elisabeth McArthur
The United Nations Convention against Torture: A Commentary (OUP Oxford
2008) 39-41.
311 Manfred Nowak U. N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commen-
tary (N P Engel Kehl 2005), 161, 163.
312 Manfred Nowak U. N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commen-
tary (N P Engel Kehl 2005) 161.
313 UN HRC ‘General Comment No 20: Replaces General Comment 7 concerning
Prohibition of Torture and Cruel Treatment or Punishment (Art. 7)’ (3 April
1992) GAOR 47th Session Supp 40, 193 para. 6; see also UN HRC Communica-
tion ‘No 577/1994 Polaly Campos v Peru’ (6 November 1997) UN Doc
CCPR/C/61/D/577/1994 para 9.
314 See eg UN HRC ‘Communication No 1780/2008, Aouabdia v. Algeria’ (22
March 2011) UN Doc CCPR/C/101/D/1780/2008; UN HRC ‘Communication No
1640/2007, El Abani v The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya’ (26 July 2010) UN Doc
CCPR/C/99/D/1640/2007; UN HRC ‘Communication No 1588/2007, Benaziza v.
Algeria (26 July 2010) UN Doc CCPR/C/99/D/1588/2007; UN HRC ‘Communi-
cation No 1295/2004, El Awani v. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, (11 July 2007)
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and not merely a regional instrument, referring to the ICCPR and, in par-
ticular, the sophisticated ‘jurisprudence’ of its HRC can be immensely
useful for the ICC in order to raise the legal weight of the judgment and
the credibility of the court as a global and not merely a ‘Western’ or Euro-
pean institution.
Other Instruments Prohibiting Torture
The ECHR prohibits torture pursuant to Article 3. It states ‘[n]o one shall
be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment’. Article 15 (2) ECHR, at the same time, emphasizes the importance
of the prohibition of torture by proclaiming it one of the absolute, non-
derogable rights. The Inter-American Convention follows the pattern of
the ICCPR and the ECHR by providing for the prohibition of torture in
Article 5 (2) (without defining acts of torture) while, in Art 27 (2) IACHR
declaring that a derogation from the prohibition is not possible. Article 5
ACHPR combines the prohibition of torture with the prohibition of slav-
ery and puts these two in systemic relation with the dignity of person. Ar-
ticle 5 ACHPR reads ‘[e]very individual shall have the right to the respect
of the dignity inherent in a human being and to the recognition of his legal
status. All forms of exploitation and degradation of man particularly slav-
ery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and
treatment shall be prohibited.’ Other regional thematic convention solely
dedicated to the prohibition of torture are the European Convention for the
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment315 and the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture,
which contains a substantially similar definition of torture.316 The Euro-
pean Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment focuses on the prevention of torture by establish-
ing a European Commission for the Prevention which, similar to the UN
d)
CCPR/C/90/D/1295/2004, para. 6.5; communication No. 1422/2005; UN HRC
‘Communication No. 458/1991, Womah Mukong v Cameroon’ (21 July 1994)
UN Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991, para. 9.4.
315 COE ‘European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or De-
grading Treatment or Punishment’ (done 26 November 1987, entered into force 1
February 1989) 1561 UNTS 363.
316 Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture (done 9 December
1985, entered into force 28 February 1987) (1986) 25 ILM 519.
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Committee against Torture, also monitors the treatment of incarcerated
persons. In contrast, the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish
Torture goes further than that and again affirms the status of the prohibi-
tion of torture as an absolute prohibition under the penalty of law.
Hence, it is obvious that there are a number of instruments of interna-
tional human rights law international Courts and Tribunals can draw from
when adjudicating torture
The Prohibition of Torture under International Criminal Law
Acts of torture can be subsumed under different crimes under international
law, and can constitute genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.
All crimes will be discussed as laid out in the Rome Statute as the prime
instrument governing the permanent ICC of the future. In case of differing
definitions in any of the ad hoc or the hybrid courts, these differences will
be pointed out.
Genocide
Causing serious bodily or mental harm (Art. 6 (b) Rome Statute)
Under the definition of genocide in the Genocide Convention, which has
been taken on by the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals as well as the Rome
Statute, and are reflective of customary international law,317 there are sev-
eral modalities under which actions constituting torture under human
rights law can also be prosecuted as genocide. Art. 6 (b) Rome Statute
(Art. II (b) Genocide Convention) states that genocide can be committed
by ‘causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group’ as
long as the mens rea, the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, is given. The wording ‘serious bodily or
mental harm’ reminds of Art. 1 (1) CAT which refers to ‘severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental’. Footnote 3 to the respective ele-




317 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Merits) ([2007]
ICJ Rep 43 para. 161.
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Statute) expressively states ‘this conduct [the perpetrator caused serious
bodily or mental harm to one or more persons] may include, but is not re-
stricted to, acts of torture, rape, sexual violence or inhuman or degrading
treatment’.318
The only difference in the two definitions is ‘serious harm.’ It could, in-
terpreted literally, refer to a permanent damage in comparison to ‘pain or
suffering’. However, two arguments can be brought forward against such
an assumption. First, the ICTR has clarified in its jurisprudence that
‘[c]ausing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group does
not necessarily mean that the harm is permanent and irremediable’.319 And
second the definition of the word ‘harm’ in the English language merely
refers to ‘[e]vil (physical or otherwise) as done to or suffered by some per-
son or thing; hurt, injury, damage, mischief’.320 Genocidal intent, hence
the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or reli-
gious group’ is not a purpose of torture per se. However, the intent to de-
stroy a group requires a discriminatory intent, which is prohibited under
Art. 1 (1) CAT. Furthermore, the prohibited intent does not have to be the
only purpose for which the severe pain or suffering is inflicted. The perpe-
trator can have other motivations apart from the ones listed in the CAT.
Hence torture inflicted with genocidal intent constitutes genocide.321 The
relation between genocide by inflicting serious bodily or mental harm and
torture is also underlined in the first report on torture by the UN Special
Rapporteur.322 The same is true for cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment which is committed fulfilling the mens rea of genocide. As
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment can be defined as
318 Elements of Crimes (adopted and entered into force 9 September 2002) Doc ICC-
ASP/1/3 (Pt. II-B), footnote 3.
319 Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment) ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998).para. 502;
see also Prosecutor v Kayishema and others (Judgment) ICTR-95-1-T (21 May
1999) para. 108; Prosecutor v Rutaganda (Judgment) ICTR-96-3-T (6 December
1999) para. 51; Prosecutor v Gacumbitsi (Judgment) ICTR-01-64-T (17 June
2004) para. 291.
320 Oxford English Dictionary www.oed.com/view/th/class/83601 (31 October
2017).
321 So eg Prosecutor v Stakić (Judgment) IT-97-24-T (31 July 2003) para. 516; Ap-
plication of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Merits) ([2007]
ICJ Rep 43 paras 291-297; 319.
322 UN Commission on Human Rights ‘Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrad-
ing Treatment or Punishment: Report by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. P. Kooij-
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‘the infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental,
by or at the instigation of or consent or acquiescence of a public official or
another person acting in an official capacity. Such conduct can be both in-
tentional or negligent, with or without a particular purpose’, 323
For the crime of genocide, universal jurisdiction is recognized, even if
not explicitly provided for in the Genocide Convention.324
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part (Art. 6 (c)
Rome Statute)
The prime example for this modality of genocide is deportation.325 How-
ever, there are other actions which fulfil the actus rea of ‘deliberately in-
flicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physi-
cal destruction in whole or in part’. These might be, for example ‘placing
a group of people on a subsistence diet, reducing required medical ser-
vices’.326 These are techniques which, according to the ECommHR and
the ECtHR can amount to torture, or at least constitute cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment, even more so if they are used simultaneously (see
e.g. the Ireland v United Kingdom cases).327 Generally, the denial of a per-
son’s basic needs can constitute torture when the required ‘severe’ thresh-
(2)
mans, appointed Pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 1985/33’
(19 February 1986) UN Doc E/CN.4/1986/15.
E/CN.4/1986/15 para. 26.
323 Manfred Nowak and Elisabeth McArthur The United Nations Convention against
Torture: A Commentary (OUP Oxford 2008) 558.
324 Universal jurisdiction has also been recognized for crimes against humanity and
war crimes, see Rüdiger Wolfrum ‘Prosecution of International Crimes by Inter-
national and National Criminal Courts: Concurring Jurisdiction’ Studi di Diritto
Internazionale in Onore di Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz vol 3 (Editoriale scientifica
Naples 2004) 2199-2209, 2200.
325 UN ILC ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-
Eighth Session’ vol II part II UNYBILC 46.
326 William A Schabas ‘Article 6: Genocide’ in O Triffterer Commentary on the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2nd edition Beck Munich
2008) 143-157, 153.
327 See also UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs ‘Study on the right of
everyone to be free from arbitrary arrest, detention and exile’ (1965) UN Doc
E/CN.4/826/Rev. 1.see already in 1965 (even though this interpretation was at-
tributed to the ‘broad’ definition.).
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old is reached.328 The ICJ has also included encirclement, shelling and
starvation as examples of ways to deliberately inflict conditions of life cal-
culated to bring about a group’s physical destruction in whole or in part
and ruled that these actions constitute genocide when they are accompa-
nied with the necessary genocidal intent.329
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group (Art. 6
(d) Rome Statute)
This modality of committing genocide covers acts such as ‘[forced]
sterilization, compulsory abortion, segregation of the sexes and obstacles
to marriage’.330
The Special Rapporteur on Torture has repeatedly mentioned sterilization
conducted without informed consent and compulsory abortions within his
mandate331 and suggested that countries should review their anti-torture
legislation in relation to these actions.332
(3)
328 J Herman Burgers and Hans Danelius The United Nations Convention against
Torture: A Handbook on the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhu-
man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Nijhoff Dordrecht 1988) 118.
329 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Merits) ([2007]
ICJ Rep 43 paras 323-328.
330 William A Schabas ‘Article 6’ in Otto Triffterer Commentary on the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court (2nd edition Beck Munich 2008)
1143-157, 53, with reference to the travaux préparatoires of Art. II para. d Geno-
cide Convention.
331 Eg UN Committee against Torture ‘Consideration of Reports Submitted by States
Parties under Article 19 of the Convention: Conclusions and Recommendations
of the Committee against Torture: China (12 December 2008) UN Doc
CAT/C/CHN/CO/4 para. 29.
332 See eg UNGA ‘Interim report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cru-
el, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ (22 July 2008) UN Doc A/
63/175 paras 40–41.
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Crimes against Humanity
Torture (Art. 7 (1) (f) Rome Statute)
Torture has been recognized as a war crime since the 19th century.333 Ad-
ditionally, it was mentioned at the report of the Commission of the Re-
sponsibility of the Authors of the War and the Enforcement of Penalties as
an example of a violation of the ‘laws against humanity’, albeit under the
heading ‘violations of the laws and customs of war’.334 The Allied Control
Council Law No 10 explicitly mentioned torture as a crime against hu-
manity.335 As the prohibition of torture is commonly held to be a part of
ius cogens,336 it is also uncontroversial under international criminal law,
particularly as a crime against humanity and a war crime. What remains in
dispute, as shown above, is rather the definition of the term torture for the
purposes of the two crimes.337
In contrast to the ICTY and the ICTR Statutes, the Rome Statute pro-
vides for a definition of torture as a crime against humanity under Art. 7
(2) (e). It reads
‘”torture” means the intentional infliction of severe pain and suffering,
whether physical or mental, upon a person in custody or under the control of
the accused; except that torture shall not include pain of suffering arising
from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions’.
This differs in various respects from the definition of torture under human
rights law. The most conspicuous difference is that the Rome Statute does
not refer to a purpose to be pursued with the infliction of pain and suffer-
ing.338 This is explicitly stated in the Elements of Crimes for torture as a
b)
(1)
333 See Part Two Chapter One III. 2 c) below.
334 Commission of the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and the Enforcement
of Penalties ‘Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference’ (March
1919) (1920) 14 AJIL 95–154, 113.
335 Control Council Law No 10 ‘Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes,
Crimes against Peace and against Humanity’ (done 20 December 1945) (1946) 3
Official Gazette of the Control Council for Germany 50.
336 See, with further references, Malcolm N Shaw International Law (6th edition
CUP Cambridge 2008) 326.
337 See Part Two Chapter One I. 1.
338 Machtheld Boot, Rodney Dixon and Christopher K Hall ‘Article 7: Crimes
against Humanity’ in Otto Triffterer Commentary on the Rome Statute of the In-
ternational Criminal Court (2nd edition Beck Munich 2008) 159-273, 254-5-.
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crime against humanity. The respective footnote reads ‘[i]t is understood
that no specific purpose need be proved for this crime’.339 This could
mean an extension of the acts to be qualified as torture. However, the em-
phasis of no ‘specific’ purpose being necessary could, in a logical argu-
mentum e contrario, also be interpreted in a way that Art. 7 Rome Statute
requires some sort of purpose and indeed the footnote is said to have been
introduced as such as the result of a political compromise.340 The Ele-
ments of Crimes also clarify that the question whether the pain or suffer-
ing reached the threshold of ‘severe’ pain of suffering is to be determined
objectively and, hence, does not depend on the value-judgment of the ac-
cused. The Elements of Crimes clarify that ‘[w]ith respect to mental ele-
ments associated with elements involving value judgment, such as those
using the terms “inhumane” or “severe”, it is not necessary that the perpe-
trator personally completed a particular value judgment, unless otherwise
indicated’.341 Therefore, ‘knowledge’, which generally constitutes a nec-
essary part of the mental element required for criminal liability under
Art. 30 (1) Rome Statute, is not required when it comes to torture. It is
enough that an accuse person indented to inflict severe pain or suffer-
ing.342 The waiving of the requirement of knowledge is also a result of the
criteria established by the ICTY jurisprudence which has been discussed
above, in particular Kunarac and Furundžija.343
As such, the Rome Statute stands in explicit contradiction to the way
intent was understood by the US Department of Justice during the Bush
Administration. In their memorandum of 1 August 2002, Assistant Attor-
ney General Jay S. Bybee and Deputy Assistant Attorney General John
Yoo interpret the US reservation to the CAT according to which an act
must ‘specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suf-
339 Elements of Crimes (adopted and entered into force 9 September 2002) Doc ICC-
ASP/1/3 (Pt. II-B) Footnote 14.
340 Machtheld Boot, Rodney Dixon and Christopher K Hall ‘Article 7: Crimes
against Humanity’ in Otto Triffterer Commentary on the Rome Statute of the In-
ternational Criminal Court (2nd edition Beck Munich 2008) 159-273, 255.
341 Elements of Crimes (adopted and entered into force 9 September 2002) Doc ICC-
ASP/1/3 (Pt. II-B) General Introduction para. 4.
342 See Machtheld Boot, Rodney Dixon and Christopher K Hall in ‘Article 7: Crimes
against Humanity’ in Otto Triffterer Commentary on the Rome Statute of the In-
ternational Criminal Court (2nd edition Beck Munich 2008) 159-273, 252.
343 Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgment) IT-96-23 (22 February 2001) para. 483; Prose-
cutor v Furundžija (Appeal Judgment) IT-95-17/1-A (21 July 2000) para. 111.
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fering’ in order to commit torture, to mean that the infliction of severe
pain ‘must be the defendant’s precise objective.’344
Furthermore, there is no requirement of the pain of suffering being in-
flicted by a State official. However, and this is also in contrast to the ICTY
jurisprudence which denied the requirement of an involvement of a State
official for charges of torture as a war crime, Art. 7 Rome Statute does al-
ready include in its chapeau element the requirement that the attack
against any civilian population has to be conducted ‘in furtherance of a
State or organizational policy’ (Art. 7 (2) (a) Rome Statute). This provides
for a rather high threshold for cases of crimes against humanity in general,
and does also apply in cases of torture as a crime against humanity.
The requirement ‘upon a person in custody or under the control of the
accused’ is also not explicitly included in the CAT definition of torture.
However, it is clear from both the drafting history of the CAT and the Tor-
ture Declaration and the jurisprudence of the human rights treaty bodies,
that one of the characterizing elements of torture is the helplessness of the
victim and, necessarily, the control that the perpetrator has over the victim.
Therefore, this element does not add a new requirement to the definition
of torture.
Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy,
enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of
comparable gravity (Art. 7 (1) (g) Rome Statute)
These modalities of crimes against humanity are discussed in detail in
Chapter Three below.
Enforced disappearance of persons (Art. 7 (1) (i) Rome Statute)
Forced disappearance, which had been associated in particular with dicta-
torial regimes in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s, has been ad-
dressed as a human rights problem separate from the prohibition of arbi-
(2)
(3)
344 US Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel ‘Memorandum for Alberto R.
Gonzales, Counsel to the President Re: Standard of Conduct for Interrogation un-
der 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A’ (1 August 2002) https://www.aclu.org (last ac-
cessed 1 Ocotober 2015) 3.
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trary arrest by a number of international instruments and treaty bodies/
courts. The UNGA, in 1992, adopted the Declaration on the Protection of
All Persons from Forced Disappearance in 1992.345 Two years later, the
Organization of American States adopted a regional convention address-
ing forced disappearance.346 Finally, in 2006, the UNGA adopted the In-
ternational Convention on the Protection of All Persons from Forced Dis-
appearance (‘Forced Disappearance Convention’).347
According to Art. 2 Forced Disappearance Convention, forced disap-
pearance means
‘the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by
agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the autho-
rization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to ac-
knowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or where-
abouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the pro-
tection of the law’.
The definition used in the Rome Statute is slightly different, but neverthe-
less contains all the elements set out in the Forced Disappearance Conven-
tion.
Like torture, forced disappearance is hence characterized by the help-
lessness of the victim and the complete control which the perpetrator exer-
cises over the victim. Particular to cases of forced disappearance is that the
State will not even acknowledge its responsibility for the person’s arrest or
his or her detention. This does naturally increase the risk of ill-treatment
during detention, as, at the same time, the risk of the State being held ac-
countable for ill-treatment decreases.
However, not only does forced disappearance and incommunicado de-
tention increase the risk of torture, it can amount to torture itself. Already
in 1981, the Institut des droits de l’homme Du Barreau de Paris issued a
draft declaration in which it stated that forced disappearance undermines
the ‘physical, psychological and moral integrity or security of any per-
345 UNGA Res 47/133 ‘Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance’ (18 December 1992) GAOR 47th Session Supp 49 vol 1, 207.
346 Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons (done 9 June
1994, entered into force 28 March 1996) (1994) 33 ILM 1529.
347 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disap-
pearance (adopted 20 December 2006, entered into force 23 December 2010)
GAOR 61st Session Supp 49 vol 1, 408.
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son’.348 In 1983, the UN Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary
Disappearances stated in its report that ‘[t]he very fact of being detained
as a disappeared person, isolated from one's family for a long period is
certainly a violation of the right to humane conditions of detention and has
been represented to the Group as torture’.349 The HRC has mentioned in-
communicado detention in its General Comment No 20 concerning prohi-
bition of torture and cruel treatment or punishment and urged State Parties
to enforce provisions against this sort of detention, to hold detainees only
in official places of detention and to keep a register with the place and the
person responsible for detention publicly accessible to relatives and
friends of a detained person.350 If this is not the case, incommunicado de-
tention can be qualified as cruel and inhuman treatment or even even as
torture.
The HRC has furthermore held in an individual communication that the
applicant ‘by being subjected to prolonged incommunicado detention [for
more than three years] in an unknown location, is the victim of torture and
cruel and inhuman treatment’.351 In other cases, the HRC has accepted
claims regarding violations of Art. 7 in forced disappearance cases, albeit
those claims were not based on forced disappearance alone, but were sup-
ported by claims of further ill-treatment during detention.352 The IACtHR
348 Le Refus de L’oubli: La Politique de Disparation Forcée de Personnes (Editions
Berger-Levrault Paris 1981) 313 (translation by the author.).
349 UN Commission on Human Rights ‘Question of the Human Rights of All Per-
sons Subject to any Form of Detention or Imprisonment: Question of Enforced or
Involuntary Disappearances: Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Invol-
untary Disappearances’ (21 January 1983) UN Doc E/CN.4/1983/14 para. 131.
350 UN HRC ‘General Comment No 20: Replaces General Comment 7 concerning
Prohibition of Torture and Cruel Treatment or Punishment (Art. 7)’ (3 April
1992) GAOR 47th Session Supp 40, 193, para. 11; UN Commission on Human
Rights ‘Torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’
Res 2003/32 (2003) UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2003/32 para. 14.
351 UN HRC ‘Communication No 440/1990, El-Megreisi v Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
(23 March 1994) UN Doc CCPR/C/50/D/440/1990 para. 5.4; UN HRC ‘Commu-
nication No 540/1993, Laureano Atachahua v Peru’ (26 March 1996) GAOR 51st
Session Supp 40, vol 2, 42 para. 8.5.
352 eg UN HRC ‘Communication No. 449/1991, Mojica v Dominican Republic’ (5
July 1994) UN Doc CCPR/C/51/D/449/1991 para. 5.7; UN HRC ‘Communica-
tion No. 458/1991, Womah Mukong v Cameroon’ (21 July 1994) U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991 para. 9.4; UN HRC ‘Communication No. 428/1990,
Bozize v Central African Republic’ (7 April 1994) UN Doc CCPR/C/50/D/
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has also considered prolonged isolation and communication to be a viola-
tion of Art. 5 IACHR.353
Additionally, the ECtHR and the ECommHR have found violations of
Art 3 ECHR regarding the relatives of ‘disappeared’ persons in Turkey354
and the HRC has held that the pain and suffering experienced by a disap-
peared persons’ family amounts to a violation of Art. 7 ICCPR.355
Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great
suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health
(Art. 7 (1) (k) Rome Statute)
The 1996 ILC Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of
Mankind contains a differently framed wording of this catch-all provision,
namely ‘other inhuman acts which severely damage physical or mental in-
tegrity, health or human dignity, such as mutilation and severe bodily
harm’.356 Even though this addition was not included into the Rome
Statute, it already shows that actions that fall under Art. 7 (1) (k) Rome
Statute can also be actions which are in the proximity of torture.
It will be interesting to see what sorts of actions the ICC will subsume
under this provision, as many of the acts which have been held by the ad
hoc tribunals to constitute ‘other inhumane acts’, like for example en-
forced prostitution or other sexual violence, are explicitly listed in the
Rome Statute as separate crimes. One of the possible acts which have been
held to constitute both torture and inhumane acts already during the
Nuremberg Medical Trial are biological, medical and scientific experi-
(5)
428/1990 para. 5.2; UN HRC ‘Communication No. 950/2000, Sarma v Sri Lan-
ka’ (6 July 2003) UN Doc CCPR/C/78/D/950/2000 para. 9.5.
353 Velasquez Rodriguez v Honduras (Judgment) IACtHR Series C No 4 (29 July
1988) para. 156.
354 Eg Cyprus v Turkey (ECtHR) Reports 2001-IV 1 para. 157; Kurt v Turkey (EC-
tHR) Reports 1998-III 1152 paras 130–43.
355 UN HRC ‘Communication No. 950/2000, Sarma v Sri Lanka’ UN Doc
CCPR/C/78/D/950/2000.para. 9.5.
356 Art. 18 (k) UN ILC ‘Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of
Mankind’ (1996) GAOR 51st Session Supp 10, 9.
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ments.357 In the context of war crimes, biological, medical and scientific
experiments are expressly punishable under Art. 8 (2) (a) (II) Rome
Statute.
War Crimes
Within the context of war crimes, there are several provisions of the Rome
Statute which prohibit torture under certain circumstances. As an in-depth
analysis of the connections would go beyond the scope of this book, they
are listed for the sake of completeness without further explanation.
Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions
– Torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments (Art. 8
(2) (a) (II) Rome Statute
– (1.2) Wilfully causing great suffering (Art. 8 (2) (a) (iii) Rome Statute
Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in
international armed conflict
– Subjecting persons who are in the power of an adverse party to physi-
cal mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments of any kind
which are neither justified by the medical, dental or hospital treatment
of the person concerned nor carried out in his or her interest, and which
cause death to or seriously endanger the health of such person or per-
sons (Art. 8 (2) (b) (x) Rome Statute)
– Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating
and degrading treatment (Art. 8 (2) (b) (xxi) Rome Statue)
– Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced preg-
nancy, as defined in article 7, paragraph 2 (f), enforced sterilization, or
any other form of sexual violence also constituting a grave breach of




357 See Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under
Control Council Law No 10 (US Government Printing Office Washington DC
1952) vol I 16, vol II 182.
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– Intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by
depriving them of objects indispensable to their survival, including
wilfully impeding relief supplies as provided for under the Geneva
Conventions (Art. 8 (2) (b) (xxiii) Rome Statute)
In the case of an armed conflict not of an international character,
serious violations of article 3 common to the four Geneva
Conventions
– Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutila-
tion, cruel treatment and torture (Art. 8 (2) (c) (i) Rome Statute)
– Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating
and degrading treatment (Art. 8 (2) (c) (ii) Rome Statute)
Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed
conflicts not of an international character, within the established
framework of international law
– Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced preg-
nancy, as defined in article 7, paragraph 2 (f), enforced sterilization,
and any other form of sexual violence also constituting a serious viola-
tion of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions (Art. 8 (2) (e)
(vi) Rome Statute)
– Subjecting persons who are in the power of another party to the con-
flict to physical mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments of
any kind which are neither justified by the medical, dental or hospital
treatment of the person concerned nor carried out in his or her interest,
and which cause death to or seriously endanger the health of such per-
son or persons (Art. 8 (2) (e) (xi) Rome Statute)
Concluding Remarks
In conclusion, it is clear that the ad hoc tribunals needed guidance on how
to define torture and that the definition of the CAT was the most obvious
place from which to seek said guidance. It is also clear that the tribunals
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The reason for that is, at least partly, the well-established nature of the
prohibition of torture in international law. It is is a well-known component
of national, regional and international protection of the individual. The
CAT is a high-profile convention with a high number of ratification. The
prohibition torture is a part of ius cogens, and as such, it emanates authori-
ty and it is easily accessible. It is also mirrored by a prohibition of torture
that can be found in many national legal systems.
However, one cannot fully agree with Judge Pocar’s statement that
‘over multiple judgments and with concerted deliberate effort, the ICTY
has contributed significant value to international criminal jurisprudence
through honing in on a concrete definition of torture under international
humanitarian law’.358 In the case of torture, one can observe frequent use
in absence of a coherent methodology for said use. For one, the definitions
applied by the different Trial and Appeals Chambers were not always con-
gruent and, at times, were contradictory and mutually exclusive. And sec-
ond, the dogmatic approaches applied, the extent to which international le-
gal dogma was applied at all, varied so much between the different cham-
bers that the overall record of the tribunals when it comes to a dogmatical-
ly convincing definition of torture for the purpose of international criminal
and international humanitarian law can be labelled mixed at best.
Minority Rights Law359
What is a Minority in the Context of Crimes under International Law?
The definition of the term ‘minority’ and the rights attached to minority
status are often portrayed to be controversial.360
Chapter Two:
I.
358 Fausto Pocar ‘International Criminal Tribunals and Serious Violations of Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law against Civilians and Prisoners of War’ in Manoj Ku-
mar Sinha (ed) International Criminal Law and Human Rights (Manak Delhi
2010) 1-26, 12.
359 Chapter Two of this thesis is partly based and draws from on the author’s master
thesis entitled ‚A Race between Education and Catastophe? The Role of Minority
Issues in the Prevention of Crimes under International Law’ (Lund University
2006), available at http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&record
OId=1555279&fileOId=1563606 (31 October 2017).
360 For the overview of minority rights in an historic context see Jost Delbrück and
Rüdiger Wolfrum Völkerrecht Volume I/2: Der Staat und andere Völker-
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The definition which is most often used and referred to traces back to a
study by Francesco Capotorti, then Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Com-
mission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. Ac-
cording to Capotorti, a minority is defined as:
A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-
dominant position, whose members-being nationals of the State-possess eth-
nic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of
the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed to-
wards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language.361
In recent years, it has, however, been more and more disputed whether
members of a minority need to be citizens of the State in which they in-
voke their rights as members of a minority group, especially because mod-
ern globalized societies with influx of migrants might require to grant mi-
nority protection also to non-citizens.362 One argument in favour of the ex-
pansion of minority definition to so-called ‘new minorities’ is that other-
wise it would be much easier for governments to exclude groups by sim-
ply denying them citizenship. Historically, and in particular under the
League of Nations, the term ‘minority’ has been understood as applying
only to citizens.363 However, HRC stated that Art 27 ICCPR is applicable
not only to State citizens, but also to aliens constituting a minority within
rechtssubjekte; Räume unter internationaler Verwaltung (2nd edition De Gruyter
Berlin 2002) 271-3.
361 UN Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission
on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Francesco Capo-
torti ‘Study on the Rights of Persons belonging to ethnic, religious and linguistic
minorities’ (1979) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev. 1 para 568; see also a de-
tailed critical discussion of the elements of Capotorti’s definition in Jost Delbrück
and Rüdiger Wolfrum Völkerrecht Volume I/2: Der Staat und andere Völker-
rechtssubjekte; Räume unter internationaler Verwaltung (2nd edition De Gruyter
Berlin 2002), 276-281.
362 Manfred Nowak U. N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commen-
tary (N. P Engel Kehl 2005) 647; see also Rüdiger Wolfrum ‘”New Minorities”
as a Result of Migration’ in Caterine Brölmann, Rene Lefeber and Marjoleine
Zieck Peoples and Minorities in International Law (Nijhoff Dordrecht 1993)
153–166; Jost Delbrück and Rüdiger Wolfrum Völkerrecht Volume I/2: Der Staat
und andere Völkerrechtssubjekte; Räume unter internationaler Verwaltung (2nd
edition De Gruyter Berlin 2002) 278-9.
363 Manfred Nowak U. N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commen-
tary (N. P Engel Kehl 2005) 645.
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the meaning of the Covenant.364 Art 27 itself does not hint at the exclusion
of foreigners from its protection, as it only speaks of ‘persons,’ not ‘citi-
zens.’ However, mostly due to political realities, it might not be realistic
or sustainable to grant or demand instant minority protection to actual cas-
es of recent arrivals in a country.365
No matter which definition is the most appropriate when it comes to
granting individuals minority rights in the strict sense, “[t]he existence of
[minority] communities is a question of fact; it is not a question of law.”366
In the context of international criminal law, the protection of a group does
not depend on its nationality, but rather on its vulnerability and need for
protection. In this sense, even though minority rights law as obvious links
to the provisions of international human rights law safeguarding equality
and non-discrimination, the instruments of minority protection go beyond
that as they have in common the assumption that formal equality and the
prohibition of discrimination are not enough to address ethnic or religious
differences on a legal level.367 The 1948 Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (hereinafter: the Genocide Con-
vention) refers to the destruction of a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group as such, and does not ask for any additional formal requirements.
Clearly, it would be an absurdity to distinguish between nationals and non-
nationals: the prohibition transcends the category.368 The same must be
true for the other crimes under international law examined here, namely
crimes against humanity and war crimes.
364 UN HRC ‘General Comment No 15: The Positions of Aliens under the
Covenant’ (9 April 1986) GAOR 41st Session Supp 40, 117 para 7; UN HRC
‘General Comment No 23: The Rights of Minorities (Art. 27)’ (8 April 1994)
GAOR 49th Session Supp 40 vol 1, 106 para 5.1.
365 Gudmundur Alfredsson ‘Minorities, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples: Definition of
Terms as a Matter of International Law’ in Nazila Ghanea and Alexandra Xantha-
ki (eds) Minorities, Peoples and Self-Determination, Essays in Honour of Patrick
Thornberry (Nijhoff Leiden 2005) 167.
366 Greco-Bulgarian Communities (Advisory Opinion) PCIJ Series B No 17 22.
367 Stefan Oeter ‘Der Schutz nationaler Minderheiten im Völkerrecht’ in Rüdiger
Wolfrum (ed) Gleichheit und Nichtdiskriminierung im nationalen und interna-
tionalen Menschenrechtsschutz (Springer Berlin 2003) 187-214, 197-8.
368 Patrick Thornberry International Law and the Rights of Minorities (Clarendon
Press Oxford 1991) 8.
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Where Has Minority Rights Law Been Referred to?
In Tadić, the ICTY Trial Chamber discussed the take of the ILC Draft
Code on the relationship between ‘the crime of “persecution on political,
racial, religious or ethnic grounds” and that of “institutionalized discrimi-
nation on racial, ethnic, or religious grounds involving the violation of
fundamental human rights and freedoms and resulting in seriously disad-
vantaging a part of the population”’.369 It clarifies that ‘[i]t is the violation
of the right to equality in some serious fashion that infringes on the enjoy-
ment of a basic or fundamental right that constitutes persecution, although
the discrimination must be on one of the listed grounds to constitute perse-
cution under the Statute’.370 This statement in its early-on case could have
served as a gateway for minority rights to be incorporated into the tri-
bunals ‘analyses. Unfortunately, this has not been the case, and minority
rights are scarcely referred to in both the ICTY’s and the ICTR’s deci-
sions.
The Krstić Case is one of the rare examples were an ad hoc tribunal ex-
plicitly refers to instruments available under minority rights law in order
to establish the groups protected by the prohibition of genocide. It was the
first judgment in which the ICTY held that the events that happened in
Srebrenica constituted genocide. 371 The decision was later upheld on ap-
peal372 and in the Bosnian Genocide Case of the ICJ.373 In order to estab-
lish the state of customary international law on genocide at the time of the
events in Srebrenica took place, the ICTY refers to the Genocide Conven-
tion, the Rome Statute and the ICTR case law, as well as to the Report of
the International Law Commission (ILC) on the Draft Code of Crimes
against Peace and Security of Mankind374 and the two reports of the Sub-
II.
369 Prosecutor v Tadić (Opinion and Judgment) IT-94-1 (7 May 1997) para 697; UN
ILC ‘Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind’ (1996)
GAOR 51st Session Supp 10, 9, 98.
370 Prosecutor v Tadić (Opinion and Judgment) IT-94-1 (7 May 1997) para. 697.
371 Prosecutor v Krstić (Judgment) IT-98-33-T (2 August 2001) paras 539-599.
372 Prosecutor v Krstić (Appeal Judgment) IT-98-33-A (19 April 2004).
373 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Merits) ([2007]
ICJ Rep 43 paras 231-376.
374 UN ILC ‘Commentary on the ILC Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and
Security of Mankind’ GAOR 51st Session Supp 10, 9, in particular 106-114.
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Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities
of the UN Commission on Human Rights.375
First, the trial chamber establishes the actus rea of genocide, i.e. murder
and serious bodily and mental harm had occurred. Then, the chamber turns
to whether the mens rea existed in the actors, establishing whether they
had the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or
religious group. In order to define groups protected by the Genocide Con-
vention, the court refers to minority rights law by establishing that the
preparatory work conducted on the Convention and the work of the inter-
national bodies in relation to the protection of minorities “partially overlap
and are on occasion synonymous”.376 The Chamber states that even
though the European human rights instruments use the term ‘national mi-
norities’ while universal documents more commonly refer to ‘ethnic, reli-
gious or linguistic minorities,’ the two expressions appear to embrace the
same goals.377 Furthermore, it establishes that
“[t]he preparatory work of the Convention shows that setting out such a
list was designed more to describe a single phenomenon, roughly corre-
sponding to what was recognised, before the second world war, as “na-
tional minorities”, rather than to refer to several distinct prototypes of hu-
man groups. To attempt to differentiate each of the named groups on the
basis of scientifically objective criteria would thus be inconsistent with the
object and purpose of the Convention.”378
The chamber further holds that Bosnian Muslims are a protected group
under the Genocide Convention and that such a group cannot be limited to
the Bosnian Muslim population in a specific geographical area.379 How-
ever, the court acknowledges that the destruction may target only a part of
the geographically limited part of the larger group because the perpetrators
375 UN Commission of Human Rights Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission
on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Nicodème
Ruhashyankiko ‘Study on the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide’ (4 July 1978) UN Doc E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/ 416; UN Commis-
sion of Human Rights Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Benjamin Whitaker, ‘Revised and
Updated Report on the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide’ (2 July 1985) E/CN.4/Sub. 2/1985/6.
376 Prosecutor v Krstić (Judgment) IT-98-33-T (2 August 2001) para. 555.
377 Prosecutor v Krstić (Judgment) IT-98-33-T (2 August 2001) para. 555.
378 Prosecutor v Krstić (Judgment) IT-98-33-T (2 August 2001) para. 556.
379 Prosecutor v Krstić (Judgment) IT-98-33-T (2 August 2001) paras 559-60.
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regard the intended destruction as sufficient to annihilate the group as a
distinct entity in the respective geographic area.380
Furthermore, the court points out that genocide, as opposed to persecu-
tion as a crime against humanity, does require the intent to physically de-
stroy a group and not merely eradicate its culture and identity as a distinct
social entity.381 It is however acknowledged by the tribunal that a physical
or biological attack on a protected group is often accompanied by simulta-
neous attacks on cultural or religious property and symbols and the intent
to deliberately destroy a minority’s identity can therefore serve as evi-
dence for the intent to physically destroy the group.382
The Krstić Judgment is exceptional in several ways: apart from the ex-
plicit reference to minority rights law in order to establish protected
groups under international criminal law, the court touches on the concept
of group identity and the eradication thereof in the context of both perse-
cution and genocide. The notion that the attack of a minority group’s iden-
tity can serve as evidence of intent to physically eliminate them shows the
connection between the neglect of minority rights and the outbreak of vio-
lence against minorities. It also demonstrates how much a broad under-
standing of both concepts can positively affect the development of each of
the two branches of international law.
Where Could Minority Right Law Have Been Referred to?
Minority rights law, like the international courts and tribunals in the areas
of genocide or persecution as a crime against humanity, intensively con-
cern themselves with the individual-group dichotomy.383 The need for us-
III.
380 Prosecutor v Krstić (Judgment) IT-98-33-T (2 August 2001) para 590.
381 Prosecutor v Krstić (Judgment) IT-98-33-T (2 August 2001) para 574-575.
382 Prosecutor v Krstić (Judgment) IT-98-33-T (2 August 2001) para 580.
383 See for the historic development of this dichotomy: UN Commission on Human
Rights Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimina-
tion and Protection of Minorities, Francesco Capotorti ‘Study on the Rights of
Persons belonging to ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities’ (1979) UN Doc
E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev. 1; Manfred Nowak U. N. Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights: CCPR Commentary (N P Engel Kehl 2005) 652-657; UN HRC ‘General
Comment No 23: The Rights of Minorities (Art. 27)’ (8 April 1994) GAOR 49th
Session Supp 40 vol 1, 106; Carsten Stahn ‘Internationaler Menschenrechtss-
chutz und Völkerstrafrecht’ (1999) 3 Kritische Justiz 345; for decisions of the
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ing minority rights for guidance in interpretation is especially obvious
when it comes to the ICTY. From the time of its establishment, the tri-
bunal’s assignment was to punish large-scale violations of international
humanitarian law in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.384 As the first
international criminal tribunal since the end of World War II, the ICTY
had to face a variety of problems regarding the doctrine of nullum crimen
sine lege.
The Categorization of Groups Falling under the Ambit of Protected
Groups Within the Definition of Genocide
In the first judgement of the ICTR, the Akayesu judgment, no such refer-
ence to minority rights law is made. This is all the more surprising when
keeping in mind that genocide was the core crime the ICTR was establish
to deal with and the first couple of judgments still had to counter the pred-
ication that a genocide had not taken place at all.385 For this, the Akayesu
judgment delves into the colonial history of Rwanda and explains how the
categories of Hutu and Tutsi were exploited by the German and Belgian
colonial powers and what before were fluid denominations attributed to
individuals and referring to lineage and social class became stable cat-
egories attributed to groups.386At the same time, persons also increasingly
referred to themselves belonging to a stable group called Tutsi, as a result
of the racial and racist considerations introduced by the colonial powers
and based on, inter alia, physical appearance that set the taller, ‘Tutsi’ with
fairer, more ‘European’ features apart from the majority population.387
Here, the court clarified that, according to the travaux préparatoires of the
Genocide Convention, the convention seeks to protect any stable and per-
1.
Human Rights Committee see eg UN HRC ‘Communication No 167/1984, Omi-
nayak, Chief of the Lubicon Lake Band v Canada’ (26 March 1990) GAOR 45th
Session Supp 40 vol 2, 1; UN HRC ‘Communication No 197/1985, Kitok v Swe-
den’ (27 July 1988) GAOR 43rd Session Supp 40, 221; UN HRC ‘Communica-
tion No 511/1992, Länsman v Finland’ (26 October 1994) GAOR 50th Session
Supp 40 vol 2, 66.
384 United Nations Security Council Resolution 808, Article 1; United Nations Secu-
rity Council Resolution 827, Article2 UN Doc. S/RES/827, 25 May 1993.
385 Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment) ICTR-96-4-A (1 June 2001) paras 112-129;.
386 Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment) ICTR-96-4-A (1 June 2001) paras 78-84.
387 Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment) ICTR-96-4-A (1 June 2001) para 83.
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manent group.388 However, the court could have gained much from argu-
ing with the help of minority rights law and how ethnic minorities are de-
fined there. As, for example, the term ‘ethnic minority’, introduced by the
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Mi-
norities in the 1950s, does not only encompass what had been known as
‘racial’ minorities but also contained cultural as well as historical ele-
ments, the narrative of the coming into existence of the Tutsi as a distinct
ethnical group in light of colonial history would have strengthen the argu-
ment.389 Furthermore, other criteria such as subjective acceptance of mem-
bership or family ties of the person could have been employed as evidence
of the Tutsi as an ethnic group in line with international law.390 The same
goes for other ICTR judgments whose subjective approach focused on the
perpetrators: Tutsi were an ethnic group because the perpetrators believed
them to be one.391 Even though the ICTR and referring to it, later the
ICTY hold that the determination of the protected group has to be done on
a case-by-case basis using objecting and subjective criteria, no reference
to human rights law is made.392
388 Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment) ICTR-96-4-A (1 June 2001) paras 511, 316;
see also Prosecutor v Musema (Judgment) ICTR-96-13-T (27 January 2000)
para. 162; See also Prosecutor v Rutaganda (Judgment) ICTR-96-3-T (6 Decem-
ber 1999) para. 57.
389 Manfred Nowak U. N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commen-
tary (N P Engel Kehl 2005) 649.
390 Manfred Nowak U. N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commen-
tary (N P Engel Kehl 2005) 653; see also Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment) IC-
TR-96-4-A (1 June 2001) paras 170-172 where the court included a large quote
of an expert witnesson how persons came to view themselves as a Tutsi ethnic
group but no mention of international alw on this subject is made; see also Prose-
cutor v Brđanin (Judgment) IT-99-36-T (1 September 2004) para. 683.
391 Prosecutor v Kayishema (Judgment) ICTR-95-1-T (21 May 1999) para 98; see
also Prosecutor v Semanza (Judgment) ICTR-97-20-T (15 May 2003) para 317;
Prosecutor v Kajelijeli (Judgment) ICTR-98-44A-T (1 December 2003) para 811;
see also Prosecutor v Brđanin (Judgment) IT-99-36-T (1 September 2004) para.
683; in judgments where the affiliation to a group was based on the perception of
the perpetrators, no mention was made of minority rights law, see also see also
Prosecutor v Brđanin (Judgment) IT-99-36-T (1 September 2004) para. 683.
392 See Prosecutor v Semanza (Judgment) ICTR-97-20-T (15 May 2003) para 317;
Prosecutor v Kajelijeli (Judgment) ICTR-98-44A-T (1 December 2003) para 811;
Prosecutor v Brđanin (Judgment) IT-99-36-T (1 September 2004) para 684;
Prosecutor v Blagojević (Judgment) IT-02-60-A (9 May 2007) para 667.
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The Definition of Persecution
Whereas tribunals were able to take recourse to prior definitions in the
case of torture, in one way or another, no prior definition was available for
persecution as a crime against humanity. Even though persecution on po-
litical, racial or religious grounds was listed as a crime against humanity in
Article 6 (c) of the Nuremberg Charter, it was not clearly defined in inter-
national criminal law or in the world’s major criminal justice systems.393 It
was also not defined in any statute or treaty prior to the adoption of the
Rome Statute in 1998.394 The respective trial chamber in Tadić could
therefore not draw guidance from international criminal law instruments
when establishing the content of the crime of persecution. It found that the
commission of the crime must involve discrimination on racial, religious
or political grounds that is intended to infringe an individual’s basic or
fundamental human rights.395 At least when it comes to discrimination on
racial or religious grounds, the prohibition of such forms of discrimination
is set out clearly by the international instruments governing the rights of
minorities. Furthermore, discrimination on these grounds with the intent to
infringe an individual’s fundamental human rights is, both generally and
specifically in the context of the former Yugoslavia, a violation of the
rights of minorities. Generally, the concept of persecution is very similar
to that of gross and systematic violations of human rights. 396 Additionally,
persecution is the link between crimes against humanity and genocide ‘in
that acts that might begin as persecution of a minority group may lead, in
the most extreme manifestation, to a plan for the intentional destruction of
the group.397 As such, at a lowest common denominator, they protect the
same groups (even though persecution under the Rome Statute provides a
wider range of protection in terms of groups than genocide), so that find-
2.
393 Prosecutor v Tadić (Opinion and Judgment) IT-94-1 (7 May 1997) para. 694.
394 Machtheld Boot Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes-Nullum
Crimen Sine Lege and the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the International Crimi-
nal Court (Intersenita Antwerp 2002) 284-5.
395 Ibid. 285 Prosecutor v Tadić (Opinion and Judgment) IT-94-1 (7 May 1997)
paras. 695-697; 712-713.
396 William A Schabas The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the
Rome Statute (OUP Oxford 2010) 175.
397 William A Schabas The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the
Rome Statute (OUP Oxford 2010) 175.
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ings valid for the protected groups in the crime of genocide could also
have served the court with regards to persecution.
However, the Chambers dealing with the definition of persecution as a
crime against humanity did not take recourse to any of the instruments or
cases dealing with minority rights law. In the Kupreškić Case, the Cham-
ber emphasised that in order to define the crime of persecution, it cannot
relate to the definition of persecution under human rights or refugee law,
as the court deemed this a violation of the principle of legality.398 The
Chamber concentrates on the definition of persecution set out in refugee
law and concludes that it is based more on the perception and fear of being
prosecuted than on factual and legal findings.
Despite this fact, the tribunal does not mention the instruments of mi-
nority protection that are closely connected to the concepts of persecution
and non-discrimination and that could have been helpful for guidance in
this matter.
Neither do other Trial Chamber which was faced with the need to de-
fine persecution and the intensity of the denial of rights necessary for an
act to fall under the ambit of persecution. In particular, an instrument like
the ICCPR, ratified by 169 States, and the products of its treaty body
would have had considerable authority.399 In Kvocka (and later in Krno-
jelac), the Chambers, when faced with having to decide the threshold of
persecution stated ‘jointly or severally, the acts alleged in the Amended
Indictment must amount to persecution’.400 But that did not mean that
each discriminatory act alleged must individually be regarded as a viola-
tion of international law.’401 While it is certainly true that persecution can
be established in cumulating many individual acts that, taken by them-
selves, do not reach the necessary threshold (as the Kvocka Chamber es-
398 Prosecutor v Kupreškić (Trial Chamber Judgment) IT-95-16 (14 January 2000)
para. 589.
399 Status of ratifications as of November 2017.
400 Prosecutor v Kvočka (Judgment) IT-98-30 (2 November 2001) 186; see also
Prosecutor v Krnojelac (Judgment) IT-97-25 (15 March 2002) para 434; see also
Theodor Meron ‘Human Rights Marches into New Territory: The Enforcement of
International Human Rights in International Criminal Tribunals’ Fourth Marek
Nowicki Memorial Lecture (28 November 2008) <http://web.ceu.hu/legal/pdf%2
0documents/Nowicki/Meron_Enforcement%20of%20HRwarsawnowicki13nov 0
8.pdf > (as last accessed on 10 June 2013; speech no longer accessible online) 29.
401 Prosecutor v Kvočka (Judgment) IT-98-30 (2 November 2001) 186; see also
Prosecutor v Krnojelac (Judgment) IT-97-25 (15 March 2002) para 434.
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tablishes referring to trials dealing with the persecution of European Jews
before and during World War II), the Chamber overlooks that many of the
acts it examines (e.g. acts of murder, rape, torture, humiliation and physi-
cal abuse) are in fact violations of minority rights law and therefore viola-
tions of international law.402 It is unfortunate that the ICTY, established to
contribute to peace and reconciliation in a conflict that centred largely on
minority issues, missed the opportunity to show the interdependence be-
tween the crime of persecution and the protection of minorities.
The Definition of a Stigmatised Group within the Crime of Persecution
The ICTY fails to take recourse to minority rights law when defining a
group subjected to persecution. In Kvocka, it characterizes genocide as ‘an
extreme and most inhuman form of persecution’403 thereby acknowledg-
ing the systemic similarities between the two crimes, which, in turn, are
closely related to the protection of minorities.404 The respective Chambers
of the ICTY have repetitively used the criterion of stigmatisation instead.
In Prosecutor v Dragan Nikolić, for example, the Court refers to discrimi-
natory measures directed solely towards the Muslim population like the
requirement of laissez-passers, the restriction of accounts towards person
of Muslim faith, the requirement to hand in weapons, summary arrests, de-
tention, torture and massive transfer of civilians that incorporated a greater
policy of ethnic cleansing.405
Even though the Court uses terms and principles of minority rights law,
it does so without directly referring to the law, its instruments, and the
scholarly work and findings. With this, the decisions lose legal weight and
the court misses out on an opportunity to make use of an area of law close-
ly interlinked with international criminal law. In Jesilić, for example, the
court uses the term ‘national, ethnical and racial groups’ to established
3.
402 Manfred Nowak U. N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commen-
tary (N. P Engel Kehl 2005) 662-663.
403 Prosecutor v Kvočka (Judgment) IT-98-30 (2 November 2001) 636.
404 This approach has also been cited by the ICJ in Application of the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Merits) [2007] ICJ Rep 43 para 188.
405 Prosecutor v Nikolić (Review of Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61of the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence) ICTY IT-94-2-R61 (20 October 1995) (‘the Nikolic De-
cision’), para. 27.
Part Two: How are Different Areas of Human Rights Law Referred to?
134
persecuted groups; however, this does not coincide with the use of the re-
spective minority rights instruments or scholarly works in this area to give
more weight to their interpretation. 406 Although it is obvious that the
concepts used by the Court are crucial i.e. the identification by others and
the self-identification within the group, these conceptions are also consid-
ered in minority rights law and a discussion of these concepts would have
increased the authority of the delivered judgment.
Where is the Link?
State Obligations regarding the Protection of Minorities from Crimes
under International Law
Minorities have always been a particularly vulnerable group and from the
conception of the concept on, minority rights have been more closely
linked to violent conflict then other categories of human rights.407 How-
ever, minority rights have been seen by some to be a cause and not a cure
for conflict. Particularly, at the time the UDHR was drafted, after World
War II, minority rights law was looked upon with scepticism due to the
misuse of the concept by Nazi Germany and the fact that various instru-
ments conceived by the League of Nations could not protect them.408 Mi-
nority rights have been portrayed as divisive, as they categorize groups of
people and convey different rights to them according to their ethnic, reli-
gious, national or racial background.409 Many hoped that the new empha-
sis on human rights would resolve the problems associated with minority
IV.
1.
406 Prosecutor v Jelisić (Judgement) ICTY-IT-95-10 (14 December 1999) para. 70 et.
seq.
407 Minority Rights Group International ‘Briefing: Why a minority rights approach
to conflict? The case of Southern Sudan’ (2008) <http://www.academia.edu/3622
460/Why_a_minority_rights_approach_to_conflict_The_case_of_Southern_Suda
n> (31 October 2017) 2.
408 Lyal S Sunga ‘International Criminal Law: Protection of Minorities’ in Zelim A
Skurbaty (ed) Beyond a One-Dimensional State: An Emerging Right to Autono-
my? (Nijhoff Leiden 2005) 255-275, 256.
409 Minority Rights Group International ‘Briefing: Why a minority rights approach
to conflict? The case of Southern Sudan’ (2008) <http://www.academia.edu/3622
460/Why_a_minority_rights_approach_to_conflict_The_case_of_Southern_Suda
n> (31 October 2017) 2.
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rights by guaranteeing basic civil and political rights regardless of group
membership.410 The end of the Cold War and the decline of authoritarian-
ism, which led to the outbreak of many previously suppressed internal
(ethnic) conflicts made the international community rethink their stance on
minority protection.411 Ignoring real grievances along ethnic lines seemed
to not be the solution anymore.412 Hence, several universal and regional
instruments for the protection of minorities were adopted in the early
nineties that seem to focus on the resolution of intra-state conflict and the
maintenance of peace and security.413
However, even before that, the international community thought to pro-
tect the existence of minorities on several occasions in both universal and
regional human rights and international law instruments. This section will
focus on the most crucial instruments of under general human right law
from which an obligation to protect minorities from crimes under interna-
tional law can nevertheless be inferred.
Even though international provisions for the protection of minorities
could be found long before the evolvement of modern international human
rights law414, the International Bill of Human Rights, consisting of the
410 Will Kymlicka Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory on Minority Rights
(OUP Oxford 1996) 2-3.
411 Helen Quane ‘Rights in Conflict? The Rationale and Implications of using Hu-
man Rights in Conflict Prevention Strategies’ (2007) 47 Virginia. Journal of In-
ternational Law 463-523, 498.
412 Minority Rights Group International ‘Briefing: Why a minority rights approach
to conflict? The case of Southern Sudan’ (2008) <http://www.academia.edu/3622
460/Why_a_minority_rights_approach_to_conflict_The_case_of_Southern_Suda
n> (31 October 2017) 2.
413 Helen Quane ‘Rights in Conflict? The Rationale and Implications of using Hu-
man Rights in Conflict Prevention Strategies’ (2007) 47 Virginia. Journal of In-
ternational Law 463-523, 498.
414 E.g. in the religious treaties of peace treaties of Augsburg (Abschied des Augs-
burger Reichstages [Augsburger Friede] [25 September 1555] in K Zeumer (ed)
Quellensammlung zum Staats-, Verwaltungs- und Völkerrecht vol 2.1 Quellen-
sammlung zur Geschichte der Deutschen Reichsverfassung in Mittelalter und
Neuzeit [2nd edn Siebeck Mohr Tübingen 1913] 341) and Westphalia (Treaty of
Peace between the Holy Roman Empire and Sweden and the Treaty of Peace be-
tween France and the Holy Roman Empire [signed and entered into force 24 Oc-
tober 1648] [1648–49] 1 CTS 198, 319 [these two treaties form the Westphalian
Peace Treaty]) and the Peace Treaties following World War I.; System of Minori-
ty Protection set up by the League of Nations; Manfred Nowak U. N. Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (N. P Engel Kehl 2005) 480.
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UDHR, the ICCPR and the IESCR, only specifically mentions minorities
in Article 27 ICCPR.
All major human rights treaties are in their substantive part preceded by
general non-discrimination clauses. Art. 2 Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights in so far served as a blueprint for all major international and
regional human rights conventions.415
Art. 2 UDHR reads ‘Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms
set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status.’ The same is repeated, in substance,
in Arts. 2 (1) ICCPR, Art. 2 (2) ICESCR, Art. 2 (1) CRC and Art. 2 ACH-
PR coining the reference to a ‘common Art. 2 of international human
rights instruments on the prohibition of discrimination’.416 The same ap-
proach can be found in Art. 1 ACHR and Art. 14 ECHR. Apart from
Art. 14 ECHR, none of the provisions deal with the status of a national mi-
nority explicitly in the context of non-discrimination. All of them do,
however, include a protection against discrimination on a similar basis as
the Genocide Convention, namely on the grounds of race, religion, nation-
al origin.417
Charter of the United Nations
The Charter of the United Nations (‘UN Charter’) does not deal with mi-
norities explicitly. Amongst the purposes of the UN’s foundation are the
maintenance of international peace and security, the development of
a)
415 Rüdiger Wolfrum ‘The Prohibition of Discrimination in International Human
Rights Treaties: The Development from an Accessory Norm to an Independent
One’ in Dirk Hanschel and Others Mensch und Recht: Festschrift für Eibe Riedel
(Duncker und Humblot Berlin 2013) 2009-2019, 2012.
416 Rüdiger Wolfrum ‘The Prohibition of Discrimination in International Human
Rights Treaties: The Development from an Accessory Norm to an Independent
One’ in Dirk Hanschel and Others Mensch und Recht: Festschrift für Eibe Riedel
(Duncker und Humblot Berlin 2013) 2009-2019, 2012.
417 Though ethnicity is not covered in the range of protection, the reference to ‘race’
partially covers the same groups. A reference to ‘ethnicity’ does, however, in-
clude a wider range of groups than the controversial ‘race’ as, on top of biologi-
cally or physically recognisable attributes, it also covers cultural and historical el-
ements; see; Manfred Nowak U. N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
CCPR Commentary (N. P Engel Kehl 2005) 649.
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friendly relations amongst nations and the promotion and protection of hu-
man rights.418 The main governing principles on which the United Nations
are based are the principle of State sovereignty (Article 2 (1) UN Charter)
and the prohibition of the use of force, stipulated in Article 2 (4) UN Char-
ter. Article 55 UN Charter expresses the aim of promoting “universal re-
spect for, and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for
all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.” The Member
States pledge themselves to take joint and separate actions to achieve the
aims set out in Article 55.419 This is the framework in which minority pro-
tection within the United Nations takes place.
Regarding the protection of minorities against crimes which are com-
mitted against them outside of a State’s own boundaries, the prohibition of
the use of force outlaws the threat or use of force against the territorial in-
tegrity of other states. Force is only permitted in well-defined exceptions,
namely for the purpose of self-defence under Article 51 and when the Se-
curity Council decided to take action pursuant to Articles 39 and 42, as ac-
knowledged by the Responsibilty to Protect according to which the Secu-
rity Council is prepared to take collective action, including under Chapter
VII UN Charter, to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity.420 There has been much discussion
and controversy about a third exception, humanitarian intervention, but it
cannot be said to have crystallised into an exception to Article 2 (4) under
international law.421 It has been argued that as a consequence of the Re-
sponsibility to Protect, in some extreme cases of mass violence against a
population, the international community has an obligation to intervene and
418 Article 1(1), 1(2) and 1(3) Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945,
entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS 16.
419 Article 56 Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into
force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS 16.
420 UNGA Res 60/1 ‘2005 World Summit Outcome’ (16 September 2005) GAOR
60th Session Supp 49 vol 1, 3 para. 139; see also Anne Peters ‘Article 24’ in
Bruno Simma, Daniel Khan and others The Charter of the United Nations: A
Commentary (3rd ed OUP Oxford 2012) 761-786, 766-767 see Part Two Chapter
Two IV. 1 e) below.
421 See Christine Gray ‘The use of force and the international legal order’ in Mal-
colm D Evans (ed) International Law (3rd ed OUP Oxford 2010) 621-623.
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that in these cases, the use of veto power on part of a member of the Secu-
rity Council should be considered illegal or invalid.422
Things are much less clear when it comes to the treatment of popula-
tions by their own State. Even though the UN Charter sets out some stan-
dards in the field of human rights, for example on non-discrimination in
Articles 1 and 55 regarding self-determination or in chapters XI-XIII, it
does not contain a bill of rights. The initial proposal of several States to
include a declaration of rights analogous to national constitutions was
dropped under pressure of the major powers and the issue was essentially
postponed.423 For this reason, one has to look further into the instruments
adopted under the auspices of the United Nations and within other interna-
tional and regional organisations to see the extent to which minorities are
protected within the state they are living.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Article 27 ICCPR reads:
‘In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist,
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in com-
munity with other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to
profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language’.
The formulation ‘persons belonging to such minorities’ emphasises that
Article 27 sets out an individual right and not a group right, even though it
is the collective enjoyment of the right that is protected.424 Article 27 is
the only provision in the ICCPR that is formulated in a negative way,
which shows that the first State obligation towards minorities is to refrain
b)
422 Anne Peters ‘Humanity as the A and Ω of Sovereignty’ (2009) 20 EJIL 513-544,
536-540.
423 William A.Schabas Preventing Genocide and Mass Killing: The Challenge for
the United Nations (Minority Rights Group International London 2006) https://ep
rints.mdx.ac.uk/7840/1/MRGGenocideReport.pdf (31 October 2017) 7.
424 UN Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission
on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Francesco Capo-
torti ‘Study on the Rights of Persons belonging to ethnic, religious and linguistic
minorities’ (1979) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev. 1, 35; Manfred Nowak U. N.
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (N. P Engel Kehl
2005) 655-657.
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from interference and to practice tolerance.425 Particularly prohibited are
all measures directed against or threatening the existence of ethnic, lin-
guistic or religious minorities.426 In this respect, General Comment No. 29
of the HRC is of particular importance as it states that:
“…the international protection of the rights of persons belonging to mi-
norities includes elements that must be respected in all circumstances.
This is reflected in the prohibition of genocide under international law, the
inclusion of a non-discrimination clause in Article 4 itself (paragraph 1),
as well as in the non-derogable nature of Article 18.”427
However, the obligation set out in Article 27 goes beyond the mere pro-
hibition of discrimination of minorities. Instead, it contains an element of
a right to de facto equality, to positive protection against discrimination.428
It can require legislative, judicial or administrative- measures to be taken
in order to guarantee the rights set out in Article 27, a fact that has been
made clear by the HRC in its General Comment No 23.429 This means that
State at least have an obligation to prosecute acts that qualify as geno-
cide.430
Another provision that can be invoked in the protection of minorities is
Article 20 (2) ICCPR. According to this provision, States have an obliga-
tion to protect minorities against national, racial or religious hatred that
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.
425 Manfred Nowak U. N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commen-
tary (N. P Engel Kehl 2005) 657-658.
426 Manfred Nowak U. N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commen-
tary (N. P Engel Kehl 2005) 662.
427 UN HRC ‘General Comment No 29: Derogations from Provisions of the
Covenant during a State of Emergency (Art. 4)’ (24 July 2001) GAOR 56th Ses-
sion Supp 40 vol 1, 202..
428 Manfred Nowak U. N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commen-
tary (N. P Engel Kehl 2005) 500; critical as to the practical significance of
Art. 27 ICCPR and the reluctance of the HRC to interpret Article 27 in a wider
and more progressive manner: Stefan Oeter ‘Der Schutz nationaler Minderheiten
im Völkerrecht’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed) Gleichheit und Nichtdiskriminierung
im nationalen und internationalen Menschenrechtsschutz
(Springer Berlin 2003) 187-214, 196.
429 UN HRC ‘General Comment No 15: The Positions of Aliens under the
Covenant’ (9 April 1986) GAOR 41st Session Supp 40, 117 para 6.1.
430 Peter Finell Accountability under Human Rights Law and International criminal
law against Minority Groups Committed by Non-State Actors (Åbo Akademi In-
stitute for Human Rights, Åbo/Turku May 2002) 20.
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In order to preclude genocidal policies to be executed through legally
binding court judgements, Article 6 (2) ICCPR stipulates that death sen-
tences must not contravene the Genocide Convention and that in any
killing which constitutes genocide, the State Party is not allowed to dero-
gate from its obligations under the Genocide Convention (Article 6 (3)).431
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to
National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities
On 18 December 1992, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to Nation-
al or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (UNDM)432, which, al-
though not legally binding, has been regarded as an important step for-
ward in the internationalisation of minority rights.433 It can be applied to
render States politically accountable for how they treat their minorities.434
The Declaration was ‘inspired by’ Article 27 ICCPR.435 It builds up on,
specifies and adds to the rights enshrined in the ICCPR and in the other
two documents that together make up the International Bill of Human
Rights.436 The rights contained are set out as rights of individuals, whereas
c)
431 See also Carsten Stahn ‘Internationaler Menschenrechtsschutz und Völker-
strafrecht’ (1999) 3 Kritische Justiz 343-355at 346.
432 UNGA Res 47/135 ‘Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National
or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities’ (18 December 1992) GAOR 47th
Session Supp 49 vol 1, 210.
433 Patrick Thornberry, ‘The UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to
National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities: Background, Analysis,
Observations, and an Update’ in Alan Phillips/Allan Rosas (eds) Universal Mi-
nority Rights (Åbo Akademi University Institute for Human Rights/Minority
Rights Group International Turku/Åbo and London 1995) 13-76, 14.
434 Helen Quane ‘Rights in Conflict? The Rationale and Implications of using Hu-
man Rights in Conflict Prevention Strategies’ (2007) 47 Virginia. Journal of In-
ternational Law 463-523 501.
435 UN ECOSOC ‘Commentary of the Working Group on Minorities to the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic,
Religious and Linguistic Minorities’ (4 April 2005) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.
5/2005/2 para. 3.
436 UN ECOSOC ‘Commentary of the Working Group on Minorities to the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic,
Religious and Linguistic Minorities’ (4 April 2005) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.
5/2005/2 para. 4.
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duties of the State are in part formulated as duties towards minorities as a
group, which means that even though only individuals can claim the
rights, the State cannot fully implement them without ensuring adequate
conditions for the existence and identity of the group as a whole.437
In terms of minority protection from crimes under international law, the
preamble of the UNMD is of particular importance. The preamble sets out
the principle goals and purposes that the declaration is meant to achieve
and can, in accordance with Article 31 (2) Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, be drawn upon to establish the meaning of the operative provi-
sions.438 Preambles have been used in treaty interpretation by the ICJ ‘(i)
in order to elucidate the meaning of clauses the purpose of which other-
wise would be doubtful’ and ‘(ii) to indicate the judicial ‘climate’ in
which the operative clause should be read, whether for instance liberally
or restrictively, broadly or strictly’.439 In the case of the UNMD, the
preamble refers to, amongst other things, the promotion of the principles
set out in, inter alia, the Genocide Convention.
The preamble also acknowledges that the promotion and protection of
the rights of persons belonging to a minority contributes to the political
and social stability of the countries in which they live.440 Furthermore,
they acknowledge that strengthening minorities’ positions by providing
them with the rights set out in the operative articles is a way not merely to
improve their individual well-being or that of the group they belong to, but
is a way to contribute to the stability of the whole state or region. The
437 UN ECOSOC ‘Commentary of the Working Group on Minorities to the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic,
Religious and Linguistic Minorities’ (4 April 2005) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.
5/2005/2 para. 14.
438 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (concluded 23 May 1969, entered into
force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331.
439 Gerald G Fitzmaurice ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Jus-
tice: Treaty Interpretation and Certain Other Treaty Points’ (1951) 28 British
Yearbook of International Law 28 1-28, at 25; Sir Gerald G Fitzmaurice ‘The
Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1951-4: Treaty Interpre-
tation and Other Treaty Points’ (1957) 33 British Yearbook of International Law
203-38, at 227; see Asylum Case (Colombia/Peru) (Judgement) [1950] ICJ Rep
266, 282; Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco
(France v United States of America) [1952] ICJ Rep 176, 196.
440 ‘[…]Considering that the promotion and protection of the rights of persons be-
longing to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities contribute to the
political and social stability of States in which they live’.
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preamble also emphasises again the close relationship between the prohi-
bition of genocide and the protection of minorities.441 This relationship is
also addressed in the operative part of the Declaration, namely in Article
1(1), which starts: ‘States shall protect the existence … of minorities’.
From this article, a basic right to be protected from genocide is inferred;
although the right to existence is not expressly mentioned in the Genocide
Convention itself, the key General Assembly resolution on which the Con-
vention is based states that genocide is ‘a denial of the right of existence
of entire human groups’.442 The Commentary of the working group on mi-
norities to the Declaration explicitly mentions the prohibition of the elimi-
nation of minorities within the context of Article 1.443 The Working Group
also states that not only the physical destruction of minority group is cov-
ered by the requirement of protection in Article 1(1). States must also pro-
tect minorities from attempts to deliberately weaken them (e.g. by forced
transfer of population).444 Additionally, the
Independent Expert on Minorities, created by a Human Rights Commis-
sion’s resolution focuses on the link between minorities and conflict as a
key element and promotes the Declaration on the Rights and Duties of
Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minori-
ties. 445
441 William A. Schabas Preventing Genocide and Mass Killing: The Challenge for
the United Nations (Minority Rights Group International London 2006) <https://e
prints.mdx.ac.uk/7840/1/MRGGenocideReport.pdf> (31 October 2017) 456.
442 UNGA Res 96 (I) ‘The Crime of Genocide’ (11 December 1946) GAOR 1st Ses-
sion Part II Resolutions 188; Thornberry in Alan Phillips/Allan Rosas (eds) Uni-
versal Minority Rights (Åbo Akademi University Institute for Human Rights/
Minority Rights Group International Turku/Åbo and London 1995) 40.
443 UN ECOSOC ‘Commentary of the Working Group on Minorities to the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic,
Religious and Linguistic Minorities’ (4 April 2005) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.
5/2005/2 paras 21 and 24.
444 UN ECOSOC ‘Commentary of the Working Group on Minorities to the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic,
Religious and Linguistic Minorities’ (4 April 2005) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.
5/2005/2 para. 24.
445 Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 2005/79 ‘Rights of persons belonging
to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities’ (21 April 2005) E/CN.
4/2005/L.10/Add.14,.
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Responsibility to Protect
The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ is part of the Outcome Document adopted
at the United Nations summit in September 2005 by representatives of the
United Nations member States, mostly heads of States or governments. It
accepts that:
‘[E]ach state has the responsibility to protect its populations from geno-
cide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This re-
sponsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incite-
ment, through appropriate and necessary measures’.446
The document also affirms that the international community has the re-
sponsibility to use diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means un-
der Chapter VI and VII of the UN Charter to protect populations against
these crimes and show willingness to take collective action, in a timely
and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with
Chapter VII, if peaceful means are inadequate. 447 It further acknowledges
that the promotion and protection of minority rights contributes to the so-
cial and political stability.448 The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ was later reaf-
firmed by the Security Council.449 In 2009, the UN Secretary-General is-
sued a report reaffirming the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ and outlining a
three-pillar approach in which the first pillar focuses on the States’ pri-
maty responsibility in protecting its own populations, the second pillar
deals with international assistance and capacity-building in this area and in
the third pillar, timely and decisive action by the international community
is described as an obligation in cases States fail to fulfil their protection
obligations.450
Even though the outcome document does not mention minorities ex-
plicitly, acknowledging the responsibility of States to protect their own
populations from crimes under international law is a step forward in the
protection of minorities. The kinds of scenarios that trigger the responsi-
d)
446 UNGA Res 60/1 ‘2005 World Summit Outcome’ (16 September 2005) GAOR
60th Session Supp 49 vol 1, 3 para. 138.
447 UNGA Res 60/1 ‘2005 World Summit Outcome’ (16 September 2005) GAOR
60th Session Supp 49 vol 1, 3 para. 139.
448 UNGA Res 60/1 ‘2005 World Summit Outcome’ (16 September 2005) GAOR
60th Session Supp 49 vol 1, 3 para. 130.
449 UNSC Res 1674 (2006) (28 April 2006) UN Doc S/Res/1674.
450 UNGA ‘Implementing the responsibility to protect: Report by the Secretary-Gen-
eral’ (19 January 2009) UN Doc A/63/677.
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bility to protect are those situations in which minorities are the most likely
victims. Worthy of mention in this context is also the appointment of a
Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide by the UN Secretary-Gen-
eral based on a Security Council Resolution.451 The mandate of the Spe-
cial Advisor does not only refer to genocide but also to mass murders and
other large-scale human rights violations such as ethnic cleansing.452
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (ICERD)453 is concerned with discrimination based on af-
filiation to a specific racial group.
Article 1 ICERD defines racial discrimination as ‘any distinction, ex-
clusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or nation-
al or ethnic origin’. As such, the ICERD emanates from a broad list of cri-
teria which must not be used for unequal treatment and can circumvent a
definition of and limitation to the controversial term ‘race.’454 In the con-
text of Article 1 ICERD, Minorities are the natural victims of racial dis-
crimination in most States and have been frequently discussed within the
General Recommendations issued by the Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination and the reporting procedure under the Conven-
tion.455 The notions of (racial) discrimination and minority protection have
e)
451 UNSC Res 1366 (2001) (30 August 2001) SCOR [1 January 2001–31 July 2002]
283.
452 Asbjörn Eide and Rianne Letschert, ‘Institutional Developments in the United
Nations and at the Regional Level’ (2007) 14(2) International Journal on Minori-
ty and Group Rights 299-332 at 305.
453 International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion (opened for signature 7 March 1966, entered into force 4 January 1969) 660
UNTS 195.
454 Rüdiger Wolfrum ‘Das Verbot der Diskriminierung aufgrund von Rasse, Herkun-
ft, Sprache oder Hautfarbe im Völkerrecht’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (eds) Gleichheit
und Nichtdiskriminierung im nationalen und internationalen Menschenrechtss-
chutz (Springer Berlin 2003) 215-231, 221-2.
455 Patrick Thornberry International Law and the Rights of Minorities (Clarendon
Press Oxford 1991) 272; see eg. UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination ‘General Recommendation XXVII on Discrimination against Ro-
ma’ (16 August 2000) GAOR 55th Session Supp 18, 154; UN Committee on the
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been regarded as twin concepts that both make up the principle of equali-
ty. 456
This is also the approach of the CERD Committee, the ICERD’s treaty
body which recognized ethnic cleansing as a violation of ICERD and eth-
nic discrimination as a first step to future ethnic cleansing457
Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of
National Minorities
The Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of Na-
tional Minorities (‘Framework Convention’)458 was agreed on after the
Heads of States and Government of the Council of Europe Member States
adopted the Vienna Declaration in 1993. There, they expressed ‘awareness
that the protection of national minorities is an essential element of stability
and democratic security in our continent’ and resolved to enter ‘into politi-
cal and legal commitments relating to the protection of national minorities
in Europe and to instruct the Committee of Ministers to elaborate appro-
priate international legal instruments’.459 It is the first binding internation-
al instrument which focuses only on the protection of national minori-
f)
Elimination of Racial Discrimination ‘Conclusions and recommendations of the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on Romania’ (2001) UN
Doc CERD/C/304/Add.85 paras 10-11, 14-15; UN Committee on the Elimination
of Racial Discrimination ‘Conclusions and recommendations of the Committee
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on Azerbaijan’ (2005) UN Doc
CERD/C/AZE/CO/4 para 14.
456 Warwick A McKean Equality and Discrimination in International Law (Claren-
don Oxford 1983) p 159.
457 UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination ‘Annual Report’ (20
September 1995) GAOR 50th Session Supp 18 para. 219; see also David S Weiss-
brodt ‘The Approach of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimina-
tion to Interpreting and applying International Humanitarian Law’ (2010) 19
Minnesota Journal of International Law 327–62, 345.
458 COE ‘Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities’ (opened
for signature 1 February 1995, entered into force 1 February 1998) 2151 UNTS
243.
459 COE ‘Vienna Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of the Member
States of the Council of Europe on the Reform of the Control Mechanism of the
ECHR, on National Minorities, and on a Plan of Action against Racism’ (9 Octo-
ber 1993) (1993) 14 HRLJ 373–76.
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ties.460 The Framework Convention aims at addressing ‘unstable minority-
majority relations that have a clear potential to destabilize peace and secu-
rity in Europe’.461
The preamble of the Framework Convention mentions the protection of
the existence of national minorities as one of the aims treaty. It refers to
the upheavals in European history, which have shown that the protection
of national minorities is essential to the stability, democratic security and
peace in Europe. The preamble reflects the concern of the Council of Eu-
rope and its Member States about the risk to the existence of national mi-
norities and is inspired by Article 1 (1) United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguis-
tic Minorities.462
Other Instruments Relevant to the Protection of Minorities from
Crimes under International Law
At the international level, further provisions concerning the rights of mi-
norities can be found in Article 30 of the Convention on the Rights of the
Child463 and Article 5 (c) United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cul-
tural Organization (UNESCO) Convention against Discrimination in Edu-
cation.464. Art 7(2) of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples explicitly spells out that indigenous peoples ‘shall not be subject-
ed to any act of genocide or any other act of violence, including forcibly
removing children of the group to another group’.465
g)
460 UN ‘Pamphlet No 8 of the UN Guide for Minorities’ available at http://www.ohc
hr.org/Documents/Publications/GuideMinorities8en.pdf (31 October 2017) 2.
461 Rainer Hofmann ‘The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Mi-
norities: An Introduction’ in Marc Weller (ed) The Rights of Minorities: A Com-
mentary on the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities (OUP Oxford 2005) 1-24, 6.
462 Council of Europe ‘Explanatory Report of the Council of Europe on the Frame-
work Convention for the Protection of National Minorities’ (1995) H (95) 10,
para. 24.
463 Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into
force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3.
464 Convention against Discrimination in Education (adopted 14 December 1960, en-
tered into force 22 May 1962) 429 UNTS 93.
465 UNGA Res 61/295 ‘United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peo-
ples’ (13 September 2007) GAOR 61st Session Supp 49 vol 3, 15.
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On the regional level, Article 14 Convention for the Protection of Hu-
man Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (or European Convention on Hu-
man Rights, ECHR) contains a provision regarding minorities.466 Protocol
12 ECHR is also of importance to the protection of minorities as it deals
with the prohibition of discrimination.467 Within the context of the OSCE,
the appointment of a High Commissioner on National Minorities468 and
the adoption of the Copenhagen Document that emphasises the importance
of the protection of national minorities to ‘justice, stability and peace in
the participating States’469 and introduces far-reaching provisions regard-
ing their rights.470
The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) does not
mention minorities explicitly, although it contains a prohibition of dis-
crimination.471 In 1994, the Heads of States and Governments of the
African Union’s (AU) predecessor, the Organization of African Unity
(OAU), passed the Declaration on a Code of Conduct for Inter-African
Relations in which they called for the protection of ethnic, cultural, lin-
guistic and religious identity of minorities. 472
The American Convention on Human Rights and the American Decla-
ration on the Rights and Duties of Man also lack an explicit mentioning of
466 COE ‘Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms’ (signed 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) 213
UNTS 221.
467 COE ‘Protocol No 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms’ (signed 4 November 2000, entered into force 1 April
2005) CETS No 177.
468 Created at the CSCE Summit on 9-10 July 1992 in Helsinki; CSCE ‘Helsinki
Summit Document: The Challenges of Change’ (10 July 1992) (1992) 31 ILM
1385.
469 CSCE ‘Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human
Dimension of the CSCE’ (29 June 1990) (1990) 29 ILM 1305 para. 30.
470 CSCE ‘Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human
Dimension of the CSCE’ (29 June 1990) (1990) 29 ILM 1305 para. 30-39; Jo-
hannes Binder The Human Dimension of the OSCE: From Recommendation to
Implementation (Verlag Österreich Vienna 2001) 38.
471 Art. 2 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, en-
tered into force 21 October 1986) 1520 UNTS 217 (Banjul Charter).
472 Article 4 Organization of African Unity, Assembly of Heads of State and Gov-
ernment ‘Declaration on a Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations’ Thirtieth
Ordinary Session, Tunis, Tunisia, 13-15 June 1994 available at <https://www1.u
mn.edu/humanrts/africa/INTAFN.htm> (31 October 2017).
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minorities. 473 Nevertheless, they contain several provisions that are of
particular importance to minorities, most importantly the principle of non-
discrimination and the right to culture as stipulated in Article XIII of the
American Declaration.
Protection of Minorities under International Criminal Law
The following chapter examines different international crimes according
to the minority issue inherent in them. Minorities have always been espe-
cially vulnerable to the violation of their rights, from small-scale interfer-
ence with their rights to culture, religion, language to mass violence
against them. The commission of crimes under international law directed
against minorities is the ultimate violation of their rights. Even though
there is little mention in the texts of international criminal law of ‘rights’,
as the law aims for the condemnation or ‘criminalisation’ of acts, the con-
text of the criminal prohibition makes it clear that the reason why a partic-
ular conduct is regarded as criminal is precisely because it violates a fun-
damental right.474
All the crimes examined in the following are crimes as laid out in the
Rome Statute. If necessary, the differences between the crimes as set out
by the Charters of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals475 and the Statutes
of the ICTY and the ICTR are explained. The examined crimes have been
selected because of their special interconnection with minority protection
and the violation of minority rights. This does not in any way infer that the
crimes examined are the only crimes that minorities are particularly vul-
nerable to.
Genocide (Art. 6 Rome Statute)
‘The fact of genocide is as old as humanity. To this day, there has been no so-
ciety protected by its structure from committing that crime. Every case of
2.
a)
473 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (10 December 1948)
(1949) 43 AJIL Supp 133.
474 Patrick Thornberry International Law and the Rights of Minorities (Clarendon
Press Oxford 1991) 58.
475 Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (19 January 1946)
4 Bevans 20.
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genocide is a product of history and bears the stamp of the society which has
given birth to it’.476
The Genocide Convention can be seen as the first of the post-World War II
general conventions which has any bearing on minority protection and is
listed by the United Nations secretariat as the one of the international in-
struments which provide special protective measures for ethnical, reli-
gious, or linguistic groups. 477
The Genocide Convention is based on General Assembly Resolution 96
(I) of 1946, which was adopted in the aftermath of World War II and was
clearly influenced by the genocide committed by Germany against nation-
al minorities within its own territory and the occupied, allied or annexed
territories.478
When the Genocide Convention was adopted in 1948, the deliberate in-
tent of its drafters was to derive the scope of criteria from the ‘already
well-recognized concept in international law then known as “national mi-
476 Jean-Paul Sartre ‘On Genocide’ in Richard A Falk, Gabriel Kolko and Robert Jay
(eds) Crimes of War (Random House New York 1971) 534.
477 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (adopt-
ed 9 December 1948, entered into force 12 January 1951) 78 UNTS 277.
478 UNGA Res 96 (I) ‘The Crime of Genocide’ (11 December 1946) GAOR 1st Ses-
sion Part II Resolutions 188; see also comment by John Maktos Chairman UN
Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide ‘Summary Records of the Fifth Meeting’ (8
April 1948) UN Doc E/AC.25/SR.5; in the statute of the Nuremberg International
Military Tribunal, crimes that which would now be labelled genocide were prose-
cuted under the heading of crimes against humanity. However, in the drafting of
the IMT Statute, the term genocide was already discussed and the concept of the
term as a violation of the rights of minorities was clearly spelled out. Justice
Robert Jackson, at the beginning of the London Conference in 1945, compiled a
‘Planning Memorandum’ explaining the evidence to be brought before the Tri-
bunal. In this memorandum, Jackson mentioned ‘[g]enocide or destruction of
racial minoritiesand subjugated populations by such means and methods as (1)
underfeeding; (2) sterilization and castration; (3) depriving them of clothing,
shelter, fuel, sanitation, medical care; (4) deporting them for forced labour; (5)
working them in inhumane conditions’ see United States Representative to the
International Conference on Military Trials Robert H Jackson ‘Planning Memo-
randum’ (US Government Printing Office Washington 1949) 6; see also HG van
der Wilt, J Vervliet and others (eds): The Genocide Convention: The Legacy of 60
Years (Martinus Nijhoff Leiden 2012) 5-6.
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norities,”’479 This interpretation was confirmed by the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in its Krstić judgment
where the court said:
National, ethnical racial or religious groups are not clearly defined in
the [Genocide] Convention or elsewhere. In contrast, the preparatory work
on the Convention and the work conducted by international bodies in rela-
tion to the protection of minorities show that the concepts of protected
groups and national minorities partly overlap and are on occasion synony-
mous. (…). The preparatory work of the Convention shows that setting
out such a list [of protected groups] was designed more to describe a sin-
gle phenomenon, roughly corresponding to what were recognized, before
the second world war, was ‘national minorities’, rather than to refer to sev-
eral distinct prototypes of human groups.
The requirement of permanence of a group affiliation which cannot or
only with difficulties be changed or challenged by the members of the
group themselves, finds it reflection in the term ‘minorities’: even though
there is no generally accepted definition of the term, it is generally re-
quired that it contains, besides a subjective element and an individual
sense of belonging to a group, certain objective criteria which differ from
the rest of the population and are usually permanent and stable.480
Furthermore, the Genocide Convention and Article 6 of the Rome
Statute protect ‘national, ethnical, racial or religious’ groups. Similarly,
Article 27 ICCPR refers to ‘ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities’.481
This already shows a high degree of overlap between the concept of a mi-
nority under international human rights law and the groups protected by
the prohibition of genocide, especially when considering that ‘ethnic’ in
Article 27 ICCPR is open to a broad interpretation and therefore covers,
inter alia, what is referred to as racial and national minorities.482 Even if
479 William A Schabas ‘Developments relating to Minorities in the Law of Geno-
cide’ in Kristin Henrard and Robert Dunbar Synergies in Minority Protection:
European and International Law Perspectives (CUP Cambridge 2008) 192.
480 UN Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission
on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Francesco Capo-
torti ‘Study on the Rights of Persons belonging to ethnic, religious and linguistic
minorities’ (1979) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev. 1. 28.
481 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 19 December 1966,
entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171.
482 Manfred Nowak U. N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commen-
tary (N P Engel Kehl 2005) 492.
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the two protected groups/right holders are not completely synonymous,
the clear link between minorities and genocide has also been confirmed by
the HRC, which in its Article 29 stated that ‘the international protection of
the rights of persons belonging to minorities includes elements that must
be respected in all circumstances. This is reflected in the prohibition of
genocide under international law…’.483
Even though the individual is clearly a victim of genocidal measures,
the perpetration of the act extends beyond its actual commission. The mur-
der of a particular individual, for example, must therefore be committed
for the realization of an ulterior motive, namely the specific intent to de-
stroy, in whole or in part, a national ethnical, racial or religious group.484
This group element does again bring the prohibition of genocide into the
clear vicinity of the system of minority protection, which has been strug-
gling since its beginnings with the individual vs collective dichotomy and
has been described as a bundle of ‘individual rights, but with a group ref-
erence’.485 Resolution 96 (I) United Nations General Assembly already
emphasized the group element inherent in the crime of genocide by stating
that ‘genocide is a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups,
as homicide is the denial of the right to live of individual human beings’.
The Genocide Convention as well as the Rome Statute protect against the
commission of acts by both State officials and private persons.486
In conclusion, the fact that the Genocide Convention itself does not ap-
ply the term ‘minorities’ can simply be seen as an acknowledgment of the
483 UN HRC ‘General Comment No 29: Derogations from Provisions of the
Covenant during a State of Emergency (Art. 4)’ (24 July 2001) GAOR 56th Ses-
sion Supp 40 vol 1, 202; see also Rüdiger Wolfrum ‘Das Verbot der Diskrim-
inierung aufgrund von Rasse, Herkunft, Sprache oder Hautfarbe im Völkerrecht’
in Rüdiger Wolfrum (eds) Gleichheit und Nichtdiskriminierung im nationalen
und internationalen Menschenrechtsschutz (Springer Berlin 2003) 215-231, 218,
where the Genocide Convention is listed das the first international convention
dealing with a specific aspect of racial discrimination.
484 See eg Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment) ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998) para.
522.
485 Jost Delbrück and Rüdiger Wolfrum Völkerrecht Volume I/2: Der Staat und an-
dere Völkerrechtssubjekte; Räume unter internationaler Verwaltung (2nd edition
De Gruyter Berlin 2002) 279, translation by the author.
486 Art. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(adopted 9 December 1948, entered into force 12 January 1951) 78 UNTS 277;
Art. 25 (1) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July
1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90.
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fact that a numerical inferiority is not legally necessary in order to gain the
protection of the Genocide Convention. This does, however, not challenge
the fact, which had also been acknowledged by the drafters of the conven-
tion, that minorities are ‘genocide’s most frequent targets’487 and ‘natural
victims’488 of genocidal measures and therefore the prime beneficiaries of
the Genocide Convention and Article 6 of the Rome Statute which protect
minorities against physical destruction. 
Crimes against Humanity/Persecution
The gap in minority protection with regards to the criminal prosecution of
acts directed against minorities which fall short of genocide was, on a
global level, partly remedied only with the adoption of the Rome Statute.
The concept of crimes against humanity had before been inserted into the
Statutes of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal and the Military
Tribunal of the Far East489. The insertion of crimes against humanity into
the Statute of the Nuremberg Tribunal was done in an attempt to cover the
crimes committed by Germany against its own minorities. 490
Important Developments in Terms of Minority Protection
In the context of minority protection, the development from the interna-
tional military tribunals after World War II to the ad hoc tribunals estab-
lished in the 1990s and finally to the Rome Statute and the ICC brought
two major developments which ought to be highlighted: first the disap-
pearance of the link between the crime and an armed conflict as a require-




487 UN Secretary-General ‘Address to the Commission on Human Rights’ (7 April
2004) <http://www.un.org/press/en/2004/sgsm9245.doc.htm> (31 October 2017).
488 Patrick Thornberry International Law and the Rights of Minorities (Clarendon
Press Oxford 1991) 59.
489 Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (19 January 1946)
4 Bevans 20.
490 Lyal S Sunga ‘International Criminal Law: Protection of Minorities’ in Zelim A
Skurbaty (ed) Beyond a One-Dimensional State: An Emerging Right to Autono-
my? (Nijhoff Leiden 2005) 255-275, 270.
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Crimes against Humanity and Armed Conflict
Control Council Law No. 10,491 issued by the Control Council for Ger-
many on 20 December 1945, omitted the restriction of crimes against hu-
manity to acts connected to war from the definition of such crimes. How-
ever, this does not mean that crimes against humanity as defined in the
Nuremberg Charter can be considered the cornerstone of a system of inter-
national criminal law equally applicable in times of war and peace, pro-
tecting the human rights of inhabitants of all countries, ‘of any civilian
population’,492 against anybody, including their own states and govern-
ments. According to its preamble, Council Law No. 10 was enacted to
give effect to the Nuremberg Charter, which was mentioned in Article I as
an integral part of Council Law No. 10.493 This link was thought to give
the definition of crimes against humanity in Control Council Law No. 10
the same connotation as in the Nuremberg Charter.494 Therefore, even
though the Nuremberg Trials were an important contribution to minority
protection and the evolution of international criminal law, crimes against
humanity as interpreted in Nuremberg aimed to ensure that inhumane acts
in violation of general principles of the law committed in connection with
war should be punished. Crimes against humanity were treated as ‘accom-
panying’ or ‘accessory’ crimes to either crimes against peace or war
crimes.495
Article 5 ICTY Statute explicitly links the concept of crimes against hu-
manity to the existence of an armed conflict of an international or national
character, whereas according to Article 3 of the ICTR Statute, the crime
must be committed on national, political, ethnic, racial or political
(1.1)
491 Control Council Law No 10 ‘Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes,
Crimes against Peace and against Humanity’ (done 20 December 1945) (1946) 3
Official Gazette of the Control Council for Germany 50.
492 Egon Schwelb ‘Crimes against Humanity’ (1946) 23 British Yearbook of Interna-
tional Law 178-226, 206.
493 Egon Schwelb ‘Crimes against Humanity’ (1946) 23 British Yearbook of Interna-
tional Law 178-226, 218.
494 Patrick Thornberry International Law and the Rights of Minorities (Clarendon
Press Oxford 1991) 89; Egon Schwelb ‘Crimes against Humanity’ (1946) 23
British Yearbook of International Law 178-226 217-8.
495 Egon Schwelb ‘Crimes against Humanity’ (1946) 23 British Yearbook of Interna-
tional Law 178-226, 206; Kriangsak Kittichaisaree International Criminal Law
(OUP Oxford 2001) 87.
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grounds, linking crimes against humanity more closely to the protection of
minorities. This additional requirement of discriminatory intent in each of
the enumerated crimes is omitted in the Rome Statute. This does not, how-
ever, mean that the relevance towards minority issues has been neglected
at the Rome Conference. On the contrary, the delegations felt the need to
avoid an onerous and unnecessary burden for the prosecution while at the
same time not excluding other forms of crimes against humanity that can
be committed without a discriminatory motive.496 Nevertheless, with the
notion that not all crimes against humanity require a discriminatory mo-
tive, the drafters of the Rome Statute also acknowledged that the (vast)
majority of these crimes are indeed committed out of a discriminatory in-
tent.
Article 7 (1) (h) Rome Statute dismisses any link of the concept of
crimes against humanity to an armed conflict. The majority of delegations
believed that such a limitation would have rendered crimes against hu-
manity largely redundant, as they would have been subsumed in most cas-
es within the definition of war crimes.497 This is of capital importance to
minority protection as many attacks on minorities are committed in situa-
tions where the intensity of violence falls short of the definition of an
armed conflict,498 particularly in cases of crimes perpetrated against mi-
norities by their own governments. 499
Despite this major contribution to the protection of minority groups,
one has to keep in mind that the threshold for crimes against humanity is
still a very high one. The acts listed in Article 7 must be ‘committed as
part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian pop-
ulation, with knowledge of the attack.’ Therefore, even though the omis-
sion of a nexus between the commission of crimes against humanity and
an armed conflict is a big step forward in the prevention of crime perpe-
trated against minorities, numerous organized crimes perpetrated against
496 Darryl Robinson ‘Defining ”Crimes against Humanity” at the Rome Conference’
(1999) 93 American Journal of International Law 43-57, 46-47.
497 Darryl Robinson Defining ”Crimes against Humanity” at the Rome Conference’
(1999) 93 American Journal of International Law 43-57, 46-47.
498 Lyal S Sunga ‘International Criminal Law: Protection of Minorities’ in Zelim A
Skurbaty (ed) Beyond a One-Dimensional State: An Emerging Right to Autono-
my? (Nijhoff Leiden 2005) 255-275, 271.
499 Darryl Robinson Defining ”Crimes against Humanity” at the Rome Conference’
(1999) 93 American Journal of International Law 43-57, 46.
Chapter Two: Minority Rights Law
155
minorities still fall short of the high requirements necessary for labelling a
crime an international ‘crime against humanity’.
Crimes Against Humanity and Non-State Actors
According to Article 7 Rome Statute, crimes against humanity can be
committed by both State and non-State actors. Similarly, both the ICTY
and the ICTR held that their jurisdiction covers action by non-State actors
as well as actions committed by State actors.500 On the one hand, it obvi-
ously seems to be an improvement of their situation if they are protected
from crimes committed by both State and private actors. On the other
hand, it is to be feared that governments use the ICC to get rid of insur-
gents and rebel forces while at the same time drawing attention away from
their own human rights violations.501 As the ICC was established to deal
with such (State) actors that typically go unpunished as opposed to non-
State actors, which, once the State can catch them, are exposed to its full
force, this is a worrying development.502 It needs to be kept in mind when
following the ICC’s investigations that they so far mostly concentrate on
cases transferred by co-operative governments concerning rebel forces and
members of previous governments.503 Yet it is still also worth noting that a
State which refers a situation to the ICC cannot pick and choose which ac-
tors the court is going to focus on. This means that, at least theoretically,
there is a possibility that the Prosecutor of the ICC will in fact expand his
investigations to cover State as well as non-State actors, a fact that the for-
mer Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, repeatedly emphasized.504 Keeping
(1.2)
500 Prosecutor v Tadić (Opinion and Judgment) IT-94-1 (7 May 1997).
para. 654; Prosecutor v Kayishema (Judgment) ICTR-95-1-T (21 May 1999)
para. 126.
501 William A. Schabas Preventing Genocide and Mass Killing: The Challenge for
the United Nations (Minority Rights Group International London 2006) <https://e
prints.mdx.ac.uk/7840/1/MRGGenocideReport.pdf> (31 October 2017) 24.
502 William A. Schabas Preventing Genocide and Mass Killing: The Challenge for
the United Nations (Minority Rights Group International London 2006) https://ep
rints.mdx.ac.uk/7840/1/MRGGenocideReport.pdf >2 (31 October 2017) 24.
503 Situations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, Uganda, and the Cen-
tral African Republic.
504 Eg in an interview with the Coalition for the International Criminal Court http://
www.iccnow.org/?mod=newsdetail&news=1841 (last retrieved October 2015).
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in mind the ICTR’s experience, however, which was faced with Rwandan
refusals to co-operate once it mentioned the possibility of investigating
atrocities committed by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (now: Rwandan Pa-
triotic Army) backed by present Rwandan government, such a develop-
ment seems to be unlikely.
Nonetheless, some of the most prominent cases, before the ICC, the sit-
uation in Darfur and Libya, which were referred to the ICC by the Securi-
ty Council and the situation in Kenya, which was initiated by the Prosecu-
tor using his proprio motu powers, are an exception to this pattern. Fur-
thermore, the ICC is keeping situations in further countries under prelimi-
nary examination (e.g. Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq/UK, Nigeria and
Ukraine), including a variety of both State and non-State actors. 505 There-
fore, it is still to be seen whether the ICC will continue to focus its efforts
on the prosecution of non-State actors, a development that would be re-
grettable.
Specific Crimes and Their inherent Minority Element
Murder/Extermination
Murder as listed in Article 7 (a) Rome Statute and extermination (Article 7
(b)) cover the widespread or systematic targeting of a minority group that
falls short of the definition of genocide.506 What distinguishes murder
from extermination is that extermination requires an element of mass de-
struction that is not imperative for murder.507
(2)
(2.1)
505 See https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/preliminary-examinations.aspx?ln=en (31
October 2017).
506 Lyal S Sunga ‘International Criminal Law: Protection of Minorities’ in Zelim A
Skurbaty (ed) Beyond a One-Dimensional State: An Emerging Right to Autono-
my? (Nijhoff Leiden 2005) 255-275.
507 Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment) ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998) para 591.
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Deportation or Forcible Transfer of Population
The crimes of deportation and forcible transfer of population were often
used in the past by ultra-nationalist governments in their attempts to ethni-
cally cleanse the territory of its minority population.508
Deportation or forcible transfer of populations is defined under Article
7 (2) (d) as ‘forced displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or
other coercive acts from an area in which they are lawfully present, with-
out grounds permitted under international law’. Article 7 (d) Rome
Statute, as opposed to Article 5 (d) ICTY Statute and Article 3 (d) ICTR
Statute, refers to ‘forcible transfer of population’ as an alternative offence.
‘Deportation’ is defined as the forced removal of people from one country
to another, whereas ‘forcible transfer of population’ means the compulsory
movement of people from one area to another within the same state.509
This reflects the experiences in conflicts such as the former Yugoslavia,
where the victims were transferred within the territory of Yugoslavia as a
part of a greater policy of ‘ethnic cleansing.’510
Rape, Sexual Slavery, Enforced Prostitution, Forced Pregnancy,
Enforced Sterilisation, or any other Form of Sexual Violence of
Comparable Gravity
In comparison to the ICTY and the ICTR Statute, Article 7 (g) Rome
Statute takes a much wider approach on sexual violence. Whereas Articles
5 (g) ICTY Statute and 3 (g) ICTR Statute mention only rape, the drafters
of the Rome Statute seemed to have learned from past experiences, espe-
cially of the two ad hoc tribunals, which for a long time tended to
marginalise sexual violence. It acknowledges that sexual violence as a
crime against humanity can be committed through various actions. Sexual
(2.2)
(2.3)
508 E.g the deportation of more than 1 million Armenians by Turkish authorities be-
tween 1915 and 1917, see Adam Jones Genocide (Routledge London 2006) 107.
509 M Cherif Bassiouni Crimes against Humanity in International Criminal Law (2nd
ed Kluwer Law International The Hague 1999) 301.
510 Even though there is no formal legal definition of the term ‘ethnic cleansing’, it is
often conducted through means of forcible transfer, deportation or persecution
and was labelled a form of genocide by the UN General Assembly in UNGA Res
47/121 ‘The Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (7 April 1993) GAOR 47th
Session Supp 49 vol 1, 44.
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violence is often used as a means to demoralise minority populations by
committing acts on individuals that are said to affect the ‘honour’ of the
group as a whole. Furthermore, this form of violence can be used in the
context of ethnic violence to destroy minorities by forcing their female
members to give birth to babies that are considered to belong to a different
ethnic group in order to ‘pollute and water down the blood line’,511 which
can constitute an act of genocide.512 However, it should be noted that the
way international criminal and international humanitarian law has dealt
with sexual violence against women, concentrating on concepts of honour
of the community rather than the physical harm caused to an individual,
has been heavily criticised by feminist scholars (see also under Part Two
Chapter Three).513 In this respect, the Rome Statute with its expansion of
the perception of sexual violence as a crime against humanity beyond rape
is a positive development in the protection of women’s physical individual
integrity.
Persecution as a Crime against Humanity with a Particularly
Prominent Minority Element
The crime of persecution is a criminal offence which minorities are partic-
ularly prone to. The crime as defined in the Rome Statute covers a broad
range of actions. Article 7 (1) (h) Rome Statute contains persecution
‘against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national,
ethnic, cultural, religious, gender (…) or other grounds that are universally
recognized as impermissible under international law’ as a crime against
humanity. Furthermore, in Article 7 (2) (g) Rome Statute the term is de-
fined to mean ‘the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental
rights contrary to international law by reasons of the identity of the group
or collectivity.’ The Rome Statute is the first international criminal instru-
(2.4)
511 Amy E Ray, ‘The Shame of it: Gender-Based Terrorism in the Former Yugoslavia
and the Failure of International Human Rights Law to Comprehend the Injuries’
(1997) 46 American University Law Review 793-840, 805-6.
512 Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment) ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998) para 688.
513 Eg Judith Gardam and Hilary Charlesworth ‘Protection of Women in Armed
Conflicts’ (2000) 22(1) Human Rights Quarterly 148-166, 159.
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ment defining persecution.514 However, its definition derives in part from
the jurisprudence of the ICTY, which dealt with large-scale persecutions
of minorities during the conflicts that followed the dissolution of Yu-
goslavia. According to the ICTY, whose judgments can shed light on the
interpretation of Articles 7 (1) (h) and (2) (g) Rome Statute, ‘it is the vio-
lation of the right to equality in some serious fashion that infringes on the
enjoyment of a basic or fundamental right that constitutes persecution (…)
on one of the listed grounds to constitute persecution under the Statute’,515
‘the gross and blatant denial, on discriminatory grounds, of a fundamental
right, laid down in international customary or treaty law, reaching the
same level of gravity as the other acts prohibited in Article 5 [ICTY
Statute]’.516 The Tadic definition roots in the descriptive explanations of
the 1991 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind
which states that persecution is aimed at subjecting ‘individuals or groups
of individuals to a life in which enjoyment of in which enjoyment of some
of their basic rights is repeatedly or constantly denied.’517 The commen-
tary to the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes stated that the common denomina-
tor of persecution was the denial of the human rights and fundamental
freedoms to which every individual is entitled without distinction as rec-
ognized in the Charter of the United Nations (Articles 1 and 55) and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 2)’518
The notion of persecution as such contains a group element, and in-
cludes the targeting of individuals because of their group membership as
well as targeting the group as such.519 Persecution as a crime against hu-
manity encompasses acts from killing to limitations on the type of profes-
514 Machtheld Boot, Rodney Dixon and Christopher K Hall ‘Article 7: Crimes
against Humanity’ in Otto Triffterer Commentary on the Rome Statute of the In-
ternational Criminal Court (2nd edition Beck Munich 2008) 159-273, 256.
515 Prosecutor v Tadić (Opinion and Judgment) IT-94-1 (7 May 1997) para. 697.
516 Prosecutor v Kupreškić (Trial Chamber Judgment) IT-95-16 (14 January 2000)
para. 621.
517 UN ILC ‘Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind’
(1991) vol II part II UNYBILC 79, 104.
518 UN ILC ‘Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind’
(1996) GAOR 51st Session Supp 10, 9.
519 See Machtheld Boot, Rodney Dixon and Christopher K Hall ‘Article 7: Crimes
against Humanity’ in Otto Triffterer Commentary on the Rome Statute of the In-
ternational Criminal Court (2nd edition Beck Munich 2008) 159-273, 217.
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sions open to targeted groups520 and acts of physical, economic or judicial
nature in violation of an individual’s right to equal enjoyment of basic
rights.521 As such, the prohibition of persecution in international criminal
law supplements the general principles of equality and non-discrimination
in international human rights law in a common effort to protect minorities
in heterogeneous societies. Generally, the acts prohibited can be grouped
into ‘serious bodily harm and mental harm, infringements upon freedom
and attacks against property’522 and therefore cover a wide range of threats
against minorities.
The acts must be carried out with the intent of depriving the victim of
the political, social or economic rights enjoyed by members of the wider
society for reason of his or her membership in a particular protected
group523. One recent development of particular importance to minority
protection is the categorizing of systematic hate speech against minorities
as persecution by the ICTR524. The deprivation of rights which are a result
of the act of persecution include fundamental rights from which no dero-
gation is permitted. However, the list of acts enlisted in the Rome Statute
shows that also acts from which States are generally allowed to derogate
can constitute persecution.525
As examined, a large variety of acts committed against minorities can
be subsumed under the heading of ‘persecution’. Generally, what is com-
monly referred to as ‘cultural genocide’ is indeed mostly covered by the
notion of persecution. The legal concept of crimes against humanity thus
constitutes a useful tool capable of covering many of forms of attacks
against minorities, including on their cultural heritage.
520 Prosecutor v Tadić (Opinion and Judgment) IT-94-1 (7 May 1997) para. 704.
521 Prosecutor v Tadić (Opinion and Judgment) IT-94-1 (7 May 1997) para. 710.
522 Machtheld Boot, Rodney Dixon and Christopher K Hall ‘Article 7: Crimes
against Humanity’ in Otto Triffterer Commentary on the Rome Statute of the In-
ternational Criminal Court (2nd edition Beck Munich 2008) 159-273, 258.
523 Prosecutor v Kupreškić (Trial Chamber Judgment) IT-95-16 (14 January 2000)
para. 634.
524 Prosecutor v Nahimana (Judgment) ICTR-99-52-T (3 December 2003).para.
1072.
525 Machtheld Boot, Rodney Dixon and Christopher K Hall ‘Article 7: Crimes
against Humanity’ in Otto Triffterer Commentary on the Rome Statute of the In-
ternational Criminal Court (2nd edition Beck Munich 2008) 159-273, 263.
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(2.5) Enforced Disappearance of Persons
The delegations at the Rome Conference agreed that enforced disappear-
ance, which was previously identified as a crime against humanity only in
international instruments526 but not in the statutes of any of the interna-
tional tribunals, was an inhumane act similar to the other acts in character
and gravity, which warranted specific acknowledgement.527 It is punish-
able pursuant to Article 7 (1) (i) Rome Statute. The practice of enforced
disappearance has been employed by governments on many occasions to
rid the country of political opponents and to silence dissidents over such
issues as greater autonomy for minority groups.528
The Crime of Apartheid
In general terms, apartheid refers to the racial segregation and discrimina-
tion policies enacted by a government against a part of its own people.529
Historically, the term evolved from the segregation policies institutional-
ized by the government of South Africa from the late 1940s until 1994. It
has been a punishable crime against humanity since 1976, when the Unit-
ed Nations Apartheid Convention entered into force.530
Article 7 (1) (j) Rome Statute chooses a broader approach than the one
taken by the Apartheid Convention. Whereas the latter states that
Apartheid includes “similar policies and practices of racial segregation
(2.5)
526 UNGA Res 47/133 ‘Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance’ (18 December 1992) GAOR 47th Session Supp 49 vol 1, 207; In-
ter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons (done 9 June
1994, entered into force 28 March 1996) (1994) 33 ILM 1529; UN ILC ‘Draft
Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind’ (1996) GAOR 51st
Session Supp 10, 9.
527 Darryl Robinson Defining ”Crimes against Humanity” at the Rome Conference’
(1999) 93 American Journal of International Law 43-57, 55.
528 Lyal Sunga ‘International Criminal Law: Protection of Minorities’ Zelim A Skur-
baty (ed) Beyond a One-Dimensional State: An Emerging Right to Autonomy?
(Nijhoff Leiden 2005) 255-275, 272.
529 Claire de Than and Edwin Shorts International Criminal Law and Human Rights
(Sweet &Maxwell London 2003) 110.
530 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid (adopted 30 November 1973, entered into force 18 July 1976) 1015
UNTS 243.
Part Two: How are Different Areas of Human Rights Law Referred to?
162
and discrimination as practised in southern Africa” (Article II), the Rome
Statute does not contain that phrase and instead, in Article 7 (2) (h), de-
fines apartheid as:
‘inhumane acts of a character similar to those referred to in paragraph 1, com-
mitted in the context of an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression
and domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups and
committed with the intention of maintaining that regime’.
This expands the scope of application of that prohibition and eliminates
the connection to the South African apartheid system that was unique in
the sense that it was a minority which oppressed the majority. The fact that
in many cases a minority group is suppressed can be inferred from the
commentary by the working group on minorities to the UNDM Minorities
in which apartheid is expressively mentioned as a way to exclude minori-
ties from society.531
‘Ethnic Cleansing’ in International Criminal Law
Targeting of minorities is often associated with the term ‘ethnic cleans-
ing’. However, ethnic cleansing is not a technical term used or defined in
the Rome Statute or any of the statutes of international courts or tribunals.
Nevertheless, it is an often-used term, in the media as well as in the inter-
national arena, especially during the conflicts following the dissolution of
the former Yugoslavia532. Ethnic cleansing ‘was used initially as a eu-
phemistic expression to describe a variety of practices undertaken with the
objective of expelling or inducing the departure of persons who did not
belong to a particular group from a defined area’.533 The UN General As-
sembly has expressly linked ‘ethnic cleansing’ to minority protection and
c)
531 UN ECOSOC ‘Commentary of the Working Group on Minorities to the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic,
Religious and Linguistic Minorities’ (4 April 2005) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.
5/2005/2 para 25.
532 Eg in UNGA Res 60/1 ‘2005 World Summit Outcome’ (16 September 2005)
GAOR 60th Session Supp 49 vol 1, 3 paras 138-140, in which the responsibility
of a State to protect ‘its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing
and crimes against humanity’ was set out.
533 William J Fenrick ‘The crime against humanity of persecution in the jurispru-
dence of the ICTY’ (2001) 32 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 81-96,
89.
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racial discrimination in its resolution 48/91 on ‘Ethnic Cleansing and
Racial Discrimination’534.
The ICJ in the case of the Application of the Convention on the Preven-
tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina
v. Serbia and Montenegro) defined ethnic cleansing as ‘rendering an area
ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove persons
of given groups from the area’535. Ethnic cleansing often comes hand in
hand with other gross violations of human rights, as it may be conducted,
inter alia, by means of forcible transfer, deportation murder or rape.
Therefore, the legal categorization of the term is highly controversial and
the additional value that the term brings compared to the use of already
acknowledged legal terms is disputed. Nevertheless, the term has often
been referred to by the ICTY, also in indictments, and has been linked to
crimes against humanity in general536 and also, more particular, to the
crime of persecution537.
But not only crimes against humanity, also genocide has been associat-
ed with the term ‘ethnic cleansing’.538 However, compared to the acts cov-
ered in the Genocide Convention, ‘ethnic cleansing’ seems to pursue a dif-
ferent goal, namely the expulsion of an ethnic minority and its culture
from a given area as opposed to the extinction of that minority. One fre-
quent component of ‘ethnic cleansing’, namely forcible population trans-
fer, was, like the destruction of a minorities’ cultural life, deliberately ex-
534 UNGA Res 48/91 ‘Third Decade to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination’
(20 December 1993) GAOR 48th Supp 49 193.
535 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Merits) ([2007]
ICJ Rep 43 para 190; see also UNSC ‘First Interim Report of the Commission of
Experts established pursuant to Paragraph 2 of UNSC Resolution 780 (1992) (9
February 1993) UN Doc S/25274 (1993) para. 55 and M Cherif Bassiouni and
Peter Manikas The Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (Transnational Publishers Irvington-on-Hudson 1996) 608.
536 Prosecutor v Kupreškić (Trial Chamber Judgment) IT-95-16 (14 January 2000)
para. 606.
537 Prosecutor v Sikirica et al (Judgement on Defence Motions to Acquit) IT-95-8-T
(3 September 2001) para. 90.
538 See UNGA Res 47/121 ‘The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (18 December
1992) GAOR 47th Session Supp 49, 44 and the UN Commission on Human
Rights Special Rapporteur Bacre Waly Ndiaye ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur
of the Commission on Human Rights on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary exe-
cutions (6 October 1996) UN Doc A/51/457, para. 69.
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cluded from the Genocide Convention. This is true at least if it is not
paired with a genocidal intent and done in circumstances ‘calculated to
bring about its [the group’s] physical destruction in whole or in part’.
Additionally, already the Nuremberg Charter grouped the acts commit-
ted in crimes of the ‘murder type’ and crimes of the ‘persecution type’539,
which suggests that the crime of persecution is not typically committed
through the killing of individuals (even though it may well lead to it), but
through their systematic discrimination in public life. This categorization
of crimes by the Nuremberg Trials has later been upheld by the Interna-
tional Law Commission and the ICTY.540 Looking at the above-mentioned
definition of ethnic cleansing by the ICTY, ethnic cleansing seems not to
fall under the ‘murder type’ of crimes against humanity (which at Nurem-
berg also covered what is now know legally known as genocide) as envis-
ages by the Nuremberg Trial. Therefore, an equation of ethnic cleansing
with genocide seems to be inaccurate.
In conclusion, ‘ethnic cleansing’ seems to be, at least partly, subsumed
by the above-discussed crime of persecution (Article 7 (1) (h) Rome
Statute) and the more specific means by which an area is rendered ‘ethni-
cally homogenous’ are mostly punishable as crimes against humanities by
themselves (see e.g. murder and extermination as enshrined in Article 7
(1) (a) and (b) Rome Statute or the prohibition of deportation or forcible
transfer of population in Article 7 (1) (d) Rome Statute).
539 See Prosecutor v Tadić (Opinion and Judgment) IT-94-1 (7 May 1997) para. 694.
540 UNILC ‘Principles of International Law recognized in the Charter of the Nürn-
berg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, with commentaries’ ’in (1950)
vol II UNYBILC 375-378, para. 120; Prosecutor v Tadić (Opinion and Judg-
ment) IT-94-1 (7 May 1997) paras 651 and 694.
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War Crimes (Art. 8 Rome Statute)
The law of war as set out in its fundamental instruments, the 1907 Hague
Regulations541, the 1949 Geneva Conventions542 and their 1977 Proto-
cols,543 does not refer to minorities as such, but provides specific protec-
tion to especially vulnerable groups in conflicts, like civilians or prisoners
of war. Therefore, in this context, minorities are only protected as victims
of a conflict, even though they are indirectly shielded by the underlying
principles of the law of war, impartiality and non-discrimination.544 Fur-
thermore, the principle of non-discrimination is also enshrined in many ar-
ticles within the Geneva Conventions, for example Article 3 common to
all four Geneva Conventions.545
The most essential problem in terms of minority protection and war
crimes is deciding in which situations a certain act constitutes a war crime.
Traditionally, the instruments governing the law of war, with the exception
d)
541 1907 Hague Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18
October 1907, annexed to the Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land (signed 18 October 1907, entered into force 26 January 1910)
(1907) 205 CTS 277.
542 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21
October 1950) 75 UNTS 31 (Geneva Convention I); Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October
1950) 75 UNTS 85 (Geneva Convention II); Geneva Convention relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21
October 1950) 75 UNTS 135 (Geneva Convention III); Geneva Convention rela-
tive to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (adopted 12 August
1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 287 (Geneva Convention
IV).
543 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (adopt-
ed 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 3; Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (adopt-
ed 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 609.
544 Peter Finell Accountability under Human Rights Law and International criminal
law against Minority Groups Committed by Non-State Actors (Åbo Akademi In-
stitute for Human Rights, Åbo/Turku May 2002) 44.
545 Peter Finell Accountability under Human Rights Law and International criminal
law against Minority Groups Committed by Non-State Actors (Åbo Akademi In-
stitute for Human Rights, Åbo/Turku May 2002).
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of Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions, deal with interna-
tional armed conflicts fought between one state and another. Consequent-
ly, war crimes as enshrined in the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters related
to crimes committed during international armed conflicts. However, after
World War II, the international community has perceived a shift from in-
ternational, conventional wars, to internal guerrilla style conflicts and civil
wars between non-state actors and states. 546 Since 1945, more than 250
internal conflicts and abuses of repressive regimes resulted in an estimated
86 million casualties.547
As a result, most of the crimes under international law that have been
committed within the context of a conflict occurred within an internal, not
an international armed conflict. This is particularly true for crimes com-
mitted against minorities because they are, as previously discussed, partic-
ularly vulnerable against attacks from their own governments and the gov-
ernments of the countries they live in respectively. In the situation of the
former Yugoslavia, crimes were committed as part of an internal or inter-
nationalized armed conflict. For this reason, the ICTY Statute covers war
crimes both as grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions relating to inter-
national armed conflicts (Article 2) and ‘violations of the laws and cus-
toms of war’ (Article 3) which has been held to cover any serious viola-
tion other than grave breaches irrespective if it occurs within an interna-
tional or an internal armed conflict.548
Out of these experiences, many delegations at the Rome Conference,
supported by a wide range of NGOs, insisted that the ICC should have ju-
risdiction not only over crimes committed in inter-state wars but also over
those atrocities that occurred within the context of an internal armed con-
flict.549 This view ultimately prevailed and accordingly Article 8 (2) Rome
546 See e.g. Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen Patterns of Major Conflicts
1997-2008- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Yearbook 2007:
Armaments, Disarmaments and International Security (OUP Oxford 2007).
547 M Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Accountability for Violations of International Humanitarian
Law and Other Serious Violations of Human Rights’ in M Cherif Bassiouni (ed)
Post-Conflict Justice (Transnational Publishers Ardsley New York 2002) 6.
548 Kriangsak Kittichaisaree International Criminal Law (OUP Oxford 2001) 132-3;
Prosecutor v Tadić (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction) IT-94-1-AR72 (2 October 1995) paras. 86-94.
549 Sunga in Zelim A Skurbaty (ed) Beyond a One-Dimensional State: An Emerging
Right to Autonomy? (Nijhoff Leiden 2005) 255-275, 273.
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Statute distinguishes among four categories of war crimes:550 Concerning
international armed conflicts, Article 8 (2) Rome Statute defines war
crimes as grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Article 8
(2) (a) Rome Statute) and secondly, ‘other serious violations of the laws
and customs applicable in international armed conflict, within the estab-
lished framework of international law’ (Article 8 (2) (b) Rome Statute).
As for non-international armed conflicts, Article 8 (2) defines war crimes
as serious violations of Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions
(Article 8 (2) (c)) and secondly, ‘other serious violations of the laws and
customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international armed char-
acter, within the established framework of international law’ (Article 8 (2)
(d))551. The minority aspects in most of the war crime containing such an
aspect have already been discussed, in a different form, under the heading
of crimes against humanity. The issues discussed there are just as valid for
war crimes, albeit taking account of the specific prerequisite for armed
conflict for each of the provisions. Therefore, the provisions with a minor-
ity aspect will be simply listed here for the sake of completeness.
International Armed Conflicts
Provisions especially relevant to the protection of minorities in interna-
tional armed conflicts include, inter alia,:
Article 8 (2) (a) Rome Statute: Grave Breaches of the Fourth
Geneva Convention Protecting Civilian Persons in Times of War:
The prohibition of wilful killing (Article 8 (2) (a) (i)) Rome Statute;
– The prohibition of torture or inhuman treatment, including biological
experiments (Article 8 (2) (a) (ii)) Rome Statute;
– The prohibition of wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to
body and health (Article 8 (2) (a) (iii)) Rome Statute;
(1)
(1.1)
550 Sunga in Zelim A Skurbaty (ed) Beyond a One-Dimensional State: An Emerging
Right to Autonomy? (Nijhoff Leiden 2005) 255-275, 273.
551 Sunga in Zelim A Skurbaty (ed) Beyond a One-Dimensional State: An Emerging
Right to Autonomy? (Nijhoff Leiden 2005) 255-275, 273.
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– The prohibition of unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful con-
finement (Article 8 (2) (a) (vii)) Rome Statute.
Article 8 (2) (b) Rome Statute: Other serious violations of the Laws
and Customs Applicable in International Armed Conflict, within the
Established Framework of International Law:
– The prohibition of attacks against the civilian population (Article 8 (2)
(b) (i)) Rome Statute;
– The prohibition of deportation or forcible transfer (Article 8 (2) (b)(vi-
ii)) Rome Statute;
– The prohibition of attack of religious, charitable, scientific, cultural ob-
jects (Article 8 (2) (b) (xi)) Rome Statute;
– The prohibition of sexual violence (Article 8 (2) (b) (xxii)) Rome
Statute.
Non- International Armed Conflicts
When it comes to internal conflicts, the most crucial provisions on terms
of minority protections are:
Article 8 (2) (c) Rome Statute: Serious Violations of Article 3
Common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949
The prohibition of violence to life and person, in particular murder of all
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture (Article 8 (2) (c) (i) Rome
Statute);
The prohibition of outrages on human dignity, in particular humiliating
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Article 8 (2) (e) Rome Statute : Other Serious Violations of the
Laws and Customs Applicable in Armed Conflicts not of an
International Character, within the Established Framework of
International Law:
– The prohibition of intentionally directing attacks against the civilian
population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part
in hostilities (Article 8 (2) (e) (i) Rome Statute);
– The prohibition of intentionally directing attacks against buildings ded-
icated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, his-
toric monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are
collected, provided they are not military objectives (Article 8 (2) (e)
(iv) Rome Statute);
– The prohibition of rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced
pregnancy, as defined in Article 7 (2) (f) Rome Statute, enforced steril-
isation and any other form of sexual violence also constituting a seri-
ous violation of Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions
(Article 8 (2) (e) (vi) Rome Statute);
– The prohibition of ordering the displacement of the civilian population
for reasons related to the conflict, unless the security of the civilians
involved or imperative military reasons so demand (Article 8 (2) (e)
(viii) Rome Statute).
Concluding Remarks
As one can see from the above analysis, recourse to minority right is
scarcer than, for example, reference to torture under human rights law.
There are several reasons for this, which are to be found both in the sys-
tem of minority rights law as a concept of human rights as well as in the
crimes which contain an element of minority protection. As a first reason,
minority rights law are much less established than the prohibition of tor-
ture is. The instruments governing it contain few concrete provisions, the
content of rights are actually granted to minorities is often contested and
the legal nature of many of these rights is controversial on a national level
as well as internationally. While minorities are protected through provi-
sions in major international and regional conventions, the rights are fre-
quently misunderstood, looked upon with suspicion by many States for
reasons that rooted in history or practical policy, which is mirrored by
(2.2)
V.
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reservations issued to Article 27 ICCPR.552 This makes minority rights
less accessible and too abstract, in particular for judges who do not have a
background in public international law. Secondly, those crimes under in-
ternational law which contain an element of minority protection, like
genocide or persecution, do often have no or no well-established counter-
part in national criminal codes. Therefore many instances in which re-
course to minority rights would have made the judgments more convinc-
ing or would have facilitated the Chamber’s arguments remained idle.
Women’s Rights/The Prohibition of Gender-Based
Violence
The concept of gender-based crimes has experienced a rapid development
in international criminal law within the last decade. They went from being
an overlooked, side-lined issue linked to family honour to one of the most
discussed and researched areas in international criminal law today. Gen-
der-based crimes also triggered prosecutorial creativity in dealing with
those crimes under a variety of other concepts (e.g. rape as torture, geno-
cide, outrages against personal dignity, enslavement, sexual slavery or per-
secution). The degree to which sexual crimes are prioritized and properly
included in indictment does, however, vary considerably between the re-
spective tribunals and seems, to a large degree depend on the persistence
and experience of investigators in that field.553 The developments of gen-
der-based crimes are also mirrored in the general development of the hu-
man rights of women in international human rights law and of the under-
standing and conceptualisation of violence against women and gender-re-
lated violence in particular. Like gender-based crimes under international
Chapter Three:
552 See the Declarations of France, Turkey Declarations and Reservations of the
States Parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights https://tr
eaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=
4&lang=en (31 October 2017).
553 See further Alison Cole ‘International criminal law and sexual violence: an
overview’ in Clare McGlynn and Vanessa Munro Rethinking Rape Law: Interna-
tional and Comparative Perspectives (Routledge Abingdon 2010) 47-60 and
Doris Buss ‘Learning our lesions: The Rwanda Tribunal record on prosecuting
rape’ in Clare McGlynn and Vanessa Munro Rethinking Rape Law: International
and Comparative Perspectives (Routledge Abingdon 2010) 61-75.
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criminal law, violence against women has for a long time not been seen as
an issue relevant to human rights law and its instruments.
According to feminist theory of international law, the reason for this is
that the human rights system and international criminal and humanitarian
law, are build, like all other legal systems, primarily by men, privileges
their experiences and consequently protects humans from violations which
predominantly men are likely to suffer from.554 International humanitarian
law has long been in the line of criticism of feminist international legal
scholars as a legal system which either relegates women to the status of
victims, or accords them legitimacy only in their role as child-bearers.555
As a consequence of that, international human rights law protects first and
foremost violations within the ‘public’ sphere, violations committed by
the State or its agents. Persons who typically suffer from these sorts of vi-
olations are active in the public sphere. Women, in contrast, are often con-
fined to the private sphere. Therefore, international human rights law as it
was conceived after World War II does often not meet the realities of their
existence and therefore also does not protect them. Violations women tra-
ditionally suffer from are committed within this private sphere, often by
private persons. However, the conceptualisation of human rights law as
horizontal rights which put obligations solely on States and, ultimately,
makes the State the only responsible for violations.556 The actions of non-
554 Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin and Shelley Wright ‘Feminist approaches
to international law’ (1991) 85(4) American Journal of International Law
613-645, 625-634; Helen Durham and Katie O’Byrne ‚The dialogue of differ-
ence: gender perspectives on international humanitarian law’ 92 (2010) Interna-
tional Review of the Red Cross 31–52, 34.
555 Helen Durham and Katie O’Byrne ‚The dialogue of difference: gender perspec-
tives on international humanitarian law’ 92 (2010) International Review of the
Red Cross 31–52, 34; Gardam and Jarvis point out that of 42 provisions in the
Geneva Conventions and the related Protocols which specifically deal with wom-
en, almost half of them address them in their capacities as mothers, while the oth-
er predominant theme of specific protection of women, with regards to sexual vi-
olence, is centred on notions of modesty and chastity: Judith Gardam and
Michelle J Jarvis Women Armed Conflict and International Law (Kluwer Law
International The Hague 2001) 96-7; a modern understanding of sexual violence
places an emphasis rather on the violation of the victim’s ‘physical and moral in-
tegrity’, see eg Prosecutor v Češić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-95-10/1-S (11
March 2004) para. 53.
556 See eg Robert McCorquodale ‘Non-state actors and international human rights
law’ in Sarah Joseph and Adam McBeth (eds) Research Handbook on Interna-
tional Human Rights Law (Elgar Cheltenham 2010) 97-114, 100, 101.
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State actors can only lead to ‘State responsibility in cases of human rights
violations in exceptional circumstances557. Within these exceptions, the
due diligence standard of State responsibility is particularly momentous
for recognizing violence against women as violations in the context of hu-
man rights law.558 That way an act which is ‘not directly imputable to a
State’559 because it was, for example committed by a private person, can
nevertheless trigger the responsibility of a State ‘not because of the act it-
self, but because of the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation’.560
This concept opened the door for a more creative use of human rights law
in order to protect women from systematic violence, usually committed by
private persons, in times of peace, and, simultaneously, makes human
rights law in this area an obvious source to be consulted by practitioners of
international criminal law dealing with issues of gender-related violence.
International human rights documents increasingly mention armed con-
flict and mass atrocities as situations where women’s human rights are en-
dangered and use concepts developed by international criminal or humani-
tarian law in areas of violence against women. Non-binding human rights
documents such as reports by special rapporteurs or by the UN Secretary-
General have pointed to a certain violation of women’s physical and/or
psychological integrity during an armed conflict as ‘crimes of a very seri-
ous nature with a wide range of severe effects on the victim’561. Hence,
there is a relatively high degree of reference to international criminal and
humanitarian law permeating human rights documents and discourse in
the area of sexual violence. This trend might be fuelled as modern interna-
tional criminal courts and tribunals increasingly gain experience with
judging sexual violence. At the ICTY, as of September 2016, 78 individu-
557 UN ILC ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts’ (2001) GAOR 56th Session Supp 10, 43.
558 See further Alice Edwards ‘Everyday rape: International human rights law and
violence against women in peacetime’ in Clare McGlynn and Vanessa Munro Re-
thinking Rape Law: International and Comparative Perspectives (Routledge
Abingdon 2010) 92-108, 102-104.
559 Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras (Judgment) IACtHR Series C No 4 (29 July
1988) para 172.
560 Velásquez Rodríguez v Honduras (Judgment) IACtHR Series C No 4 (29 July
1988) para 172.
561 UNSC ‘Annex II: Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts es-
tablished Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992)’ (27 May 1994)
UN Doc S/1994/674.
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als (48% of the accused) had sexual violence charges included in their in-
dictment.562 However, only 32 of the accused have been convicted for acts
of sexual violence.563 The prosecution of the ICC was heavily criticised
for not bringing charges of sexual violence against Thomas Lubanga Dyi-
lo, instead focussing solely of charges of enlisting and conscripting child
soldiers.564 With the case against Germain Katanga, the ICC had a case
which focused on sexual crimes. In March 2014, Katanga was convicted
of crimes against humanity and war crimes but he was acquitted of all
modalities related to sexual crimes (rape and sexual slavery) as the court
held that even though it found beyond reasonable doubt that the crimes
had been committed, Katanga’s responsibility had not been adequately
proved.565 However, the majority of cases active before the ICC now in-
clude charges of sexual violence and in those in which sexual violence is
not included, the prosecutor often explicitly stated that sexual violence
continues to be investigated.566
562 ICTY ‘Crimes of Sexual Violence: In Numbers’ http://www.icty.org/sid/10586
(31 October 2017).
563 ICTY ‘Crimes of Sexual Violence: In Numbers’ http://www.icty.org/sid/10586
(31 October 2017).
564 See Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Decision on the confirmation of
charges) ICC-01/04-01/803-tEN (29 January 2007); Brigid Inder ‘Reflection:
Gender Issues and Child Soldiers – The Case of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo’ The
Lubanga Trial at the International Criminal Court (31 August 2011) http://www.l
ubangatrial.org/2011/08/31/reflection-gender-issues-and-child-soldiers-the-case-
of-prosecutor-v-thomas-lubanga-dyilo-2/ (31 October 2017).
565 http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/P
ages/pr986.aspx (31 October 2017).
566 This is for example the case in the situation in Libya brought before the ICC by
the UN Security Council. Even though the charges are limited to murder and per-
secution as crimes against humanity (and sexual violence could also be included
under the heading of persecution), the Prosecutor explicitly and repeatedly stated
that sexual violence is one focus of the continuous investigations, see eg Interna-
tional Criminal Court The Office of the Prosecutor ‘Statement to the United Na-
tions Security Council on the situation in
Libya, pursuant to UNSCR 1970 (2011)’ (2 November 2011) <http://www.iccno
w.org/documents/StatementICCProsecutorLibyaReporttoUNSC021113.pdf> (31
October 2017) paras 14-17, 22. Currently, the majority of cases before the ICC
include charges of sexual violence.
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Where Were Women’s Human Rights Referred to?
Sexual Assault as Persecution
Reference to human rights law in international criminal jurisprudence is
scarcer. However, there are instances in which human rights law is refer-
enced, albeit often in a general and incomplete matter which does not ex-
amine human rights law thoroughly and often gives the impression that a
reference to human rights law is somewhat expected and the ‘human rights
box’ has to be ticked before judges can turn to comparative law in this
area. This, for example, happened with ‘enforced prostitution and painful
circumcision.’567 Those offences are mentioned by the ICTY in Miluti-
novic as possible examples of sexual assault other than rape. The ICTY
was faced with the problem of determining whether the court has jurisdic-
tion over ‘sexual assault’ and whether it can qualify as persecution, as this
is not clear from looking at the ICTY Statute. The tribunal therefore
looked at several other documents, for example its Rules of Procedure and
Evidence568, which contain specific rules for dealing with victims of sexu-
al assault, a fact from which the Chamber defers a will of drafters to pros-
ecute and punish such acts.569 Furthermore, the tribunal examined its own
case law.570 First and foremost, however, the tribunal consulted ‘other au-
thorities’ in the area of human rights law, such as the Final Report by the
Commission of Experts cited above and the Report of the Secretary-Gen-
eral, which mentioned ‘widespread and systematic rape and other sexual
assault’ as crimes against humanity over which the ICTY should have ju-
risdiction.571
Nevertheless, the Chamber did not resort to ‘hard law’ like CEDAW. It
concluded that ‘[t]he term “sexual assault” is not explicitly used in any in-
ternational human rights treaty. The Convention on the Elimination of All
I.
1.
567 UNSC ‘Annex II: Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts es-
tablished Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992)’ (27 May 1994)
UN Doc S/1994/674.
568 UN International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ‘Rules of Proce-
dure and Evidence’ (as amended 10 December 2009) IT/32/Rev. 44.
569 Prosecutor v Milutinovic (Judgment) IT-05-87-T (26 February 2009) para. 185.
570 Particularly at Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment) IT-95-17 (10 December
1998) and Prosecutor v Stakić (Judgment) IT-97-24-T (31 July 2003).
571 UNSC ‘Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security
Council Resolution 808 (1993)’ (3 May 1993) Un Doc S/25704.
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Forms of Discrimination Against Women does not mention sexual assault,
although it makes reference to the prohibition on “exploitation of prostitu-
tion”’. The same is stated by the Trial Chamber in Furundžija, where it
held that ‘[n]o international human rights instrument specifically prohibits
rape or other serious sexual assault’572. In both cases, the Chambers then
resort to human rights provisions safeguarding physical integrity. In Fu-
rundžija, the ICTY Trial Chamber refers to the prohibition of cruel, inhu-
man or degrading treatment in Art. 7 ICCPR, Art. 5 Banjul Charter and
Art. 5 Inter-American Convention on Human Rights. Furthermore, refer-
ence is made to Art. 4 Banjul Charter which prohibits violations of the
right to integrity of a person and the jurisprudence of the ECommHR
(Cyprus v Turkey573) and the ECtHR (Aydin v Turkey574) which deals with
rape committed by State officials, acts that the Court and the Commission
classified as a violation of Art. 3 of the ECHR. In Milutinovic, the Cham-
ber holds that ‘[t]he right not to be sexually assaulted has (…) been sub-
sumed under more general fundamental rights relating to physical integri-
ty’575 The Chamber is here referring to the above-quoted explanation in
Furundžija and does not give its own explanations on the matter.
While it remains true that the ‘sexual assault’ is not explicitly used in
any human rights treaty, the Chamber fails to look at the interpretation of
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW) by its treaty body, the Commission on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.576 How and to what ex-
tent the jurisprudence and the general recommendations of this quasi-judi-
cial body could have been of help to the ICTY is examined below (under
Part Two Chapter Three).
572 Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment) IT-95-17 (10 December 1998) para. 170.
573 Cyprus v Turkey (EComHR App 6780/74 and 6950/75) 4 EHRR 482.
574 Aydin v Turkey (ECtHR) Reports 1997-VI <http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-5
8371> (31 October 2017); the case of Aydin v Turkey is referred to by several
other Chambers as well, for example in Prosecutor v Kvočka (Judgment)
IT-98-30 (2 November 2001), para. 145.
575 Prosecutor v Milutinovic (Judgment) IT-05-87-T (26 February 2009) para. 188.
576 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(adopted 18 December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS
13.
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Rape as Torture
In the first case at the ICTR, Prosecutor v Akayesu, the court argues that
‘rape is a form of aggression and that the central elements of the crime of
rape cannot be captured in a mechanical description of objects and body
parts’577. This mirrors, as the chamber explicitly mentions, an approach
central to the CAT, which ‘does not catalogue specific acts in its definition
of torture, focusing rather on the conceptual framework of state-sanc-
tioned violence’.578 The Chamber furthermore compares rape to torture in
terms of the purposes the acts serve and the violation of personal dignity,
leading to the conclusion that rape indeed constitutes torture ‘when inflict-
ed by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a pub-
lic official or other person acting in an official capacity’.579
In Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Celebići Case), the ICTY was faced with
the need to determine whether rape could be considered torture in viola-
tion of the Geneva Conventions. 580 After examining the provisions under
humanitarian law, which prohibit rape and other forms of sexual assault
and after concentrating on the definition of rape, the chamber discussed
the jurisprudence of international judicial bodies on the issue of rape as
torture. Reference was made by the court to the Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights in the Fernando and Raquel Mejia v Peru Case581
and the ECtHR in Aydin v Turkey582. The Trial Chamber uses these two
cases to determine the constituent elements of torture and also to outline
the difference between torture on the one hand and inhuman or degrading
treatment on the other. In Aydin v Turkey, the ECtHR held that the differ-
ence between torture and inhuman or degrading treatment was ‘to allow
the special stigma of “torture” to attach only to deliberate inhuman treat-
2.
577 Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment) ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998) paras 596,
687.
578 Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment) ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998) para 687.
579 Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment) ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998) para 597-.
580 Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Celebići Case Judgment) IT-96-21 (16 November
1998).
581 Fernando and Raquel Mejia v Peru Case 10.970 IACommHR Report No 5/96 (1
March 1996); see Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Celebići Case Judgment) IT-96-21
(16 November 1998) paras 481-486.
582 Aydin v Turkey (ECtHR) Reports 1997-VI <http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-5
8371> (31 October 2017); see Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Celebići Case Judg-
ment) IT-96-21 (16 November 1998) paras 487-489.
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ment causing very serious and cruel suffering’.583 The ECtHR, as well as
the responsible ICTY Trial Chamber in Celebići, concludes that rape does
involve such a severe level of suffering that the crime can be categorized
as torture. To this end, the ICTY Chamber also refers to a similar oral
statement by the Special Rapporteur on Torture584 and a statement by the
Commission of Experts outlining the physical and psychological suffering
experienced by victims of rape.585 Finally, the ICTY examined whether
any of the prohibited purposes necessary for the act to be classified as tor-
ture are given. To this end, the Chamber considered the prohibited purpose
of discrimination and pointed to the report of the Special Rapporteur on
Contemporary Forms of Slavery, Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and
Slavery-like Practices during Armed Conflict and, albeit indirectly, also to
the work of the CEDAW Committee. In its Report on ‘Contemporary
forms of Slavery: Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-like
Practices during Armed Conflict’ the Special Rapporteur cites the
CEDAW Committee saying that ‘violence directed against a woman be-
cause she is a woman, including “acts that inflict physical, mental or sexu-
al harm or suffering”, represents a form of discrimination that seriously in-
hibits the ability of women to enjoy human rights and freedoms’.586 The
ICTY fails to clarify that the CEDAW Committee sees gender-based vio-
583 Aydin v Turkey (ECtHR) Reports 1997-VI <http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-5
8371> (31 October 2017) para. 82; see also Ireland v United Kingdom (ECtHR)
Series A No 25, para. 167.
584 Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Celebići Case Judgment) IT-96-21-T (16 November
1998) para 491, referring to the oral introduction of the Special Rapporteur on
Torture, Mr P Kooijmans, to his 1992 report to the Commission on Human
Rights according to which rape or other forms of sexual assault against women in
detention were a particularly ignominious violation of the inherent dignity and
the right to physical integrity of the human being, they accordingly constituted an
act of torture’ UN Doc E/CNA/1992/SR.21 para.35. See UN Commission on Hu-
man Rights ‘Question of the human rights of all persons subjected to any form of
detention or imprisonment, in particular: torture and other cruel, inhuman or de-
grading treatment or punishment: Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Nigel S.
Rodley’ (12 January 1995) UN Doc E/CNA/1995/34.
585 Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Celebići Case Judgment) IT-96-21-T (16 November
1998) para 492, referring to UNSC ‘Final Report of the Commission of Experts
Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 935 (1994): Annex IX’ (9
December 1994) UN Doc S/1994/1405, Section D.
586 UN Commission on Human Rights ‘Systematic rape, sexual slavery and slave-
like practices during armed conflict: Final report submitted by Ms. Gay J. Mc-
Dougall, Special Rapporteur’ (22 June 1998) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13,
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lence explicitly in the context of State parties obligations and defines dis-
criminatory and therefore illegal gender-based violence broadly, not only
as violence committed against a woman because she is a woman, but also
violence which affects women disproportionally587 as discrimination pro-
hibited by CEDAW. Here, the court fails to acknowledge that discrimina-
tion, which it has earlier identified as one possible of the necessary prohib-
ited purposes in torture, manifests itself in the mass occurrence of violence
against women. States can be in breach of CEDAW in this case, either
when they do not live up to the due diligence standard of prevention and
punishment of violent acts against women or if the perpetrators are State
agents. These findings of the CEDAW Committee are directly relevant to
many cases of sexual violence under international law and open an entry
point for prosecutorial innovations. By cutting the CEDAW Committee’s
definition in half and taking the definition of gender-based violence that
arguably has the higher threshold and is harder to prove (violence is com-
mitted against a woman because she is a woman) the court limited the ap-
plication area of the definition in cases of crime requiring discrimination
like persecution or torture. The reason why the ICTY chose to only em-
ploy part of the CEDAW Commission’s definition could be that the Court
thought itself on safer ground in terms of the customary nature of the defi-
nition when using the more narrow part of the definition. However, the ap-
proach to place all violence against women in the context of discrimina-
tion has been established years before the Celebići judgement and support-
ed by a variety of institutions and UN agencies. In 1993, the UNGA
adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women
(‘DEVW’), which acknowledges in its preamble that
‘violence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal pow-
er relations between men and women, which have led to domination over
and discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of the full
advancement of women, and that violence against women is one of the
para. 55; see also UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women ‘General Recommendation No 19: Violence against Women’ (30 January
1992) GAOR 47th Session Supp 38, 1, para. 6.
587 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women ‘General
Recommendation No 19: Violence against Women’ (30 January 1992) GAOR
47th Session Supp 38, 1, para. 6.
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crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced into a subordinate
position compared with men’.588
Article 1 DEVW states
‘[f]or the purposes of this Declaration, the term “violence against women”
means any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in,
physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including
threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether oc-
curring in public or in private life.’
These provisions seem to suggest that the terms violence against women
and gender-based violence are used basically used as synonyms, even
though the CEDAW Committee uses gender-based violence both in a
broader and in a narrower sense than violence against women.589 It is
broader than the term violence against women because the former also en-
compasses violence in which gender is not the ‘main or sole determinant’
of the violence committed.590 It is also narrower than the term gender-
based violence as violence against women obviously excludes any vio-
lence committed against men or intersex persons in which gender is the
decisive factor.591 However, the DEVW states that both terms refer to ac-
tions rooted in systematic oppression and discrimination. As the ICTY
case at hand concerns the rape of women, the events fall under the appli-
cation area of both terms, even if they are not congruent. Furthermore, the
approach of the CEDAW Committee was endorsed by the Special Rappor-
588 UNGA Res 48/104 ‘Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women’
(20 December 1993) GAOR 48th Session Supp 49 vol 1, 217.
589 See also Alice Edwards Violence against Women under International Human
Rights Law (CUP Cambridge 2011) at 20, where she states that, even though the
two terms are used interchangeably in international law, international human
rights instruments tend to prefer the term ‘violence against women’ while the ‘ju-
risprudence, guidelines and policy statements of the broader UN’ favor ‘gender-
based violence’.
590 Alice Edwards ‘Everyday rape: International human rights law and violence
against women in peacetime’ in Clare McGlynn and Vanessa Munro Rethinking
Rape Law: International and Comparative Perspectives (Routledge Abingdon
2010) 92-108, 97-98.
591 Alice Edwards ‘Everyday rape: International human rights law and violence
against women in peacetime’ in Clare McGlynn and Vanessa Munro Rethinking
Rape Law: International and Comparative Perspectives (Routledge Abingdon
2010) 92-108, 98.
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teur on Violence against Women from her first report of 1994 on.592 The
decision of the court to limit the definition to the first part is even less con-
ceivable as it is accompanied with no further analysis in the findings. The
court merely states that two women were raped because they were women,
without further analysis to back up this statement.593 Furthermore, the
court lets slip the opportunity to link back to the fundamental treaty in the
area of gender-related violence and discrimination against women and to
strengthen its argumentation by reiterating the fact that rape, particularly
when committed by State officials, can constitute a breach of CEDAW.
The court could also have referred to the elaborate description of the
scope of the DEVWD in Article 2 and the modalities in which violence
against women can be committed.594
Finally, the Court cites, without further analysis, the Special Rappor-
teur’s report: ‘[i]n many cases the discrimination prong of the definition of
torture in the Torture Convention provides an additional basis for prose-
cuting rape and sexual violence as torture’.595 As explained, the court
takes ‘discrimination’ to be an additional purpose which is pursued by the
592 UN Commission on Human Rights’ Special Rapporteur Radhika Coomaraswamy
‘Preliminary report submitted by the Special Rapporteur on violence against
women, its causes and consequences in accordance with Commission on Human
Rights resolution 1994/45’ (22 November 1994) E/CN.4/1995/42 para. 29; see
also UN ECOSOC Res 1996/12 (23 July 1997) UN Doc E/RES/1996/12 and UN
Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur Radhika Coomaraswamy ‘Re-
port of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and conse-
quences, submitted in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution
2002/52, Addendum 1: International, regional and national developments in the
area of violence against women 1994-2003’ (27 February 2003) UN Doc E/CN.
4/2003/75/Add.1 paras 5, 56; several Special Rapporteurs have repeatedly also
used a variation of the phrase ‘violence and other forms of discrimination against
women’ see eg UN Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur Yakin
Ertürk ‘Integration of the human rights of women and the gender perspective: Vi-
olence against Women; The due diligence standard as a tool for the elimination of
violence against women: Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against
Women, its causes and consequences’ (20 January 2006) E/CN.4/2006/61 para.
97; UNGA ‘Advancement of women: Note by the Secretary-General’ (1 August
2011) UN Doc A/66/215 para 13.
593 See Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Celebići Case Judgment) IT-96-21-T (16 Novem-
ber 1998) paras 941 and 963.
594 See Part Two Chapter Three III e below.
595 Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Celebići Case Judgment) IT-96-21-T (16 November
1998) para 493; UN Commission on Human Rights ’Systematic rape, sexual
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intentional inflicting of severe mental or physical pain or suffering. This is
in line with Art. 1 (1) CAT. The court strengthens its argument by referring
to the CEDAW Committee. Its reasoning is sexual violence constitutes
discrimination which is one of the purposes with which the severe mental
and physical harm must be inflicted in order to constitute torture. The
equation of gender-based violence with discrimination is one of the cor-
nerstones of the modern human rights jurisprudence on gender issues. The
CEDAW Committee issues two General Recommendations (No 12 and
No 19) which state that CEDAW obliges Member States to protect women
from violence and that ‘[g]ender-based violence is a form of discrimina-
tion that seriously inhibits women's ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on
a basis of equality with men’596 thereby bringing violence against women
under the ambit of CEDAW.
In its findings and after the analysis of the human rights provisions dis-
cussed, the Trial Chamber enumerates four constituent elements of torture:
(i) There must be an act or omission that causes severe pain or suffering,
whether mental or physical,
(ii) which is inflicted intentionally,
(iii) and for such purposes as obtaining information or a confession from the
victim, or a third person, punishing the victim for an act he or she or a third
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, intimidating or
coercing the victim or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimina-
tion of any kind,
(iv) and such act or omission being committed by, or at the instigation of,
or with the consent or acquiescence of, an official or other person acting in
an official capacity. 597
The most remarkable conclusions which the Court draws after having
resulted the jurisprudence and other documents of human rights law, are
that a. the court takes into account not only the physical but also the psy-
chological suffering that rape causes and also states that b. ‘it is difficult to
slavery and slave-like practices during armed conflict: Final report submitted by
Ms. Gay J. McDougall, Special Rapporteur’ (22 June 1998) UN Doc E/CN.4/
Sub.2/1998/13, para. 55.
596 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women ‘General
Recommendation No 19: Violence against Women’ (30 January 1992) GAOR
47th Session Supp 38, 1 para 1.
597 Unlike this definition and art. 1 CAT, Art. 7 (1) (f) Rome Statute does not require
any ‘specific’ purpose, see Part Two III 2. (b) (2) above.
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envisage circumstances in which rape, by, or at the instigation of a public
official, or with the consent or acquiescence of an official, could be con-
sidered as occurring for a purpose that does not, in some way, involve
punishment, coercion, discrimination or intimidation. In the view of this
Trial Chamber this is inherent in situations of armed conflict’.598 The Trial
Chamber therefore concludes that whenever the aforementioned criteria
are fulfilled, rape constitutes torture. This approach has been followed by
several other Trial and Appeals Chambers, which refer to the Celebići -ap-
proach and usually, in a footnote, also to the Trial Chamber’s reference to
‘reports and decisions of organs of the UN and regional bodies’.599
Where Could Women’s Human Rights Have Been Referred to?
Genocide
The case of Jean-Paul Akayesu at the ICTR was the first time an interna-
tional criminal tribunal held that rape, under certain circumstances, can
amount to genocide.600 The initial indictment to the case, which was sub-
mitted by the Prosecutor on 13 February 1996 and confirmed on 16 Febru-
ary 1996, did not contain any acts of sexual violence.601 It was only during
the proceedings when the judges started asking questions to a witness who
had mentioned that her daughter had been raped during the genocide, that
the prosecutor investigated those crimes and the indictment was subse-
quently amended in June 1997.602 The Court heard many more accounts of
rapes and other forms of sexual violence and based on them held Akayesu
responsible for rape as genocide, as the court found that the rapes were
committed solely against Tutsi women and with the intent of destroying
II.
1.
598 Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Celebići Case Judgment) IT-96-21-T (16 November
1998) para 495.
599 See Prosecutor v Kunarac et al (Appeal Judgment) IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A (12
June 2002) para. 151 (fn 206); Prosecutor v Brđanin (Judgment) IT-99-36-T (1
September 2004) para. 485 (fn 1265);.
600 Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment) ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998).
601 Prosecutor v Akayesu (Amended Indictment) ICTR-96-4-I (June 1997) para. 6.
602 See for example the account by one of the Judges to the case: Navanethem Pillay
‘Protection of the Health of Women through International Criminal Law: Can In-
ternational Criminal Law contribute to Efforts to Improve the Health of Women?’
(2008) 22 Emory International Law Review 15–28, 17–18.
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the Tutsi group as a whole.603 The Chamber affirmed that rape and sexual
violence ‘constitute genocide in the same way as any other act as long as
they were committed with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a particular group, targeted as such’.604 The judges further stated that
‘[t]hese rapes resulted in physical and psychological destruction of Tutsi
women, their families and their communities. Sexual violence was an inte-
gral part of the process of destruction, specifically targeting Tutsi women
and specifically contributing to their destruction and to the destruction of
the Tutsi group as a whole’.605 However, the Akayesu judgement does not
cite any other international criminal law or human rights law documents or
instruments supporting its finding that rape and/or sexual violence can
constitute genocide, even though such (soft law) documents can be found
in the realm of international human rights law. The classification of rape
as genocide did not start during the Akayesu proceedings. The foundation
is obviously to be found in the Genocide Convention. The key element for
actions to be characterized as genocide is the genocidal special intent.
The notion of rape as genocide had come up in human rights documents
years earlier; it was, for instance, mentioned in para. 145 (d) Beijing Plat-
form for Action of the Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995,
which called upon governments to ‘[r]eaffirm that rape in the conduct of
armed conflict constitutes a war crime and under certain circumstances it
constitutes a crime against humanity and an act of genocide as defined in
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide’.606 Furthermore, the Platform for Action pushed for investigations of
those acts and prosecution of those responsible.
Another document which points to the relation between rape and geno-
cide is the Final Report of the Special Rapporteur on systematic rape, sex-
ual slavery and slavery-like practices during armed conflict of June 1998
which affirms the importance of the correct legal classification of acts of
sexual violence and slavery as ‘international crimes of slavery, crimes
603 Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment) ICTR-96-4-A (1 June 2001) paras 706, 724,
731–34.
604 Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment) ICTR-96-4-A (1 June 2001) paras 731.
605 Ibid.
606 Fourth World Conference on Women ‘Beijing Declaration and Platform for Ac-
tion’ in ‘Report’ (17 October 1995) UN Doc A/CONF.177/20, 4.
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against humanity, genocide, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions,
war crimes or torture’607
Referring to these soft law documents as indicators of customary inter-
national law would have at the same time strengthened and facilitated the
courts arguments. The developments in Akayesu led to more indictments
and/or convictions for rape as genocide in the ICTR and ICTY. Even
though the link between rape and genocide is not explicitly drawn in the
Rome Statute itself (by way of including sexual violence of one of the acts
through which genocide can be committed), the ICC’s Elements of Crime
contain a footnote to Element No 1 to Art. 6 (a) dealing with genocide
committed by causing serious bodily or mental harm. The footnote states
that ‘[t]his conduct may include, but is not necessarily restricted to, acts of
torture, rape, sexual violence or inhuman or degrading treatment’.608
Definition of Rape
Prior to the establishment of the ICTR and the ICTY, there was no com-
monly accepted definition of rape in international law. As Akayesu, the
first case before the ICTR, as mentioned above,609 included charges of
rape, the tribunal was forced to define the term. In order to do so, the IC-
TR considered the definitions found in ‘certain national jurisdictions’610
without specifying which jurisdictions it was referring to and arrived at the
conclusion that those jurisdictions defined rape as ‘non-consensual inter-
course’, while some included acts ‘ which involve the insertion of objects
and/or the use of bodily orifices not considered to be intrinsically sexu-
al’.611 The Court went on comparing rape to torture under international hu-
man rights law and stated
‘[t]he Chamber considers that rape is a form of aggression and that the central
elements of the crime of rape cannot be captured in a mechanical description
2.
607 UN Commission on Human Rights ’Systematic rape, sexual slavery and slave-
like practices during armed conflict: Final report submitted by Ms. Gay J. Mc-
Dougall, Special Rapporteur’ (22 June 1998) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13,
para. 8; see also para. 34.
608 Elements of Crimes (adopted and entered into force 9 September 2002) Doc ICC-
ASP/1/3 (Pt. II-B), footnote 3.
609 See Part Two Chapter Three I. 2. above.
610 Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment) ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998) para. 596.
611 Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment) ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998) para. 596.
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of objects and body parts. The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment does not catalogue specific
acts in its definition of torture, focusing rather on the conceptual frame work
of state sanctioned violence. This approach is more useful in international
law. Like torture, rape is used for such purposes as intimidation, degradation,
humiliation, discrimination, punishment, control or destruction of a person.
Like torture, rape is a violation of personal dignity, and rape in fact consti-
tutes torture when inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capaci-
ty. 612
The Chamber did not, however, look at any instruments available regard-
ing women’s rights. It goes on defining rape as ‘a physical invasion of a
sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances which are coer-
cive’. Additionally, the ICTR holds sexual violence, which it states in-
cludes rape, to be ‘any act of a sexual nature which is committed on a per-
son under circumstances which are coercive’.613 This definition of rape
which is used is a very wide one and does leads to new ambiguities, for
example when it comes to the question what an ‘invasion’ consists of.
The approach taken by the ICTR in Akayesu was nevertheless subse-
quently confirmed by the ICTY in Delalić. 614 There, the chamber dealt
solely with charges of rape as torture as a crime against humanity and not
with accusations of genocide. The court did not include any own reason-
ing of the definition of rape, but simply cited the one used in Akayesu and
stated that it saw no reason to depart from that approach. 615 The court
then went on to examine the state of international jurisprudence of judicial
and quasi-judicial bodies on the issue of rape as torture. In particular, the
tribunal considered the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights and the ECtHR on the matter.
In Furundžija the ICTY held that due to the principle of specificity and
the principle of nullum crimen sine lege, in order to define the elements of
rape in international law, one had to resort to a comparison of the different
national jurisdictions and analyse what elements they see as a prerequisite
for establishing rape. The court in Furundžija deemed that necessary be-
612 Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment) ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998) para 597;
see also para 687.
613 Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment) ICTR-96-4-A (1 June 2001), para. 598.
614 Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Celebići Case Judgment) IT-96-21 (16 November
1998).
615 Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Celebići Case Judgment) IT-96-21 (16 November
1998) 478–79.
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cause it held that ‘no elements other than those emphasized may be drawn
from international treaty or customary law, nor is resort to general princi-
ples of international criminal law or to general principles of international
law of any avail. As the chamber held that, even though rape and sexual
assault is expressly prohibited under international humanitarian law and
courts and tribunals have convicted accordingly,616 no human rights in-
strument specifically prohibited rape and sexual assault, the Trial Chamber
therefore considered that, to arrive at an accurate definition of rape (…) it
is necessary to look for principles of criminal law common to the major
legal systems of the world. These principles may be derived, with all due
caution, from national laws’.617 The Chamber did, however, acknowledge
an implicit protection from rape and sexual assault by provisions protect-
ing physical integrity, which the chamber saw as ‘undeniably part of cus-
tomary law’.618 As such, human rights provisions, concepts and discourse
indirectly found their way into the definition of rape used in Fu-
rundžija.619 It also goes to show that judges often feel the need to demon-
strate that norms developed under international criminal law or interna-
tional humanitarian law conform with human rights law and how interna-
tional criminal law, through shaping the customary law in this area, might
also contribute to furthering a definition of rape under human rights
law.620
616 Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment) IT-95-17 (10 December 1998), para 168.
617 Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment) IT-95-17 (10 December 1998), paras
168-171, 177.
618 Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment) IT-95-17 (10 December 1998), para 170;
that sexual violence in armed conflict violates a number of basic human rights
had been stated in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of 1993:
‘Violations of the human rights of women in situations of armed conflict are vio-
lations of the fundamental principles of international human rights and humani-
tarian law. All violations of this kind, including in particular murder, systematic
rape, sexual slavery, and forced pregnancy, require a particularly effective re-
sponse’; UN World Conference on Human Rights ‘Vienna Declaration and Pro-
gramme of Action’ (25 June 1993) UN Doc A/CONF.157/23 para 38.
619 Theodor Meron ‘Human Rights Marches into New Territory: The Enforcement of
International Human Rights in International Criminal Tribunals’ Fourth Marek
Nowicki Memorial Lecture (28 November 2008) <http://web.ceu.hu/legal/pdf%2
0documents/Nowicki/Meron_Enforcement%20of%20HRwarsawnowicki13nov 0
8.pdf > (as last accessed on 10 June 2013; speech no longer accessible online) 23.
620 Theodor Meron ‘Human Rights Marches into New Territory: The Enforcement of
International Human Rights in International Criminal Tribunals’ Fourth Marek
Nowicki Memorial Lecture (28 November 2008) <http://web.ceu.hu/legal/pdf%2
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The Furundžija Trial Chamber’s definition of rape, deducted from gen-
eral principles of criminal law common to the major legal stems of the
world was the following. The objective elements of rape were 1. a. the
sexual penetration, however slight, of the vagina or anus of the victim by
the penis of the perpetrator or any other object used by the perpetrator; or
b. of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; 2. by coercion
or force or threat of force against the victim or a third person.621
In Kunarac, a comparison of different national jurisdictions was under-
taken in order to determine the scope and the limits of consent with the
result that one of the elements of rape were not established. The Trial
Chamber in Kunarac had to engage in such a comparison because the def-
initions which had been developed earlier by the ICTR in Akayesu and the
ICTY in Furundžija were too unspecific for the former and too narrow
when it comes to the latter for the case in question. The Chamber was of
the opinion that in the specific case in question, a narrow definition of
consent as applied in Furundžija would neglect other factors which
‘would render an act of sexual penetration non-consensual or non-volun-
tary on the part of the victim’622
In Furundžija, the Trial Chamber took recourse to rather unorthodox ar-
guments in order to affirm its jurisdiction over sexual violence. For in-
stance, it stated that forced oral penetration constituted rape even though
the Chamber held that there might not be sufficient State Practice to sub-
stantiate this claim under customary international law. The reason for this,
according to the Trial Chamber, was that in the context of an armed con-
flict, the conduct in question was aggravated into aggravated sexual as-
sault.623 Therefore, the Chamber held that no violation of nullum crimen
sine lege occurred. In this, the Court very much acted as a lawmaker driv-
ing a creative, yet risky line of argument without sufficient backing from
legal doctrine. The Court cannot argue that State practice of some States
0documents/Nowicki/Meron_Enforcement%20of%20HRwarsawnowicki13nov 0
8.pdf > (as last accessed on 10 June 2013; speech no longer accessible online)
23-4.
621 Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment) IT-95-17 (10 December 1998) para. 185.
622 Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgment) IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T (22 February
2001) para. 438.
623 Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment) IT-95-17 (10 December 1998) para 184; Mia
Swart ‘Judicial Lawmaking at the ad hoc Tribunals: The Creative Use of the
Sources of International Law and “Adventurous Interpretation”’ (2010) 70
ZaöRV 459-486, 467-8.
Part Two: How are Different Areas of Human Rights Law Referred to?
188
(but not enough) categorize forced oral intercourse as rape and that the
context of the of an armed conflict somehow helps to bridge this gap by
making any prohibited act somehow more grave so that therefore the act
falls into the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.
Here, referring to human rights instruments regarding violence against
women would have greatly facilitated the court’s argumentation. As we
will see below, even though violence against women is not specifically
dealt with in any of the major human rights treaties, General Recommen-
dation No 19 of the CEDAW Committee brought gender-based violence
within the ambit of CEDA. Gender based violence is defined as ‘violence
that is directed against a woman because she is a woman or that affects
women disproportionally. It includes physical, mental or sexual harm or
suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liber-
ty’.624 As such, the General Recommendation transformed CEDAW ‘from
an anti-discrimination treaty into a gender-based violence treaty’.625 Using
this argumentation, the court would have been on more solid doctrinal
ground as the CEDAW Committee provides authoritative interpretation of
the CEDAW.
The legal nature and relevance of the general recommendations (or
‘General Comments’ as they are called in some of the treaty bodies) is dis-
puted. Some commentators see them as authoritative interpretations, 626
while others ascribe them mere advisory character and regard it as apt if
they are merely taken into consideration or even deny them any legal
weight altogether.627 It seems hard to argue that the General Recommen-
dations/Comments, can be more than non-binding soft law. Already the
624 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women ‘General
Recommendation No 19: Violence against Women’ (30 January 1992) GAOR
47th Session Supp 38, 1,.
625 Alice Edwards ‚Violence against Women as Sex Discrimination: Judging the Ju-
risprudence of the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ (2008) 18 Texas
Journal of Women and the Law 1–54.
626 See eg Manfred Nowak U. N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR
Commentary (N P Engel Kehl 2005) 49; Nowak does, however, emphasis that the
General Comments (of the HRC) cannot be more that non-binding interpreta-
tions; nevertheless, the HRC–and this argumentation can be conferred to the oth-
er treaty bodies as well–has, in his opinion, the authority to interpret the ICCR
and he underlines the ‘authoritative and universal character of these interpreta-
tions’.
627 See Philip Alston ‘The Historical Origins of the Concept of “General Comments”
in Human Rights Law’ in Laurence Boisson de Chazournes and Vera Gowlland-
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terms ‘recommendations’ or ‘comments’ point to their non-binding char-
acter. The text of CEDAW itself does not contain anything to the way that
the CEDAW Committee should be invested with judicial authority the
States Parties explicitly subordinated to.
Nevertheless, the General Comments of the CEDAW Committee con-
stitute a valuable, even an indispensable source of interpretation of
CEDAW (as the General Recommendations/Comments of the other com-
mittees do for their respective treaties). This is because all human rights
treaties are by necessity formulated in a very broad manner that leaves a
lot of room for interpretation. As already Cesare Beccaria has pointed out
(quoted by Philip Alston), ‘”rights” and “obligations” are, in some re-
spects at least “abbreviated symbols of the rational argument” rather than
ideas themselves’.628 This vagueness of terms leads to insecurity on the
side of the rights-holders and provide those who are obliged to guarantee
and protect the rights with an opportunity to manipulate them and deprive
them of their content. This is where General Recommendations by the ex-
perts sitting in the treaty bodies comes in. The development, at the interna-
tional arena, of jurisprudence, which elaborates on and clarifies the nor-
mative content and the obligations and implications deriving from a spe-
cific treaty provision, decreases the possibilities for Member States to in-
terpret their obligations in a way which would essentially deprive them of
their purpose. Even though the General Recommendations are not binding
in a strict legal sense, they constitute a powerful tool as the interpretation
by the ‘guardian of the convention’, a Committee made up of independent
experts from all over the world whose recommendations on a specific is-
sue are of great weight and cannot easily be disregarded by national courts
and State officials. This is even more so because, until now, all the Gener-
al Recommendations of the Committee have been adopted by consen-
Debbas The International Legal System in Quest of Equity and Universality:
Liber Amicorum Georges Abi-Saab (Nijhoff The Hague 2001) 763-776, 764.
628 Philip Alston ‘The Historical Origins of the Concept of “ General Comments” in
Human Rights Law’ in Laurence Boisson de Chazournes and Vera Gowlland-
Debbas The International Legal System in Quest of Equity and Universality:
Liber Amicorum Georges Abi-Saab (Nijhoff The Hague 2001) 763-776, 767; Ce-
sare Beccaria On Crime and Punishment and Other Writings (Cambridge Univer-
sity Press 1995) 12.
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sus,629 (even though this is no requirement stipulated in the Rules of Pro-
cedure of the CEDAW Committee).630 Hence, one cannot look at CEDAW
isolated from the consideration of its interpretation and clarification by the
CEDAW Committee. If the ICTY looks at CEDAW in order to establish
the extent to which sexual assault constitutes the denial of fundamental
rights, it should also consider the limits and fields of application assigned
to the convention by its treaty body.
The CEDAW Committee deals with violence against women on a struc-
tural level, as ‘group-based harm, a practice of social inequality carried
out on an individual level’.631 Gender-based violence is seen as systematic
and endemic and in this respect, the legal and sociological language used
is very similar to the mass-scale crimes international criminal law is deal-
ing with. In this respect, international criminal law has a lot to gain from
the jurisprudence and the General Recommendations of the CEDAW
Committee as well as other treaty bodies when it comes to gender-based
crimes prosecuted on an international level. The discourse of the CEDAW
and the CESCR on the one side and the international criminal courts and
tribunals are similar. As we will see, many more opportunities to put en-
demic violence against women within the context of discrimination and
therefore persecution could have been realized had the Chambers referred
to the available instruments and discussions.
629 Email correspondence with two members of the CEDAW Committee, Professor
Ruth Halperi-Kaddari (16 September 2010) and Professor Niklas Bruun (17
September 2010).
630 Rule 31 of the Rules of Procedure of the CEDAW Committee stipulates: ‘1. The
Committee shall endeavour to reach its decisions by consensus. 2. If and when all
efforts to reach consensus have been exhausted, decisions of the Committee shall
be taken by a simple majority of the members present and voting’ UN Committee
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women ‘Rules of Procedure of the
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women’ (2001) UN Doc
A/56/38 Annex I.
631 See Alice Edwards ‚Violence against Women as Sex Discrimination: Judging the
Jurisprudence of the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ (2008) 18
Texas Journal of Women and the Law 1–54,25.
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Persecution
As mentioned above, the Milutinovic judgment was the first judgment in
which the court had to explore the issue of sexual assault as persecution.
As the ICTY Statute did not provide for persecution on gender grounds to
be charged, the Court, even though it does not explicitly state so in the
judgment, discusses persecution on political, racial and religious grounds
by rape and sexual assault of ‘Kosovo Albanians, in particular women by
forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia.632 ’In the judg-
ment, the responsible ICTY Chamber states that ‘[t]he term “sexual as-
sault” is not explicitly used in any international human rights treaty. The
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women does not mention sexual assault, although it makes reference to
the prohibition on “exploitation of prostitution”’. While this remains a true
statement, the Court overlooked that ‘sexual assault’, like rape, has indeed
been characterized as one of the modes of violence against women, which
is outlawed by CEDAW. In General Recommendation 19 of 1992, the
CEDAW Committee stated that ‘[t]he Convention in article 1 defines dis-
crimination against women. The definition of discrimination includes gen-
der-based violence, that is, violence that is directed against a woman be-
cause she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately. It includes
acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of
such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty. Gender-based vio-
lence may breach specific provisions of the Convention, regardless of
whether those provisions expressly mention violence’. 633 The committee
explicitly refers to the correlation between sexual assault and armed con-
flict in emphasizing that ‘[w]ars, armed conflicts and the occupation of
territories often lead to increased prostitution, trafficking in women and
sexual assault of women, which require specific protective and punitive
measures.’634 Furthermore, the CEDAW Committee urges States Parties to
3.
632 Prosecutor v Milutinović (Judgment) IT-05-87-T (26 February 2009) para 183;
generally on rape and sexual assault as persecution see paras 183-203.
633 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women ‘General
Recommendation No 19: Violence against Women’ (30 January 1992) GAOR
47th Session Supp 38, 1, para. 6.
634 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women ‘General
Recommendation No 19: Violence against Women’ (30 January 1992) GAOR
47th Session Supp 38, 1, para. 16.
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‘ensure that laws against family violence and abuse, rape, sexual assault
and other gender-based violence give adequate protection to all women,
and respect their integrity and dignity’.635 The committee additionally
states that gender-based violence, (which includes sexual assault), ‘which
impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of human rights and funda-
mental freedoms under general international law or under human rights
conventions, is discrimination within the meaning of article 1 of the Con-
vention’.636 One of the rights mentioned by the committee, the enjoyment
of which is impaired or nullified by gender-based violence is ‘[t]he right
to equal protection according to humanitarian norms in time of interna-
tional or internal armed conflict’.637
Instead of or in supplement to the Court’s arguments regarding sexual
assault constitution torture and therefore a denial of a fundamental human
right, the Court could have also referred directly to sexual assault as a
form of gender-based violence constituting discrimination prohibited un-
der Art. 1 CEDAW. The analysis conducted by the CEDAW Committee in
its General Recommendation would in this respect have been of great val-
ue to the judges.
In Milutinovic, the Trial Chamber also dealt with the question whether
the term ‘sexual assault’ encompasses acts, which can also include rape or
whether it only refers to acts, which fall short of the definition of rape.
Even though the court finally and rightly decides that ‘sexual assault’ can
include, but is not limited to, rape, the Chamber disregarded human rights
documents that substantiate this position. The Committee on the Rights of
the Child, for instance, stated in its General Comment No. 3 that ‘[v]io-
lence, including rape and other forms of sexual abuse, can occur in the
family or foster setting or be perpetrated by those with specific responsi-
bilities towards children’.638
635 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women ‘General
Recommendation No 19: Violence against Women’ (30 January 1992) GAOR
47th Session Supp 38, 1, para. 24 (b).
636 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women ‘General
Recommendation No 19: Violence against Women’ (30 January 1992) GAOR
47th Session Supp 38, 1, para. 7.
637 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women ‘General
Recommendation No 19: Violence against Women’ (30 January 1992) GAOR
47th Session Supp 38, 1, para. 7 (c).
638 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child General Comment No. 3 (2003) (17
March 2003) UN Doc CRC/GC/2003/3 para. 34.
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Not only equality was seen as a foundational principle of the CEDAW,
the CEDAW Committee argued that the prohibition of gender-related vio-
lence should be one as well.639 This approach was affirmed by the Com-
mittee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which states in its Gener-
al Comment No 16 :
‘[g]ender based violence is a form of discrimination that inhibits the
ability to enjoy rights and freedoms, including economic, social and cul-
tural rights, on a basis of equality. States parties must take appropriate
measures to eliminate violence against men and women and act with due
diligence to prevent, investigate, mediate, punish and redress acts of vio-
lence against them by private actors’.640
It was also repeated by the Secretary General in its 2006 report of vio-
lence against women where he stated that
‘Evidence gathered by researchers of the pervasive nature and multiple
forms of violence against women, together with advocacy campaigns, led
to the recognition that violence against women was global, systemic and
rooted in power imbalances and structural inequality between men and
women. The identification of the link between violence against women
and discrimination was key’.641
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights also repeti-
tively discussed violence against women as a matter of inequality between
639 Alice Edwards ‚Violence against Women as Sex Discrimination: Judging the Ju-
risprudence of the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ (2008) 18 Texas
Journal of Women and the Law 1–54, 23.
640 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ‘General Comment No
16: The Equal Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of all Economic, So-
cial and Cultural Rights (Art. 3 of the Covenant)’ (11 August 2005) ESCOR
[2006] Supp 2, 116, para. 27.
641 UNGA ‘In-Depth Study on All Forms of Violence against Women: Report of the
Secretary-General’ (6 July 2006) UN Doc A/61/122/Add.1, para. 30; see also the
very first sentence of the executive summary of the publication version ‘Violence
against women is a form of discrimination and a violation of human rights.
(…)The scope and extent of violence against women are a reflection of the de-
gree and persistence of discrimination that women continue to face’, UNGA ‘In-
Depth Study on All Forms of Violence against Women: Report of the Secretary-
General’ (Publication Version) (6 July 2006) http://www.un.org/womenwatch/da
w/vaw/publications/English%20Study.pdf (31 October 2017) i and further UN-
GA ‘Intensification of efforts to eliminate all forms of violence against women
Report of the Secretary-General’ (4 August 2008) UN Doc A/63/214 para. 6.
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men and women within its jurisprudence on many occasions.642 The ap-
proach of the HRC on the matter is less clear. In its General Comment No
28 entitled ‘Equality of Rights between Man and Women’, the HRC stated
that the ‘full effect’ of Art. 3 ICCPR is impaired ‘whenever any person is
denied the full and equal enjoyment of any right’.643 The HRC mentions,
inter alia, rape, domestic violence and abduction as actions which impair
the full and equal enjoyment of human rights for women. But it does not
explicitly mention that gender-based violence constitutes sex discrimina-
tion. In its jurisprudence, however, the HRC also often discusses violence
against women as infringements of certain rights within the ICCPR in re-
lation to inequality.644 The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Dis-
crimination had issued a General Recommendation in which it affirmed
that racial discrimination can effect men and women differently and that,
inter alia, sexual violence against members of a certain ethnic group or
coerced sterilization of indigenous women, constitutes discrimination
banned under ICERD.645
This will however still leave the problem of defining what discrimina-
tion in relation to persecution is. In terms of criminal law there is also the
dilemma that if one categorizes sexual violence as discrimination, the per-
petrator must also have fulfilled the mens rea of discrimination and not
only that of rape or other forms of sexual violence.646 Another point argu-
ing for caution when charging or deciding discrimination focused counts
is that possibly the language of torture as a violation of physical integrity
and basic human dignity is stronger than the language of discrimination.
In human rights law, however, where torture, sexual violence and discrim-
642 See Alice Edwards ‚Violence against Women as Sex Discrimination: Judging the
Jurisprudence of the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ (2008) 18
Texas Journal of Women and the Law 1–54, 24.
643 UN HRC ‘General Comment No 28: Equality of Rights between Men and Wom-
en (Art. 3)’ (29 March 2000) GAOR 55th Session Supp 40 vol 1, 133.
644 See Alice Edwards ‚Violence against Women as Sex Discrimination: Judging the
Jurisprudence of the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ (2008) 18
Texas Journal of Women and the Law 1–54, 25.
645 UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination ‘General Recom-
mendation XXV on Gender-Related Dimensions of Racial Discrimination’ (20
March 2000) GAOR 55th Session Supp 18, 152, para. 2.
646 See partly See Alice Edwards ‚Violence against Women as Sex Discrimination:
Judging the Jurisprudence of the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies’
(2008) 18 Texas Journal of Women and the Law 1–54, 27; see Prosecutor v Ku-
narac (Judgment) IT-96-23 (22 February 2001) para. 816.
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ination can fall under the heading of crimes against humanity, war crimes
or even genocide, it seems less of a danger that the respective crimes carry
markedly different levels of perceived wrongness with them.
Even though these arguments can lead to the prosecution deciding
against using discrimination-based charges, such a decision can only made
on a case by case basis and the judges as well as the prosecution should
possess the knowledge necessary to use this argumentation if it fits the
facts of the case.
Where is the Link?
In 2000, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1325 on women and
security, which highlighted the role of women in conflict and peace build-
ing.647 Together with UNSC Resolution 1820, in which the Security Coun-
cil stated that States, in tomes of conflict, have an obligations to protect
their population against sexual violence as part of their responsibility to
‘protect and ensure the human rights of their citizens’,648 this resolution
explicitly stressed the relevance of CEDAW the obligations of States not
only in peace time but also during conflict.649 At the same time, CEDAW
outlines concrete actions and obligations necessary to achieve the commit-
ments of Resolutions 1325 and 1820 one of which is the protection of
women and girls from gender-based violence.650 Resolutions 1325 and
1820 highlight the interrelation between CEDAW as a human rights in-
strument with commitments to protect women in conflict and punish per-
petrators of gender-based violence. On the other hand, the Resolutions
demonstrate the vagueness with which this interrelation is often hinted at,
characterized by the insecurity regarding how CEDAW and other human
rights instruments tie in with these commitments. This approach is symp-
tomatic for bodies dealing with the mass commission of sexual crime in
the context of conflict: reference to human rights law is somewhat expect-
III.
647 UNSC Res 1325 (2000) (31 October 2000) SCOR 55th Year 177.
648 UNSC Res 1820 (2008) (19 June 2008) SCOR [1 August 2007–31 July 2008]
154.
649 UNIFEM ‘CEDAW and Security Council Resolution 1325: A Quick Guide’
<https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/blog/document/cedaw-and-security-council-resol
ution-1325-a-quick-guide/> (31 October 2017) 4.
650 Ibid.
Part Two: How are Different Areas of Human Rights Law Referred to?
196
ed and so lip service is paid to human rights, while an insecurity on the
content, the authorities to be consulted and the general usefulness of hu-
man rights law to the area of gender-based crimes can be detected.
In the following, human rights instruments are analysed concerning
their gender-based crime content and intersections are pointed out where
reference would foster gender-based crime cases. In turn, crimes under in-
ternational criminal and humanitarian law are scrutinized regarding their
potential for being used to punish gender-based crimes.
State Obligations regarding Violence against Women
The concept of special human rights for women is a relatively recent phe-
nomenon, which has long been neglected on the agenda of universal hu-
man rights. This neglect has a variety of reasons. First, the legal inequality
of men and women has for a long time been completely accepted in do-
mestic legal systems and has not even been questioned by those striving to
implement a system of universal human rights protection. Second, even
the ones who were sympathetic to legal equality for both sexes at the time
of the drafting of the Universal Bill of Rights meant to achieve this pur-
pose by creating the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and (as en-
visaged in the early stages of drafting the Covenants) a legally binding
document mirroring the Declaration, which would encompass fundamen-
tal rights of all of humankind independent of sex. At the time of drafting
the Universal Bill of Rights, the approach that prevailed opted simply for
including equality and non-discrimination clauses into the respective in-
struments. The UDHR, for example, reaffirms the belief ‘in the equal
rights for men and women’ in its preamble. Art. 2 UDHR contains a non-
discrimination clause, which also prohibits discrimination on the ground
of sex. Finally, Art. 16 UDHR enshrines equal rights for both sexes re-
garding marriage. Several provisions regarding non-discrimination and
equality can also be found in the ICCPR and the ICESCR. However, these
provisions are very general and focus on treating all people ‘equal’ by
seeking to guarantee, through the implementation of non-discrimination,
that human rights are accessible for all persons alike. Such a ‘fits all’ ap-
proach to human rights has in the years that followed been held as disre-
garding the special needs, specific situation and vulnerabilities of individ-
uals belonging to particularly disenfranchised groups such as minorities,
disabled people, children or women. Subsequently, a strand in the field of
1.
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human rights prevailed which recognized the importance of legally ac-
knowledging the different needs of different groups, partly also advocating
special measures in order to achieve true equality and the full enjoyment
of human rights by these groups. In the field of protection of women’s hu-
man rights, these instruments include the Convention on the Political
Rights of Women,651 the Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum
Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages652 as well as several
treaties by the International Labour Organisation on aspects of women and
work.653
In recent years, the approach of creating ‘special protection schemes’
for particular groups has been criticised by scholars and activists within
these groups as contributing to side-lining these groups in major discus-
sions and disregarding them in fields and conventions in which they are
not explicitly mentioned. Particularly with regards to women’s rights,
some scholars have suggested that ‘the price of the creation of separate in-
stitutional mechanisms and special measures dealing with women within
the UN system has typically been the creation of a “women’s ghetto”, giv-
en less power, fewer resources and a lower priority than “mainstream” hu-
man rights bodies’.654 As much as there is some truth to the argument that
it is easier to disregard special groups in ‘mainstream’ discussions with
reference to a special protection regime which is dealing with a certain
group and as much as the question should be allowed which groups ‘de-
serve’ a special protection regime and whether the reason why such a
regime is established for one group but not for another can be legitimately
raised, it can be doubted whether the complete absence of special protec-
tion regimes and the fostering of those groups’ rights through more gener-
ally applicable measures would be a promising approach. It is more likely
that women’s concern would have continued to, as Chinkin and
651 Convention on the Political Rights of Women (adopted 20 December 1952, en-
tered into force 7 July 1954) 193 UNTS 135.
652 Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registra-
tion of Marriages (adopted 7 November 1962, entered into force 9 December
1964) 521 UNTS 231 (Marriage Convention).
653 See also Hilary Charlesworth ’Inside/Outside: women and the International Hu-
man Rights System’ in Aristotle Constantinides and Nikos Zaikos The Diversity
of International Law: Essays in Honour of Professor Kalliopi K Koufa (Nijhoff
Leiden 2009), 382–98, 386.
654 Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin The Boundaries of International Law:
A Feminist Analysis (Manchester University Press Manchester 2000) 219.
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Charlesworth put it, ‘to be submerged by what are regarded more “global
issues”’.655
a. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The ICCPR contains several provisions with respect to women’s rights
which can be of relevance in the context of international criminal law.
First, the ICCPR contains a number of provisions, which prohibit dis-
crimination on the basis of sex. Art. 2 (1) ICCPR provides that
‘ [e]ach State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to en-
sure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the
rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind,
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, nation-
al or social origin, property, birth or other status’.
Article 3 is solely dedicated to the equal enjoyment of civil and political
rights by both men and women and reads ’[t]he States Parties to the
present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of men and women
to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the present
Covenant’. The HRC also has issued a specific General Comment on
Art. 3 ICCPR (General Comment No. 28),656 in which it enlists State obli-
gations regarding several articles in the ICCPR in light of the obligation to
equality enshrined in Art. 3 ICCPR. Several of these obligations are rele-
vant in the context of international criminal law. The HRC does, for exam-
ple, discuss issues like rape, female genital mutilation and forced abortion
and sterilization in the context of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment und Art. 7 (and also under Art. 24 ICCPR dealing
with the rights of the child).657 It also explicitly acknowledges that women
are particularly vulnerable in armed conflict and requests States Parties to
655 Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin The Boundaries of International Law:
A Feminist Analysis (Manchester University Press Manchester 2000) 219.
656 UN HRC ‘General Comment No 28: Equality of Rights between Men and Wom-
en (Art. 3)’ (29 March 2000) GAOR 55th Session Supp 40 vol 1, 133.
657 UN HRC ‘General Comment No 28: Equality of Rights between Men and Wom-
en (Art. 3)’ (29 March 2000) GAOR 55th Session Supp 40 vol 1, 133 para 11.
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inform the HRC about measures taken in these situations ‘to protect wom-
en from rape, abduction and other forms of gender based violence’.658
Furthermore, the HRC requires information on national laws outlawing
these actions, on preventive measures and on legal remedies for victims;
rape cases are also mentioned in para. 20 as an example of the violation of
the right to privacy by taking into account a woman’s sexual life when de-
termining her scope of legal protection. 659 The Committee also states that
parties are under an obligation to inform the HRC about measures taken
‘to eliminate trafficking of women and children, within the country or
across borders, and forced prostitution’ under Art. 8 ICCPR which deals
with the prohibition of slavery. Furthermore, the Committee addresses
several issues, which could be relevant in the case of establishing persecu-
tion on gender grounds. For instance, the HRC asks States to provide in-
formation on clothing requirements for women in public (at para. 13),
marital or parental powers over women (at para. 16), whether the right to
fair trial and access to courts under Art. 14 ICCPR can fully be exercised
by women, (at. Para 18), the degree to which women can enjoy the right to
be recognized as persons before the law (at para. 19).
Art. 4 ICCPR, which deals with the possibility of derogation from cer-
tain rights in times of emergency states that
in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the ex-
istence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present
Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the
present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situa-
tion, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obliga-
tions under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the
ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.
A state of emergency can, for example, be proclaimed in case of internal
disturbances, civil unrest or an armed conflict of an international or non-
international character. This means that some of the scenarios which call
for a public emergency coincide with the situations in which was viola-
tions of human rights law and crimes under international law are extraor-
dinarily often committed.
658 UN HRC ‘General Comment No 28: Equality of Rights between Men and Wom-
en (Art. 3)’ (29 March 2000) GAOR 55th Session Supp 40 vol 1, 133, para. 8.
659 UN HRC ‘General Comment No 28: Equality of Rights between Men and Wom-
en (Art. 3)’ (29 March 2000) GAOR 55th Session Supp 40 vol 1, 133, para 20.
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Finally, Art. 24 ICCPR deals with the rights of the child and again pro-
hibits any discrimination on the basis of gender. It states ’ [e]very child
shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, re-
ligion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right to such mea-
sures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of
his family, society and the State.’ According to General Comment No. 18
of the HRC, ‘discrimination’ as understood by the ICCPR is similarly con-
strued as the same term in CEDAW or the ICERD.660
Art. 23 ICCPR deals with the right to found a family. Art. 23 (2) states
that man and women of marriageable age shall have a right to marry.
Art. 23 (3) ICCPR makes clear that ’[n]o marriage shall be entered into
without the free and full consent of the intending spouses’. This provision
is the direct human rights equivalent to the prohibition of forced marriage.
Forced marriage as a crime against humanity has been recognised by the
Special Court for Sierra Leone as a crime against humanity and has been
subsumed under ’other inhumane acts’ (Art. 2 (i) Statute of the Special
Court for Sierra Leone661). The Rome Statute can charge ’forced mar-
riage’ either as an inhumane act (Art. 7 (1) (k) Rome Statute) or as the
Special Rapporteur of the Working Group on Contemporary Forms of
Slavery as enslavement (Art. 7 (1) (c) Rome Statute) or, more precisely,
sexual slavery (Art. 7 (1) (g) Rome Statute).662
Even though the HRC discusses many of these issues in terms of struc-
tural discrimination of women in its General Comment 28, the HRC has
generally been hesitant to employ discrimination terminology and to ad-
dress issues of prevalent harmful ideologies and structural causes for the
660 UN HRC ‘General Comment No 18: Non-Discrimination’ (9 November 1989)
GAOR 45th Session Supp 40 vol 1, 173, para. 7.
661 Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (concluded 16 January 2002; en-
tered into force 12 April 2002) 2178 UNTS 145.
662 UN Commission on Human Rights ’Systematic rape, sexual slavery and slave-
like practices during armed conflict: Final report submitted by Ms. Gay J. Mc-
Dougall, Special Rapporteur’ (22 June 1998) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13
para. 8: ‘In addition, this report emphasizes that practices such as (…)forced,
temporary “marriages” to soldiers; and other practices involving the treatment of
women as chattel, are both in fact and in law forms of slavery and, as such, viola-
tions of the peremptory norm prohibiting slavery’.
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violation of women’s human rights.663 Rather, the HRC Committee’s fo-
cus, when addressing States Parties obligations generally or in Concluding
Observations, has been on measures of criminal law, on ‘the investigation,
prosecution and punishment of these crimes’.664 In this, the HRC can
again draw from a more refined system of criminal law and international
criminal law and humanitarian law. This approach certainly offers more
hands-on practical advice to States Parties and also more concrete ways of
addressing problems which makes it easier and more likely for States Par-
ties to adhere to the HRC’s evaluations. On the other hand, the HRC miss-
es out on opportunities for contributing an own approached focussed on a
more long-term resolution in the field of women’s human rights. As van
Leeuwen put it ‘the Committee only requests state parties to address the
symptom of the disease, the manifestation of physical violence, but not the
disease itself: gender inequality.’665
b. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
The realm of the ICESCR is, at first glance, further removed from interna-
tional criminal law than the ICCPR, which protects, inter alia, the right to
life and physical integrity, rights which are often primarily at stake in situ-
ations in situations of armed conflict and mass turmoil. At second glance,
however, the ICESCR enshrines the claim of certain rights which are cru-
cial to the full participation and enjoyment of everyday life on a non-dis-
criminatory basis. Art. 2 (2) ICESCR set out that the rights in the
Covenant will be exercised without discrimination to race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status.666 Art. 3 ICESCR mirrors Art. 3 ICCPR in
663 Fleur van Leeuwen Women’s Rights are Human Rights: The Practice of the Unit-
ed Nations Human Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (Intersentia Antwerp 2010) 143.
664 Fleur van Leeuwen Women’s Rights are Human Rights: The Practice of the Unit-
ed Nations Human Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (Intersentia Antwerp 2010) 143.
665 Fleur van Leeuwen Women’s Rights are Human Rights: The Practice of the Unit-
ed Nations Human Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (Intersentia Antwerp 2010) 143.
666 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 De-
cember 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3.
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that it states that the parties to the ICESCR ‘undertake to ensure the equal
right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cul-
tural rights set forth in the present Covenant.’ The Committee on Econo-
mic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) clarified in General Comment
No 16 that Arts 2, Arts 3 and 2 (2) ICESCR (and Arts 2(1) and 3 ICCPR)
are not stand-alone provisions and, unlike Art 26 ICCPR, have to be read
in conjunctions with the specific rights set out in the Covenants.667
Furthermore, in Art. 7 ICESCR, which outlines the right of everyone to
the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work, Art. 7 (a) (i)
obliges States parties to guarantee ‘[f]air wages and equal remuneration
for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in particular wom-
en being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by
men, with equal pay for equal work’. A grave violation of this right to
guarantee the right to work to both sexes equally and not to disregard
women when it comes to the conditions of work and its remuneration,
could subsequently be an indication for persecution on gender grounds. A
flagrant example, in which a grave violation of the right to work was one
of many evidence of gender-based persecution, was the issuing and the
subsequent enforcement of edicts prohibiting all but a few women to work
outside home under the Taliban regime.668
What has been said above for the HRC669 is also true when it comes to
interpretation of the ICESCR by its treaty body, the Committee on Econo-
mic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR). The Committee prefers to not
concern itself so much with the structural routes of inequality, but rather
calls for measures of criminal law to be applied in order to punish and re-
dress violence against women. For example in its General Comment No
16 on the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic,
social and cultural rights, the CESCR states ‘[g]ender based violence is a
form of discrimination that inhibits the ability to enjoy rights and free-
doms, including economic, social and cultural rights, on a basis of equali-
667 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ‘General Comment No
16: The Equal Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of all Economic, So-
cial and Cultural Rights (Art. 3 of the Covenant)’ (11 August 2005) ESCOR
[2006] Supp 2, 116, para. 2.
668 Widney Brown and Laura Grenfell ‘The International Crime of Gender-Based
Persecution and the Taliban’ (2003) 4 Melbourne Journal of International Law
347–75, 350, 365–66.
669 See Part Two Chapter Three 1 a above.
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ty. States parties must take appropriate measures to eliminate violence
against men and women and act with due diligence to prevent, investigate,
mediate, punish and redress acts of violence against them by private ac-
tors’670
Generally, the CESCR, more so than its counterpart, the HRC, outlines,
in its General Comments Nos 3 and 20, the nature of State obligations to-
wards the fulfilment of the rights enshrined in the ICESCR. In General
Comment No. 3, the Committee on ESCR clarifies that the progressive re-
alization of the ESC-rights only covers the result, the realization of the re-
spective rights. In contrast, the States have an obligation to act towards the
fulfilment of the rights ‘within a reasonably short time after the
Covenant’s entry into force’.671 The Committee goes on explaining that
this obligation to act covers, in particular, the adoption of legislative mea-
sures (see also Art. 2 (1)), especially in the area of discrimination. Dis-
crimination, according to the Committee, ‘may be difficult to combat …
effectively in the absence of a sound legislative foundation for the neces-
sary measures’672 Discrimination is defined by the ESCR Committee in its
General Comment No. 20 as ‘any distinction, exclusion, restriction or
preference or other differential treatment that is directly or indirectly
based on the prohibited grounds of discrimination and which has the inten-
tion or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or ex-
ercise, on an equal footing, of Covenant rights’.673 The Committee also
points to the importance of adopting legislation to combat discrimination
in para. 37 General Comment No 20. The ESCR Committee also reserves
the right to consider, which measures are ‘appropriate’ in the meaning of
670 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ‘General Comment No
16: The Equal Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of all Economic, So-
cial and Cultural Rights (Art. 3 of the Covenant)’ (11 August 2005) ESCOR
[2006] Supp 2, 116, para. 27.
671 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ‘General Comment No
3: The Nature of States Parties Obligations’ (26 November–14 December 1990)
ESCOR [1991] Supp 3, 83, para. 2.
672 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ‘General Comment No
3: The Nature of States Parties Obligations’ (26 November–14 December 1990)
ESCOR [1991] Supp 3, 83, para. 3.
673 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ‘General Comment No
20: Non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights (art. 2, para. 2, of
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)’ (2 July
2009) ESCOR [2009], 118 para. 1.
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Art. 2 (1) and calls on States parties to indicate in their reports not only the
legislative measures towards the realization of ESC rights, but also to
show why these measures are the most appropriate (see para. 4). General
Comment No 20 additionally offers clarification on the evolving definition
on ‘sex’ as a prohibited ground for discrimination. It states that since the
ICESCR was adopted, the notion of the term has evolved to cover not only
‘physiological characteristics but also the social construction of gender
stereotypes, prejudices and expected roles, which have created obstacles to
the equal fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights’.674 This again
can be helpful specifically for persecution on gender ground which is pun-
ishable pursuant to the Rome Statute. The considerations by the ESCR
Committee might be helpful in order to determine whether a State policy
of systematic discrimination rising, e.g., to the level of a crime against hu-
manity of persecution, is or has been taken place. The failure of a State to
adopt legislation shielding specific groups from discrimination can also, in
some exceptional instances, be seen as a State policy which is ‘conscious-
ly aimed at encouraging’ an attack against a civilian population. 675
However, it is important to note that ‘[t]he existence of such a policy
cannot be inferred solely from the absence of governmental or organiza-
tional action’.676 The ESCR Committee’s General Comment No. 3 con-
tains more content which can be of help for the international criminal
court or tribunals. While the ESCR Committee also elaborates on specific
grounds of discrimination potentially relevant in the context of interna-
tional criminal prosecutions, such as race, colour, religion or sex, the ES-
CR Committee’s specific General Comment on discrimination (General
Comment No. 20) is more concerned with the issues of special measures
and direct v indirect discrimination in the area of economic, social and
cultural rights. While these are no doubt important issues in the field of
human rights law, the human rights abuses which trigger international
674 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ‘General Comment No
20 Non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights (art. 2, para. 2, of
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)’ (2 July
2009)ESCOR [2009], 118 para. 20.
675 See footnote no 6 Elements of Crimes of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (adopted and entered into force 9 September 2002) Doc ICC-
ASP/1/3 (Pt. II-B).
676 See footnote no 6 Elements of Crimes of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (adopted and entered into force 9 September 2002) Doc ICC-
ASP/1/3 (Pt. II-B).
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criminal prosecution are so flagrant and the threshold for the crimes is so
high that the subtleties of anti-discrimination law will probably not be of
much assistance to practitioners in defining persecution as a crime against
humanity.
c. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women and the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women
In 1979, the CEDAW was adopted as the first of a number of major ‘spe-
cial’ human rights conventions. CEDAW fulfils the initial intention by the
drafters of the ICCPR and the IESCR to create a covenant which contains
civil and political rights on the one hand and economic, social and cultural
rights on the other. CEDAW therefore transcends the divide between those
two areas and includes a far-ranging set of rights covering issues from po-
litical participation to education of healthcare.677
Art. 1 CEDAW contains a definition of the terms ‘discrimination
against women’ which is held to mean
any distinction, exclusion of restriction made on the basis of sex which has
the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or
exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality
of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the politi-
cal, economic, social cultural, civil or any other field.
Taken the ICTY’s jurisprudence on the crime of persecution, according to
which persecution is ‘the violation of the right to equality in some serious
fashion that infringes on the enjoyment of a basic or fundamental right’678
and Art. 7 (2) (g) Rome Statute which states that persecution is ‘the inten-
tional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to internation-
al law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity’, the definition
set out in Article 1 CEDAW can provide a guideline for courts, in particu-
lar for the ICC, when faced with determining the core of persecution on
gender grounds. In order to establish whether a ‘violation of the right to
677 See also Hilary Charlesworth ‘Inside/Outside: women and the International Hu-
man Rights System’ in Aristotle Constantinides and Nikos Zaikos The Diversity
of International Law: Essays in Honour of Professor Kalliopi K Koufa (Nijhoff
Leiden 2009) 382–98, 386.
678 Prosecutor v Tadić (Opinion and Judgment) IT-94-1 (7 May 1997) para. 697.
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equality in some serious fashion’ has taken place, the ICC or any other
court or tribunal recognizing the crime of persecution in gender grounds,
can also resort to the list of State obligations set out in Art. 2 CEDAW.
These obligations range from enshrining the principle of equality in na-
tional constitutions (Art. 2 (a) CEDAW) to repealing national penal provi-
sions which discriminate against women (Art. 2 (g) CEDAW). However, it
should not be forgotten that CEDAW is subject to more reservations than
any of the other major human rights treaty and its content as well as the
innovative interpretation by its treaty body has been looked upon with sus-
picion by many Member States, which makes is harder for practitioners
who want refer to in the context of substantive international criminal law
but are unsure about the customary nature of some of its provisions.679
A provision in CEDAW which is linked to crimes under international
law is Art. 6, which provides that ‘States Parties shall take all appropriate
measures, including legislation, to suppress all forms of traffic in women
and exploitation of prostitution of women’. This provision is connected to
the crimes of sexual slavery and enforced prostitution as a crime against
humanity under Art. 7 (1) (g) Rome Statute. It is important to note here
that the term ‘forced prostitution’ in itself has been heavily criticised. For
one, it has been argued that sexual slavery ‘encompasses most, if not all
forms of enforced prostitution’680, a term which has been defined as ‘con-
ditions of control over a person who is coerced by another to engage in
sexual activity’.681 Additionally, the term ‘prostitution’ trivializes the ex-
perience of the victim, as ‘prostitution’ contains a connotation of an ex-
change (sexual acts against money) and downplays the suffering and the
coercion involved. 682
679 Henry J Steiner, Philip Alston and Ryan Goodman (eds) International Human
Rights in Context: Law Politics Morals (3rd edition OUP Oxford 2008) 185.
680 UN Commission on Human Rights ’Systematic rape, sexual slavery and slave-
like practices during armed conflict: Final report submitted by Ms. Gay J. Mc-
Dougall, Special Rapporteur’ (22 June 1998) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13
para. 31.
681 UN Commission on Human Rights ’Systematic rape, sexual slavery and slave-
like practices during armed conflict: Final report submitted by Ms. Gay J. Mc-
Dougall, Special Rapporteur’ (22 June 1998) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13
para. 31.
682 Machtheld Boot, Rodney Dixon and Christopher K Hall ‘Article 7: Crimes
against Humanity’ in Otto Triffterer Commentary on the Rome Statute of the In-
ternational Criminal Court (2nd edition Beck Munich 2008) 159-273, 212; see
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However, CEDAW does not address one of the most pressing issues,
namely violence against women. This disregard of violence against wom-
en concerns domestic violence as well as violence committed in armed
conflict or any other setting in which crimes under international law can
be committed. According to Hilary Charlesworth, the causes for this ne-
glect may lay in the fact that at the time CEDAW was adopted, ‘the global
extent of violence against women was not well-understood, or because vi-
olence was not analysed as a matter of discrimination’.683 A contributing
reason is within the group of State experts drafting the convention, the
predominant was governed by the dichotomy between ‘public’ acts exer-
cised by the State and regulated through international treaties and ‘private’
acts by individuals, which were generally seen as being detracted from the
field of international law. This dichotomy is one of the main criticisms of
feminist legal theory towards traditional international legal thinking, as it
downgrades many of the experiences and actions of females to the realm
of the ‘private’ and hence withdraw them of the control of the State as
well as of the competent jurisdiction of the international community. 684
Be it as it may, violence against women has since then been addressed by
the treaty body established under CEDAW, the CEDAW Committee. The
CEDAW Committee issued two General Recommendations regarding vio-
lence against women. While General Recommendation No. 12 is very
short and generally framed685, General Recommendation No. 19 clarifies
that gender-based violence is a form of discrimination coming under the
realm of CEDAW ‘which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of
human rights and fundamental freedoms under general international law or
also Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice in the International Criminal Court
‘Recommendations and Commentary for December 1997 PrepCom on the Estab-
lishment of an International Criminal Court’ (1–12 December 1997) WC.5.6-9,
6–10.
683 Hilary Charlesworth ’Inside/Outside: women and the International Human Rights
System’ in Aristotle Constantinides and Nikos Zaikos The Diversity of Interna-
tional Law: Essays in Honour of Professor Kalliopi K Koufa (Nijhoff Leiden
2009), 382–98, 386.
684 See eg Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin The Boundaries of Interan-
tional Law: A Feminist Analysis (Manchester University Press Manchester 2000).
685 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women ‘General
Recommendation No 12: Violence against Women’ (1989) Compilation of Gen-
eral Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty
Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev. 6 at 237 (2003).
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under human rights conventions’.686 As Alice Edwards puts it, this ap-
proach ‘[i]in many ways (…) transformed the CEDAW from an anti-dis-
crimination treaty into a gender-based violence treaty’.687 General Recom-
mendation No. 19 included within the scope of these human rights and
fundamental freedoms affected by gender-based violence:
(a) The right to life;
(b) The right not to be subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment;
(c) The right to equal protection according to humanitarian norms in time of
international or internal armed conflict;
(d) The right to liberty and security of person;
(e) The right to equal protection under the law;
(f) The right to equality in the family;
(g) The right to the highest standard attainable of physical and mental health;
(h) The right to just and favourable conditions of work.
Therefore, General Comment No. 19 refers to several issues of relevance
to international criminal law and the protection of women against crimes
under international law which primarily or frequently affect them. In the
context of international criminal proceedings, albeit giving due considera-
tion to the differences of the two regimes, judges would gain from refer-
ring to the jurisprudence of the CEDAW Committee to underline the fact
that violence against women is seen not only as a crime against the wom-
en’s physical integrity, but also as an indication and stemming from a sys-
tem discrimination against women. In proceedings which deal with gen-
der-based discrimination, the ICC can refer to the authority of the
CEDAW Committee in order to establish grave violations of the prohibi-
tion of violence against women as one of the signs for the grave denials of
human rights which constitutes persecution.
However, the fact that the single most important universal instrument
on women’s rights does itself not explicitly mention violence against
686 Para. 7 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
‘General Recommendation No 19: Violence against Women’ (30 January 1992)
GAOR 47th Session Supp 38, 1.
687 Alice Edwards ‚Violence against Women as Sex Discrimination: Judging the Ju-
risprudence of the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ (2008) 18 Texas
Journal of Women and the Law 1–54.
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women does doubtlessly diminish its value for application by judges seek-
ing to ensure they are on the safe ground of customary international law.
d. International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial
Discrimination
In 2000, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination pub-
lished General Recommendation 25 which dealt with specific aspects of
racial discrimination which do not affect men and women in the same
way.688 In it, the Committee ties in with sexual violence against women in
the context of international criminal law, for instance sexual violence com-
mitted against women of a specific ethnic or racial group in armed conflict
or during detention or forced sterilization of indigenous women.689
e. UNGA Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women
In 1993, the UNGA adopted the DEVW, which acknowledges in its
preamble that ‘violence against women is a manifestation of historically
unequal power relations between men and women, which have led to
domination over and discrimination against women by men and to the pre-
vention of the full advancement of women, and that violence against
women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which women are
forced into a subordinate position compared with men’.690 Article 1 DE-
VWD states ‘[f]or the purposes of this Declaration, the term “violence
against women” means any act of gender-based violence that results in, or
is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to
women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of
688 UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination ‘General Recom-
mendation XXV on Gender-Related Dimensions of Racial Discrimination’ (20
March 2000) GAOR 55th Session Supp 18, 152.
689 UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination ‘General Recom-
mendation XXV on Gender-Related Dimensions of Racial Discrimination’ (20
March 2000) GAOR 55th Session Supp 18, 152, para 2.
690 UNGA Res 48/104 ‘Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women’
(20 December 1993) GAOR 48th Session Supp 49 vol 1, 217.
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liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life.’ 691 The Declaration
includes a detailed description of its scope in Article 2 which provides that
Violence against women shall be understood to encompass, but not be limited
to, the following:
(a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, in-
cluding battering, sexual abuse of female children in the household, dowry-
related violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation and other traditional
practices harmful to women, non-spousal violence and violence related to ex-
ploitation;
(b) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring within the general
community, including rape, sexual abuse, sexual harassment and intimidation
at work, in educational institutions and elsewhere, trafficking in women and
forced prostitution;
(c) Physical, sexual and psychological violence perpetrated or condoned by
the State, wherever it occurs.692
In 1994, the UN Commission on Human Rights adopted Resolution
1994/45, which established a Special Rapporteur on violence against
women, including its causes and consequences,693 who also reported
specifically on violence against women committed within the context of
armed conflict.694
f. African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (Banjul Charter)
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter) con-
tains a very broad provision obliging Member States to ‘ensure the elimi-
691 UNGA Res 48/104 ‘Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women’
(20 December 1993) GAOR 48th Session Supp 49 vol 1, 217.
692 See Art. 2 UNGA Res 48/104 ‘Declaration on the Elimination of Violence
against Women’ (20 December 1993) GAOR 48th Session Supp 49 vol 1, 217; the
same definitonal has been used in para. 113 UN World Conference on Women
(4th) ‘Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action’(17 October 1995) UN Doc
A/CONF.177/20, 4 and later in UNGA Res 61/143 ‘Intensification of Efforts to
Eliminate all Forms of Violence against Women’ (19 December 2006) GAOR
61st Session Supp 49 vol 1, 326.
693 UN Commission on Human Rights Res 1994/45 (4 March 1994) ESCOR.
694 UN Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur Ms. Radhika
Coomaraswamy ‘Violence against women perpetrated and/or condoned by the
State during times of armed conflict (1997-2001)’ (23 January 2001) Un Doc
E/CN.4/2001/73.
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nation of every discrimination against women and also ensure the protec-
tion of the rights of the woman and the child as stipulated in international
declarations and conventions’ (Art. 18 Banjul Charter).695 Placing this pro-
vision in the context of Art. 18, which mainly deals with the protection of
family life, outlining the family as the ‘custodian of morals and traditional
values recognized by the community’ (Art. 18 (2) Banjul Charter) shows
that the drafters of the Banjul charter drew on very traditional gender
roles, portraying women as wives and mothers, and therefore as acting in
the private sphere rather than in public life, as employees or in the politi-
cal field for instance. This is also shown by the grouping together of
‘women and children’ emphasizing their vulnerability (as mothers) rather
than portraying women as individuals claiming rights which they are cor-
rectly entitled to. As Hilary Charlesworth puts it ‘[v]iolations of women’s
human rights are typically presented as an aspect of women’s inherent vul-
nerability, as if this attribute were a biological fact’.696
The provision is also extremely vague, defining neither the term ‘dis-
crimination’ nor the conventions and declarations which protect the rights
of women. It is therefore doubtful how much real authority can be drawn
from such a stipulation. Nevertheless, the ICC could possibly escape some
criticism of being Eurocentric in its applied and cited sources on the one
hand and having neo-colonial tendencies, focussing solely on one conti-
nent, on the other hand, by citing this provision.
g. Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action
The outcome document of the Fourth World Conference on Women in
Beijing in 1994 contains a part on violence against women which system-
atically defines and describes modes and circumstances of violence
against women. 697 The language of the Beijing Platform for Action
frames violence against women in terms of systematic and widespread hu-
695 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 27 June1981, entered
into force 21 October 1986) 1520 UNTS 217 (Banjul Charter).
696 Hilary Charlesworth ‘International human rights law: A portmanteau for feminist
norms?’ in Gülay Caglar, Elisabeth Prügl and Susanne Zwingel Feminist Strate-
gies in International Governance (Routledge Abingdon, Oxon/New York 2013)
21-37, 27.
697 Fourth World Conference on Women ‘Beijing Declaration and Platform for Ac-
tion’ in ‘Report’ (17 October 1995) UN Doc A/CONF.177/20, 4.
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man rights violations which are a manifestation of unequal power relations
and cultural patterns and happen throughout societies.698 It differentiates
between three kinds of violence: in the family, in the general community
and condoned by the State699 and highlights that women’s human rights
are particularly at risk in the context of armed conflict and/or when wom-
en belong to a minority group.700 The Platform for Action also contains a
section on women and armed conflict which highlights that violations of
women’s rights are violations of fundamental human rights and that the
perpetrators of mass human rights violations such as genocide, crimes
against humanity and war crimes have to be punished.701 The actions to be
taken by governments differ somewhat from the usual human rights ap-
proach to violence against women in that they do not only call for investi-
gation and criminal prosecution of perpetrators but also undertake to
change harmful perceptions of women in society in order to change the
role of women and break the cycle of systematic subordination which pro-
motes violence
Protection of Women against Gender-Based Violence in International
Criminal Law
Sexual violence can be committed in many different forms. It can amount
to different crimes, keeping in mind the specific circumstances of the case
in question. Before the ad hoc tribunals and hybrid courts, sexual vio-
lence, including rape, has so far been classified as
– rape as a crime against humanity or a war crime;
– torture as a crime against humanity and as a war crime:
2.
698 Fourth World Conference on Women ‘Beijing Declaration and Platform for Ac-
tion’ in ‘Report’ (17 October 1995) UN Doc A/CONF.177/20, 4 paras 112-3,
117, 118.
699 Fourth World Conference on Women ‘Beijing Declaration and Platform for Ac-
tion’ in ‘Report’ (17 October 1995) UN Doc A/CONF.177/20, 4 para 113.
700 Fourth World Conference on Women ‘Beijing Declaration and Platform for Ac-
tion’ in ‘Report’ (17 October 1995) UN Doc A/CONF.177/20, 4 paras 114, 116.
701 Fourth World Conference on Women ‘Beijing Declaration and Platform for Ac-
tion’ in ‘Report’ (17 October 1995) UN Doc A/CONF.177/20, 4 para 131.
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– genocide (in the alternative of causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the targeted group or by imposing measures intended to
prevent births within the group);
– persecution as a crime against humanity;
– enslavement as a crime against humanity;
– Other inhumane acts as a crime against humanity;
– outrages upon personal dignity and inhumane treatment as war
crimes.702
In 2008, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1820 dealing with
violence against women in conflict, in which it stated that violence against
women could constitute a threat to international peace and security, geno-
cide, crimes against humanity or war crimes and that States have an obli-
gations to protect their population against sexual violence as part of their
responsibility to ‘protect and ensure the human rights of their citizens’.703
a. Genocide
The acts amounting to genocide listed in Article 6 Rome Statute, Article
4(2) ICTY Statute and Article 2(2) ICTR Statute, are a verbatim copy of
the ones listed in Article II of the Genocide Convention. The groups pro-
tected are national, ethnical, racial or religious groups, gender is not men-
tioned as a factor.
Even though opinions have been voiced during the Rome Conference
and outside, to include other stable groups into the extent of protection704
702 See also United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations Review of the
Sexual Violence Elements of the Judgments of the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwan-
da and the Special Court for Sierra Leone in the Light of Security Council Reso-
lution 1820 (United Nations New York 2010), 25.
703 UNSC Res 1820 (2008) (19 June 2008) SCOR [1 August 2007–31 July 2008]
154.
704 It can be argued about how stable a group the term ‘gender’ denominates if one
refers to the commonly used definition of gender being socially constructed.
However, the definition used in Article 7(3) Statute, which is valid for the whole
of the Rome Statute, refers to gender as ‘the two sexes, male and female, within
the context of society’ and arguable conveys to the term more stableness than
usually attributed to it; see more in detail under Part Two Chapter Three III 2 c.
(2) below.
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it is unlikely that gender will be seen as within its jurisdiction by the ICC
or any other international criminal tribunal in the near future. However,
‘femicide’ or ‘gendercide’ are increasingly discusses, particularly in social
sciences, but also for example by the World Health Organization, which
discusses the term under four rough categories, intimate femicide, murders
in the name of ‘honour’, non-intimate femicide and dowry-related femi-
cide.705
Less controversial is the acknowledgement that sexual violence com-
mitted with genocidal intent against members of an explicitly protected
group is genocide. Some of the acts of sexual violence fall under Art. 6 (d)
Rome Statute as ‘measures intended to prevent births within the group’,
when, for example, women are deliberately raped and impregnated to give
birth to change the ethnic composition of a population or to break female
members of a group to a point where, after the rape, they do not wish to
have any children.706 The ICTR’s Akayesu judgment in 1998 explicitly ac-
knowledged rape as such to be genocide under the modality of causing se-
riously bodily or mental harm, when committed with the necessary in-
tent. 707 The Chamber held that rape was ‘one of the worst ways of inflict
harm on the victim as he or she suffers both bodily and mental harm.’708
705 World Health Organization: Understanding Violence against Women: Femicide
(World Health Organization 2012) 1-3 http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/77
421/1/WHO_RHR_12.38_eng.pdf (28 July 2015).
706 Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment) ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998) paras 507-8.
707 Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment) ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998) para 731;
see also Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment) IT-95-17 (10 December 1998) para
172; Prosecutor v Gacumbitsi (Judgment) ICTR-01-64-T (17 June 2004) para
292; Prosecutor v Muhimana (Judgment) ICTR-95-1B-T (28 April 2005) paras
513, 517; Prosecutor v Rutaganda (Judgment) ICTR-96-3-T (6 December 1999)
paras 50, 280, 292.
708 Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment) ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998) para 731;
Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment) IT-95-17 (10 December 1998) para 172; see
also Catharine A MacKinnon ‘Rape, Genocide and Women’s Human Rights’
(1994) 17 Harvard Women’s Law Journal 5-16; Sherrie L Russell-Brown ‘Rape
as Genocide’ (2003) 21 Berkeley Journal of International Law 350-374.
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b. Crimes against Humanity
Sexual Violence
Pursuant to Art. 7 (1) (g) Rome Statute a multitude of acts of sexual vio-
lence are punishable before the ICC. These are ‘[r]ape, sexual slavery, en-
forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other
form of sexual violence of comparable gravity’, making the list non-ex-
hausting. In this, the Rome Statute seeks to remedy omissions in the
statutes of the ICTY/ICTR according to which rape could be charged un-
der Art. 5 (g) ICTY Statute and Art. 3 (g) ICTR Statute but no other forms
of sexual violence were explicitly mentioned under Art. 5, even though the
ICTY indeed convicted persons for acts of sexual violence as crimes
against humanity under the headings of torture709, persecution,710 enslave-
ment711 and inhumane acts.712 The concept of ‘forced pregnancy’ has al-
ready been used in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action and
subsequently in the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action be-
fore it was incorporated in the Rome Statute and in the Statute of the Spe-
cial Court for Sierra Leone.713
Additionally, the ICC can prosecute persecution on grounds of gender
pursuant to Art. 7 (1) (h) or sexual violence as torture pursuant to Art. 7
(1) (f) Rome Statute.
Persecution
Article 6 (c) MT Charter contained ‘persecution on political, racial or reli-
gious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic
law of the country where perpetrated’, Article 5 (c) Charter for the Inter-
(1)
(2)
709 Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Celebići Case Judgment) IT-96-21-T (16 November
1998).
710 Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Celebići Case Judgment) IT-96-21-T (16 November
1998).
711 Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgment) IT-96-23 (22 February 2001).
712 Prosecutor v Tadić (Opinion and Judgment) IT-94-1 (7 May 1997).
713 William A Schabas The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the
Rome Statute (OUP Oxford 2010) 174.
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national Military Tribunal for the Far East contained the same provision
with the exception of religious grounds which were omitted.
Article 5 (h) ICTY Statute and Article 3 (h) ICTR Statute list persecu-
tion on persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds under crimes
against humanity (with regards to the ICTY the crime has to be committed
in the context of an armed conflict). However, as highlighted above, the
ICTY also acknowledged persecution on gender grounds714 and stated
very early on that ‘[c]rimes against humanity may be committed on dis-
criminatory grounds other than those enumerated in art 5(h) [of the Statute
of the ICTY], such as physical or mental disability, age or infirmity, or
sexual preference’715
Article 7(1)(h) Rome Statute makes persecution punishable as a crime
against humanity. Article 7(2)(g) Rome Statute defines persecution as ‘the
intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to inter-
national law by reasons of the identity of the group or collectivity’. The
Rome Statute is the first international criminal statute which defines the
crime of persecution. It is also the first statute which provides for the pos-
sibility of a conviction for persecution on gender grounds, whereupon
Art. 7 (3) clarifies that the term ‘gender’ ‘refers to the two sexes, male and
female, within the context of society. The definition in the Rome Statute is
the product of a compromise in the drafting of Article 21 (3) which pro-
hibits adverse distinction of the application and interpretation of the law
on several grounds, including gender.716 While some States insisted on
such a clause, and argued that not including, in particular, gender, would
be a step backwards as gender was included in numerous human rights
and humanitarian law instruments717other States did not want such a non-
adverse distinction clause to be included.718 As a compromise, a definition
of gender was included, which is applicable to the whole of the Rome
714 Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Judgment) IT-96-21 (16 November 1998) para 941.
715 Prosecutor v Tadić (Appeal Judgment) IT-94-1-A (15 July 1999) para 285.
716 Machtheld Boot, Rodney Dixon and Christopher K Hall ‘Article 7: Crimes
against Humanity’ in Otto Triffterer Commentary on the Rome Statute of the In-
ternational Criminal Court (2nd edition Beck Munich 2008) 159-273, 273.
717 See Cate Steains ‘Gender Issues’ in Roy S Lee (ed) The International Criminal
Court: The Making of the Rome Statute (Kluwer Law International The Hague
1999) 357–390, 372.
718 Machtheld Boot, Rodney Dixon and Christopher K Hall ‘Article 7: Crimes
against Humanity’ in Otto Triffterer Commentary on the Rome Statute of the In-
ternational Criminal Court (2nd edition Beck Munich 2008) 159-273, 273.
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Statute.719 This definition is characterized by a ‘constructive ambiguity’720
that appeases a multitude of negotiation parties and has to be further speci-
fied by interpretation by the practitioners which apply it.
This definition seems to conflates the two terms ‘gender’ and ‘sex’, but
‘within the context of society’ leaves rooms for the differentiation be-
tween ‘sex’ as referring to biological differences between men and women
and ‘gender’ as the socially constructed identities and roles. The definition
commonly used in the UN refer to gender as a social construct and can be
used by the ICC in the future to fill the wide definition in Article 7 (3)
Rome Statute with legal content. For example, the Secretary-General, in
his report ‘Integrating the gender perspective into the work of United Na-
tions human rights treaty bodies’, defines ‘gender’ as ‘the socially con-
structed roles of women and men that are ascribed to them on the basis of
their sex, in public and in private life’ whereas ‘sex’ refers to ‘the biologi-
cal and physical characteristics of women and men’.721 Here, human rights
law has a lot to offer to the development of international criminal law re-
garding the prosecution of gender crimes. Interestingly, the definition in
Article 7(3) Rome Statute could, in contrast, also significantly change the
approach to gender in international human rights law. As the definition
employed in the Rome Statute is vague enough to serve as a compromise
and not to agitate States fearing a too rapid or too progressive develop-
ment in this field, the definition is more appealing to these States than the
more specific notions usually employed at the United Nations.722 As ob-
719 Machtheld Boot, Rodney Dixon and Christopher K Hall ‘Article 7: Crimes
against Humanity’ in Otto Triffterer Commentary on the Rome Statute of the In-
ternational Criminal Court (2nd edition Beck Munich 2008) 159-273, 273 citing
Barbara Bedont and Katherine Hall-Martinez ‘Ending Impunity for Gender
Crimes under the International Criminal Court’ (1999) 6 Brown Journal of World
Affairs 65-85, 68.
720 Valerie Oosterveld ‘The Definition of “Gender” in the Rome Statute of the Inter-
national Court: A Step Forward of Back for International Criminal Justice?’
(2005) 18 Harvard Human Rights Journal 55-84, 81, referring to Anthony Aust
Modern Treaty Law and Practice (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2000)
184.
721 United Nations International Human Rights Instruments ‘Integrating the gender
perspective into the work of United Nations human rights treaty bodies: Report
by the Secretary-General’ (3 September 1998) UN Doc HRI/MC/1998/6 para 16.
722 Valerie Oosterveld ‘The Definition of “Gender” in the Rome Statute of the Inter-
national Court: A Step Forward of Back for International Criminal Justice?’
(2005) 18 Harvard Human Rights Journal 55-84, 83.
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served by Oosterveld, the Rome Statute definition has already been em-
ployed to define the notion of ‘gender’ in the Durban Declaration and
Platform of Action that is part of the Report on the 2001 World Confer-
ence Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related In-
tolerance.723 So far, the Rome Statute definition has, however, not pre-
vailed, and most major UN agencies and programs, first and foremost UN
Women, use a definition of gender which emphasizes its socially con-
structed nature.724 As mentioned, the notion ‘within the context of society’
gives the court leeway for various interpretation. The question that poses
itself is what constitutes the ‘society’ Art. 7(3) Rome Statute speaks of?
One area international criminal law could draw guidance from in this re-
spect is refugee law, which considers not only the domestic, but also the
international construction of gender within the international community.725
This provides the possibility for the Court to extensively refer to the stan-
dards in non-discrimination of women under CEDAW. As such, there is
room for ICC jurisprudence to develop the vague definition in a more pro-
gressive direction in line with the definitions most commonly used at the
United Nations.
Additionally, even if the Court may decide that a certain crime cannot
be subsumed under persecution on gender grounds as the term is defined
in the Rome Statute, the crime could still be characterized as within the
723 UN World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and
Related Intolerance ‘Report’ (2001) UN Doc A/CONF.189/12 75 Note 1.
724 UN Women ‘Concepts and Definitions’ http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/co
nceptsandefinitions.htm (31 October 2017).
725 UNHCR ‘Guidelines on International Protection No 1: Gender-Related Persecu-
tion Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees’ (2002) UN Doc HCR/GIP/02/01;
UNHCR EXCOM Conclusion No 39 (XXXVI) ‘Refugee Women and Interna-
tional Protection’ (1985) UN Doc HRC/IP/2; UNHCR ‘Guidelines on Refugee
Women’ (1991) UN Doc EC/SCP/67, all as cited in Valerie Oosterveld ‘Gender,
Persecution, and the International Criminal Court: Refugee Law’s Relevance to
the Crime against Humanity of Gender-based Persecution’ (2006) 17 Duke Jour-
nal of Comparative and International Law 49–89, 76 and Valerie Oosterveld ‘The
Definition of “Gender” in the Rome Statute of the International Court: A Step
Forward of Back for International Criminal Justice?’ (2005) 18 Harvard Human
Rights Journal 55-84, 59 (fn 25) and 67-8 (fn 70); UNHCR ‘Sexual and Gender-
Based Violence against Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons:
Guidelines for Prevention and Response’ (United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees 2003).
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jurisdiction of the Court as persecution on ‘other grounds that are univer-
sally recognized as impermissible under international law’.726
Enslavement/ Sexual Slavery
Enslavement and sexual slavery, albeit different provisions in the Rome
Statute (Arts 7 (1) (c) and 7 (1) (g) are intrinsically related in that sexual
slavery is a specific form of slavery.727 The grouping of the crime with
other crimes of sexual violence show that on top of exercising powers at-
tached to ownership over a person, the perpetrator caused the person over
whom he exercised those powers to engage in acts of a sexual nature.728
Slavery, including sexual slavery, are a part of ius cogens.729
In the Kunarac Case before the ICTY, the accused were convicted for
enslavement as a crime against humanity pursuant to Article 5 (c) and acts
of sexual and non-sexual nature were likewise considered to fall under en-
slavement as a crime against humanity.730 The court extensively referred
to human rights instruments dedicated to eliminating slavery,731 to general
human rights treaties and instruments containing a ban of slavery732 as
well as to jurisprudence on the matter by the ECtHR and the ECommHR
(3)
726 Machtheld Boot, Rodney Dixon and Christopher K Hall ‘Article 7: Crimes
against Humanity’ in Otto Triffterer Commentary on the Rome Statute of the In-
ternational Criminal Court (2nd edition Beck Munich 2008) 159-273, 220.
727 Machtheld Boot, Rodney Dixon and Christopher K Hall ‘Article 7: Crimes
against Humanity’ in Otto Triffterer Commentary on the Rome Statute of the In-
ternational Criminal Court (2nd edition Beck Munich 2008) 159-273, 211.
728 See Elements of Crime of Art. 7 (1) (g) Rome Statute.
729 Prosecutor v Brima et al (Trial Chamber Judgment) SCSL–2004–16–T (19 July
2007) para. 705.
730 Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgment) IT-96-23 (22 February 2001) paras 518-543, in
particular para. 543.
731 Slavery Convention (adopted 25 September 1926, entered into force 9 March
1927) 60 LNTS 253; Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the
Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery (adopted 7 Septem-
ber 1956, entered into force 30 April 1957) 266 UNTS 3; ILO ‘Convention No
29 concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour’ (adopted 28 June 1930, entered in-
to force 1 May 1932) 39 UNTS 55; ILO ‘Convention No 105 concerning the
Abolition of Forced Labour’ (adopted 25 June 1957, entered into force 17 Jan-
uary 1959) 320 UNTS 291.
732 Art. 4 UDHR; Art. 8 ICCPR; Art. 4 ECHR; Art. 6 ACHR; Art. 5 ACHPR.
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(and other international criminal tribunals).733 The Court also made exten-
sive reference to provisions under international humanitarian law.734 The
court did, however, not make any mention of instruments dealing explicit-
ly with human rights.
c. War Crimes
The mentioned neglect of gender issues in the area of human rights protec-
tion was mirrored by a disregard of the gendered dimension international
humanitarian law. The Hague Conventions did not explicitly mention any
form of sexual or other gendered violence, even though it contains, in Ar-
ticle 46 of the regulations annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention the
vague provision stating that ‘[f]amily honour and rights […] must be re-
spected’.735 At the ‘cradle’ of modern international criminal law, at the
Nuremberg International Military Tribunal736 (‘NIMT’) and the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal for the Far East737 (‘IMFE’), neither rape and oth-
er forms of sexual violence, nor gender-based persecution were mentioned
in the respective statutes as crimes against humanity or war crimes. Subse-
quently, even though evidence of rape and other forms of sexual violence
was introduced by the French and Russian prosecutors, these acts are not
mentioned in the final judgment, which does not in great detail enlist the
single acts that constituted wither crimes against humanity or war crimes,
but, in contrary, generally emphasizes that ‘war crimes […] were attended
733 Van Droogenbroeck v Belgium (Decision of 5 July 1979 on the admissibility of
the application) (EComm App 7906/77) D/R 17, 59; Van der Mussele v Belgium
(ECtHR) (Judgment) (1983) 6 EHRR 163; Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgment)
IT-96-23 (22 February 2001) paras 522-527.
734 Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgment) IT-96-23 (22 February 2001) paras 528-532.
735 Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War by Land and its An-
nex: Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (signed 29
July 1899, entered into force 4 September 1900) (1898–99) 187 CTS 429; Con-
vention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regula-
tions concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (signed 18 October
1907, entered into force 26 January 1910) (1907) 205 CTS 277.
736 Charter of the [Nuremberg] International Military Tribunal (8 August 1945) 82
UNTS 284.
737 Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (19 January 1946)
4 Bevans 20.
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by every conceivable circumstance of cruelty and horror’.738 Even though
not enlisted in the Statute, rape was repetitively referred to in the main
judgement of the IMFE, under ‘Chapter VIII: Conventional War Crimes
(Atrocities)’. Most prominently, the judgement recapitulates the events
following the Japanese capture of the Chinese city of Nanking in 1937,
which have commonly become known as the ‘Rape of Nanking’.739 In the
final findings, the majority of the judges does, however, only very general-
ly state that crimes under Count 54 (ordering, authorising and permitting
the commission of conventional war crimes) and Count 55 (to take ad-
equate steps to secure the observance and prevent breaches of conventions
and laws of war in respect of prisoners of war and civilian internees) have
been committed without specifically demonstrating through which acts the
crimes were committed.740 Furthermore, the IMTFE failed to prosecute
the abduction, enslavement and rape of approximately 200.000 Chinese
women in brothels principally frequented by Japanese soldiers.741
Rape was included within the acts that could constitute crimes against
humanity under Art. II (1) (c) Control Council Law No. 10, which was is-
sued by the Control Council for Germany on 20 December 1945. 742
In the following years, the awareness for gender issues and non-dis-
crimination on account of sex rose, which is reflected in the inclusion of
738 The United States of America et al v Göring et al (Judgment and Sentences of the
International Military Tribunal) (Nuremberg) (1 October 1946) (1947) 41 AJIL
172–333, 224.
739 The United States of America et al v Araki et al (Judgment of the International
Military Tribunal for the far East) (12 November 1948) reprinted in BVA Röling
and CF Rüter (eds) The Tokyo Judgment (APA University Press Amsterdam
1977) 389–93.
740 The United States of America et al v Araki et al (Judgment of the International
Military Tribunal for the far East) (12 November 1948) available at http://www.
worldcourts.com/imtfe/eng/decisions/1948.11.04_IMTFE_Judgment.htm (31
October 2017).
741 See eg AW Brown and L Greenfell ’The International Crime of Gender-Based
Apartheid and the Taliban’ (2003) 4 Melbourne Journal of International Law
347–75, 354.
742 Control Council Law No 10 ‘Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes,
Crimes against Peace and against Humanity’ (done 20 December 1945) (1946) 3
Official Gazette of the Control Council for Germany 50.
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non-discrimination provisions in the Geneva Conventions.743 Article 27
(2) Geneva IV also prohibits sexual violence against women, stating that
‘[w]omen shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour,
in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent
assault.’ The focus of this provision was put on rape as a crime against
honour, personal honour and that of the extended family, therefore coching
it ‘in terms of chasity and modesty of women’744 and not in terms of viola-
tion of physical integrity or the infliction of physical or mental harm.745
For this reason, and the failure to include rape within its ‘grave breaches’,
the way the Geneva conventions address sexual violence has been heavily
criticized.746 This protection is supplemented by Art. 3(1)(c) Common to
all Geneva Conventions, which protects against ‘outrages upon personal
dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment’.
Finally, Art. 76(1) Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts states that ‘[w]omen shall be the object of special respect
and shall be protected in particular against rape, forced prostitution and
743 See Art. 12 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (adopted 12 August 1949, en-
tered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 31 (Geneva Convention I); Art. 12
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (adopted 12 August 1949, en-
tered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 85 (Geneva Convention II); Art. 14
Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (adopted 12
August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 135 (Geneva Con-
vention III); Art. 27 Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Per-
sons in Time of War (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October
1950) 75 UNTS 287 (Geneva Convention IV).
744 Helen Durham and Katie O’Byrne The Dialogue of DifferenceL Gender Perspec-
tives on International Humanitarian Law (2010) 92 International Review of the
Red Cross 31-52, 35.
745 Helen Durham and Katie O’Byrne The Dialogue of DifferenceL Gender Perspec-
tives on International Humanitarian Law (2010) 92 International Review of the
Red Cross 31-52, 35.
746 Judith Gardam and Michelle Jarvis, Women Armed Conflict and International
Law (Kluwer Law International The Hague 2001) 96-97; see also Helen Durham
and Katie O’Byrne The Dialogue of DifferenceL Gender Perspectives on Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law (2010) 92 International Review of the Red Cross 31-52,
35 fn 13 for further references.
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any other form of indecent assault.’747 Art. 4(2)(e) Protocol Additional to
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts prohibits ‘outrages upon
personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape,
enforced prostitution and any form or indecent assault’748
However, rape in the Geneva Convention context did not rise to a
‘grave breach’ nor is it listed as a violation of the laws and customs of war
in any of the Conventions.749 Therefore, at the ICTY, which has jurisdic-
tion over grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions pursuant to Article 2
and violations of the laws and customs of war under Article 3, rape was
not explicitly mentioned as a violation of international humanitarian law.
The ICTR, having international humanitarian law jurisdiction only over
violations of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II, can charge
rape as a particular outrage upon personal dignity explicitly mentioned in
Article 4 (e) ICTR Statute.
In the beginning of the 1990s, momentum was gained for the recogni-
tion of rape as a war crime. Monumental in this change were the events in
the former Yugoslavia and later in Rwanda, where rape and other forms of
sexual violence were systematically used against women and men. The
ICRC clarified in 1992 that the grave breach of ‘wilfully causing great
suffering or serious injury to body and health’ in Article 147 Geneva Con-
vention IV covers rape.750 Influential States like the USA also categorized
rape and sexual assault as grave breaches.751 Around the same time, the
international community as started paying more attention to violations of
women’s rights in conflicts and the gendered nature of crimes under inter-
747 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (adopt-
ed 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 3.
748 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II)
(adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 609.
749 Sherrie L Russell-Brown ‘Rape as Genocide’ (2003) 21 Berkeley Journal of In-
ternational Law 350-374, 357.
750 International Committee of the Red Cross ‘Aide-Mémoire’ (3 December 1992) as
cited in Theodor Meron ‘Rape as a Crime under International Humanitarian Law’
(1993) 87(3) American Journal of International Law 424-428, 426.
751 US Department of State ‘Letter from Robert A Bradtke, Acting Assistant Secre-
tary for Legislative Affairs, to Senator Arlen Spector’ (27 January 1992) as cited
in Theodor Meron ‘Rape as a Crime under International Humanitarian Law’
(1993) 87(3) American Journal of International Law 424-428, 427.
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national law. At the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in
1993, States spoke out against gender-based violence and systematic rape
in conflict situations and) called for the integration of the ‘equal status of
women’ into the mainstream of UN activity752. They also reaffirmed that
sexual violence in conflict is a violation of fundamental human rights.753
Two years later, at the Fourth World Conference on women in Beijing, the
governments agreed on the undertaking to ‘integrate a gender perspective
in the resolution of armed conflict and foreign occupation’754 in order to
protect women living in situations of armed and other conflict and foreign
occupation’.755
In the Rome Statute, the term ‘war crime’ is defined as ‘traditional’
grave breaches, which are listed (Article 8(2)(a) Rome Statute), and
‘[o]ther serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in interna-
tional armed conflict, within the established framework of international
law’ (Article 8(2)(b) Rome Statute). In this list, ‘rape, sexual slavery, en-
forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, as defined in article 7, paragraph 2
(f), enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence also consti-
tuting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions’ are expressly listed in
Article 8(2)(b)(xxii).
Traditionally, as Charlesworth (Copelon) points out, the dichotomy be-
tween peace time and conflict, between the applicability of human rights
law and the applicability of humanitarian law, promoted IHL, as the law of
war, to focus on the ‘warrior caste’ and to neglect persons traditionally
outside that group.756 World War II brought with it the realization that
752 Cate Steains ‘Gender Issues’ in Roy S Lee (ed) The International Criminal
Court: The Making of the Rome Statute (Kluwer Law International The Hague
1999) 357–390, 360; see also UN World Conference on Human Rights ‘Vienna
Declaration and Programme of Action’ (25 June 1993) UN Doc A/CONF.157/23
Part I, paras 18 and 28, and Part II, para. 37.
753 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action’ (25 June 1993) UN Doc A/CONF.
157/23 Part I, paras 18 and 28, and Part II, para. 38.
754 UN World Conference on Women (4th) ‘Beijing Declaration and Platform for
Action’ (17 October 1995) UN Doc A/CONF.177/20, 4, para. 142(b.).
755 UN World Conference on Women (4th) ‘Beijing Declaration and Platform for
Action’ (17 October 1995) UN Doc A/CONF.177/20, 4, strategic objective E.1;
Cate Steains ‘Gender Issues’ in Roy S Lee (ed) The International Criminal
Court: The Making of the Rome Statute (Kluwer Law International The Hague
1999) 357–390, 360.
756 Hilary Charlesworth ‘Feminist Methods in International Law’ (1999) 93 Ameri-
can Journal of International Law 379-394, 386.
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rules on warfare must contain rules on the treatment of protected persons
and non-combatants. The events in the 1990s together with the evolution
of women’s rights in human right law and in many nation States, brought
this realization to a next level, acknowledging that men and women are af-
fected differently in armed conflict, on the one hand, and, sexual violence,
which women are the main victims of, can be used in a systematic and
strategic manner in conflict. Therefore, in order to effectively protect both
men and women, sexual violence has to be recognized as a war crime and
its commission has to be effectively prosecuted.
Concluding Remarks
The analyis of women’s human rights in the context of sexual violence in
international criminal lawn and humanitarian law give way to the follow-
ing conclusions: in general, human rights law, particularly in the area of
women’s rights, presents itself as a rich field for international criminal law
to benefit from. The language of CEDAW and its treaty body is, at times,
very similar in fact to the language employed when defining crimes
against humanity. Mention is made of structural and systematic actions
which are enviornments similat to the ones in which crimes against hu-
manity and other mass crimes are committed.
However, even though reference to human rights law in the context of
gender-based crimes is frequently made, the references just as often
scratch merely on the surface and an in-depth analysis of human rights law
in the area is abandoned for the sake of dismissing human rights law as a
helpful denominator of the law. Often, chambers then move on to compar-
ative law which they deem more useful.
Several reasons for this phenomenon can be brought forward. Some lie
in the nature of human rights law as such, whereas others can be contribut-
ed to a lack of understanding on part of the practitioners applying the law.
First, generally, the field of women’s human rights, like minority pro-
tection but unlike the prohibition of torture, does not exclusively deal with
areas which are of interest to criminal prosecution. Most of the provisions
in CEDAW, for example, are centred on non-discrimination and equality
of women in fields such as health, education and employment. Second, the
biggest deficit of the women’s rights scheme is the merely scarce protec-
tion of women from violence. As explained above, violence against wom-
en is not explicitly mentioned in the most prominent instrument for wom-
IV.
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en’s rights, namely in CEDAW. This is surely one of the reasons why the
reference to women’s rights instruments in the context of international
criminal proceedings has been scarce. An explicit prohibition of violence
against women, whether committed by private actors but with acquies-
cence of the State or by State actors themselves, whether in the state of
‘peace’ or within an armed conflict or whether committed inside a State or
by State agents abroad, would have certainly made it easier for judges to
refer to CEDAW. However, as indicated above, CEDAW is not the only
instrument which can be cited in this context. Whereas the drafters of
CEDAW can surely be criticised for their narrow reading of the term ‘dis-
crimination’, a reading which did not cover physical or psychological vio-
lence against women, the CEDAW Committee made clear, in its General
Comment No. 19, that CEDAW does in fact prohibit gender-based vio-
lence as a manifestation of discrimination. Such violence does also include
sexual violence, therefore providing a valuable point of reference for
judges in international criminal courts and tribunals.
Third, another hindrance to women’s human rights instruments serving
as sources of inspiration of supporting the authoritative findings of inter-
national courts and tribunal in the weakness of their language. Comparing
it for example with ICERD, which entails many immediately binding obli-
gations, CEDAW gives considerably more discretion to States, as most of
the obligations enshrined therein require States parties simply to take ‘all
appropriate measures’.757
Another set of reasons for the Courts’ and Tribunals’ reluctance, how-
ever, can be countered or at least weakened by fostering understanding of
the different concepts, aims and instruments in this area. When it comes to
gender-based crime and sexual violence, international criminal law and in-
ternational humanitarian law are often more sophisticated and further de-
veloped than international human rights law. Nevertheless, a tendency can
be observed for judges to at least pro forma refer to human rights law. Due
to the fragmentation in this field, the partly controversial subjects and the
differing nature of the instruments and bodies dealing with the subject,
judges tend to refer to human rights law in this area rather superficially
and to not deal with the multitude of soft law that shapes this area of hu-
man rights law in particular. This is because when it comes to torture or
757 Hilary Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin The Boundaries of International Law:
A Feminist Analysis (Manchester University Press Manchester 2000) 220.
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even minority rights, the law is a ‘classical’ 1st generation right which
deals with public participation of life, liberty and protection of physical in-
tegrity from State violence. These are more accessible and more obvious
also to judges who are not human rights experts than the soft law instru-
ments that set out women’s human rights and their protection from vio-
lence. Also, the approach of subsuming gender-based violence under the
heading of discrimination is innovative but at the same time, controversial
and judges might not feel comfortable in terms of consulting these kinds
of ‘activist’ human rights provisions.
When a crime which has no equivalent in national law (persecution)
and is formulated very vaguely758 meets a concepts which is not yet very
established in human rights law (protection from gender-based violence as
a human right) the biggest problems in terms of reference to human rights
law can be expected because these sort of crimes pose problems to crimi-
nal law experts and public international law experts alike.
Nevertheless there is an undeniable potential in women’s rights instru-
ments to be untapped. Especially the ICC, with its newly included ground
of gender-based persecution, has the opportunity to draw from CEDAW it-
self as well as the CEDAW Committee’s General Recommendations re-
garding non-discrimination and equality of women. The question which
remains is, of course, whether the court will be aware of this work and
whether, if it is, it sees the potential which lies in it.
Conclusions Drawn from Case-Law Analysis
The degree of recourse to international human rights law in international
criminal law can generally be called scarce. Often, judges refer to human
rights law in passing, almost as a box that has to be ticked before moving
on to more promising fields of law in the search for sbstantive elements of
crimes, for example comparative law. Sometimes, human rights law is re-
ferred to when it supports the Chamber’s view rather than examining it as
a mandatory step in the process or examining the available law. The exam-
ination of three areas of human rights and international criminal law
shows that, despite vast crossovers in the selected areas, there is scarce
Chapter Four:
758 Jonas Nilsson ‘The Principle of Nullum Crimen Sine Lege’ in Olaoluwa Olu-
sanya Rethinking International Criminal Law: The Substantive Part (Europa Law
Publishing Groningen 2007) 35-64 at 39.
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reference that follows no clear system or dogmatic approach. However,
there are degrees of disctinction between the selected areas. From the
three areas examined, it is the reference to torture that is the most elabo-
rate in terms of the variety and depth of the dogmatic consideration the
bench enganged in. A reference to minority rights in order to strengthen
the legal argument is less common and women’s rights and instruments
dealing with gender issues are discussed most infrequently.
The sub-chapters above explored the reasons for a lack of reference
stemming from the law itself and its development for each area as well as
the, often unused, potential that human rights law offers. But what conclu-
sions can be drawn generally from this examination?
First, the nature of the instrument is decisive. This means on the one
hand its status in the international legal order (legally binding or not? uni-
versally applicable or not?) and on the other hand the (legal and other-
wise) authority as well as the publicity of the body which decided on or
adopted it.
Second, the nature of the norm itself is of crucial importance. Provi-
sions (or instruments) containing legal sanctions or provisions which gen-
erally relate to actions falling under the realm of criminal law and have a
counterpart in national criminal law, rather than purely public law/ consti-
tutional law are much more likely to be used before international criminal
courts and tribunals. This can be seen in the comparison of the frequent
use of the CAT as compared to other provisions of human rights.
The third and fourth conclusion are intertwined: it is decisive whether
the protection of the right in question is controversially discussed within
the international community. As the protection of minorities has been
somewhat abandoned as a project by the international community after
World War II, it has become less of an obvious choice for practitioners of
international criminal law that do not have an in-depth knowledge of inter-
national criminal law. Even where the existence of rights as well as the
general potential connection to international criminal law can be assumed,
as it is the case with women’s rights and sexual crimes, the extend of the
rights, the international instruments governing them and the bodies apply-
ing them are not always grasped. This is also partly due to the fragmenta-
tion of protection regimes which can be (like the regime governing wom-
en’s rights) confusing and include various international and regional bod-
ies that produce documents which are binding to varying degrees.
The analyzed examples show that currently, there exists no convincing
doctrine and methodology dealing with the use of human rights law in in-
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ternational criminal law. A call for a solid methodology in this respect is
not a mere theoretical undertaking. The unequal interpretation of the law
has a pressing practical component, as it can lead to the problem that, as
shown above, the same conduct is deemed punishable by one Trial Cham-
ber and not punishable by another Trial Chamber of the same court/
tribunal.
As international criminal law is a rather new area of law, it is unsurpris-
ing that it entails gaps which have to be closed by taking recourse to other
areas of law. Such a recourse without a solid methodology to follow, is
problematic with regards to the principle of nullum crimen sine lege; it
can, due to differing interpretation of the law and the extent to which re-
course can be taken, result in conflicting definitions of crimes and ulti-
mately criminal conduct, even before the same court.
This can jeopardize the already challenging undertaking of international
criminal justice and opens it up to yet another criticism it needs to invali-
date.
Furthermore, if international criminal courts and tribunals are said to
themselves create customary international law as international organiza-
tions or organs of international organizations, contradicting case law im-
pedes this creation.759 A streamlined education for judges, including train-
ing in criminal law and human rights/humanitarian law, together with the
establishment of a methodology which is driven by theoretical understand-
ing of both concepts, their goals and values rather than by experimenting
in a legal vacuum, would counter this problem.
However, it is difficult to see any forum that possesses the necessary
authority for such an undertaking. In a relatively recent area, as interna-
tional criminal law, the lack of a central authority and the decentralized
norm interpretation and production poses a particular difficulty to the le-
gitimacy and therefore the future of the whole project. To counter this,
while realistically taking into account the lack of a solid legal and moral
authority in international law in general and international criminal law in
particular, it would at any rate be desirable to work towards an improved
exchange and coordination between the different courts and tribunals, as
well as between the different chambers within the courts. Such a mecha-
nism of prevention of conflicting case law by prior checking of draft judg-
759 See also KS Gallant ‘International Criminal Courts and the Making of Public In-
ternational Law: New Roles for International Organizations and Individuals’
2010 The John Marshall Law Review 603–34, 609.
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ments does, for example exist within the ECtHR.760 Such a common net-
work of knowledge would foster the understanding of different basic legal
concepts and could in that way contribute to a more streamlined jurispru-
dence.
760 The Case Law Conflict Prevention Unit under the authority of Jurisconsult
checks draft judgments and flags potential contradictions with existing case law;
see further David Harris, Michael O’Boyle and Others Law of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights (OUP Oxford 2014) 126-7.
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Perception of the Value of Human Rights Law from
the View of Practitioners
Perceptions of Human Rights Law in a Diverse
Professional Environment
The analysis of the cases of ad hoc tribunals throughout the earlier part of
this work showed that the existing links between international criminal
law and many parts of human rights law are at best rudimentarily used.761
It also demonstrated the dangers and pitfalls of the decentralized produc-
tion and diffusion of norms in international criminal law. Enormous free-
doms and responsibilities are bestowed upon the judge in this field due its
rudimentary nature. The variety of professional backgrounds and expertise
of judges not only feeds into this fragmentation of norms but intensifies it.
Because of the judges’ preeminent role, interviews are crucial if one wants
to understand what drives the actual practical application of human rights
law or the lack thereof, how the preconceived perception of the relation-
ship of human rights law in international criminal law shaped said applica-
tion, the understanding of when judges are mandated to apply human
rights law and to what benefit.762 This part is predominantly based on a
qualitative study including 14 semi-structured expert interviews conducted
Part Three:
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761 An adapted version of this part of the research has been published in Mayeul
Hiéramente and Patricia Schneider The Defence in International Criminal Trials:
Observations on the Role of the Defence at the ICTY, ICTR and ICC (Nomos
2016). The contribution is entitled ‘Arguing Human Rights from the Bench? How
Judges in International Criminal Courts Perceive International Human Rights
Law’, 72-92.
762 Interviews with judges were chosen due to their distinguished role in the trial as
envisaged by the Rome Statute and the ICTY Statute. In practice, judges also rely
on the legwork done by their Legal Officers. The nature of the work and the de-
gree to which Legal Officers shape the judges decisions varies from judge to
judge. It would be interesting to focus on Legal Officers, their background and if
judges choose Legal Officers with similar expertise and background as their own
(as far as they have the opportunity to choose in the recruitment process) or if
they chose Legal Officers with different, but complementing backgrounds. As, in
any case, judges have the overall authority over their decision and the last say in
them, coupled with the authority bestowed upon them by the Rome Statute,
233
with 12 judges at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yu-
goslavia (ICTY) and the ICC between January 2010 and January 2012
(two judges agreed to be interviewed twice).763 The questions on which
these conversations were based can be found in the annex. As judges can
sit in more than one Chamber, the seven of the judges were assigned to a
Pre-Trial Chamber, five to a Trial Chamber and five to an Appeals Cham-
ber. The selection of judges as interviewees was based on the following
factors. The ICTY is the international criminal tribunal which assembled
by far the largest body of case law (also exceeding the ICTR) and this case
law fundamentally shaped international criminal law in the past and will
continue to do so in the future. The ICC as the permanent forum of inter-
national criminal litigation will build up on this case law and further con-
tribute to its development and sophistication. The research sought a bal-
ance between the two institutions, and includes judges with considerable
experience acting as judges in international criminal courts and tribunals
as well as those whose experience as judges in international criminal jus-
tice was fairly recent. In approaching the judges for an interview request,
consideration was also paid to maximal possible diversity as to their pro-
fessional background (academic, judge, prosecutor, diplomat etc), field of
expertise (public international law/criminal law), national background, le-
gal system in the country of origin or education as well as diversity in gen-
der and age. That being said, the number of interview partners is compara-
bly low as there are in fact only a limited numbers of judges practising in-
ternational criminal law.764 To these judges, access is restricted. There are
a number of potential interview partners who generally declined to speak
about the way their decision-making process is conducted. Given these
judges were deemed to be the appropriate interview partners for the terms of this
study.
763 All interviews with ICC judges were conducted during a four months stay of the
author as a visiting professional at the International Criminal Court from January
2010 until April 2010. This programme is specifically designed for professionals
to do their own research project on international criminal law. Later on, the au-
thor worked at the International Criminal Court as a staff member. During her
time as an ICC staff member, no interviews with ICC staff was conducted. The
interviews with ICTY judges were conducted between January 2010 and April
2010 and between May 2011 and January 2012.
764 The ICC, for example, has 18 serving judges and 23 former judges. Of the 18
serving judges, six judges have only been appointed to the bench after the last
round of interviews was conducted in 2012.
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limitations, the present qualitative study does not claim to present a com-
prehensive picture of the perception of human rights law in international
criminal law. However, the data can help identify major tendencies in how
the background and experience of judges can influence their understand-
ing and interpretation of legal problems surrounding the role and applica-
tion of human rights law in international criminal law. Data from the inter-
views was analyzed in light of and juxtaposed with other sources, apply-
ing the concept of triangulation. These sources included the documents
such as judgments, official court documents and records and participa-
tions, conversations with legal practitioners and other experts of interna-
tional criminal law on formal and informal levels and trial observation.
Furthermore, judges volunteered their assessment of the various approach-
es of their colleagues in relation to their backgrounds, which again allows
more general inferences and tendencies. While the interviews were not
tape-recorded, notes were made during the interviews. The interviewees
were assured of their anonymity. Hence, the references to the anonymized
interviews do not refer to transcribed records but to notes made during and
immediately after the the interview. Particularly note-worthy statements,
which are quoted directly in the following, were noted from memory.
A number of scholarly works, from legal, sociological and anthropolog-
ical perspectives, have dealt with creation of prosecutorial and investiga-
tive strategies and judgments in courts and with the question what big a
role a systematic exegesis really plays vs the role attributed to external
factors.765 Mainly, these works have been dealing with the interpretation
of national constitutions, thus with legal norms that are by definition
765 Eg Christina Boyd, Lee Epstein and Andrew Martin ‘Untangling the Causal Ef-
fects of Sex on Judging’ (2010) 54 American Journal of Political Science
398-411; Nienke Grossmann ‘Sex Representation on the Bench and the Legitima-
cy oft he International Criminal Courts‘ (2011) 11 Internationnal Criminal Law
Review 643-653; John Hagan, Ron Levi and Gebrielle Ferrales ‘Swaying the
Hands of Justice: The Internal and External Dynamics of Regime Change at the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ (2006) 31(3) Law and
Social Inquiry 585-616; John Hagan and Ron Levi ‘War Crimes and the Force of
Law’ (2005) 83(4) Social Forces 1499-1534; Kimi Lynn King and Megan Gree-
ing ‚Gender Justice of Just Gender? The Role of Gender in the Sexual Assault
Decisions at the International Criminal Tribunal of the Former Yu-
goslavia‘ (2007) 88 Social Science Quarterly 1049-1071; ‘Uwe Kranenpohl ‚Die
Bedeutung von Interpretationsmethoden und Dogmatik in der Entschei-
dungspraxis des Bundesverfassungsgerichts’ 48 (2009) Der Staat 387–409; Rüdi-
ger Lautmann Freie Rechtsfindung und Methodik der Rechtsanwendung (C
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rather broad in order to be flexible enough to be applied to a variety of
cases. Naturally, the nature of a national constitutional court differs from
that of an international criminal court. To name the most obvious differ-
ence, a criminal court has, at all times, to ensure that it operates within the
limits imposed on it through the principle of legality. Whereas constitu-
tional courts can, to a large extent, be self-referential in the way that they
refer to principles of a constitutional order which the courts constructed
themselves out of the constitution,766 criminal courts, when concretising
the given norms, need to refer to systems outside of their own legal disci-
pline in a narrow sense. They consult, for instance, the answer found to
similar questions posed to national legal systems or human rights law.
Constitutional courts can deliberately maintain a certain dogmatic vague-
ness in their decision so as to keep the body of case law flexible enough
for their predecessors to apply it to new situations and future challenges
the court is faced with. Criminal courts, on the contrary, are faced with the
obligation to define a certain text in light of what a person, at the time of
his or her actions that lead to his/her indictment before the court, could
have reasonably held to be legal or illegal.
However, as international criminal law is a rather new legal discipline,
the judges can often not resort to a lot of scholarly literature, commen-
taries or preceding cases, but have to define the limits and the scope of a
specific crime themselves. In order to make the general terms of the Rome
Statute or the ICTY/ICTR Statute sufficiently concrete to work with them
in criminal proceedings, the judges are obliged to interpret the terms,
keeping in mind the principle of legality. The leeway that the courts natu-
rally have with this new body of law, when examining its limits and the
terms of its application, will decrease on its own due to the growing num-
ber of case law in the area. Even though the courts are not bound by prece-
dents within their own institution, let alone by case law decided at another
international criminal court or tribunal, they tend to either adhere to previ-
Schon München 1967); Rüdiger Lautmann Justiz—Die stille Gewalt: Teil-
nehmende Beobachtung und entscheidungssoziologische Analyse (Athenäum Ver-
lag Frankfurt am Main 1972); Ernst Gottfried Mahrenholz ‘Probleme der Verfas-
sungsauslegung, Verfassungsinterpretation aus praktischer Sicht’ in Hans-Peter
Schneider (ed) Verfassungsrecht zwischen Wissenschaft und Richterkunst: Kon-
rad Hesse zum 70. Geburtstag (Heideberg Müller 1990) 53–65;.
766 Uwe Kranenpohl ‚Die Bedeutung von Interpretationsmethoden und Dogmatik in
der Entscheidungspraxis des Bundesverfassungsgerichts’ 48 (2009) Der Staat
387–409, 398.
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ous decisions or, if the arguments used previously are dismissed, usually
do so with an explicit explanation of why the court or tribunal decided not
to follow what has previously been decided.
Furthermore, as determined above, international criminal law derives
from the most serious violations of human rights, and human rights law,
like constitutional law, is generally formulated in a very broad manner,
and, indirectly, protects basic rights of a human person and therefore sub-
ject to extensive acts of interpretation by the judges who apply the law.
Additionally, both constitutional courts and international criminal
Courts and Tribunals (or rather their Appeals Chambers) have to exercise
an increased degree of self-control, as their judgements are not subject to
the control by any other court of higher instance. When it comes to the
ICC, an aggravating factor, which called for a particularly high degree of
interpretation by the practitioners, is, that the Rome Statute is a compro-
mise which has been drawn up by the States Parties under time pressure
and therefore, at occasions, contains contradictory passages.
Hence, the tools available to the judges in order to interpret the norma-
tive framework in which they operate are similar, as is the inconsistency
when it comes to working with those tools and methods. As has been ob-
served in relation to the interpretation of national constitutions by national
constitutional courts, ‘the court, in truth, aims for the result which seems
right to it. On the way to this [result], it adheres to basic exegetical rules or
other principles of constitutional interpretation as pilot lights, but not as
guarantees for the right result; they are buoys rather than pilots’ (transla-
tion by the author).767
Therefore, the question, in the context of this work, is to what extent it
can be expected that the way a judge evaluates the use of human rights
law within substantive international criminal law is shaped by his or her
professional and other background.
Traditionally, the events leading to a judicial decision-making process
are categorized in accordance with seven different phases.768 In the first
phase, the problem is identified and the judge familiarizes himself or her-
767 Ernst Gottfried Mahrenholz ‘Probleme der Verfassungsauslegung, Verfassungsin-
terpretation aus praktischer Sicht’ in Hans-Peter Schneider (ed) Verfassungsrecht
zwischen Wissenschaft und Richterkunst: Konrad Hesse zum 70. Geburtstag
(Heideberg Müller 1990) 53–65, 60.
768 Ernst Gottfried Mahrenholz ‘Probleme der Verfassungsauslegung, Verfassungsin-
terpretation aus praktischer Sicht’ in Hans-Peter Schneider (ed) Verfassungsrecht
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self with the situation he or she is called upon to judge. In phase two, the
judge explores the alternatives for a possible solution of the situation. In
the third phase, the judge gathers the facts for the different alternatives,
the judges explores the circumstances of the case out of the pleadings and
hearings. In phase four, the judge looks at the normative framework appli-
cable to the situation and explores whether the alternatives are legally cor-
rect. The judge chooses one of the alternatives in the fifth phase. In the
sixth phase, the chosen alternative is explained, the judgment is reasoned
and delivered. Finally, the post-decision process constitutes the seventh
and last phase. The decision-maker receives criticism and learns for his or
her decision in the future.769 Even though this is simply a descriptive for-
mula which does not apply to all cases, the phases cannot be clearly distin-
guished from each other and the decision-maker often does not consort to
the different phases in a chronological order, the formula helps to catego-
rize the different fundamental phases of judicial decision-making.770
In the following, phases four and five are primarily scrutinized in order
to inquire to what extent the professional and or personal background of
the judges can play a role in the decision-making process in relation to the
judges perception of the importance of international human rights law in
substantive international criminal law and the judges’ general willingness
to use human rights law in order to define crimes under international law.
The most significant factors in relation to the background of the judges are
highlighted and analysed based on the empirical data collected.
There are plenty of ways in which the composition of a bench can
shape the outcome of the trial. This is not to assume that the individuals
who serve as judges belong to different homogenous groups and can be
defined or define themselves by belonging to this group first and foremost.
This solitarist approach to groups of human beings ineligibly shortens the
view on the individuals belonging to that group who, in fact, belong to dif-
ferent groups and do not exclusively define themselves as a member of a
zwischen Wissenschaft und Richterkunst: Konrad Hesse zum 70. Geburtstag
(Heideberg Müller 1990) 53–65, 60.
769 Rüdiger Lautmann Justiz—Die stille Gewalt: Teilnehmende Beobachtung und
entscheidungssoziologische Analyse (Athenäum Verlag Frankfurt am Main 1972)
15.
770 Rüdiger Lautmann Justiz—Die stille Gewalt: Teilnehmende Beobachtung und
entscheidungssoziologische Analyse (Athenäum Verlag Frankfurt am Main 1972)
15.
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single group.771 Even less so, it would be possible for the individuals be-
longing to a certain group to define, in a fixed homogenous way, what are
the components of which this group is made up.
Nevertheless, there are a number of dividing lines which could possibly
be of relevance to the work of the ICC and the ad hoc tribunals and which
could influence the decision-making of the judges. Apart from the profes-
sional or geographical background of the members of the bench, their un-
derstanding of the role of human rights law in their work of applying inter-
national criminal law could also be framed in terms of which basic legal
system is used in their country of origin, whether it is Common Law or
Civil Law and whether they have been working mostly as academics or
practitioners.
Safeguarding Professional Diversity on the Bench at the ICC and the
ICTY
Pursuant to Art. 36 (3) (b) Rome Statute, a judge at the International Crim-
inal Court shall either
i) Have established competence in criminal law and procedure, and the
necessary relevant experience, whether as judge, prosecutor, advocate
or in other similar capacity, in criminal proceedings; or
(ii) Have established competence in relevant areas of international law
such as international humanitarian law and the law of human rights,
and extensive experience in a professional legal capacity which is of
relevance to the judicial work of the Court;
At the ICC, the focus is, pursuant to Art. 36 (5) Rome Statute, explicitly
put on the judges with a criminal law background. They shall, in the first
election, make up the majority of at least nine judges whereas at least five
of the judges shall have an international law background. In its first ses-
sion between 3 and 7 February 2003, the Assembly of States Parties elect-
ed 18 judges for a term of office of three, six and nine years. Further ordi-
nary elections took place in 2006, 2009, 2011 and 2014. At the time of the
writing, the next ordinary election is scheduled for Deember 2017 at the
I.
771 See Amartya Sen Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny (WW Norton &
Co New York 2006.).
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17th session of the Assembly of State Parties.772 Additionally, the Assem-
by of States Parties elected some judges in special elections, eg when a
judge resigned or passed away. Currently, there are 13 judges from list A
(criminal law) and five judges from list B (international law) serving at the
ICC.773 However, some of the individuals listed as experts under list A do
also have considerable experience under international law, so the lists do
not always clearly reflect the focus of a judge’s experience.
The assessment of whether a judge has the necessary qualification is to
a large degree driven by the Coalition for the International Criminal Court
(CICC), an association of civil society organizations which, since 2006,
asks candidates to fill in questionnaires establishing their competence and
motivation and organizes public seminars with and debates amongst the
candidates.774 These measures seek to contribute to the raising the respec-
tive candidates’ expertise and assist the Assembly of State Parties in de-
ciding about the competence of a candidate.775 The questionnaire provided
to the judges asks them, inter alia, about the legal systems they were edu-
cated and have worked in.776 It also asks in detail about the experience in
either criminal law (for List A candidates) or international law (for List B
candidates) and invites the candidates to share their experience which
would qualify them for running on the list they are not appointed on.777
Additionally the nomination process is addressed and the candidate is re-
quested to lay down what qualification a person needs to have to be ap-
pointed to the highest judicial office in his or her respective country as
stipulated in Art. 36 (3) (a) Rome Statute.778 The CICC addresses the issue
of further training and skill enhancement stating that at the ICC as ‘unique
772 Further information can be found under < http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/fight
/icc-elections-2017> (31 October 2017).
773 See < https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/judicial-divisions/biographies/Pages/default.a
spx#> (31 October 2017).
774 Coalition for the International Criminal Court ‘Judges’ <http://www.coalitionfort
heicc.org/topics/judges> (31 October 2017); See for the 2017 election of judges
http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/fight/icc-elections-2017 (31 October 2017).
775 < http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/topics/judges> (31 October 2017).
776 Questions 7 a) and b); the questionaires with the anwers of the candiates for the
2017 Elections can be accessed under Coalition of the ICC ‘Questionnaire for
ICC Judicial Candidates: December 2017 Elections’ <http://www.coalitionforthei
cc.org/fight/icc-elections-2017> (31 October 2017).
777 Ibid Questions 8 a) and b).
778 Ibid Question 4.
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institution’, ‘even judges with significant prior experience …may not nec-
essarily possess requisite skills and knowledge to manage these chal-
lenges’.779 The questionnaire therefore explores the candidates’ attitude
towards the idea of ‘ongoing workplace training aimed at promoting legal
innovation and coordination amongst all judicial chambers in adjudicating
complex questions of the human rights relating to law and policy’.780 Fi-
nally, the CICC questionnaire explicitly addresses advocating for, refer-
ence to and application of human rights law. Question 16 of the question-
naire asks ‘Do you have any experience working with or within interna-
tional human rights bodies or courts and/or have you served on the staff or
board of directors of human rights or international humanitarian law orga-
nizations?’781 Since 2011, Question 17 is included to specifically ask
about the reference to human rights law: ‘Have you ever referred to or ap-
plied any specific provision of international human rights or international
humanitarian law treaties within any judicial decision you have issued
within the context of your judicial activity or legal experience?’782
In addition, an independent high-expert panel was established by the
CICC in 2010, which, for the first time, conducted assessments on
whether each individual candidate matched the qualifications outlined in
Art. 36 Rome Statute. Before the 2011 elections of judges during the Tenth
Session of the Assembly of States Parties, the Independent Panel, consist-
ing of experts of international law and criminal law, most of them former
international criminal judges or prosecutors, found that four of the nine-
teen candidates lacked sufficient qualification to be elected as judges of
the ICC.783 None of the candidates assessed as ‘not qualified’ by the Inde-
pendent Panel were under the six judges elected to the bench by Assembly
of States Parties between 12 and 21 December 2011. In 2011, the Assem-
bly of States Parties set up an Advisory Committee on the Nomination of
Judges which builds on the work of the Independent Panel and which also
779 Ibid Question No. 11.
780 Ibid.
781 Ibid Question 15.
782 Ibid Question 16.
783 Coalition for the ICC http://iccnow.org/documents/CICC_Press_Release_Report
_of_the_Independent_Panel_on_ICC_Judicial_Elections_271111_EN.pdf (1
October 2015).
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evaluates candidates prior to elections to the ICC bench.784 This goes to
show the increasing influence and importance that NGOs have in the area
of international criminal law, where civil society has continuously pushed
for the improvement and enhanced implementation of international crimi-
nal law.785
The majority of current judges under list A (experts of criminal law and
procedure) does have no or only limited experience of the other category
of relevant law. The same holds true for judges under list B (relevant areas
of international law) regarding their expertise in criminal law. However,
some judges indicate extensive expertise in both categories and could
therefore have appeared under a different list. Article 39 (1) of the Rome
Statute states that ‘the Trial and Pre-Trial Divisions are composed pre-
dominantly of judges with criminal trial experience.’ Insofar the focus on
criminal experience and expertise in the chambers is a deliberate move
and mirrors the merit that the court attaches to criminal law as opposed to
international law in its everyday work. One reason for this might be that
some of the interviewed judges saw the real challenges for the court in its
procedural aspects, for which an expertise in criminal law and procedure
and a mindset for the potential pitfalls of criminal trials in this respect is
vital.786 As one judge formulated it: ‘the devil is in the procedure’.787 The
group of international law experts is generally more heterogeneous than
the criminal law group. Whereas some of the judges previously to serving
at the bench, held high positions in international organizations pertaining
to human rights or humanitarian law, others were scholars, diplomats or
worked in fields related to international law which are, at first sight, more
detached from international criminal law.
At the ICTY the situations is slightly different, as there is no explicit
quota system dividing the bench into international law and criminal law
784 Coalition for the ICC < http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/news/20141009/expert-
panel-reports-qualifications-icc-judicial-candidates > (31 October 2017); http://w
ww.coalitionfortheicc.org/news/20171011/asp-committee-all-12-icc-judicial-can
didates-pass-test-six-are-particularly-well (31 October 2017).
785 A good example of this was the recent attempt by the Southern Africa Litigation
Centre to prevent Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, for who the ICC issued a
standing arrest warrant, from leaving South Africa where he travelled for a meet-
ing of the African Union.
786 Interview No 2.
787 Interview No 2, p. 1.
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experts in a provision which is otherwise very similar to the one in the
Rome Statute. The respective provision in the ICTY Statute reads:
The permanent and ad litem judges shall be persons of high moral char-
acter, impartiality and integrity who possess the qualifications required in
their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices. In
the overall composition of the Chambers and sections of the Trial Cham-
bers, due account shall be taken of the experience of the judges in criminal
law, international law, including international humanitarian law and hu-
man rights law.
The ICTY is currently composed of 7 judges.788 Compared to that of
the ICC, the present composition of the ICTY is somewhat more homoge-
nous. The majority of the present judges have served as judges in their re-
spective national jurisdictions before being appointed as judges of the
ICTY. Most of the judges additionally had experience with criminal trials
and a certain expertise in criminal proceedings prior to coming to the
ICTY.
General attitude of judges towards the importance of HRL in ICL
When asked about the general importance attributed to human rights law
in international criminal law, most judges, at first sight, display a convic-
tion that human rights law has a high degree of importance to their work.
Many judges referred to the development of international criminal law
and, the common roots of human rights, humanitarian law and internation-
al criminal law, as well as to crimes under international law as severe vio-
lations of human rights.789 Some describe human rights as always present
in the work of the court. Even if that might not always be visible in the
decisions that are produced and might not be explicitly mentioned there,
these judges claim human rights issues are always underlying and present
in the internal discussions. 790
However, even in this generally framed question on the importance of
human rights law on international criminal law, one can already spot dif-
ferences between judges whose expertise lays primarily in the area of in-
1.
788 At the ICTY, the numbers of judges are declining due to the imminent conclusion
up of trials of first instance.
789 Eg Interview No 6; Interview No 7; Interview No 12.
790 Interview No 13; Interview No 7.
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ternational criminal law and those who are first and foremost international
lawyers. Whereas several judges, no matter which background, empha-
sized that their courts are criminal courts and not human rights courts and
that therefore human rights play a somewhat ancillary role as compared to
aspects of criminal law and procedure,791 the criminal law experts often
explicitly emphasized that their foremost task is to sit on a criminal court
and some argue that the ‘international element’ is given too much weight,
at least at the ICC.792 It has also been stated that cases should be dealt with
in a less academic manner, that the primary tasks of the ICC is to punish
the perpetrators and help the victims, not ‘to write beautiful decisions for
academics’.793 One judge describes human rights issues as ‘not very ur-
gent’.794
Interestingly, some of the judges pointed to the reciprocal effects of an
increase in the use of human rights law in international criminal law for
the field of human rights law. One judge used the example of the UN
Commissioner for Human Rights, Navanethem Pillay, who, as a former
judge of the ICTY and the ICC, draws from her practical experience in in-
ternational criminal law by stirring up discussions about the impunity of
human rights violations in her work as UN High Commissioner for Hu-
man Rights795. However, the answer to questions regarding the mutual ef-
fect of an increased interlinkage between the areas of international crimi-
nal law and human rights law is not always positive. One judge, for exam-
ple, wondered whether international criminal law could also have a nega-
tive influence on human rights law, as is attached to human rights an ‘aura
of punitivity’ which could hamper practical human rights work and keep
States from enter into human rights commitments in the first place.796
791 Interview No 2; Interview No 5; Interview No 8; Interview No 10, Interview No
11.
792 Interview No 5, Interview No 10.
793 Interview No 5.
794 Interview No 2, p 1.
795 Interview No 3.
796 Interview No 4.
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Specific relevance of the recourse to human rights law in substantive
international criminal law
When asked about what areas of international criminal law could be most
appropriate for the use of human rights law, most judges, criminal and in-
ternational law experts alike, first pointed to procedural points, mostly to
the right to a fair and expeditious trial, including the right to defend one-
self, questions regarding the disclosure of evidence or to procedural rules
for the protection of victims.797 Whereas the international law experts usu-
ally by themselves referred also to the relevance of human rights law in
the substantial aspects of defining a crime and exploring the boundaries of
customary international law on a certain crime, most of the criminal law
experts agreed that human rights law could be used in such way after it
had been suggested to them by the interviewer. Some, however, dismissed
the importance of international human rights law in substantive interna-
tional criminal law altogether and claimed that most of the problematic is-
sues in these regard had already been solved.798
When asked about what parts of human rights law would be the most
obvious to take recourse to in substantive matters, the prohibition of tor-
ture was one of the areas most often referred to.799 Here, judges mentioned
concrete and widely ratified conventions like the CAT800 or the ICCPR.801
Minority rights law was generally not mentioned by any of the judges ini-
tially. Some judges agreed, after the suggestion by the interviewer that in-
ternational criminal law can draw from minority rights law.802 Yet, a cer-
tain confusion regarding what the concept of minority rights entails could
be observed: whereas one judge rightly pointed out that the recognition of
genocide and apartheid were influenced by concerns about minority pro-
tection,803 one judge incorrectly claimed that minority rights law also cov-
ers the protection of women and could therefore be of value to the
Court.804 One can easily see how such a confusion about what the concept
2.
797 Eg Interview No 2; Interview No3; Interview No 7; Interview No 8; Interview No
9; Interview No 11; Interview No 12.
798 Interview No 2; Interview No 6; Interview No 7.
799 Interview No 7; Interview No 10; Interview No 12.
800 Interview No 10; Interview No 12.
801 Interview No 10.
802 Interview No 7; Interview No 10; Interview No 12.
803 Interview No 12.
804 Interview No 7.
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could prevent the court from seeking assistance in the case extra-statutory
human rights law would have to be consulted.
Women’s rights were the issue, which was most often mentioned by
judges when asked areas of human rights of interest to substantive interna-
tional criminal law.805 However, the judges seemed to have only a vague
idea where to find helpful instruments in this area. One judge mentioned
CEDAW, in all other cases, the mention of women’s rights seemed to have
been guided merely by a vague idea of usefulness without any concrete
provisions or concepts to draw from.806
The question of how it can be used and what are the limits of a use of
human rights law in light of the principle of legality is characterized by a
certain dogmatic vagueness. Whereas basically all the judges mentioned
Art. 21 (3) Rome Statute as the provision which allows them to use human
rights so to a certain extent, the exact meaning of that provision and the
possibilities it opens for judges to make reference to human rights seems
to be rather unclear. In particular, no judge mentioned that Article 21 (3),
as examined above, may not be the right provision for including human
rights law into substantive international criminal law.807 Many judges
seemed to be satisfied with Art. 21 (3) Rome Statute as a sufficient legal
basis for applying international human rights law. In particular, customary
international law as a source seemed to not be of particular relevance to
the judges and was rarely brought up. Asked about how human rights can
be used in international criminal law, particularly with regard to Art. 21
(3) Rome Statute, the judges gave a variety of different answers many of
which contradicted each other. Human rights were seen as ‘underlying
principles’808, ‘sources of inspiration’809 ‘almost binding principles’810
‘persuasive, but non-binding inspiration’811, ‘sources of brainstorming on
805 Interview No 2; Interview No 7; Interview No 10; Interview No 11; Interview No
13.
806 Inerview No 7.
807 See Part One Chapter Three above.
808 Interview No. 7; one judge additionally mentioned Art. 21 (2).
809 Interview No. 10.
810 Interview No. 7.
811 Interview No. 8; Interview No. 12.
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a legal issue’812, ‘guiding principles’813 and ‘underlying constitutional pro-
vision’814.
Some judges saw it as ‘two sides of the same coin’815, others dismissed
this rhetorical figure and instead insisted on a ‘qualitative difference’816 of
the two regimes, which they saw as not being of equal value, but which
‘complement and reinforce each other’817 or ‘complement and inform
each other’.818
Professional and Personal Factors Contributing to the Attitude towards
International Human Rights Law
Public International Law Experts/(National) Criminal Law Experts
As can be inferred from the analysis of the previous sections, the dividing
line between public international law experts and experts of criminal law
was found to be one of the most decisive factors regarding the attitude to-
wards human rights law. Experts of criminal law often seemed to be some-
what dismissive of the ‘international element’ of international criminal
law and stated that this element is given too much weight in international
criminal practice.819 Human rights law in international criminal law was
for most of the criminal law experts mostly a procedural issue, though
most, but not all,820 agreed that human rights law could also be used in the
substantive definitions of crime when so suggested.
Generally, the criminal lawyers seemed to have less of a dogmatic prob-
lem with recourse to international human rights law in order to define
II.
1.
812 Interview No. 9.
813 Interview No. 9.
814 Interviews No. 5, 7, 8 and 10; in Interviews Nos 5 and 7, the term ‘underlying
constitutional provision’ was brought up by the interviewer who asked the judges
whether this is a term they could agree to in relation to human rights in interna-
tional criminal law.
815 Interview No. 10.
816 Interview No. 11.
817 Interview No. 11.
818 Interview No 12.
819 Interview No 5, Interview No 10.
820 Interview No 2; Interview No 6; Interview No 7.
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crimes, which, in general, they saw as not problematic.821 In particular,
they did often not see a dogmatic difference in the application of human
rights law in substantive as opposed to procedural law. This might partly
be due to the fact that the criminal lawyers interviewed also tended to have
a purely practical background, whereas many of the international law ex-
perts have been working as academics prior to becoming judges at the
ICTY or the ICC. One judge simply held that if the ECtHR came up with
a decision which ‘can equally work for the ICC’ and can be used there, it
becomes part of international criminal law.822 One judge suggested to nar-
row down the quota in Art. 36 (3) (b) (i) to experts of international crimi-
nal law as opposed to general criminal law and procedure as a way to en-
sure quality throughout the bench.823 In light of the limited number of es-
tablished experts in the field on the one hand coupled with geographical
quota requirements on the other hand, this suggestion does not seem vi-
able at this point in time.
One judge stated that ‘reference to human rights law is made to support
already existing convictions and views’ on a certain topic.824 In the same
vein, another judge said that what she was interested in is the impact of
her decisions ‘on the people’ and not so much where they stem from.825
This is congruent with the sociological findings regarding the decision-
making process of judges in national legal systems826 and also confirms an
observation made by Antonio Cassese regarding the use of comparative
law as an extra-statutory source of law at the ICTY.827
821 Interview No 5; Interview No 6;Interview No 7; Interview No 9.
822 Interview No 9.
823 Interview No 7.
824 Interview No 1.
825 Interview No 9.
826 Rüdiger Lautmann Justiz—Die stille Gewalt: Teilnehmende Beobachtung und
entscheidungssoziologische Analyse (Athenäum Verlag Frankfurt am Main 1972)
101.
827 ‘Mon experience est que souvent le droit comparé est utilisé pour confirmer une
solution que l’on avait déjà trouvée’ Antonio Cassese in Mireille Delmas-Marty
and Antonio Cassese (eds) Crimes Internationaux Et Jurisdictions Interna-
tionales (Presses Unversitaires de France Paris 2002) 140.
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Common Law/Civil Law
The question whether they were educated in a common or in a civil law
system was explicitly posed to the interviewees and some expressed opin-
ions on whether and how this background influenced their work and the
collaboration with their colleagues. Pursuant to Art. 36 (8) (a) (i) Rome
Statute, the principle legal systems of the world shall be taken into account
in the selection of the judges. Several of the judges emphasized that they
see a dividing line between judges coming from civil law countries and
judges with a common law background in their work.828 This perception is
backed by analyses of the deciding attitude of judges at the ICTY, which
found clear differences between civil and common law judges in the way
they refer to sources outside of international criminal law in order to back
their arguments.829
One judge mentioned that there is more ‘separation’ by judges from
common law countries: the judge was of the opinion that judges educated
in common law systems were generally more willing than their colleagues
from civil law countries to apply human rights regarding procedural, for-
malistic issues (rights of the accused regarding deadlines for submissions
etc.) but that the strive for ‘clean, clear criminal law’ without referring to
extra-statutory provisions.830
For another judge, the common law/civil law divide was interlinked
with question of whether a judge came from a country which was a former
British colony. This judge was of the opinion that judges coming from for-
mer British colonies applied Common law in a more dogmatically strict
fashion than colleagues from the United Kingdom.831 For most judges,
List A and List B judges alike, this issue did, however, not pose a particu-
lar problem, even though one could suspect that judges with an expertise
in international law might be more used to a flexible approach in this re-
spect.
2.
828 Interview No 1, Interview No 6.
829 Michael Bohlander and Mark Findlay ‚The Use of Domestic Sources as a Basis
for International Criminal Law Principles’ (2002) 2 Yearbook of International
Law and Jurisprudence 3–26.
830 Interview No. 1.
831 Interview No 6.
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Academics/Practitioners
Closely related to whether judges are criminal law or international law ex-
perts is the question whether they have a theoretical, academic background
or expert a purely practical one. This issue was brought up by several
judges on their own account, as it was not part of a question put to the
judges, and the ones who brought it up usually felt strongly about the sub-
ject.832 All the judges who brought up this topic were appointed on List A
as experts of criminal law and they were all practitioners who had served
as judges or prosecutors in their respective countries. These judges empha-
sized that the courts and tribunals needed more practitioners and deemed
work with practitioners easier than with ‘professors’.833 Two of these
judges criticised the way of evaluation and decision-writing: judges were
writing ‘too much’, 834facts should be dealt with in a ‘less academic man-
ner’835 but in a more practical way (‘help victims, punish perpetrators’836)
as it was not about ‘writing beautiful decisions for academics’837 or writ-
ing ‘for the public’.838 Additionally, a desire to ‘write history’ and ‘lay
down principles’ at the expense of efficiency and goal-oriented action’
was criticized.839 Another List A judge, however, stressed the importance
of keeping up with developments in academic scholarly literature in deci-
sion-making.840 None of the judges appointed through List B did express
any views on the distribution of practitioners and more theory-focused in-
dividuals on the bench.
Developing Country/Industrialized Country
Application of human rights law might also depend also on the geographi-
cal background of the judge. According to Art. 36 (8) (a) (iii) Rome
Statute the Court shall take equitable geographical representation into ac-
3.
4.
832 Interview No 5; Interview No 6; Interview No 13.
833 Interview No 13.
834 Interview No 6.
835 Interview No 5.
836 Interview No 5.
837 Interview No 5.
838 Interview No 6.
839 Interview No 5.
840 Interview No 9.
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count when selection the judges. One European judge argued that human
rights did not play a major role in practical international criminal law, but
since they, as he argued, gained importance in the European legal dis-
course they receive more attention.841
However, the geographical background of the judge might not necessar-
ily play a role in whether or not human rights law is referred to but rather
which system of human rights protection is referenced. Several judges
from the global south stated that international courts and tribunals fre-
quently refer to case law of the ECtHR and underused jurisprudence and
provisions from other regional systems of human rights protection. One
judge argued that in terms of usefulness to international criminal law, the
American system of human rights protection was more advanced than the
European one as the IACtHR and the Commission dealt with massive hu-
man rights violations on a regular basis and therefore, their case law had
more to offer to international criminal law.842 Another judge argued that
due to the fact that all cases before the court dealt with situations in
African countries (at the time of the interview), more reference should be
made to the African system of human rights protection and the use of hu-
man rights jurisprudence and rules should generally be more diversi-
fied.843
Additionally, one judge saw age as another decisive matter in how open
a judge was to extra-statutory sources or input from outside he or her ini-
tial area of expertise.844 This judge saw a generational shift in internation-
al criminal law and argued that older judges from the same generation
generally had a more conservative approach to applying human rights law.
The same judge argued that judges, in their decision-making process, are
influenced by their personal experiences. Examples of these factors which
were mentioned by this judge to be of influence were gender, sexual orien-
tation and disability.845
841 Interview No. 1.
842 Interview No 7.
843 Interview No 8.
844 Interview No. 1.
845 Interview No. 1.
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Concluding Remarks
The answers given by the judges in the interviews conducted were often
characterized by a certain dogmatic vagueness. This vagueness is by no
means surprising given the multitude of diverse education and profession-
al experiences of the judges which lead to different priorities in their work
and differing degrees of attention given to the issue of human rights in in-
ternational criminal law. Furthermore, in an area as vast as international
criminal law which combines a plurality of different fields, it is nearly im-
possible to possess the same degree of expertise on all up and coming is-
sues in academia and practice. For this reason, a bench consisting of sev-
eral individuals whose expertise complements each other is of higher im-
portance than in national criminal law where education is streamlined. On
the other hand, due to the immense freedom that judges possess in the still
emerging discipline of international criminal law, judges are under enor-
mous pressure and their judgements regularly come under critical scrutiny.
Therefore, it is even more important that the presence of international law
experts on the bench is ensured. Currently, there are four Trial Chambers
at the ICC in which only judges appointed from List A (experts in criminal
law and procedure) are serving (even though one has to observe that most
of these Trial Chambers have judges amongst them that do indeed also
possess expertise in human rights law). It is also not evident why the ICC
explicitly states that in its Trial Chambers, criminal law expertise is fo-
cussed on, whereas in the Appeals Chamber, most judges are appointed
from List B (experts in international law).
The judges with an expertise predominantly rooting in criminal law of-
ten pointed to the need for a more practical approach at ICC proceedings
and to the fact that the court was not established to write ‘beautiful deci-
sions’ which are well-reviewed in academic circles.846 Whilst the truth
within this perception is the fact that the ICC and the ad hoc and hybrid
courts, like any other criminal courts, decide on the guilt of individuals for
specific actions, the problem that these new sorts of courts face is that
they, at the same time, have to constantly justify the existence of their area
of law and need to bring their reasoning in line with the principle of legali-
ty. This requires an enormous effort of justification on behalf of the
judges, which might be something that international lawyers, as opposed
Chapter Two:
846 Interview No 5.
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to criminal lawyers coming from national criminal justice systems, are
used to.
Several times, the judges seemed to harbour scepticism towards the
usefulness of human rights for their substantive work, in helping them to
define crimes under international law. Several judges emphazised the im-
portance of human rights law in international criminal procedure while, at
the same time, downplaying its significance in terms of substantive law.
Judges mentioned that according to them, the big problems regarding the
definition of crimes are solved and the ICC will not have to deal with this
issue majorly.847 From a defence perspective, these statements should trig-
ger a substantive amount of skepticism. On the one hand, it should be re-
ceived positively by defence teams that the human rights of the accused in
the pre-trial and trial period seems to have such a prominent role in the
perception of the judges. This is particularly true for the ICC which has a
chance to avoid some of the mistakes the ad hoc tribunals made in this re-
spect, for example concerning the length of the trials. However, when one
looks at the numerous innovations that the Rome Statute brings in compar-
ison to previous statutes, stating that human rights law does not have any
more to contribute to the substantive definition of crimes seems to be inac-
curate. Particularly with regard to ‘treaty crimes’ which have previously
been enshrined in human rights treaties only (such as the crime of
apartheid [crimes against humanity, Art. 7 (1) (j) Rome Statute] or inten-
tional attacks on UN personnel or other personnel or material involved in
an assistance or peacekeeping mission [war crimes, Art. 8 (2) (b) (iii)
Rome Statute], and to a lesser degree, forced disappearance [crimes
against humanity, Art. 7 (1) (i) Rome Statute]) or regarding gender-based
persecution will the ICC have to result sources outside the Rome Statute
itself and will not be able to resort to case law issued by any other interna-
tional criminal court or tribunal. This can lead to serious collisions with
the principle of legality to the detriment of the accused. The very nature of
the ICC as an international court, seen by some purely as a court function-
ing like any other criminal court and portrayed by others as an internation-
al court established to protect victims against mass violations seems to be
disputed amongst judges.. The vagueness and the conflicting ideas por-
trays a spectrum of divergent opinions and dogmatic murkiness that
should be worrisome to the attorneys representing accused persons.
847 Interview No 2; Interview No 6; Interview No 7.
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As such, the approach of the CICC to assess candidates and work to-
wards a comprehensive skill enhancement of judges seems to be the way
forward. Incoherence in jurisprudence and legal norms in international law
stems mostly from increasingly more separate legal regimes with a limited
mandate.848 International criminal courts and tribunals are few in numbers
and with the establishment of a permanent International Criminal Court
the numbers are likely to stagnate or, with the completion of the trials be-
fore the ICTR and the ICTY go down. As such, by ensuring that the
question of how extra-statutory sources, in particular human rights law,
can be used in international criminal law and what he limits of such an ap-
plication are, international criminal law is confronted with the unique op-
portunity to counteract incoherent or conflicting jurisprudence at least to a
certain degree and thereby avoid the level of fragmentation prevalent in
more established fields like the law of the sea, human rights law or world
trade law.849 This is particularly crucial in international criminal law as en-
hanced fragmentation is likely to undermine the defendant’s right to a fair
trial.
848 Oliver Diggelmann and Tilman Altwicker ‘Is There Something Like a Constitu-
tion of International Law? A Critical Analysis of the Debate on World Constitu-
tionalism’ (2008) 68 ZaöRV 623-650, 630.
849 Oliver Diggelmann and Tilman Altwicker ‘Is There Something Like a Constitu-
tion of International Law? A Critical Analysis of the Debate on World Constitu-
tionalism’ (2008) 68 ZaöRV 623-650, 630; see also as referenced by Diggelmann
and Altwicker Gerhard Hafner ‘Pros and Cons Ensuing from Fragmentation of
International Law’ (2004) 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 849-863;
George Abi-Saab ‘Fragmentation or Unification: Some Concluding Remarks’
(1999) 31 NYU Journal of International Law and Politics 919-932.
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Conclusion
The examination pursued in this work was divided into three encompass-
ing parts, which led to results that can be used independently as well as in
conjunction. They map out the relationship between human rights law and
substantive international criminal law in terms of de lege lata and dogmat-
ic conception; the chances, pitfalls and prerequisites for an application of
human rights law in substantive international criminal law; areas which
present themselves as particularly well-suited for said application as well
as taken and missed opportunities in this respect in the current jurisdiction;
and the understanding of human rights law and its use by practitioners of
international criminal law and what shapes this understanding.
Part One examined the reciprocal relation between human rights law
and international criminal law, a subject that despite a multitude of re-
search in both areas is still largely under-researched and not dealt with
conclusively. This part acts as the legal theory basis of the research
project. It outlines the similarities of both areas as law, starting from M.
Cherif Bassiouni’s Five-Stages-theory of the emergence and development
of human rights, the criticism voiced against it as well as its relevance for
a practical application of human rights law. It further follows up on the de-
velopments in jurisprudence and scholarly work since Bassiouni’s model
was published. It is concluded that, as a whole, Bassiouni’s model of the
evolution of human rights leading to a core group of rights whose mass
violation is sanctioned by means of international criminal law, is not nec-
essarily incorrect, but of limited value to practitioners applying substan-
tive international criminal law.
Hence, as a first step, this book delves into explaining the dogmatic
framework of how human rights law emerged and where international law
fits in. This is crucial as a first step in determining how the two areas re-
late, how they evolved and to what degree they overlap or can even be
considered to be congruent. As a next step, it is examined how the two ar-
eas are framed differently from the standpoint of legal policy, the ad-
dressee of the areas as well as the rights and obligations the areas convey
to or demand of the addressee. Structural differences and similarities here
decide to what degree human rights law can legitimately be used in inter-
national criminal law. Surely, both fields of law complement each other
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and their cross-fertilization leads to further developments in both areas.
On the other hand it is shown that international criminal law and human
rights law are in some way exact opposites. Their way of development, the
precision which its terms and instruments are defined, the legal principles
which they have to adhere to, the behaviour (of States or individuals)
which the law seeks to trigger (in terms of rights or obligations), all this
differs to a substantive degree and has to be kept in mind by practitioners
seeking to apply extra-statutory law. Furthermore, structural differences
between the areas of human rights law and international criminal law do,
without doubt, exist and have to be taken into account when recourse to
human rights law is taken in international criminal law. The argument
brought forward that for the sake of universality, no such differences
should be acknowledged, is of particular importance when it comes to the
application of human rights law in procedural international criminal law,
where these differences could easily undermine the rights of the accused.
In substantive international criminal law, however, there is already a dif-
ferent scope of protection due to the limited jurisdiction of international
court and tribunals in cases of widespread mass commission of crimes.
However, while caution is advised against an uncritical application of
human rights law in international criminal law in the judgments of its
courts and tribunals, this study argues that the structural and dogmatic dif-
ferences of both areas are often up for discussion and fewer in number
than sometimes argued by scholars of both fields.
More than conceptional differences, it is a potential violation of nullum
crimen sine lege which can make the application of human rights in sub-
stantive international criminal law a risky exercise.
This work also concludes that there exists confusion as to what are the
valid provisions which allow the ICC to apply human rights in the first
place. Whereas Art. 21 (3) Rome Statute is deemed to be an appropriate
gateway for human rights to be applied before the court in procedural mat-
ters, substantive extra-statutory law, including human rights law, needs to
be applied pursuant to Art. 21 (1) (b) Rome Statute. Reference to human
rights as mere ‘guidance’ or ‘inspiration’, without a conclusive and
methodologically coherent determination of the status of a concept under
customary international law, is deemed problematic as it can violate nul-
lum crimen sine lege.
The last section of Part One delves deeper into the significance and
construction of the principle of nullum crimen sine lege in the area of in-
ternational criminal law. International criminal law in this respect offers a
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unique field of research as it combines criminal law with elements of pub-
lic international law and hence implants an area in which legal certainty is
of utmost importance for any proceeding to be legitimate in an area which
is characterized by gradual evolvement of the ways States‘ behaviour
changes into legal norms. The concept of nullum crimen sine lege has to
be construed conservatively and narrowly in international criminal law so
as to not violate the defendant’s rights. Therefore, judges may only apply
extra-statutory substantive law if it is part of customary international law.
This still gives judges enough flexibility to take into account develop-
ments of the law.
Part Two examines this practical application of extra-statutory human
rights law. It must be emphasised that many of the judgments analysed do
indeed lack a degree of critical examination of whether the part of human
rights law that the chamber seeks to apply is applicable in international
criminal law and is indeed part of customary international law. The depth
of the analysis employed by the respective chambers in this respect varies
greatly and there is no coherent methodology to determine the applicabili-
ty of a certain area of human rights law in the definition of crimes under
international law or said category’s status under customary international
law.
The case-law analysis focuses on aspects in jurisprudence concerning
the prohibition of torture, minority rights law and sexual crimes/gender is-
sues. These three areas of law were chosen because they exhibit differing
degrees of elaboration in human rights law as well as different level of
connections with crimes known to most national legal systems. The prohi-
bition of torture as such is a universally accepted fundamental part of cus-
tomary international law,850 widely recognized as a ius cogens norm851
and prohibited not only in major international conventions but also mir-
rored in many national laws.852 The rights of minorities, while protected in
major international and regional conventions, are frequently misunder-
stood, looked upon with suspicion by many States for reasons rooted in
history or practical policy, which is mirrored by reservations issued to Ar-
850 C Tofan (ed) Torture in International Criminal Law (Wolf The Hague 2011) 1.
851 Machtheld Boot, Rodney Dixon and Christopher K Hall ‘Article 7: Crimes
against Humanity’ in Otto Triffterer Commentary on the Rome Statute of the In-




ticle 27 ICCPR.853 The issue of hate crime, which, to some extent, is an
instrument of minority protection on a national level, is controversial and
not embraced by many national legislators. Finally, the topic of violence
against women has not been addressed in a binding international human
rights instrument so far. The CEDAW Committee took on the issue by
declaring that violence against women falls under its auspice, but its rec-
ommendations are not legally binding and its elaborations on why vio-
lence against women is discrimination are not shared by many countries.
Hence, in the area of sexual violence as a matter of international criminal
law, courts and tribunal have mostly soft law instruments at their disposal,
in an area which is also intertwined with social mores and unfavourable
attitudes. Hence the three areas provide three excellent points of departure
to see under what circumstances human rights law is most often and most
convincingly invoked.
The study finds that the definition and subject-matter or torture under
international human rights law is referred to regularly. Here, courts have
not missed many opportunities where pointing to human rights law would
have strengthened or facilitated their argument. The reasons for this are
manifold. First, the high-profile nature of the prohibition of torture as a ius
cogens norm and in the fact that the prohibition of torture in human rights
is governed by a widely ratified, robust convention make the relevance of
the concept obvious also to experts of criminal law which might not be en-
tirely familiar with the intricacies of public international law. The crime
also has counterparts in many national legislations as a sanctioned prohibi-
tion which makes it further accessible to practitioners of various back-
grounds. Concerning torture, the problem lies in how human rights law is
referenced. There is no coherent method within or across the tribunals to
determine the status of customary law of the subject. This leads, in the
worst case, to an unequal application of the law. In comparison, minority
rights law is less frequently referred to. The concept itself is less clear and
more controversial and many of the crimes that have a relevance to minor-
ity rights, such as persecution, do not or not often find an equivalent in na-
tional law. The issue of minority protection seems somewhat abstract and
foreign to many of those practitioners, which are criminal lawyers and do
853 See the Declarations of France, Turkey Declarations and Reservations of the
States Parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights https://tr
eaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=
4&lang=en (27 July 2015).
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not have academic or practical experience in an area of public internation-
al law that includes human rights. The role of accessibility is most clear in
the case of women’s rights: at first glance, judges in international criminal
cases do relatively often refer to human rights in cases of gender-based vi-
olence. However, such references are often superficial and leave the im-
pression that the judges feel obliged to mention human rights law before
moving on to areas like comparative law in their search for extra-statutory
sources. This is despite the fact that, in particular, the rhetoric of crimes
against humanity and that of women’s rights as enshrined in the CEDAW
are often quite similar. Both, in their subject-matter, deal with systematic,
structural oppression. However, in the case of women’s rights, three prob-
lems come together which aggravate an application: controversy, fragmen-
tation and the nature of the instruments in question. Many controversies
surround gender issues and women’s rights, so that often, judges do not
feel like human rights law in this field can answer to their legal needs or
be of any assistance at all. Additionally, there are many different bodies
and instruments that deal with women’s rights, which makes it difficult the
one main instrument which deals with the subject. Often, gender issues are
formulated in soft law documents in a variety of different forms.
Generally, this study concludes that the best and most appropriate pre-
conditions for an application of human rights in substantive international
criminal law are given when two elements come together: first, an area of
human rights law is governed by a well-established, robust and widely rat-
ified convention. Second, the area of human rights law is mirrored by a
direct or indirect counterpart in national criminal law. ‘Classic’ first gener-
ation rights are generally more accessible then up and coming, yet to be
established concepts. In contrast, crimes which do not have a national
criminal equivalent (like persecution) and concepts which are controver-
sial in nature and governed by soft law (violence against women as dis-
crimination) most problems in terms of reference can be expected.
The analysis of the relevant case law leads to the conclusion that the ju-
risprudence offers a multitude of unrealised opportunities to raise the legal
as well as, in some cases, the political weight of the judgments through
reference to human rights law. This is particularly obvious in the jurispru-
dence on persecution as a crime against humanity regarding the definition
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of persecution854 or the delimitation of the protected groups.855 With a
view to the definition of persecution the definition of persecution if inter-
national refugee law was considered and, due to systematic differences in
the two areas of law, rejected, without even mentioning international mi-
nority rights law, which dogmatically is much closer.856 In the cases in
which human rights law was referred to, there is no systematic approach
identifiable and no dogmatically sound methodology. It is exclusively up
to each chamber if and to what extent they engage in a discussion about
the status of customary international law regarding a specific issue. In the
extreme case, this leads to the paradoxical result that one and the same
crime is punishable according to different requirements in one and the
same forum.857
Part Three dealt with the perception of this problem by the judges. This
part examined the preconditions under which judges deem a reference to
human rights law helpful or compelling and for which sort of crimes such
recourse is appropriate in their opinion.
Connecting to Parts One and Two, Part Three scrutinized how the per-
ception of the interplay between human rights law and international crimi-
nal law, which dominates the discourse amongst practitioners, determines
the extent to which they are ready to seek recourse to human rights law.
The interviews have drawn up a very broad spectrum of partly diametri-
cally opposite views on the relation between human rights law and inter-
national criminal law.
The statements regarding the relation between the two areas of law
move between two extreme, irreconcilable stances on the subject. One
opinion voiced was that human rights law has no place in international
criminal jurisprudence and that international criminal law ‘does not apply
human rights law, this court applies its statute’.858 Another judge set up
854 Eg Prosecutor v Duško Tadić, (Judgment) IT-94-1 (7 Mai 1997) para 654; paras
695-697.
855 Eg Prosecutor v Dragan Nikolić (Review of Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 Deci-
sion of Trial Chamber I) IT-94-2-R61 (20 Oktober 1995) para. 27; Prosecutor v.
Goran Jesilić (Judgment) IT-95-10 (14 Dezember 1999) paras 70-72.
856 Prosecutor v Zoran Kupreškić et. Al (Judgment) IT-95-16 (14 Januar 2000) para
589.
857 Eg Prosecutor v Delalić et al (Judgment) IT-96-21 (16 November 1998) para 473
and Prosecutor v Kunarac (Judgment) IT-96-23 (22 February 2001).
858 Statement made during a presentation about judges as law makers by a former
judge of an international criminal tribunal.
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the equation Human Rights Law + Criminal Law = International Criminal
Law, making human rights law the decisive factor which differentiates na-
tional criminal law from international criminal law and held the view that
definitions enshrined in the international bill of human rights that is the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic,
social and Cultural Rights can be used in her court with no further dog-
matic consideration..859
Several factors related to the professional background of the judges had
an influence on how they viewed the reference of human rights law. Crim-
inal law experts, in theory, had less dogmatic misgivings about using hu-
man rights law in both procedural and substantive international criminal
law, but they were often weary of the potential benefits and advantages of
doing so: Criminal law experts often complained that the ‘international el-
ement’ was given too much weight at the ICC and the ICTY and that deci-
sions should be dealt with in a less academic manner. As a consequence,
experts on criminal law and procedure were less ready to apply human
rights law than their counterparts appointed as criminal law experts and
several of them argued that substantive problems which could ask for the
applications of extra-statutory law have all been solved. This result is not
particularly surprising given that judges appointed on List B (or, with re-
gards to the ICTY, judges with international law expertise) are, in general,
more familiar to public international law including human rights law.
However, there is a considerable number of judges who do have a certain
expertise in both areas and could have been appointed on either list.
Throughout the benches, a certain vagueness as to the relationship be-
tween human rights law and international criminal law and, intertwined
with that, the legal basis of applying human rights law could be observed.
Some judges openly admitted that they only to resort to international hu-
man rights law when it supports their opinion which they have already
previously formed, showing that they do not see the undertaking as a
mandatory part of their work. A lack of in-depth knowledge in human
rights law that could be referred to as well as insecurity as to how far such
recourse can go and what its advantages are common. Regarding minority
rights, a particular reluctance has been observed. Other dividing lines
which were explored concern the legal system in which the judge was ed-
859 Interview No. 7.
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ucated, whether they follow an academic or a more practical approach due
to their prior work experience and their geographic background
The research project mapped out the practical influence of human rights
in the jurisprudence of international court and tribunals and the dogmatic
framework applied in the application. It explored the reasons for the refer-
ence to human rights law as well as the reason for a lack thereof and as
such points to areas of possible synergy between international human
rights and international criminal law.
The importance of ongoing workplace training and skill enhancement
for judges and the necessity for diverse chambers able to fall back on ex-
pertise in criminal law and relevant fields of international law is increas-
ingly promoted. The CICC’s Independent Panel as well as the Advisory
Committee set up by the Assembly of States Parties assess the experience
of candidates through interviews and questionnaires. The CICC, addition-
ally, explores their attitude towards continuous training. Since 2011, the
CICC explicitly asks candidates about their prior experience with the ap-
plication of human rights law. The results of this study show that this in-
creasing understanding of the necessity of a comprehensive training of
judges is vital for the further success of international criminal law. Interna-
tional criminal law as it stands conveys upon judges an enormous freedom
to apply extra-statutory sources. This freedom is mirrored by a huge re-
sponsibility for an emerging field faced with loud and consistent criticism.
This criticism focuses, inter alia, on the selectivity of international crimi-
nal law in terms of situations, cases and charges.
On the other hand, there is probably no other area of international law
which can resort to a group of highly experienced senior experts with such
a vast number of different fields of expertise. As the Rome Statute brings
about numerous legal innovations, there will be plenty of instances in the
future where judges will be forced to consult extra-statutory sources.
One of the biggest challenges, but also, a unique opportunity of the ICC
as the one single permanent handler of international criminal law will be
to benefit from its array of expertise and channel and streamline it into a
more comprehensive and methodological approach in international crimi-
nal law that takes into account relevant fields of international law. What is
necessary to work towards a more coherent and methodologically sound
application of extra-statutory sources? This study has identified three main
elements: First, an understanding of the best preconditions for an applica-
tion of human rights law (robust convention + equivalent in national crim-
inal codes). Second, a balanced composition of chambers is necessary, in-
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cluding members with various backgrounds. Third, a more streamlined ed-
ucation or, at a minimum, continuous training for judges in the areas of
extra-statutory law that might be of relevance. These factors will foster a
correct application of human rights law in substantive international crimi-
nal law in the future and will guarantee that the synergies between the two
areas are not left untapped.
As it stands, international criminal law feels like an unfinished mosaic
in which all the needed parts are present, but have not yet been employed





Questions for ICC/ICTY Judges
1- General Questions:
1.1- Last profession before entering the ICC?
1.2- Education in a common law or in a civil law system?
1.3- Expertise pursuant to article 36 (3) of the Statute?
2- General questions regarding the relationship between international
criminal law and human rights law
2.1- How would you personally describe the general relationship between
international criminal law and human rights law?
2.2- How much would you say human rights law influences the work of the
ICC in general (in procedural and substantive jurisprudence)?
2.3- How much does human rights law influence your specific work in
particular?
2.4- To what extent can the jurisprudence of international human rights
courts and/or treaty bodies influence the work of the ICC?
2.5- To what extent can international human rights courts and/or treaty
bodies benefit from the work of the ICC?
3- Specific areas of human rights law and their influence on international
criminal law
3.1- Which areas of human rights law would you say have had a signifi-
cant influence in the evolution of international criminal law?
3.2- Which areas of human rights law would you say have a significant
impact on the practical work of the ICC today?
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3.3.1- To what extent would you say that international minority rights law
has influenced the development of international criminal law?
3.3.2- Which specific crimes would you say were influenced by the over-
riding concern of minority protection and by substantive minority rights
law and how?
3.3.3- What practical role does international minority rights law play in
the application of international criminal law today?
3.4.1- To what extent would you say women’s rights influenced the devel-
opment of international criminal law?
3.4.2- What practical role do women’s rights and gender issues play in the
practical application of international criminal law today?
3.5.1- To what extent would you say that children’s rights have influenced
the development of international criminal law?
3.5.2- What practical role do children’s rights play in the application of
international criminal law today?
3.6.1- To what extent would you say that the prohibition of torture has in-
fluenced the development of international criminal law?
3.6.2- What practical role does the prohibition of torture play in the appli-
cation of international criminal law today?
3.7- To what extent would you say judges at the ICC are willing to consid-
er international human rights law in their decisions/judgments?
3.8- To what extent would you say that judges at the ICC have the man-
date to consider international human rights law in their decisions/judg-
ments?
4- Question regarding the Rome Statute
4.2- Would you say that the specific mentioning of human rights law in ar-
ticle 21 (3) of the Rome Statute will further the consideration/ application
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